

THE CREATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOLIVIA

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PREFACE

The entire history of Bolivia needs to be rewritten; it is badly done and unexplored by Bolivians and it is completely unknown outside the country. Of all Latin American history probably Bolivia's is the most neglected, since little is available to acquaint those interested with this fascinating country's events of the past. In English practically nothing can be found except some descriptions of Bolivia, and in Spanish the few works are of poor quality with the exception of several items that are so rare that they are unavailable even in the most famous libraries. In the classroom of any course, undergraduate or graduate, dealing with Latin American history, Bolivia is usually skipped or if mentioned, only the interesting but mostly false, anecdotes of Mariano Melgarejo are told because of their humorous note. Bolivia's most important statesman, who was as important to the country as was Rosas to Argentina, Francia to Paraguay, Santa Ana to Mexico, is not even known by Latin American specialists with the exception of a few, not more than a half-dozen. Who has heard of Casimiro Olañeta, the man who practically managed the country from 1823 to 1860, although he was never president? This present study is the first attempt to give in English a section of Bolivian history, the emergence and creation of the republic. But because this is a pioneer work, and although it has been written with care, it undoubtedly will have mistakes and maybe erroneous interpretations. I hope, however, that I have given the initial impulse and that further studies, monographs and dissertations

will be written about Bolivian history. It remains for Bolivian historians who, with the exception of a few, ignore documents and write history from poor secondary sources, to examine thoroughly the primary material and evaluate this study.

Care has been taken to use and consult as many sources as possible. But it must be admitted that for a nearly perfect study of Bolivia in this period one should consult the archives in Buenos Aires and Salta, in Lima and in Spain, besides the Bolivian repositories. Because of financial reasons this was naturally impossible, and a choice had to be made. I decided that probably Bolivia would be the best and most appropriate place to write this work and I feel that I made the right selection. I am confident that this study with its new information is the best proof of this. Therefore this is a study based mostly on Bolivian sources, and it is hoped that this is a welcome contribution since Bolivian books are virtually unknown. In⁽deed during my fourteen month stay in the National Library at Sucre, I was usually the only researcher in the cold and gray, century-old rooms of the Library. I felt only too happy to be joined for several days by Dr. Lewis Hanke from the University of Texas and then by Ruben Vargas Urgarte, the tireless scholar from Lima. But during all the many other days and months no one ever stepped into the Library or Archives to do research.

It should be said that no perfect study of the creation of Bolivia will ever be possible. The great Bolivian writer, René-Moreno, intended to write such a study as one of his many proposed projects. Diligently he started to collect in his great and invaluable library in Santiago, Chile, all documents and printed sources for such a study. Then in 1881, while he was in Europe, his library with its rare and irreplaceable documents

stored in boxes went up in flames. The three cases that contained the material for the creation of Bolivia and the administration of General Sucre were completely destroyed by the fire. Their contents, since René-Moreno had not yet started his index, remain unknown. In the flames perished the whole correspondence of Marshal Sucre while he was in Bolivia from 1825 to 1828, which René-Moreno had acquired. For some unknown reason the Sucre letters of 1825 were not in the boxes as was thought but were located in 1953 among the René-Moreno papers and in other unexpected places, partly by the director of the National Library and partly by this author. Yet a diligent search for the letters of the subsequent years has proved fruitless and therefore it must be assumed that they were destroyed in the fire. This disaster banished forever a complete study of the early days of Bolivia, yet René-Moreno was later able to replace some of the lost material, and the fire did not burn everything. I was convinced that the history of the creation of Bolivia could be written even in the face of the loss of these three valuable boxes, with what was saved and what René-Moreno had not known or yet collected. I believe my faith and efforts have proven to be correct in view of the overwhelming amount of source material that I had at my disposal. Naturally my constant curiosity about what was in these boxes will never be answered and will hang as a great question mark over this study.

I have tried to use only documents and worthwhile secondary material as evidence and to write history with an unprejudiced eye. My seven years in Bolivia during my two stays have given me the opportunity to know the country as few foreigners have. And the events portrayed in this study all took place and moved in familiar places. I like and love Bolivia and

I am also well aware of its shortcomings and problems. But I have intended to write this work not as an American, not as a Bolivian, but as a historian to whom only the documents, the good primary and the pertinent secondary sources count. I am sure that this study will produce some severe criticism from the chauvinistic Bolivian writers, but I also know that there are today a small number of excellent scholars and historians who are determined to write the history of their country as it really happened and to expose the oligarchic rule of the criollos who did nothing for the welfare of the impoverished masses, but only perpetuated their feudalistic rule. These men inspired this work and were a constant guide and aid to this author. This group of honest historians of liberal ideas all take as their model a man who was anything but liberal, and in his political outlook was a racist. Yet he was an excellent and honest historian and writer, a superb stylist, and an unsurpassable bibliographer; he was fearless in his words which earned him the hatred of his contemporaries. This Bolivian was the only one who wrote sound history in the past and his only criteria were the words of the document; he was untiring in the search for truth, and when he believed he had located it he wrote it down even if it went against his personal beliefs and convictions. This was Gabriel René-Moreno, whose books are excellent studies but which are now rare and almost forgotten. Unquestionably René-Moreno belongs among the great historians of Latin America, ranking with José Toribio Medina, Bartolomé Mitre, Diego Barros Arana and the other few great ones. This study is written in memory of René-Moreno without whose collection, most of which is today in the National Library of Bolivia, it would have never been possible. Bolivia, as one

Chilean friend has told me, still owes René-Moreno a great debt and apology. She has mistreated and ignored him, and the best way for her to make up for this would be to re-edit his many volumes, and finance publication of his unpublished essays.

To no one do I owe more thanks, for his stimulating aid, constant interest, his great willingness and his unsurpassed enthusiasm in my research than to Dr. Gunnar Mendoza. He has spent innumerable hours in his office, or over coffee, beer, wine, tea, or when our ulcers reacted, over milk, discussing the many phases of Bolivian history. Indeed in Dr. Mendoza the republic of Bolivia has a first-class, young and energetic director of its National Library and Archive. Dr. Mendoza has in his suggestions and conversation given me much food for thought. He provided me with a great deal of material with which I was unacquainted. His thorough knowledge of every single detail and manuscript of the Archive and Library proved to be the best bibliographic guide. He is a brilliant writer and an impartial and careful historian whose monographs are examples of solid, scholarly work. I could not think of anyone else better to whom to dedicate this work than this good friend.

I must give a word of thanks to the staff of the National Library and Archive, who for fourteen months had to tolerate me and who accepted me as one of them. At all times they gave me the most splendid service, and their interest in my progress was one of the nicest and most sincere expressions of friendship that was shown to me. To Concepción Salanova, Amado Vargas, Rebeca Salazar, Nelly Huerta, Octavio Garnica, Mario Osinaga and Margarita Reyes Elías go my most sincere thanks. A special word of

thanks goes to Mrs. Reyes in the archival section, who has diligently checked, word for word, my handwritten copies in order to discover errors. As no electricity was available in the Archive, and Chuquisaca had a very unpredictable current, microfilming and photostating were impossible, and everything had to be transcribed by hand. Mrs. Reyes copied over 1,500 letters for me without any errors. Once I left Chuquisaca she helped me check items about which I was doubtful. Her great ability to read any script and her most beautiful handwriting were to me a great and unexpected gift.

There are many more people in Chuquisaca who graciously have given me all kinds of help and whose friendship was a valuable asset and remains an enjoyable memory. The distinguished president of the Sociedad Geográfica de Sucre, Don Jorge Urioste, put at my disposal the rich collection of the Society and spent many hours helping me in searching the unorganized material. His invitation to join this exclusive society of great Bolivian scholars was indeed an unexpected honor for me. To the authorities of the University of San Francisco Xavier, including its acting rector, Dr. Armando Solares, the new rector, Dr. Enrique Vargas Sivila, the librarian, Mr. Hugo Poppe, and the executive secretary, Dr. Jose Ipiña, goes a most sincere thanks. To Drs. Roberto Alvarado, Miguel Bonifaz, Hugo Sandoval, Manuel Durán, Rafael García Rosquellas, Gustavo Medeiros, Carlos Gerke, Leonardo Branisa, Oscar Frerking Salas, Joaquín Gantier, Felipe Costas Argüedas and Enrique Llobet, all professors at the University, a special word of gratitude for their many hours of enlightened and scholarly conversation and discussions,

uninterrupted by the constant looking at watches in order to rush away and avoid controversial topics as may happen on American campuses. As for my other friends in Chuquisaca, unconnected with the academic world and in all sections of society, I can only say that we remember them vividly, since they made our stay in this beautiful city a most enjoyable one.

I have already said that I owe to Gabriel René-Moreno and Gunnar Mendoza more than to anyone else. I must add a third person whose influence was as important as these other two. He is the dynamic historian from La Paz, Dr. Humberto Vázquez-Machicado, who has written so many articles and monographs besides several books that he does not remember what he has written, and who wonders when he sees his name in a footnote if he really is the author of the cited study. Dr. Vázquez-Machicado has provided me with many of the copies of documents and guides in his library. He has not hesitated to criticize many of my conclusions. His great generosity in providing me with primary material which took him years to collect and his great intellectual honesty were more than welcome. Other Bolivian scholars such as Marcos Beltrán Avila in Oruro, Humberto Guzmán, Augusto Guzmán, José Antonio Arze and Macedonio Urquidí in Cochabamba, the late Enrique Finot in Santa Cruz, and Armando Alba, Domingo Flores and Subieta Sagarnaga in Potosí gave at several times valuable aid and suggestions. A particular word of estimation goes to my friends in Potosí who welcomed me so cordially in this fascinating Silver City. The grandson of Marshal Andrés Santa Cruz, who is known by the same name, is a most generous and pleasant gentleman. In his house in La Paz is located the valuable archive of his illustrious forefather. This is one of the richest private reser-

voirs in Latin America, and his willingness to let me do research in this depository made me extremely happy. A cordial welcome by Andrés Santa Cruz will be given to all interested scholars. To him many thanks.

A word or two has to be said about the attentive and interested attitude of the Bolivian government, especially the governing M. N. R. party which did not hesitate to facilitate journeys across Bolivia. Especially I wish to express my thanks to Don Víctor Paz Estenssoro, President of Bolivia (1952 -), for his kindness and his sincere interest in this historical project. To some of his associates, many of whom I had known during my first residence in Bolivia, also I owe thanks. Without their aid and cooperation I could have hardly moved with swiftness and security through the country in this period of great social upheavals. To Mr. Crawford Brooks and Mr. Fred Dickens of the United States Information Service in La Paz I am extremely grateful for having shipped my three hundred books on Bolivia to me. Indeed both gentlemen had a difficult time in getting the necessary permission from Washington, and finally shipped the books nearly around the world in an army plane. It was a great odyssey but they were finally able to triumph over governmental bureaucracy. Without these books this study could not have been completed, as most of them are unavailable in the United States.

Naturally this journey to Bolivia could not have been undertaken without definite financial support. In 1953 I was so fortunate as to be chosen a Doherty Fellow by the Doherty Foundation. The awarding committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Dana Munro from Princeton University, and composed of Dr. Clarence Haring of Harvard University, Dr. Arthur P. Whitaker

of the University of Pennsylvania and Dr. Frank Tannenbaum of Columbia University, in selecting candidates put faith in the selectees' doing an honest and worthwhile piece of research. I hope that with this work and the intended subsequent publication of expanded and revised edition of it, I have fulfilled satisfactorily their expectations. To Mrs. Helen Wesley, benefactor of the Doherty Foundation, and to the selection committee my most sincere gratitude and thanks. This would be an incomplete acknowledgment if I did not express my appreciation to Dr. Irving Leonard of the University of Michigan, whose student I was as a master's candidate. At his suggestion I applied to the Doherty Foundation, and much of my knowledge of Latin American history and research I learned from him. To Dr. Lewis Hanke, the energetic and great Latin American historian from the University of Texas, go a few words of thanks for his interest and preoccupation with my topic. While we were colleagues in the National Archive in Chuquisaca I learned and profited greatly by my association with him. Because of his recent interest in Potosí I can only say that I do not know of anyone else with whom I would like more to share an interest in the history of Upper Peru.

A doctoral dissertation cannot be completed without the approval and guidance of the candidate's committee, especially the chairman. My chairman was more of a helpful friend than a stern, cold and pedantic professor. His criticisms were sound and constructive; his many corrections of style were more than welcome to someone to whom English is not native. To Dr. Donald Worcester a very special word of thanks. I will always remember him as a man with a most cheerful and wonderful personality and a

personal preoccupation with the well-being of his candidates. To the other members of the committee, Drs. R. W. Patrick, Raymond Crist, Lyle MacAlister, George Osborn, E. Ashby Hammond and Arthur W. Thompson many thanks for accepting this dissertation and therefore permitting one more historian to join the profession. Drs. MacAlister, Crist, Curtis Wilgus and T. Lynn Smith I shall remember as excellent Latin Americanists who have given me new knowledge in this field. A sincere word of thanks to the University of Florida, especially to Deans Ralph E. Page, C. Francis Byers, and Linton E. Grinter and to Dr. Patrick for awarding me fellowships upon my return from Bolivia in order to pursue and terminate my graduate studies.

It is customary to leave the one person who has done the most until the end of the list of acknowledgements. Without her this study would never have been possible or completed. It is no exaggeration to say that my wife, Marjorie, has worked as hard or even harder on this study than I. She checked it word for word, since my English sometimes becomes a strange juxtaposition of Germanic construction and Spanish complexity and vocabulary, and my spelling is atrocious. She typed the work in the second draft and she was the most severe critic pointing out many deficiencies. Besides she accompanied me into the interior of Bolivia, managing a house and family with no conveniences, where many other Americans refuse to live. She even learned to copy old Spanish script. And in order to create good will she worked with no pay as a medical technologist at the University of San Francisco Xavier. In Sucre without the convenience of a modern hospital our second son, Carlos Anthony, was born. Much of my success in

Bolivia was due to her. To my wife I owe much more than to anyone else. She is as much the author of this work as I.

Many people have aided me in this project and I only hope that their confidence has not been in vain. Naturally I alone am responsible for what is said in this work and any errors are solely mine. I hope that the emergence of Bolivia will be the first in a series of works in English in Bolivian history, a history that is fascinating, unknown, ignored and distorted.

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CHAPTER I

BIBLIOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS OF BOLIVIAN INDEPENDENCE

Synopsis

The War of Independence in Upper Peru, also known as Charcas, had its beginning on May 25, 1809, when the Oidores of the Audiencia of Charcas in Chuquisaca came out in support of Ferdinand VII. The President of Charcas and the Archbishop favored the Council in Seville and Carlota of Portugal. The subversive elements, professors and students at the university in Chuquisaca, who had played with the idea of emancipation, joined the pro-Ferdinand movement. Influenced by these doctores of Chuquisaca, known as the generation of 1809, La Paz also raised the standard of rebellion on July 16. There the generation of 1809 came into the open and requested a complete "new order." When the war started in 1809 the Audiencia of Charcas had been, since 1789, an integral part of the Viceroyalty of Peru. But when the rebellion in La Paz occurred in July, 1809, the Viceroy of Peru sent his troops to suppress the revolution. Nine leaders were hanged. On May 25, 1810, Buenos Aires followed the lead of Chuquisaca and La Paz. Cochabamba, in September of the same year, recognized the new order of Buenos Aires, and they improvised a militia to oppose the Spanish army directed from Lima. Oruro followed Cochabamba. In 1810 the Loyalist authorities in Upper Peru, in view of the defection of Buenos Aires, annexed the Audiencia of Charcas to the Viceroyalty of Peru again. However, the Patriots still recognized the autonomous Buenos Aires authorities. In the

same year of 1810 the first battles between the improvised militias and the Spanish army took place. But the Patriots and the unprepared armies could not hold their own without aid from Buenos Aires. From Argentina four expeditionary forces were sent to the upper provinces (Charcas) to liberate that region, the birthplace of the War of Independence. All of them were defeated. The improvised militias of Charcas soon operated as guerrilla forces. By 1817 the Loyalist army had defeated all auxiliary expeditions and had dealt a serious blow to the guerrilla units. In this year practically complete Spanish rule over Charcas was reestablished. Only isolated guerrilla units kept the war alive. In 1821 Lower Peru, the very heart of the Viceroyalty of Peru, became a theater of war. Lima was liberated and Peru declared its independence, but Charcas remained in Spanish hands. No new auxiliary expedition was sent from Argentina. These provinces were submerged in anarchy. Now a fifth expedition was sent into Charcas from Lima. It also ended in failure. It was the sixth auxiliary expedition under General Sucre that broke the Spanish rule in Upper Peru in 1825. The war terminated in the month of April of 1825.

Antonio José de Sucre, on April 9, was a very happy man. On that particular day he and his staff were in the world's highest city, the city that had been Spain's fountain of wealth. Sucre, Bolívar's beloved lieutenant, was in Potosí. Indeed, the sole fact that lofty Potosí had fallen into the hands of the liberating Bolivarian army a few days earlier would have been enough reason for joy, as the imperial city had been Spain's prime fortress in Upper Peru.¹ But on that day of April 9, Sucre had just received a dispatch from the front that the last remaining Spanish colonel, known and feared as Barbarucho,² which in English means The Barbarous, had surrendered in the tiny village of Chequelte two days earlier.³ No other Spanish enemy remained. In haste, Sucre, as commander of the liberating army, issued a circular letter to all commanding authorities saying that he had the great pleasure to be able to tell them about the "absolute and final end of the war."⁴ The war had ended in the Perus.

Upper Peru, known also as Charcas, the inner provinces, or the upper provinces, was an isolated country. High mountains and a great desert separated the center of Upper Peru from the blue waters of the Pacific, and jungles made her communication with the rivers that flowed into the Atlantic difficult. The entrance into or exit from Charcas was either by bad roads from Argentina via Salta to Potosí, or from Cusco to La Paz. It was always a north and south movement, rather than an east and west. It was then, as it is now, a great diversified region with extensive highlands where the center of the population lived and even larger lowlands that were practically uninhabited. Two majestic and steep mountain ranges, the cordilleras of

the east and of the west enclosed like powerful pincers the highlands where the Upper Peruvians lived and where the air was thin and the winds were ice cold. The eastern lowlands were extensive but were removed from effective administrative control and were unintegrated with the populous highlands. Between the highlands and the eastern plains and jungles were the transitory lands that were beautiful valleys known in Charcas as the montaña. Most of the cities lay in the highlands or in the montaña. Potosí was Upper Peru's most important town because of its great flow of silver and it was situated in the middle of a cordillera. Chuquisaca was the capital of Charcas, near Potosí but also near the beginning of the montaña. Oruro, another mining center, stood defying the elements of nature in the middle of the high plateau known as the Altiplano. La Paz too was on the Altiplano but rather protected in a narrow canyon at the foot of the snow covered mountains of the cordillera. Cochabamba lay in a most gorgeous valley where montaña and highlands met, as did Tarija although it was farther east and therefore farther inside the green montaña, at the foot of a delightful river. Only one city of importance was in the plains of the lowlands, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and it was situated where the montaña ended and the plains began. Charcas was a land isolated from the rest of the continent and internally divided by the great elements of nature.

Fifteen years, ten months and fourteen days the struggle had lasted in the lands of Charcas. It had begun on that memorable day, May 25, 1809, when the subtle, speculative and quite subversive doctores of cultural Chuquisaca⁵ had taken advantage of a quarrel among the Spanish authorities, caused

by various allegiances to the different authorities in Spain.⁶ Publicly they came out for Ferdinand VII but their real feelings were very, very radical, since they wished to "raise the standard of rebellion in these unhappy colonies" which they said were acquired without "any just title and conserved through injustice and tyranny."⁷ Their protest of Ferdinand's captivity was only a pretext, but it gave them an ideal excuse for rebellion. To their fellow partisans in other places in Upper Peru they wrote to imitate them and "take advantage of the circumstances in which we are."⁸ Here then the War of Independence had begun on May 25, 1809, in Chuquisaca, also known as La Plata, and it came to a glorious end fifteen long years later in the hamlet of Chequelte.⁹ Indeed it had been a long struggle. On Upper Peruvian soil the War of Independence had started¹⁰ and on Upper Peruvian soil the war had ended. In no other region had the fighting lasted so long. Yet there had been little warfare on a great scale. No such famous engagements as Boyacá, Pichincha and others. It is hardly possible to speak of great armies and grandiose tactics.¹¹

The warfare was limited to two kinds of movements: the various expeditionary forces that were sent from Argentina to defeat the Spanish authorities in Upper Peru, and the guerrilla fighting, sometimes referred to as a war of factions,¹² and which Mitre has immortalized as the war of republiquetas.¹³ The latter was a very distinctive and peculiar type of fighting, quite heroic and colorful. It was intermittent, sporadic and done by small bands. Most all of the territory of Charcas was divided into multiple republiquetas; maybe a mountain, maybe a valley, maybe a village, each one guided by the enthusiasm, will, sacrifice, perhaps arbitrary behavior,

and zest of one leader.¹⁴ There was no preconceived plan, no overall strategy, no general headquarters, no uniform. Each leader undertook what he wished to do and what he thought best for himself and his band. Many times instead of fighting the enemy, they fought another band, or among themselves. Yet these guerrillas kept the War of Independence alive for fifteen years, harrassing the Spaniards and wresting from them any sense of security.

To write the complete history of this guerrilla war in Charcas would be a nearly impossible task. Almost all of the ^{leaders} ~~they~~ left no records, and indeed, how many of them could write? Only a dozen or so achieved their deserved stature in the annals of history. Don Ildefonso Muñecas, a parish priest, operated around the legendary Lake Titicaca.¹⁵ In the very green and fruitful valley of Cochabamba Don Esteban Arze became a tireless fighter.¹⁶ In the vineyard region of Cinti, Don Vicente Camargo, with much Indian blood, was not only a fearless fighter, but also a brilliant orator.¹⁷ In the plains of Santa Cruz de la Sierra Colonel Ignacio Warnes, of Flemish blood, made the Spaniards tremble.¹⁸ In the steep mountain region of Ayopaya, José Manuel Lanza acted with extreme shrewdness.¹⁹ And between the rivers Pilcomayo and Río Grande, Don Manuel Asencio Padilla, dean of the guerrilla leaders, and his fighting lady, Doña Juana Azurduy de Padilla, greatest folk heroine of Charcas and of today's Bolivia, brought factional fighting to a high pitch.²⁰ Perhaps a dozen more are vaguely known and have become part of history and folk legend. The Bolivian historian, Manuel José Cortés, states that there were more than one hundred,²¹ and probably he simply guesses. The sole chronicler of this war of fifteen years, Manuel María Urcullu, cate-

gorically refers to 102 guerrilla leaders.²² The Bolivian writer, Octavio Moscoso, accounts for around 150, but he includes such names as Bolívar and Belgrano.²³ About many he has scarcely one line of information, sometimes solely the last name, all other data being unknown.²⁴ Many more existed and fought bravely as partisan leaders but they have faded into the unrecorded past and are beyond the grasp of history.²⁵ Yet some painstaking research might reveal more names and data. In the Bolivian Archives there is an interesting document about a temerarious leader, Francisco Monroy, who harassed the Royalists around Oruro.²⁶ And who has read about Manuel and Juan Pacheco who assaulted a convoy of patriotic prisoners, condemned to work in the Potosí mines, and then invaded and liberated many villages? Both were captured by the Spaniards, Manuel was sentenced to hang and Juan to hard labor in the mines of Potosí.²⁷ Michilini, Ferreyra, Serna, Franciscota, San Martín and Dupui are most obscure or completely unknown partisan fighters who seem to have operated in the neighborhood of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.²⁸ And what about Ygnacio Fuentes, Manuel Palacio and Ventura Aranibar, about whom a Royalist document speaks, representing them as guerrilla fighters finally captured in 1817.²⁹ Many Indian caciques became partisan fighters. Manuel Ayaviri of Sacaca and Antonio Condori of Tiahuanacu terrorized the Spaniards until captured.³⁰

Truly it was a very interesting and fearful war that raged for many years in the wilds of Charcas. The partisan forces kept the war alive after each defeat of the expeditionary armies, or as one early nineteenth-century newspaper editor expressed it, "They refilled the emptiness which the regular [defeated] army had left."³¹ The Patriots accused the Loyalists of extreme

cruelty in fighting the partisan armies. Suspicious villages were indiscriminately burned, innocent farmers assassinated, and those suspected of partisan feelings were apprehended with the purpose of cutting off part of one ear in order to identify them before the public.³² It is reasonable to believe that because of boiling emotions exaggerated accounts were published, as in any other war in any age. For example, when in 1812, the great guerrilla leader, Miguel Lanza, was captured and indicted before the criminal chamber of the Audiencia, he was not sentenced to be hanged as one would expect, but was given a ten year prison term. At the same time Lanza's lawyer's license was revoked for six months because of "his ignorance and partiality," at least so says the record.³³ Lanza escaped after entering prison.³⁴

Yet the fight was indeed ruthless and bloody. In the skirmish of El Villar on September 14, 1816, between the great partisan, Asencio Padilla, and the Loyalist commander, Aguilera, Padilla was defeated and captured along with a female partisan soldier of his unit. He was gravely wounded and Aguilera killed him with his own hands, but not before the cruel Spanish commander had requested his accompanying priest to absolve Padilla.³⁵ The female soldier was mistaken for Padilla's fighting wife and was beheaded on the battle field. The head of Padilla's corpse was cut off and both heads were taken to the next village, La Laguna, where they were displayed on poles in the town's square as a reminder and warning.³⁶

Colonel Aguilera, who distinguished himself by being a restless fighter and whose maxim was to never give rest to his enemies,³⁷ was commissioned to exterminate the guerrilla Warnes, and to destroy his successful republicaneta

in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Warnes was a thorn in the side of the Spanish authorities. Aguilera swiftly reorganized his army, somewhat weakened by the skirmish of El Villar. Soon he was able to muster over one thousand crack troops, including the fearful Talavera battalion, which the Patriots feared and said was composed of Spanish criminals straight out of jail and the galleys.³⁸ He advanced carefully toward Santa Cruz. Warnes, taken by surprise, evacuated Santa Cruz, hastily organized his army, and on November 21, 1816,³⁹ on the outskirts of town in a spot known as El Pari⁴⁰ both contingents of more or less identical strength clashed in the largest battle between a partisan and a Loyalist army. The native guerrillas were well and colorfully dressed. The infantry had white shirts, open collars, and white pants with bright red stripes. All uniforms were hand woven and of cotton. A fancy leather helmet completed their vestments. The cavalry had all leather clothes which gave them a fascinating look. Leader Warnes was distinguished by his deep mulberry-colored jacket with clean white fringe. He wore a native made straw hat with many colorful feathers. High leather boots gave him a very martial look, and a long saber hung from his belt. At eleven o'clock in the morning of this fateful day both armies clashed with terrific impact, and for six hours the battle raged with close hand to hand fighting. The Patriots put on a good show and Aguilera's army was making no headway. Then suddenly a cannon ball killed Warnes' splendid horse. When the animal collapsed it buried its gallant rider under its heavy dead weight. A Loyalist soldier, seeing the enemy leader in a defenseless situation, rushed toward him and quickly ran his bayonet through Warnes. Another Spanish soldier finished the mortally wounded Latin-Flemish partisan leader with a pistol shot in the head. The death of the leader

turned the tide of the battle and the seemingly victorious Patriots became discouraged and demoralized. They took to flight from the battlefield, dispersing into the province. Aguilera, with his decimated army, entered the city of Santa Cruz triumphantly. The victor's army carried with it the severed head of Warnes.⁴¹ It had the same fate as Padilla's, only being exhibited in a more populous city. Aguilera had destroyed a most successful republiqueta, and in a short time had defeated two fearless partisans. The chronicler Urcullu states that Aguilera then commenced a reign of terror and that nearly one thousand persons fell before the firing squad of his Spanish army.⁴²

It looked as if most of the partisan fighters were destined for a similar fate, pathetically put into verse by an Indian guerrilla on the very brink of his death in battle. His simple, clear and plaintive Quechua poetry has passed into folk literature. It was only hours before his death that Juan Huallparrimachi, "the sweet Quechua poet,"⁴³ sang among other of his beautiful verses:

I am seeking death.
Our enemies,
They shall come
From their quarters.⁴⁴

But cruelty was not the monopoly of the Spanish forces; the partisans, too, often showed their disdain for the enemy, and the poor Loyalist who fell into their hands! Guerrilla Curito Rojas was known and feared as fighting with "barbarous atrocity."⁴⁵ He opened the breasts of his enemies and sucked their blood. Yes, excesses occurred on both sides. Since the partisans were irregular fighters, made up of rough and tough elements, the

majority fighting for the joy of adventure rather than an ideology, it may be assumed that they had all the makings of an inconsiderate band, and that is putting it mildly. The atrocities of the Spanish army are described by the Patriotic historians, yet the excesses of the guerrillas are little known mostly because of a lack of records and also because of too many biased historians.⁴⁶

The preceding pages are not intended to picture the history of the war of emancipation in Charcas, or Upper Peru. It is rather an introduction with the specific purpose of conveying some fundamental concepts. It must be said that we do not possess a final volume on this fascinating theater of war. It would be a long task of research and would, first of all, require the location of most primary sources. Spanish and Patriotic records must be examined. Peruvian, Argentine and Spanish archives should be consulted, and private collections must be found and worked over. The Bolivian Archives, located in Sucre, ancient capital of Charcas and the very center of the theater of the war, a most splendid archive,⁴⁷ possess only a few documents dealing with the actual struggle.⁴⁸ It has already been said that the guerrillas did not keep records. The Spanish army correspondence went mostly to the seat of the viceroyalty, Lima. The various expeditionary forces that came up from Argentina did not leave their records in Charcas. The Argentine archives have them.⁴⁹ But we know very little about the Loyalist army records. In 1953 the director of the Bolivian National Library⁵⁰ found, by sheer accident, among the discarded correspondence file of the Library, a typewritten catalog entitled "Catalog of the Corbacho Library." It appeared that the owner wished to sell to the Bolivian government the

documents described in the catalog. Seven thousand documents are listed, which the catalog says amount to 30,960 folios. A tremendous number deal with the War of Independence. Number 685 alone reads:

Documents belonging to the archives of the army of Upper Peru under the command of the Generals Goyoneche [sic], Pezuela, Ramirez, La Serna, Tristán, etc. It contains review lists of all units, service records, pay orders, [list of] weapons, equipments, uniforms, etc. Bills of expenditure and many other items which, due to their large number, are impossible to catalog in detail and which amount in total to 5,258 documents between the years 1809 and 1822. There are 11,155 folios.⁵¹

There are many more documents cited in the catalog that have to do with the war of emancipation in Charcas.⁵² Really here we would have the much needed archives of the Loyalist army. This might be the best single source for this struggle, but what has happened to the documents? The director and this author do not know. Corbacho most probably had them with him. We located in the catalog an old La Paz hotel bill of a hotel unknown today.⁵³ It is stated there that Mr. Corbacho had with him in his room four large boxes containing forty-eight packages. The catalog is dated March 20, 1919. It seems that Corbacho was in La Paz in this year, with his boxes. This is the last we know. If a serious history about the War of Independence in Bolivia should be written, it would be imperative to do some detective work and find out what has happened to this Corbacho collection.⁵⁴ Besides, a survey in the Spanish, Peruvian and Argentine archives would be necessary. The task is a tremendous one and it might turn out to be a life-time job for a dedicated scholar. It is to be hoped that some day a scholar, preferably a Bolivian, will undertake this enterprise and

thereby lay a better basis for Bolivian history.

Certainly Bolivian historians have written about their heroic war. Manuel María Urcullu is today accepted Bolivian chronicler of the war.⁵⁵ He was contemporary with the period and was a distinguished citizen of Chuquisaca of mixed alignment: a Loyalist when the Spaniards won, a Patriot when the cause of independence seemed victorious. Urcullu knew the ins and outs of his period, and was closely associated as administrative officer of both armies.⁵⁶ But his work is inaccurate and biased. The sharp pen of René-Moreno has severely criticized this work, which he considers a bad juxtaposition of unrelated events.⁵⁷ Another witness of those days, a member of the Audiencia who lived into the independence period, was Manuel Sánchez Velasco, who wrote a history of Bolivia from 1808 to 1848.⁵⁸ It is mediocre, very superficial and of little value. Muñoz Cabrera, a man of letters,⁵⁹ had done somewhat better in history of the war of fifteen years.⁶⁰ The work is superior to those of Urcullu and Sánchez Velasco, and it contains many interesting and important documents. Yet Muñoz Cabrera was primarily a journalist, and given to easy writing and fast interpretations.⁶¹ He lacked the seriousness and patience required of a good historian. Miguel de los Santos Taborga was a high Catholic prelate of distinction in Chuquisaca⁶² with a flair for history, and from his pen came two fairly interesting works⁶³ which should not be ignored.⁶⁴ Among early twentieth-century historians, General Miguel Ramallo,⁶⁵ an amateur historian, has three solid books on the war.⁶⁶ None of them are monumental and excellent history according to modern standards of research, but Ramallo deserves applause for his having stimulated interest in this period of

history. What he has produced is good and deserves to be consulted. The best overall work for rapid reference and consultation remains Luis Paz' history of Upper Peru.⁶⁷ Ramallo classifies it as a "notable work,"⁶⁸ which is giving too much credit. Paz did not use primary sources, but took almost everything from the standard authors such as Urcullu, and Torrente and Camba, the two Spanish⁶⁹ army chroniclers of the war.⁷⁰ These last two authors remain the best source from the Loyalist side. Unquestionably their books⁷¹ constitute valuable works which are absolutely necessary for a study of this period. Torrente's work is more extensive, and is based on army records.⁷² It is a rare book today. René-Moreno, who seldom praised books, considered this one a "clear exposition; generally exact."⁷³ Camba's work is also important because he fought for the Spaniards in the Peruvian theater. Blanco-Fombona rightly thinks this book should be consulted by the new generation of historians, as the old ones have done.⁷⁴ Both authors are biased and they tell the history from the Spanish point of view. Both rationalize the final defeat of their country's armies. Another splendid work by a Spaniard is the valuable, and very little known, volumes published by the Count of Torata, son of the energetic, and possibly best, Spanish general in the South American battlefields, Gerónimo Valdés.⁷⁵ They contain a nearly complete documentation of that interesting last phase of the war in Upper Peru known as the Separatist War, with which the reader will become well acquainted in a later chapter. The Bolivian historian, Beltrán Avila, justifiably considers them absolutely necessary in studying the emancipation of Upper Peru.⁷⁶

Argentine and Peruvian works are of great importance, and anyone interest in pursuing a thorough study of the war in Upper Peru must make an exhaustive search for items published in those countries, whose hegemony over Upper Peru was practically equal in this period. The Loyalist line of command led to Lima, and the Patriots gravitated toward Buenos Aires. Mitre's history of Belgrano is a well known classic and, as said above, his chapter on the republiquetas is the great study of this irregular warfare. The four volumes of Argentine government publications of documents relating to the War of Independence in Argentina constitute an indispensable source, since they include Upper Peruvian material.⁷⁷ Of the publications that emanated from Peru, Manuel de Odriózola's ten volumes of documents of Peruvian history⁷⁸ have many items pertinent to the fight in Charcas. The organization of the work is poor⁷⁹ and the lack of indication from where the documents came is reproachable.⁸⁰ Paz Soldán's history of the independence of Peru contains interesting documents that are essential for research on the Bolivian emancipation.⁸¹

Several outstanding memoirs of participants in the struggle for independence are of interest and value, and are an excellent source. General William Miller⁸² recounts his colorful experiences with the Bolivarian army in a serious but simple vein.⁸³ His Irish friend, the unforgettable and honest Burdett O'Connor,⁸⁴ also wrote some memoirs later published by his grandson, the Bolivian writer, Tomás O'Connor D'Arlach.⁸⁵ These remembrances of the Irish general,⁸⁶ who settled down in beautiful Tarija, are excellent for their sincerity, extreme simplicity, unsophisticated philosophy of life and healthy humor. In its own way it is a magnificent

work. Memoirs⁸⁷ that are beyond doubt of superior quality were written by the Argentine general, Jose María Paz.⁸⁸ The severe René-Moreno, whose pen was mostly acid, wrote that he "always believed that this work and the Facundo of Sarmiento are the most notable productions of Argentine literature."⁸⁹ It is a piece of superior writing and of remarkable moderation. The memoirs of Gregorio Aráoz de la Madrid⁹⁰ and of General Rondeau⁹¹ are of importance, be it or not for their honorable or dishonorable conduct as commanders of Argentine expeditionary forces. They should be consulted.⁹²

Besides archives and books, newspapers of this period acquire importance as a source of information. Editorials, usually written with a biased pen, add color and show the pulse of tempers that always boil during a conflict, and that with time cool off. Most historians have trouble in making their lines alive with the passion of the times they try to retell and reconstruct. Historians with a journalistic background are more apt to succeed in this. Newspapers, although unreliable for facts, are the best indicators of the human emotions of the time. Besides, most of these papers include official dispatches, constituting therefore a primary source. Of the newspapers of the time one is particularly valuable for information about the war, the famous Gaceta of Buenos Aires.⁹³ The energetic Bolivian historian, Vázquez-Machicado, believes this paper remains the best published source for a study of the War of Independence in his country.⁹⁴ And René-Moreno, who loved newspapers as sources,⁹⁵ severely chastised Muñoz Cabrera for ignoring the Gaceta.⁹⁶ Not only the Gaceta, but also all other newspapers that were published in this period in Argentina, Peru and Chile are necessary.⁹⁷ Most of these are described in René-Moreno's

bibliographic index of newspapers.⁹⁸ Those set forth in this index, some of them indeed very rare, rest today in the Bolivian National Library, used little by Bolivian scholars.⁹⁹ And there, too, are five heavy manuscript volumes collected by René-Moreno, identified as Argentine newspapers, which contain extracts of articles of interest to Upper Peru and Bolivia, which not a single scholar has used or acknowledged.¹⁰⁰ It was one of the most exciting and fruitful finds made by this author in Sucre. More newspapers should rest in the many libraries and archives in Peru and Argentina.

If all the sources cited, and others, are used, if the documents of the Loyalist army are located, if Peruvian, Argentine, Bolivian, Spanish, provincial, local and private archives are studied, it is possible that still a vital section, the fight of the guerrilla forces, could not be reconstructed in its totality. Few printed books, essays or monographs are available. What has been published, with one or two exceptions, is mediocre. They are eulogies more fit for patriotic festivities rather than for serious historical considerations. Most probably this shortcoming does not rest so much with the authors, but is probably a consequence of the lack of primary sources needed to portray the life of these soldiers. The war the guerrillas fought was irregular, here and there in small bands, surprises, traps, quick retreats, daring attacks, dispersions and few battles on a larger scale. This war was also known as the war of the montoneras.¹⁰¹ Who knows if records were kept, who knows if some of the minor partisans knew even how to write? As stated above, some authors have immortalized these heroes.

The best book, and really the best piece of research, with abundant documents, is a work by the Argentinian, Evaristo Uriburu, sketching the history of General Arenales.¹⁰² This officer was a Spaniard by birth, who already in 1809 had switched allegiance to the American cause. When the war started in 1809 he was a Spanish provincial official in Upper Peru. Later, during the early part of the war, he was named by the Río de la Plata government as intendant of Cochabamba, and from this post, being a career officer, he became the outstanding commander of the Patriotic cause. But since the American position in Upper Peru was untenable after the failure of the first two expeditionary forces from Argentina, Arenales was forced to take to guerrilla warfare, as his intendency was mostly in the hands of Loyalists who had joined the Viceroyalty of Peru. After the defeat and death of the two other outstanding partisans, Padilla and Warnes, to which was added the failure and rout of the third expeditionary force under General Rondeau in 1815, Arenales, discouraged and his health in bad shape, took the road of defeat with Rondeau back to Argentina. In Charcas only the small montoneras, those who did not die, remained to maintain a spark of the American cause alive. Their action is hard to construct.¹⁰³ The Arenales book is excellent, and is based on the Arenales archives, seemingly belonging to Mr. Uriburu, the author. It is the most serious publication about the war in Upper Peru or Charcas, but naturally is restricted in scope since it gravitates around a sole person, although, to be sure, a very important one.¹⁰⁴

The other great partisans, guerrillas or montoneros have no extensive biographies. Much has been written about the Padilla couple,¹⁰⁵ but nothing good, with the exception of a fair treatment by the cited Ramallo.¹⁰⁶

Esteban Arze has two biographers whose books are fair.¹⁰⁷ The guerrilla priest, Muñecas, is studied in a passable monograph.¹⁰⁸ The same goes for the montonero, Camargo.¹⁰⁹ Others have not found their biographers, merely some laudatory lines or pages.¹¹⁰ Others have not been mentioned at all.¹¹¹ As said above, many remain unknown and maybe only their names can be resurrected. Truly these soldiers, irregulars, partisan guerrillas, montoneros, or whatever one wishes to call them, fought bravely and sometimes savagely. The big question one wishes to ask is what did they fight for. They did not come from the elite group of doctores criollos or students who started the war in Chuquisaca in 1809. They sprang up once the fight had started, in response to the punitive expeditions that the Spanish authorities sent to eliminate the rebel intellectual generation of 1809, which emanated from Chuquisaca.¹¹² With few records left for posterity this problem is hard to study or discuss.

Fortunately, in 1951, the energetic director of the Bolivian National Library in Sucre, Gunnar Mendoza, discovered among the unclassified pieces of the Rück collection¹¹³ an incomplete document entitled the Diary of a Soldier of the Upper Peruvian Independence in the Valleys of Sicacaca and Hayopaya, 1816-1821. This document runs from folio 26 to 59, then from 81 to 118, and the third part from 124 to 161. The other folios are missing and lost. The folios available correspond to March 25, 1816, to December of the same year; the end of March, 1817, until January 28, 1818; and April 19, 1818, to July 17, 1821. A thorough examination of the diary by Director Mendoza¹¹⁴ has revealed that the main bulk of the document was written when the events described happened, or just shortly after, because of the very

preciseness of details, time and places, plus the short telegraphic style. Later additions were made, which project some matters mentioned in the journal into a later period, after independence. The author, for example, mentions, " . . . the owners and the Indians of these two districts (today's provinces)."¹¹⁵ Obviously at the time of the writing of the diary the term "provinces" was not yet existent, the author later copied his first draft. At various places the soldier left signs with the specific intent to expand the matter later. But most of these intercalations have been lost or were never completed. In total, the diary is a golden find. It is not so much because a simple soldier tells us his adventures in plain, sometimes hard to understand, sentences, harsh style, bad grammar and often erroneous vocabulary. But for the first time we get a genuine insight into the life and reason of a guerrilla force. Is it not possible that this little educated soldier might provide us with an interesting and simple answer, so vitally necessary in a serious study of the creation of Bolivia, to why and for what did these partisans fight? Did they fight for an independent Upper Peru? Did they have the conception of a future Bolivia? And once we have an answer we might ask further, did they survive until 1825 when the Bolivarian army finally defeated the Spaniards? Those who survived, did they, the veterans of a sixteen-year struggle, become the fathers of the new nation? The humble soldier of the valleys of Sicasica and Ayopaya, in his unsophisticated diary, provides us with a key document in the history of Bolivia. A discussion about the guerrillas is warranted in understanding the emergence of Bolivia.

NOTES

¹See Enrique Vidaurre, Potosí, cuartel general de los guerreros de la independencia (La Paz, 1952), 210 pp.

²See Charles W. Arnade, "Una bibliografía selecta de la guerra de la emancipación en el Alto-Perú," Boletín de la Sociedad Geográfica y de Historia "Potosí", XL, no. 12 (1953), 159.

³Carlos Medinaceli to Antonio José de Sucre, Cotagaita, April 8, 1825, in Archivo Nacional de Bolivia, Ministerio del Interior, Vol. 6, no. 31. Hereafter cited as ANB, MI, volume and number of legajo.

⁴Carta circular de . . . Sucre, Potosí, April 9, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 36.

⁵Luis Caballero (H), "Los doctores de Chuquisaca," Boletín de la Sociedad Geográfica Sucre, XIX, nos. 218-220(1919), 164-179. Hereafter cited as BSGS, volume, number, date, page.

⁶Much has been written by Bolivian writers about the interesting events of 1809 in Chuquisaca. Most of it is repetitious, full of eulogies and is of little historical value. The pages of Gabriel René-Moreno are the only ones that give a detailed, accurate and unbiased account. Anyone interested in this early movement for independence should not fail to consult the works of René-Moreno, such as his classic Últimos días coloniales en el Alto-Perú (S. d. Ch., 1896-1901), 2 vols.; see also his Bolivia y Argentina (S. d. Ch., 1901), 283-299; Bolivia y Perú/ más notas históricas . . . (S. d. Ch., 1905). In the pages of the BSGS, I, 1 (1898) -- still in publication, much material about the events of 1809 is available; see also Luis Paz, Estudios históricos de Monseñor Miguel de los Santos Taborza (La Paz, 1908), 35-63.

⁷"Proclama de la ciudad de la Plata a los valerosos habitantes de la ciudad de la Paz," no signature, no date [1809] (facsimile reproduction), in Guillermo Francovich, El pensamiento universitario de Charcas (Sucre, 1948), 144-145.

⁸Loc. cit.

⁹In the standard texts of Bolivian history April 3 or April 2 is considered the end of the war, see Emilio Medinaceli, "Tumusla, batalla que selló la independencia de Bolivia," El Diario (La Paz) (January 11, 1953), suplemento dominical.

¹⁰This author does not agree with any precise date as the starting point of the movements of independence in the Spanish colonies. Yet the events at Chuquisaca have indeed a good claim to being considered as the first real expression of the War of Independence. The above cited, n. 7, proclamation is indeed a remarkable document in which a desire for independence is expressed openly. Cf. Luis Arce, "Iniciativa y comienzos de la guerra de la independencia Sud-Americana," Cuarto Congreso Científico (1^o Pan-Americano, septima seccion, ciencias sociales, S. d. Ch., 1908), 60 pp.

¹¹"Inutil sería, por cierto, buscar en la guerra de emancipación en el Alto Perú, las grandes batallas y la alta estrategia militar" (Eufronio Viscarra, Biografía del General Estebán Arze, 2d ed.; Cochabamba, 1910, p.7).

¹²Gunnar Mendoza, "Una cronica desconocida de la guerra de independencia altoperuana," Universidad de San Francisco Xavier (Sucre), XVI, nos. 37-38 (1952), 199. Hereafter cited as USFX, volume, number, date, page.

¹³Historia de Belgrano y de la independencia Argentina (3d ed.; Buenos Aires, 1876-77), II, chap. 31, (4th ed.; B. A., 1887), II, chap. 33, ([5th ed.]; B. A., n. d.), II, chap. 33. The second edition (B. A., 1859), 2 vols., is a very rare edition and the first edition (?) is one of the rarest books in Latin American history; cf. G. René-Moreno, Biblioteca Boliviana (S. d. Ch., 1879), nos. 1762-1763, pp. 443-445. Hereafter cited as R-M, BB, number, page. See also Bartolomé Mitre, Historia de San Martin (2d ed.; Buenos Aires, 1890), I, chap. 5.

¹⁴Ibid. (ed ed.), II, 311-312.

¹⁵Santos Machicado, "Ildefonso de las Muñecas," in José Domingo Cortés, Galería de hombres célebres de Bolivia (S. d. Ch., 1869), 91-97.

¹⁶Viscarra, op. cit.; Humberto Guzmán, Estebán Arze, caudillo de los valles (Cochabamba, 1948), 178 pp.

¹⁷Carlos V. Romero, Apuntes biográficos del Coronel José Vicenté Camargo (Sucre, 1895), 31 pp.

¹⁸I have not run across any biography about Warnes, but see Hernando Sanabria-Fernandez, Bosquejo de la contribución de Santa Cruz a la formación de la nacionalidad (Santa Cruz, 1942), chap. 6.

¹⁹See Arnade, op. cit., 168, n. 38.

²⁰Much has been written about these two great heroes but nothing is scholarly or very good, see Miguel Ramallo, Guerrilleros de la independencia/ los esposos Padilla (La Paz, 1919), 310 pp.; Ismael Vasquez, "Juana Azurduy de Padilla," BEGS, XXVI, 274-278 (1926), 151-158; Joaquín Gantier, Doña Juana Azurduy de Padilla (Buenos Aires, 1946), 269 pp.

²¹Ensayo sobre la historia de Bolivia (Sucre, 1861), 93.

²²Apuntes para la historia de la revolución de Alto-Perú, hoy Bolivia por unos patriotas (Sucre, 1855), 93. Hereafter cited as [U], Apuntes, page; R-M, BB, 207, 49, identifies Urcullu as the author (also spelled Urcullo).

²³Apuntes biográficos de los proceres mártires de la guerra de la independencia del Alto-Perú (Sucre, 1885), 93 pp.

²⁴"Cerna, Sillo, Pozo, Inojosa, Mier, caudillos de que la tradición apenas ha conservado el nombre, no recordandose los hechos que ejecutaron sino de una manera confusa en sus detalles" (Ibid., 23).

²⁵Manuel Ordóñez Lopez, Luis Crespo, Bosquejo de la historia de Bolivia (La Paz, 1912), 162.

²⁶ANB, Audiencia de Charcas (Expedientes Coloniales, 1818), no. 2, 59 fs. Hereafter cited as ANB, ACh (E.C., year), number, folio; cf. Mitre, Belgrano, op. cit. (5th ed.), II, 397.

²⁷ANB, ACh (E.C., 1812), 12, 2 fs.

²⁸Catálogo Corbacho (1919), nos. 525, 536, 537 (1819), in Biblioteca Nacional de Bolivia (Sucre). Hereafter cited as BNB.

²⁹"Relación histórica del batallón de Chichas . . . , Cotagoita (21 de septiembre de 1819), "unclassified document in the manuscript collection of the Biblioteca de la Sociedad Geográfica Sucre.

³⁰ANB, ACh (E.C., 1812), nos. 4, 6, 4 fs., 8 fs.; see about the very interesting cacique guerrilla, Manuel Victoriano Titchoca, in Marcos Beltrán Avila, Historia del Alto Perú en el año 1810 (Oruro, 1918), chap. 3; General Gregorio Aráoz de la Madrid in his fascinating Memoirs (Biblioteca Ayacucho, vol. 60; Madrid, n.d.), 138, mentions a partisan Indian who operated in the neighborhood of Yamparáez.

³¹"America," El Argos (Buenos Aires), no. 19 (March 24, 1824).

³²Loc. cit.

³³"Causa criminal seguida . . . contra el reo José Miguel Lansa . . . ," La Plata, September 4, 1812, in ANB, ACh (E.C.), document yet unclassified.

³⁴See infra, chap. 2.

³⁵It is not very clear if Aguilera killed Padilla. In 1882 in

in the Bolivian village of Tomina a man by the name of Mariano Ovando, who said he was 105 years old, categorically affirmed that he had killed Padilla in 1816 on the battlefield. About this controversy see Ramallo, Guerrilleros, op. cit., 200-212.

³⁶Ibid., 194.

³⁷No biography has come to the attention of this author about this interesting Spanish officer. For a short account see Miguel Ramallo, Guerra doméstica (Sucre, 1916), 103 pp., passim; Miguel Ramallo, Batalla del Pari (Tarija, 1911), 4-5; Sabino Pinilla, Crónica del año 1828 (Cochabamba, [1928]), 74-76; Jose Augustin Morales, Los primeros cien años de la republica de Bolivia (La Paz, 1925), I, 120-121.

³⁸[U], Apuntes, 97.

³⁹About the uncertainty of this date see Luis Paz, Historia general del Alto Perú hoy Bolivia (Sucre, 1919), I, 429, n. 1. Hereafter cited as Paz, Historia, volume, page.

⁴⁰Ibid., I, 430; [U], Apuntes, 97.

⁴¹Ramallo, Batalla del Pari, op. cit., 18 pp., passim.

⁴²[U], Apuntes, 98.

⁴³Fernando Díez de Medina, Thunupa (La Paz, 1947), 34.

⁴⁴Huañuyta maskaj, ñocka riscani
Auckanchejcuna
Jamullanckancu, Pucarancuna
Jalatatajmi. (Taken from Gantier, op. cit., 132); cf. Benjamín Rivas, "Huallparrimachi," in Modesto Omiste, Crónicas Potosinas (La Paz, 1919), II, 1-6.

⁴⁵Moscoso, op. cit., 27; Jose Macedonio Urquidí, La obra historica de Arguedas/ breves rectificaciones (Cochabamba, 1923), 40. Hereafter cited as Urquidí, Rectificaciones.

⁴⁶P. Pruvonena /pseudonym, José de la Riva Agüero/, Memorias y documentos para la historia de la independencia del Peru y causadel mal exito que ha tenido esta . . . (Paris, 1858), I, 274-286.

⁴⁷Rubén Vargas Ugarte, "Los archivos de la antigua Chuquisaca," BSGS, XXVII, 297-299 (1930), 101-115; G. René-Moreno, "Los archivos historicos en la capital de Bolivia," Revista Chilena, VI (1876), 111-141; Juan de Zengotita, "The National Archive and the National Library of Bolivia at Sucre," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXIX (1949), 649-676.

⁴⁸Cf. Rubén Vargas Ugarte, Biblioteca Peruana . . . (Lima, 1935-1949), 6 vols.

⁴⁹Cf. Mitre, Belgrano, op. cit., passim.

⁵⁰The National Archive and the National Library are located in the same building and are under the same director.

⁵¹Arnade, op. cit., 164-165.

⁵²For example, number 267 reads, "Copis certificada del parte del Coronel Benavente dando cuenta de los combates que desde Tarbita hasta la villa de la Laguna ha sostenido en su retirada contra las fuerzas del caudillo Padilla. Es largo, detallado y muy interesante (1814).

⁵³Hotel Guibert.

⁵⁴No serious research has been undertaken by this author to solve the Corbacho mystery. But there are rumors to the effect that Corbacho was one of the shrewdest document thieves and that he had access to Peruvian archives. It has been said that he died in a Buenos Aires hotel room and in the room many boxes full of documents were found. It is stated that it is possible that the collection made its way to the United States. All this might be completely wrong, since it is merely gossip.

⁵⁵R-M, BB, 207, 49.

⁵⁶In the BNB, Colección Ruck (hereafter cited as CR), no. 387 is the first draft of an unpublished biography of Urcullu. It is this author's opinion, based on an analysis of the handwriting, that it was written by Samuel Velasco Flor; see Biblioteca Ruck catálogo (Lima, 1898), p. 52.

⁵⁷R-M, BB, 207, 49.

⁵⁸Memorias para la historia de Bolivia (Sucre, 1938), 401 pp.

⁵⁹G. René-Moreno, "Juan Muñoz Cabrera," in Bolivia y Argentina, op. cit., 301-548.

⁶⁰La guerra de los quince años en el Alto-Perú . . ., (S. d. Ch., 1867), 402 pp.

⁶¹R-M, BB, 1722, 436.

⁶²Luis Paz, Miguel de los Santos Tabora (Sucre, 1906), 92 pp.

⁶³Documentos inéditos para la historia de Bolivia (Chuquisaca, 1891), 250 pp.; Luis Paz, ed., Estudios historicos de Monsenor Miguel de los Santos Tabora (La Paz, 1908), 136 pp.

⁶⁴ Cf. Valentín Abecia, "Observaciones a los capitulos de la historia de Bolivia de Monseñor Taborga," BSGS, VIII, 94 (1908), 159-173; Luis Paz, Respuesta a las observaciones del Doctor Valentín Abecia . . . (Sucre, 1909), 105 pp.

⁶⁵ See Julio Díaz, Los generales de Bolivia (La Paz, 1929), 669-671.

⁶⁶ Guerra domestica (Sucre, 1916), 103 pp.; Guerrilleros de la independencia (Sucre, 1919), 310 pp.; Batallas de la guerra de la independencia (La Paz, 1930), 260 pp.

⁶⁷ Paz, Historia, 2 vols.

⁶⁸ BSGS, XVII, 206-208 (1918), 238.

⁶⁹ Other books by Bolivian authors which deserve attention are Marcos Beltrán Avila, Historia del Alto Perú en el año 1810 (Oruro, 1918), 127, LXVI pp.; M. Beltran Avila, La pequeña gran logia que independizó a Bolivia (Cochabamba, 1948), 168 pp. (hereafter cited as Beltran Avila, Logia); Enrique Vidaurre, Potosí cuartel general de los guerreros de la independencia (La Paz, 1952), 210 pp.; Modesto Omiste, Memoria historica sobre los acontecimientos politicos ocurridos en Potosí en 1810 (Potosí, 1877), 36 pp.; Modesto Omiste, Memoria historica sobre los acontecimientos politicos ocurridos en Potosí en 1811 (Potosí, 1878), 55 pp.

⁷⁰ See Alcides Arguedas, La fundación de la republica (La Paz, 1920), XIV-XV, in which he accuses Paz of plagiarizing the conventional historians such as Toborga, Urcullu, Cortés, René-Moreno, José Maria Paz, Camba and Mitre; cf. José Maria Paz, Un proceso historico/ respuestas al proceso literario de Alcides Arguedas (Sucre, 1922), 43 pp. It has been rumored that the two volumes were really written by Santos Taborga (supra, n. 62, 63); cf. Enrique Finot, Historia de la literatura boliviana (Mexico, D.F., 1943), 227-228.

⁷¹ Mariano Torrente, Historia de la revolución hispano-americana (Madrid, 1830), 3 vols.; Garcia Camba, Memorias para la historia de las armas españoles en el Peru (Biblioteca Ayacucho, vols. 6-7; Madrid, n.d.), 2 vols. Hereafter cited as Camba, Memorias.

⁷² Gunnar Mendoza, "Cronica," op. cit., 217, n. 65.

⁷³ R-M, BB, 1773, 447.

⁷⁴ Camba, Memorias, preface, 9.

⁷⁵ Conde de Torata, [Hector Valdés], Documentos para la historia de la guerra separatista del Perú (Madrid, 1894-98), 4 vols. (Really there are five volumes because vol. III is in two books: vol. III, 1896, 585 pp.)

⁷⁶ Beltrán Avila, Logia, introduction, no pagination.

⁷⁷ Archivo General de la Nación (Argentina), Partes oficiales y documentos relativos a la guerra de la independencia argentina (2d ed.; Buenos Aires, 1900-1903), 4 vols.

⁷⁸ Documentos históricos del Perú (Lima, 1863-1877), 10 vols.

⁷⁹ Cf. Alberto Tauro, "Historia e historiadores del Perú," Revista de Historia de América, no. 27 (1949), 6.

⁸⁰ This has remedied by the publication of Emilia Romero, Índice de los documentos de Odriózola (Lima, 1946), 193 pp.

⁸¹ Historia del Perú independiente (Lima, 1868-1874), 3 vols.; cf. Francisco X. Mariategui, Anotaciones a la historia del Peru independiente de Mariano F. Paz Soldan (Lima, 1869), 165 pp.

⁸² As this dissertation is being written a well qualified candidate at the University of New Mexico by the name of Robert Delaney is preparing a dissertation on Guillermo Miller.

⁸³ John Miller, Memoirs of General Miller . . . (London, 1828), 2 vols. (2d ed.; London, 1829), 2 vols.

⁸⁴ Cf. Arnade, op. cit., 167, n. 19.

⁸⁵ Heriberto Trigo, Don Tomás, vida, obra y época de Tomás O'Connor D'Arlach (Tarija, 1953), 132 pp.

⁸⁶ Recuerdos (Tarija, 1895), 308 pp.; also published as Burdett O'Connor, Independencia americana (Biblioteca Ayacucho, vol. 3; Madrid, n.d.), 416 pp.

⁸⁷ Las memorias póstumas del General José Maria Paz (Buenos Aires, 1855), 4 vols. (2d ed.; La Plata [Argentina], 1892), 3 vols., partially reproduced in (Biblioteca Ayacucho, vol. 16; Madrid, n.d.).

⁸⁸ Luis Paz, Don José Maria Paz (Tarija, 1891), 78 pp.; Juan Teran, Jose Maria Paz, 1791-1854 (Buenos Aires, 1936), 316 pp.

⁸⁹ Bolivia y Perú/ mas notas . . . (S. d. Ch., 1907), 208, n. 1.

⁹⁰ Las memorias del General Gregorio Aráoz de la Madrid (Buenos Aires, 1895), 2 vols., also in (Biblioteca Ayacucho, vol. 60; Madrid, n.d.), 415 pp.

⁹¹"Memorias del General Rondeau," in Andres Lamas, Colecciones de memorias y documentos para la historia y la geografía de los pueblos del Río de la Plata (Montevideo, 1849), 2-88; cf. G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Peru/ mas notas, op. cit., 173-178.

⁹²An interesting and useful discussion about the memoirs of Paz, la Madrid, and Rondeau can be found in the very excellent article by Rodolfo Trostine, "Las memorias y autobiografias en la historiografia argentina, 1810-1852," Anuario de Historia Argentina, V (1943-1945), 411-414.

⁹³"El ano 1882 ya eran en Buenos Aires rarísimos los numeros de la 'gaceta' vagaban todavia sueltos por librerías de viejos o testamentarios criollos Alguna vez ha de reimprimirse esta grande obra de la capital del Plata de valor esencialísimo, sino tambien del Paraguay, Uruguay, Brasil y Bolivia" (G. René-Moreno, Biblioteca Peruana, S. d. Ch., 1896, II, no. (178) 2250, p. 564); Antonio Zimny, Gaceta de Buenos Aires . . . (Bueno Aires, 1875), 455 pp.; Junta de Historia y Numismática Americana, Gaceta de Buenos Aires (1810-1821) (facsimile reproduction, Buenos Aires, 1910-1915), 6 vols.

⁹⁴"Hasta hoy, el mejor acervo documental impreso sobre la guerra emancipadora en el Alto-Perú es la prensa bonaerense, sobre todo la Gaceta" (La creación de Bolivia, unpublished monograph).

⁹⁵See his Anales de la prensa boliviana [matanzas de Yanez] 1861-1862 (S. d. Ch., 1886), 499 pp. (2d ed., Potosí, 1954), 435 pp., and his "El golpe de estado de 1861," USFX, XIV, 33-34 (1946), 289-348.

⁹⁶R-M, BB, 207, 49.

⁹⁷No newspaper was printed in Upper Perú at the time of the War of Independence. See Carlos Montenegro, Nacionalismo y coloniaje (2d ed.; La Paz, 1943), 41; Charles W. Arnade, "Notas sobre los Estados Unidos en la primera gaceta boliviana," El Diario (November 8, 1953), 2d section.

⁹⁸Ensayo de una bibliografía general de los periodicos de Bolivia, 1825-1905 (S. d. Ch., 1905), 2 vols. The Peruvian and Argentine newspapers are in vol. II, appendix, 297-330. Although the title says 1825-1905, many are prior to 1825; cf. Nicolás Acosta, Apuntes para la bibliografía periodística de la ciudad de La Paz (La Paz, 1876), 2.

⁹⁹Zengotita, op. cit., 655-656.

¹⁰⁰Prensa argentina/ extractos sobre Bolivia y Bolívar, 6 vols. For a complete listing see Arnade, Bibliografía, op. cit., 168, n. 35.

¹⁰¹R-M, BB, 207, 49.

¹⁰² Historia del General Arenales, 1770-1831 (2d ed.; London, 1927), vol. I (subsequent volumes never published), 312 pp.

¹⁰³ Urquidí, Rectificaciones, 40.

¹⁰⁴ Armando Cáceres, La primera campaña del General Arenales en el Valle Grande (Buenos Aires, 1944), 214 pp.

¹⁰⁵ Supra, n. 20.

¹⁰⁶ Loc. cit.

¹⁰⁷ Supra, n. 16.

¹⁰⁸ Rigoberto Paredes, Relaciones históricas de Bolivia (Oruro, n.d.), 102 pp.

¹⁰⁹ Supra, n. 17.

¹¹⁰ Tomás O'Connor D'Arlach, El Coronel José Eustaquio Méndez (Tarija, 1893), 25 pp.

¹¹¹ For example, this author is completely unaware of a biography of Commander Warnes, probably the most energetic partisan leader.

¹¹² Francovich, op. cit., passim.

¹¹³ Cf. Biblioteca de Ernesto O. Rück/ catálogo (Lima, 1898), 72 pp.

¹¹⁴ The reader will find a complete description of the examination of the document in Méndez, op. cit., 200-205.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 203.

CHAPTER II

THE ARMIES OF THE PARTISANS

Synopsis

The fighting in the War of Independence was done on the Patriotic side by two kinds of forces. There were the regular armies sent from the United Provinces, and later from Lima, to liberate Upper Peru. These forces were unsuccessful until 1825. They went from defeat to defeat. The other force was native to the land and was irregular in nature. They were the guerrilla units. These guerrillas fought the Spaniards throughout the whole war. There were many units, and they operated separately. Lack of coordination prevented any unified front. No overall command existed, and one partisan knew little of what the other was doing. Very rarely did two squads join to aid each other, but more often they fought among themselves. When the foreign expeditionary forces moved into Charcas the guerrillas tried to help them and prepare the way for their advance. But generally this coordination was ill planned. Most of the partisans were mestizos, known in Upper Peru as cholos. They had much Indian blood in their veins. Very few criollos were among them. They relied heavily on Indian help and many commanded an extensive Indian allegiance, because they were closer and more akin to the natives than the Spanish army. Their overall allegiance was to the United Provinces. We do not know of a single guerrilla fighting with the clear cut purpose of independence for Upper Peru. They fought for

freedom from the Spaniards, and to them independence meant an independent viceroyalty of La Plata. Separation from the United Provinces was not in their minds. But the most important purpose was to win or survive, and they cared little about the future. They entertained grass roots democratic ideas, but most of them had little knowledge of history and political science, some of them could not even write. They fought because they disliked the Spaniards and because it was an opportunity for adventure. Many plundered, and often fought other partisan forces instead of the common enemy. Some deserted and changed allegiance many times. But even so the guerrilla forces were the most devoted soldiers of the War of Independence in Charcas. Yet they had little part in the creation of Bolivia. Some historians estimate that there were around one hundred partisan commanders, but there were many more. They remain forgotten and uncounted. It is said that only nine survived the war. And only one, yes one, was a member of the assembly that declared the independence of Bolivia. Their efforts of long years of sacrifice were fruitless. Bolivia was not created by them, but by the criollos who, while the guerrillas fought, were either Royal officials, Loyalist army officers or loyal priests.

The origins of the partisan units are obscure. Most of them represent an outgrowth of a popular militia that was organized when some of the towns in Upper Peru rebelled against Spain. The militia wanted to defend the towns against the punitive expeditions sent by the Spanish authorities. Other guerrilla units mushroomed in time. They did not acquire an effective standing until 1812 to 1814. By 1814 the partisans

were well established and quite strong. Six great partisan jurisdictions, known as republiquetas, stand out as the most important strongholds. Many, many others existed on a much lesser scale. The years 1814 and 1815 represent the highpoint of the activities of the guerrillas. In 1816 the Spanish army started a huge offensive against the large strongholds of the partisans. The great republiquetas fell under the impact of this attack and their leaders met cruel death. Only one of the great six remained invincible, it was never conquered. This was the republiqueta of Ayopaya. But 1816 was not the complete end of the guerrillas. Besides Ayopaya the smaller partisans, whose activities are lost to history, continued to live, fight, disappear and reappear.

How many guerrilla¹ leaders fought in the war? One historian gives the exact number of 102.¹ Another Bolivian writer even goes so far as to say that two partisan leaders deserted during the fight and nine survived the war.² This author thinks that any exact statistics are useless and really senseless. It is simply impossible to know the exact number of guerrilla leaders. But the serious Mitre has rightly pointed out six strong points, under the leadership of six guerrillas, which seriously jeopardized the Spanish hegemony in Upper Peru. These were in the six most important and extensive republiquetas.³

Upper Peru in those days was accessible from two main directions, either from Lower Peru or from northern Argentina. In the east were the impenetrable jungles of the Amazon Basin and the plains of Santa Cruz that merged into Brazil. In the west the desert of Atacama was an obstacle to reaching the Pacific coast. Therefore most all movement was north and south. In the heart of Charcas six towns flourished: Potosí, Chuquisaca, Oruro, La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz. Of these Potosí was the most important for Spain because of its riches, and Chuquisaca was the capital where the Audiencia was located. La Paz and Oruro were mining centers, and Cochabamba and Santa Cruz were of agricultural importance.⁴ The six republiquetas were wedges between Charcas and the outside, and between the six important cities.

On the shores of Lake Titicaca, to the Desaguadero River and north of La Paz, with the center in Larecaja, the priest Muñecas jeopardized communications between Upper and Lower Peru. In the south Vicente Camargo ruled another republiqueta, with headquarters in Cinti.

This represented a threat to and outflanked Cotagaita, one of the strongest fortresses⁵ in Upper Peru which protected Potosí from the south, from where the Argentine expeditionary forces advanced when on their march to liberate Charcas. Camargo held the door open for these Argentinians⁶ as Muñecas closed the door for the Spanish armies from Lima, Cusco and Arequipa. Somewhat to the west of Camargo's jurisdiction was another large partisan republic that extended between the Grande and Pilcomayo Rivers. Its center was Laguna⁷ and it obeyed the command of the Padilla couple. This republiqueta neutralized the capital, Chuquisaca, and kept a road open from Argentina to the capital.⁸ In the ~~east~~ⁿ was the most extensive republiqueta under the famous Warnes, with its capital at Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Although the largest, this one was the least important from a strategic point of view. It neither guarded nor opened the entrance to anyone. Yet it protected the ~~east~~ⁿ flanks of almost all other republiquetas and was a haven for escape and retreat for them in time of defeat. In the center two fairly extensive republiquetas were like two emboli in the very heart of Upper Peru, putting the communications among the six big towns at their mercy. One was under the celebrated Arenales, with its center in Mizque and Vallegrande. This threatened and often cut off the roads between Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Santa Cruz. The other was the partisan republic of Ayopaya in the heart of Bolivia's majestic mountain region. From its confines the partisan forces could dominate the roads between Oruro, La Paz and Cochabamba. Both central montoneras had escape routes. From the Arenales domain it was easy to go to Warnes' republic, since the two were adjacent. The

Ayopaya republicueta, on its eastern frontier, lost itself in the dense jungles of Mojos.⁹ These were the six great republicuetas. There was another one of great importance but of unstable nature, and with no one outstanding commander. This was the factional jurisdiction of Chayanta which, when active, dominated the roads between Potosí, Oruro, Chuquisaca and Cochabamba.¹⁰ But since it was enclaved within these four towns, strongpoints of the Spanish army, it had no escape route and therefore was only of a temporary nature, appearing and disappearing in accordance with the Loyalist impact upon its domain.

However, these were not the only guerrilla republics. There were many more of minor extent and importance. From Camargo's and the Padillas' jurisdictions down to Tarija numerous factions kept the line to the United Provinces open.¹¹ In the neighborhood of the pleasant valley of Tarija important guerrilla commanders such as José Fernández Campero, Ramón and Manuel Rojas, Francisco Uriondo and Eustaquio Múñoz were very active, and in command of important republicuetas which have not yet received close attention.¹² In the eastern territories, besides Warnes, numerous partisan leaders were practically independent. They remain totally obscure.¹³ One should not be deceived by the fact that jurisdictional lines were vague and borders changed every day. It is impossible to determine where one republicueta started and another ended. The same is true of the lines between Patriot and Loyalist territory. Besides, there were smaller republicuetas within larger ones. Sometimes minor factional leaders were under the command of major guerrilla leaders.¹⁴ Other times they acted independently and drew together only in times of

emergency. Usually one leader did not know what others were doing, and cared little. Well documented are the complaints of Commander Arenales in regard to his neighboring commander, Warnes, who nearly always refused to cooperate.¹⁵ Yet the six major jurisdictions or republicuetas were the most important ones, and gave the Spaniards the greatest trouble. They isolated Upper Peru from the outside and dominated the communications among the main centers of Charcas. In 1816 they had become a major threat to effective Spanish dominance of Upper Peru. It remained an obvious goal for the Loyalist command to destroy them. This was achieved in a great sweep in 1816. Muñecas, Camargo, Padilla and Warnes fell in battle, and Arenales had to take flight to Argentina. Only the republicueta of Ayopaya survived the impact and remained undefeated throughout the remainder of the war. On January 29, 1825, the Ayopaya commander, Miguel Lanza, occupied La Paz before Sucre and his liberating army entered the town.¹⁶

Little has been known about the republicueta of Ayopaya. Historians acknowledged its existence, that it survived the 1816 drive and from then on remained an invincible region. The epic of Ayopaya was extremely obscure. Isolated by grandiose mountains and bordering on impenetrable jungles, little news of the doings in this most beautiful guerrilla republic reached the outside. Historians claimed that Ayopaya existed and was heroic because of its leader, Miguel Lanza. In Bolivia they call him the "pelayo boliviano."¹⁷ He created this partisan territory and from it fought until the very end of the war. To Lanza the credit was given that from his majestic and impregnable mountain repub-

lic he checked and threatened the roads of the three cities of La Paz, Cochabamba and Oruro.¹⁸ Lanza survived the war, was then integrated into the Bolivarian army and became a trusted lieutenant of President Sucre. In 1828 he died defending Sucre against his enemies.¹⁹ He was the sole guerrilla leader who took part in the foundation and consolidation of Bolivia. It is to his credit that he gave his life for Sucre in 1828 and was one of the few associates and friends of Sucre who remained loyal to the last, when the President was betrayed by unscrupulous supporters. Yet his career as a guerrilla is quite different from what has been told.

As stated in chapter one, in 1952, during the presence of this writer in the Bolivian National Library at Sucre, a monumental diary was found.²⁰ It was written by a simple soldier, a drummer, who tells us, in minute detail, the life of the Ayopaya guerrilla republic from 1816 to 1821. In 1816 when the soldier's narrative starts Miguel Lanza was not in Ayopaya.²¹ Only on February 3, 1821, did he make his appearance in the republicueta with the appointment by his superiors in Argentina as the "principal commander of the interior."²² In cold blood he killed the previous commander of the republic, Manuel Chinchilla, a close friend of his²³ who had fought the Spaniards valiently for many years.²⁴ The diary ends in 1821. It must be assumed that from that time on Miguel Lanza was the chief of the republicueta. But indeed, to give him full credit, he was not new to the Ayopaya region in 1821, and very likely had been the original organizer of this factional territory. Already in 1812 he was engaged in fighting the Spaniards. On September 4, 1812,

the Audiencia condemned him to ten years in prison for his revolutionary activities, "fighting against the King's army."²⁵ In that same year Lanza was together in jail with Chinchilla, the man he killed nine years later in order to take his place. Both escaped; Lanza was naked, and his friend and fellow prisoner, Chinchilla, provided him with clothes.²⁶ From 1812 to 1821 Lanza's activities are quite obscure. It might be that in those years he set the foundations for the guerrilla faction of Ayopaya. After the defeat of the third auxiliary army under Rondeau in 1815, Lanza left Upper Peru with the retreating Argentinians,²⁷ not to return until six years later. Therefore during the most critical years of the war Lanza was not even in Upper Peru.²⁸ It was Lira, Chinchilla and Farjado who were respectively the commanders of the Ayopaya republic.²⁹

This guerrilla republic was quite extensive in the rough mountain territory. About eighty-five leagues from south to north and around forty leagues from west to east was the territory that was under its mandate most of the time. The land was unusually rough, and varying in elevation from one thousand meters at some places to 5,500 meters at others.³⁰ No particular town served as permanent headquarters, but such small mountain villages as Palca, Machaca and Inquisivi were the core of the partisan republic.³¹ Palca had only a single street, most of the time full of mud, and the houses were in a dismal state. It had however a spacious church and its drinking water was good.³² But these villages were the heart of the republic. From their confines easy dashes could be made to the very limits of Oruro, Cochabamba and La Paz, and once Oruro nearly fell into Partisan hands.³³ The traveler or tourist who

today flies from La Paz to Cochabamba or vice versa, a well established international air lane, flies directly over what was the Ayopaya guerrilla country. Those who have gone over it know that this is one of the most fascinating and breathtaking flights. Underneath lies one of the roughest, but most beautiful lands. It includes sharp mountains, narrow, fertile valleys, the magnificence of the eternal snow-capped peaks of the Cordillera Real, and then the fearful drop into the jungles. In itself this region is like a microscopic reproduction of the whole world. Both everlasting snow and bananas are seen within its confines, and only at short distances from each other.³⁴ When the weather is clear and the plane lifts itself over the mountains instead of flying in the narrow passes, one can see snow and jungle at the same time. It was then, as it is now, a region where Indian blood flowed in everybody's veins. There were very few whites, many pure Indians that spoke Aymara or Quechua,³⁵ and much mixed blood.³⁶ The people were hardy, for the roughness of the territory molded men to fit their environment. And the sharpness of the social classes had not penetrated into its very midst.³⁷

Such was the place in which the guerrilla republic of Ayopaya existed, and about which only vague or erroneous information was available until the diary of Vargas, a soldier of that faction, was located. Why did he write this diary? He tells us simply because he "was curious to do this."³⁸ Vargas is a common name, and author Vargas does not tell his reader what his first name was. He was the main drummer, and he was a native of the region, from the little mountain village of Moosa, far away from civilization.³⁹ He was no Indian, but came from a fairly well-

established mestizo family. His family had some land and one of his brothers was a priest.⁴⁰ The discoverer of the Vargas diary, Mr. Gunnar Mendoza, has spent many hours searching documents of the early period of the independence for a better identification of Vargas⁴¹ since from the diary it can be inferred that he survived the war.⁴² This author, in his extensive reading of Bolivian documents of 1825 to 1828, has also looked out for this particular Vargas. No tangible evidence has been found. It remains that the author of the best primary source that exists about the War of Independence in Upper Peru is a Vargas from Moosa,⁴³ and that is all that is known.

Vargas knew how to write, but he probably had little instruction beyond the rudiments of a few grades in a backward country school. His diary is hard to read and impossible to translate. His vocabulary was extensive⁴⁴ and colorful, with all the colloquialisms of the region. He was undoubtedly a brilliant man with a superb ability to speak, and he wrote just as he spoke. Therefore, there is absolutely no syntax. After one becomes accustomed to the style one comes to like the manner in which he writes, because it is intimate and frank, and it fits into the whole milieu of the era, region and fighting band.

All parts are interesting because there were no dull times in the life of the faction. It is therefore feasible that a certain section of the diary should be given here. In order to be true to the author, direct translation would be the most satisfactory way of passing on the diary. But because of the peculiarity of the style such is hardly possible,⁴⁵ for it would mean writing without any syntax. A modernistic

style would spoil the whole tone and setting of the diary. Therefore the following pages are not a translation but a sort of edited version, maintaining the modulation and plainness. The general opinion is that the faction was there to fight the Spaniards.⁴⁶ Indeed this they did, but not all of the time. The following pages will show why.

On November 5, 1817, Captain Eugenio Moreno, with his company and around one hundred Indians, all of them stationed between Moosa and Leque, went to Paria. Moreno had not received any order to go there. Very early in the morning of November 17, they reached Paria and many went to the house of a respected citizen of the village, Eugenio Flores, whose birthday it was. Hearing all the noise that was being made, an honest citizen of the town, Anselmo Carpio, of "patriotic leaning,"⁴⁷ went to join the party since he had heard the toasts of "Long live the fatherland."⁴⁸ But as soon as he entered they shot him and left him dead. Then the partisans left the party and took prisoners, whomever they found in the streets. The next day at nine o'clock the unit left the village, but not before the Indians had sacked and destroyed whatever they wished to. The unit took fourteen prisoners with them. These were innocent people they had taken from the streets. On the way back one of the prisoners requested permission from a sergeant to step out of line for a while. When Captain Moreno saw this he had the prisoner killed. On the way home Moreno ordered two more of the prisoners to be shot. But Laureano Choque kept close watch over the village mayor they had apprehended, "very much an enemy of the fatherland and decorated by the King."⁴⁹ Choque sent him to Cabari where Commander Lira had him shot.

On November 19 Moreno got back to Leque. The next day the enemy, 150 men strong from Oruro, met them. A little skirmish took place and the enemy had to retreat, burning some houses and killing five Indians.

During this time Commander Lira had seen to it that a certain Parrientos from the hacienda of Manata was captured and hanged because this individual had helped in the intrigue that had killed Lira's father.⁵⁰ On December 1, Lira left Inquisivi and went to Machaca, accompanied by drummer Vargas, writer of the diary. Commander Lira ordered Moreno to appear and he reprimanded him very severely for having gone to Paria and sacked that town for absolutely no reason, and having killed Carpio and three prisoners without ever inquiring if these people were Patriots or friends of the King. Lira asked Moreno to tell him who had ordered him to do all this, who had told him to sack the town, who had told him to take old people prisoners. The Commander told Moreno that such behavior would make their "cause hateful"⁵¹ to the people, and if news of such behavior would reach the ears of the superior commanders in Salta and Buenos Aires, what would they think of them? Their superiors would say that Captain Moreno had gone to Paria with no orders, that he had destroyed and killed, and that he had taken peaceful villagers prisoner. Commander Lira continued saying that he would not know how to explain to the people, to his superiors, and to the whole continent such behavior of his troops. Lira said that everybody might well say that they were not troops of "the fatherland,"⁵² but a raving band.

Commander Lira had Moreno put under heavy guard as a prisoner. He then called half of his grenadiers to Machaca, because he had gone

there with only eight men. Lira also wished that no officer should come to Machaca because he knew they would press for the freedom of Moreno, who was a likable fellow with them. But even so a lot of people asked forgiveness for the prisoner. There was Colonel Buenaventura Zarate, Doctor Don Manuel Ampuero, the parish priest, and many others. There were many letters from the respectable citizens⁵³ of the neighborhood and from the officers. The mistress⁵⁴ of Lira, Doña Maria Martínez, also interceded for Moreno. Lira would not agree with them because he thought that his honor, the honor of his unit, and "lastly, the cause of the fatherland"⁵⁵ had been injured.

On December 5, at four o'clock in the morning, Moreno disappeared. Lira had put him in a room, had forbidden visitors, had tightly shut the door and put a heavy guard before it. The prisoner escaped with the help of his padrinos⁵⁶ and Lira's mistress. They had helped him through an old stone-filled window. When Commander Lira heard of the break he was so mad that he "nearly killed himself."⁵⁷ He was very angry at everybody, he cried, then he took his horse and galloped away to the house of his mother in Moosa, nine leagues away. At night he returned and called for the guards, but they had escaped too. Lira, angrier than ever, left for Palca. He was so furious he did not eat anything. On December 7, he showed up again in a somewhat better mood and requested food. Then the Commander decided to call a staff meeting of all the officers and available friends. The padrinos of Moreno told Lira that everything should be resolved with reflection and with the thought in mind of "Thou shalt love thy neighbor." They added that everybody knew that Lira was

not responsible for the Paria massacre, that Moreno had gone there on his own without any superior orders. The parish priest⁵⁸ then added that everything was governed by God, He had made everything, and that God has everything happen because He wants it so. He continued that since God had permitted Moreno to escape He must have had a reason, and one day God would punish him for his deeds. He then terminated his speech by saying that Lira should leave the punishment of Moreno to God alone. After the address of the pastor everybody remained reflective. Then everyone in the meeting supported the words and thoughts of Don Ampueri, the priest. After a period of tense quietness Lira gave a huge sigh and said that he was very sorry that Moreno had been able to escape but that he, Commander Lira, had learned a lesson. From then on he would not throw into prison anyone who had committed a crime. He would instead catch him and put the delinquent immediately before a firing squad; he would forget all about this business of putting them in prison, calling a jury, putting them in the death cell, commuting the sentence and all such needless prolongations. Lira continued, saying that all those who escape do the same nasty thing, and so Moreno would do: they go over to the enemy, and the final consequence is that we have one more enemy to fight. He thought Moreno would tell the armies of the King everything about his unit, its strength, and what he wanted to do.

When Lira had terminated his address Colonel Zarate asked if Lira knew that the accused Moreno had not gone over to the enemy, but rather was hiding in the territory of this partisan unit, and that if Moreno out of his own free will would come into the open and ask forgive-

ness, would he, Commander Lira, pardon Moreno. Lira became somewhat thoughtful and then gravely responded that he would forgive him in "the name of the fatherland."⁵⁹ Lira thought that in doing this Moreno would not go over to the enemy. He, Lira, was convinced, as everybody had assured him, that the people and his superiors would know that he was not responsible for the massacre of Paria. The priest then thought that all this should be put immediately into writing. Commander Lira had to sign twice a sworn testimony, and then again swear before the Holy Cross to fulfill his words: that Moreno was pardoned, but that he was retired from the service, and that ex-Captain Moreno could not leave the territory of the partisan republic of Ayopaya. Then Colonel Tarate offered to vouch for Moreno. After this happy settlement the grenadiers were called, everybody gave loud hails to the fatherland and more cheers to the Commander for his generosity. Tambo Vargas took his drum from his box which he always carried with him, and beat it to announce the great happy event. Then the pardoned man, Moreno, crawled out from beneath the bed of the priest where he had hidden and, believe it or not, had listened to the whole debate. Lira told him of the pardon and Moreno, with tears in his eyes, kneeling, kissed the Commander's hand. He then promised to return some of the remaining part of the stolen belongings to Paria, and said too that he would tell the names of the soldiers and Indians who had committed most of the crimes at Paria. Lira gently shook Moreno's hand, lifted him up, and asked him where he wished to reside, to which Moreno responded that he preferred Palca. Everybody then left Machaca for Palca. Moreno went to the house of Major Marquina, his good friend. On Decem-

ber 9 the whole officer corps of the unit went to visit the home of the Commander to express their thanks for his having pardoned one of their fellow officers. They said that everyone thought that Lira was a very prudent commander. After this Lira accompanied his officers to the barracks. Major Marquina had the whole division form a review line, and when Commander Lira entered the camp Marquina stepped forward and ordered all soldiers to hail the great commander and the fatherland. After this everybody dispersed in a jovial and happy mood.

The night of December 14,⁶⁰ around midnight, Major Pedro Marquina,⁶¹ Captain Agustín Contreras, Lieutenants Santiago Morales and Pedro Graneros, ex-Captain Eugenio Moreno, First Lieutenant Antonio Pacheco and a soldier of the guard of Commander Lira by the name of José María Torres, entered the barracks. They ordered the whole unit to get up, they relieved the guards, Morales had his infantry unit so stationed that nobody could get out and no one was able to get in, and guards were put all around the barracks and the horse stables. Once the division was lined up, Major Marquina pulled out a piece of paper and gave the assembled unit a hard hitting speech. He called the soldiers "companions in arms" and reminded them of their allegiance to defend the fatherland with their own blood and their own lives. Marquina told the guerrilla force that they had served without pay, working extremely hard, many times suffering hunger, defeat and heavy casualties. He said that he had never heard complaints from the troops, and this was rightly expected of them because they had joined "the sacred cause of our beloved fatherland, independence and liberty."⁶² He continued that they had lived up to their

allegiance and that because of their faith the whole continent now knew that here, in these regions, were men "devoted to the common cause of the fatherland."⁶³ The orator then said bluntly that they were all fighting for the welfare of the future and not for their own well-being or adventure, and that probably all those present in the "service of their country"⁶⁴ would never see "the total triumph of our sacred opinion."⁶⁵ He thought that the sons of those who were fighting, persecuting and committing cruelties would enjoy the "fruit of the tree of liberty"⁶⁶ for which their unit was fighting. After this the officer added gravely that the commander under whom they fought was creating their ruin, that he was destroying their work, that this man would send them all to the grave, and he, Marguina, and those who had come to speak to them at this late hour, would prove this.

The speaker then called all the sergeants, corporals and privates who knew how to read, and showed them a paper and asked them if they knew the signature. Everybody tensely glanced at the paper, and then all said that it was the handwriting and signature of their Commander Lira. Then the Major read in a loud voice a letter addressed to Colonel José Manuel Rolando of the King's army; it was dated December 14, 1817, at Palca, county seat of the district of Ayopaya. In the letter it said more or less that the writer, Commander Lira, had ordered that on the twenty-fifth of this month⁶⁷ Commanders José Domingo Cardarillas⁶⁸ and José Manuel Chinchilla should come for a meeting in Tapacari. The writer continued, saying that on the twenty-sixth⁶⁹ he would fulfill the stipulated treaty made with the Viceroy, taking upon himself the respon-

ibility that all resistance in these regions by his unit and his subordinates would cease, and that no more partisan units would jeopardize the King's army. And then Lira would be only too glad to give Colonel Rolando an embrace and greet him as a "loyal vassal of the King."⁷⁰

From then on Lira too would become a faithful servant, as he had intended to do for a long time, but, due to the fact that an early defection would end in failure, he had not taken such a step. Now the time was ripe and Lira emphasized that Rolando should not doubt a minute that he was ready for the defection and surrender which he had promised a long time ago to the governor of the district, Juan Oblitas, as well as to the governor of Sicasica, Francisco España, even though they had lately persecuted him frequently. The Commander then suggested that the King's forces should be stationed in the village of Calliri or Caraca, and that after this they could meet at an appropriate point between, on neutral territory, to conclude the final surrender. The writer of the letter then reassured Colonel Rolando that he would proceed as promised "by his word of honor."⁷¹ He requested that the letter be forwarded to the Intendant of Cochabamba. As said before, the communication was signed "Eusebio Lira."

When the reading of this amazing letter was terminated everyone was stunned, as if a bomb had dropped in their midst. Many wished to read the letter two times or more. Our author, Tambor Vargas, was there too, and he said that in the very moment of confusion when everybody was discussing this surprise First Sergeant Manuel Branes took him, Vargas, to side and whispered, "This signature is falsified. It is not the hand-

writing of Lira."⁷² Vargas rushed to see the letter again, and then took courage to go close to Major Marquina and asked him bluntly how he had got hold of this letter. Marquina said that it was the soldier, Torres, of the honor guard of Commander Lira, who had given him the letter. Torres jumped up and said that when Lira was changing his coat the letter had fallen out of the pocket, and that he, Torres, picked it up in order to hand it to Lira. Then he saw on the envelope the insignia of the Spanish army and quickly decided to keep it and take it to Marquina.⁷³ Again there was silence, and then everybody insisted that the Commander should be apprehended and face the accusation. Some soldiers cried, and wanted to kill him immediately for his treason. Others, also crying, said that Lira was honest and incapable of committing such a low thing, and insisted on a quick clarification of the abominable accusation. Tambor Vargas, seeing the tumult, called aside his little friend, the small drummer from Tapacari, "the smartest of all drummers,"⁷⁴ according to Vargas. He told him to slip out through the back wall of the stables and rush over to the Commander's house, and explain everything to him so that he would be warned of what he would have to face. The little fellow did as told, went out unseen by the guards and rushed over to Lira's residence, three blocks away. But time was short, and when he reached the house he already saw a crowd moving from the barracks toward the residence. He hurriedly explained to the Commander, in an incoherent way due to the nervous tension, the unfortunate news. Lira apparently did not understand the very real significance, and he scolded the little drummer for having left the barracks and sternly ordered him to return and go

to bed, where he should have been at this very late hour.

In the meanwhile, at the barracks it had been decided that a selected platoon with its leader, Don Ramón Rivera, go to arrest the Commander. Some officers opposed this procedure, and confusion reigned. Ex-Captain Moreno, whom Lira had pardoned for his massacre of Paria, now insisted that he go with the soldiers himself. Moreno won his point. At two o'clock he and Sergeant Manuel Miranda, an intimate friend of the Captain, and the platoon left the barracks for Lira's residence in order to apprehend him. The house of Lira, a dilapidated single-story building three blocks away from the quarters, was located just across from the priest's residence. Moreno knocked on the door. From the inside a voice, that of the Commander, responded, "Go to sleep, let me sleep, don't disturb me." Moreno answered, "Get up, Commander, you are arrested." Again from the inside Lira replied, "Arrested, who has ordered this?" Moreno screamed through the door, "By the order of the whole officer corps and all the troops." Again Lira put a question, "Do you have armed men with you to apprehend me?" "Yes, I have half of the grenadiers with me," responded Moreno. Then Lira said, "Let's see you prove to me that you have armed soldiers with you." Moreno ordered his men to give two shots into the air. The door then opened, and Lira stepped out and said calmly, "Ha, you are making a revolution, you smart cusqueños."⁷⁵ I want to ask you not to kill me without letting me go to confession."⁷⁶ Lira was wide awake, dressed in a poncho, and underneath wore his saber. Then Moreno explained that this was not a revolution, but that they had found a paper with Lira's signature, and that the reason for the Commander's

arrest was nothing else than to prove or disprove if it was his signature.

They took Lira to a nearby store where the trial was scheduled to take place immediately. The store was closed and while they tried to open it the captured Commander sat down on a bench in front of the store. The platoon of soldiers surrounded him. Once the store was opened Moreno asked Lira to please enter. At the moment that the Commander stepped into the store someone from behind fired a shot. It hit Lira. Moreno turned around and screamed, "Who has shot, from where did it come, who has shot?" The bullet had penetrated from behind into the ribs. There was confusion. Moreno ordered Tambor Vargas to sound a general alarm. The drummer and the band left for the village square to fulfill Moreno's order. Vargas tells us that on his way back to the store he saw that disorder had overtaken the village. Those soldiers and officers who had remained in the barracks had broken out. The village inhabitants, who had been peacefully sleeping at that very early hour, unaware of the count that was taking place in the guerrilla unit stationed in their town, had awakened with the noise and now were wandering in confusion on the dark streets. Moreno was frantic. He was swearing and continuously mumbling and repeating, "I don't know who has shot the Commander." The wounded Lira was painfully and nervously pacing in the dark in the store.

Vargas approached the store because he wanted to see Lira and be with him in his critical hour. When the wounded commander saw him he shook his hand and then spoke in sad words to his faithful subordinate, the drummer. He reminded him that Vargas had been his companion from the very start of the struggle, that together they had traveled extensive-

ly, worked very hard, that the drummer had been a faithful witness of everything, and that he had been a devoted comrade and defender of the fatherland. He complained that bad people had forged the letter and falsified his signature. The dying Lira was bitter against Moreno and Marquina, who he said were "good soldiers of the King."⁷⁷ He believed they had reduced his troops. Lira emphasized that he never would have committed the crime of which they had accused him. He wondered why he would have wanted to surrender when his troops were stronger than ever, and when he had fought bravely against the enemy at a time when he had had only six or eight rifles. He was sure that the whole division did not believe this fraud. He ended in a tone of desperation saying, "Everything has been fraud, rivalry, envy, and this [coup] is [only] ambition for power." He then repeated, "This is not my signature, I never thought of this."⁷⁸ The deposed commander then asked his friend Vargas to go to the barracks and tell the army of his innocence.

Tambor did as requested by Lira. But when he reached the quarters they were empty, with the exception of a few officers who had been arrested, probably because they had voiced allegiance to the wounded commander. Vargas was also arrested and jailed with these officers. Later they all were freed and taken to an assembly room. There Santiago Farjado, father-in-law of Marquina, was the first to address the meeting. He said that history was full of these incidents, but what he lamented most was that a courageous and fine leader had been murdered in cold blood. Farjado wondered what the superiors in Buenos Aires would think about this, and what excuse they could give them for such a barbarous act.

He was concerned too about what the Patriots would say about such a scandal, about the way this unit did its business. Farjado was wondering how they could cleanse their name. As Lira in his speech to Vargas, so Farjado, the man who soon would take the place of Lira, in his speech to the assembly, ended in a note of sadness and skepticism. He thought that he would have been better off if he had remained an uninterested citizen instead of becoming a Patriot. He added that if he had the means⁷⁹ he would leave these lands in order not to witness these rivalries among the Patriots. Then Marquina, the son-in-law of Farjado and the man who had first publicized the original charges against Lira, said to the meeting that this eventful day had produced two important incidents. The first was the loss of a "brave, sagacious, prudent and meritorious commander,"⁸⁰ and the second, the awareness that someone had wanted to start a great intrigue with the intention of destroying the unity and faith of this partisan unit. He thought that nobody was responsible for the death of Lira, who incidentally had not yet died, but that it was due to the wishes of "the god of the warriors,"⁸¹ who is the one who holds in his hands the destiny of all fighters. He thought that the most important thing to do was to name a new commander in order to avoid further anarchy. Everybody present agreed with this need. Farjado was quickly and unanimously elected as the new commander of the partisan unit. At first he refused the honor but then gave in. The new leader then swore to uphold the cause of the Patriots, and after this all the other members at the meeting swore allegiance to Farjado and to obey strictly his orders and judgments. Immediately four mem-

bers⁸² raised the question about the false signature, and wanted it to be cleared up. They were of the opinion that this letter was false and that the signature was forged, and demanded that a committee be set up to investigate this scandalous case. They emphasized that it was most pertinent to come to a conclusion, since in the future this same kind of trick could be played with the new commander. But already most members at the meeting advanced the opinion that the signature was forged by Lieutenant Antonio Pacheco. Farjado ordered that Pacheco should be arrested for inquiry and if enough evidence was available he should be put before a military court.

In the meanwhile the disorder in the village streets had not yet subsided. Soldiers were roving in the streets, shouting, "Long live the fatherland, death to bad government."⁸³ At nine o'clock the dying Lira requested that Tambor Vargas be with him in his last moments. Farjado consented to this wish. The ex-Commander, in a coma, lay in the bed, very pale, with a wooden crucifix in his hand. The country commissioner (subdelegado) held him in his arms; a priest stood at the other side. No one else was in the room. Four heavily armed guards stood outside, not letting anyone in. Vargas embraced the dying man with tears in his eyes. In a shaking voice he told him that he was very moved, that he felt so very bad that Lira was paying dearly for his uninterrupted work for the Patriotic cause. Lira was unable to answer, but only held up the crucifix, pointing to Christ as if he wanted to say that in Christ he had found peace. Vargas was overtaken completely by his emotions, as were the priest and commissioner. It was indeed a pa-

thetic mement. Then Lira suddenly rallied strength, took some water and said quite clearly, "Where are all my companions, why do they leave me alone in this moment? Are they already dead? Where are they? Without doubt dead or prisoners." Rallying more strength, he embraced Vargas and whispered, "Good-by, my friend."⁸⁴ He was painfully hurt that no one else besides Vargas had come. Whispering still, he said that he was dying but that he had worked always for the cause of the Patriots, that he had worked very hard, and in gratitude his troops had now killed him. Lira advised Vargas to commit suicide or go to the enemy. He thought the enemy would take him and free him, and then Vargas would be free of all this nonsense. But it might be, although he did not think so, that the enemy would put him before a firing squad. But then he would die in honor for the fatherland "in a public square, well provided for, and with the formalities of the occasion."⁸⁵ At least Vargas would not finish as miserably as he, Lira, had. He became agitated, fell back and was unable to continue. Again he rallied strength, put his hand in the wound, tore out a piece of bone and handed it over to a second priest, who had just entered, saying, "I am dying innocent, I die innocent, they have betrayed me. I die as a Patriot, I die as a Catholic."⁸⁶ He then mumbled some prayers very weakly, holding the crucifix tightly. Lira was in his very last moments. It was 10:30 when one more guerrilla leader passed away.

The succeeding pages of the diary acquire even more color, movement, sadness and adventure. Space does not permit to tell more in detail. With Lira's death and Farjado's election unrest did not calm

down, but a period of anarchy and internal strife followed. Nobody thought anymore of fighting the Spaniards. How much jurisdiction or how extensive Lira's republiqueta had been is vague and indeterminable. But it certainly extended beyond the limits of his headquarters. He had commanded the allegiance of far-away villages, and the Indians had loved him since he had their blood in his veins.⁸⁷ Once he was dead, thousands and thousands of Indians and minor guerrilla leaders converged upon Palca and Machaca. They wished to know who had killed their beloved leader and hero. The picture then took a dramatic turn, and our source, the drummer Vargas, has expressed it in simple and captive words. The Indians threatened and besieged the Farjado force. They demanded Moreno, Marquina, Miranda and others, in order to judge them for the death of their caudillo.⁸⁸ Farjado vacillated, negotiated, small skirmishes took place, then the new commander decided to turn over the wanted ones. Moreno and his band resisted, and they fought the Indians bitterly. Farjado was helpless. It was war among the factions. Moreno and Marquina were accused by their own fellow officers of having been soldiers of the King. It was said that Marquina was responsible for the death of the great guerrilla Munecas. Farjado, a peace-maker with no ambition but to lead a simple life, wanted to resign and turn over his command to a council composed of all the antagonistic factions. His son-in-law, Marquina, and his followers refused to let him do this, for it would have meant the end for them. But finally a junta composed of all important members of the factions, including such Indian and mestizo leaders as Copitas, Calderón, Chinchilla, Quispe

and Zúñiga, was set up. Farjado resigned to the council. The council's sole job was to supervise an election of a new overall commander. Then the voting took place. It is not clear who could vote and who could not, but it resembled a great and sincere show of real grass roots democracy. Village mayors and Indian caciques were there for the election. The voting was secret. The honest, but uninterested, Farjado was reelected, and Chinchilla, the favorite of the Indians, became second in command. The members who had engineered the coup against Lira (Moreno, Marquina etc.) remained unpunished.

But peace was not yet established among the factions. Again, in the early part of 1818, another crisis arose. Under the influence of alcohol, Marquina and Moreno accused each other of planning the death of Lira. Later they decided to desert to the enemy. The news leaked out. Marquina killed Moreno. Then he defended himself against arrest with his unit. Finally the Indians, who had not yet forgotten their beloved Lira, captured Marquina and "shot him, cut off his head, and put it on a post."⁸⁹ Farjado, who had let those who had killed Lira go unpunished, then wished to retire. In a grandiose manifestation the Indians and other soldiers elected Chinchilla as their commander. From then on more unity was achieved and Chinchilla distinguished himself as an active fighter against the King's army.⁹⁰ The Ayopaya guerrilla republic stood solid until the end of the war.⁹¹

What are the deductions or conclusions that one can make from this account of the intimate life of the most famous and successful guerrilla unit of the War of Independence in Upper Peru? The existence of

the partisan republic was due to the war, but was enmity and hatred of the Spaniards the incentive for fighting? The point is unquestionably debatable. Some would say yes, and the patriotic sentiments of the Bolivian historians do not permit them even to consider any other cause.⁹²

To them the guerrilla is a heroic being. One distinguished Bolivian historian has severely criticized another for not pointing out the superior qualities of the Upper Peruvian guerrilla leaders over the guacho guerrillas of the United Provinces.⁹³

But would not the spirit of adventure be a rather potent factor for the existence of those factions?⁹⁴

Clear-cut points of grievance against the Spanish domination, such as the generation of 1809 published and used as the platform for their rebellion, were not considered by the guerrillas.⁹⁵ They spoke against the crown in vague terms, such as freeing themselves from the Spanish yoke.⁹⁶

Indeed isolated cases of real and sincere anti-Spanish hatred and complete dedication to the cause of freedom are known, such as the guerrilla

soldier, Pedro Loaysa, of the Ayopaya unit, who refused to surrender to the Spaniards and threw himself over a precipice rather than fall into

the hands of the hated enemy.⁹⁷ But these are exceptions. Desertion was

very common. Even the great fighter Lira was many times in contact with the Spaniards,⁹⁸ although the accusation which was used as an excuse to

kill him was absolutely false. There was constant intercourse between

the enemies. Soldiers and officers passed over from one side to the other, whenever the other side offered better conditions, or when their positions

in their unit had become threatened because they had committed some mis-

demeanor.⁹⁹ Each side accepted with great pleasure the enemy's deserters.

The War of Independence offered a wonderful opportunity for adventure, a free and loose life, and living outside the law. Around a few honest people with clear-cut convictions, such as Chinchilla and Padilla, a huge group of adventure-loving and careless people grouped. To them it did not matter for what they fought, but only that they fought.

In order to put up a successful fight, manpower was needed. The great Indian masses offered a large reservoir of able fighting men. The Indian constituted one of the most complex aspects of the War of Independence in Upper Peru. They were the materia prima for both sides, and the two contending parties of the war siphoned from this source of supply as extensively as possible. But the Indian was nothing more than reservoir material. Little did the natives know of the issues involved. They knew that their services were needed and only that mattered to them. It is hardly possible to say that the great bulk of Indians were in favor of the Spaniards or were sympathetic to the Patriots. They fought for whichever side was more convenient to them. The partisan leaders had an advantage over the Loyalist officials because most of them had Indian blood and the ability to offer a better bargain to the Indians. Also, the guerrillas operated mostly in the countryside, which had a heavier Indian concentration. It was natural that the Indians fought for whoever was dominant in their district. They constituted a great power in the Ayopaya republic, and when Lira was assassinated they were responsible for lifting their favorite, Chinchilla, to the command.

Unquestionably the Indian was a potent element in the partisan warfare.¹⁰⁰ But the Indian, far more than the mestizo, was very ignorant of the issues and reasons for the war,¹⁰¹ and therefore became an extremely dangerous element, because at the slightest provocation he shifted allegiance to the enemy. In some instances when he deserted to the opposition, he took with him the heads of some soldiers or officers to gain acceptance with the other side.¹⁰² The Indian was needed, but feared.¹⁰³

Generalization is always an evil, and there were Indians and Indian caciques who were staunchly loyal to the Patriots¹⁰⁴ or the Spaniards.¹⁰⁵ It often happened that the Spaniards treated the natives much better than the American whites. The criollos and the mestizos felt a certain disdain for the Indians and looked down on them. During the great Indian rebellions of the late eighteenth century in Upper Peru, it was the criollos and mestizos who frantically mobilized the resistance against the Indian threat.¹⁰⁶ In Upper Peru's capital, Chuquisaca, the criollos more than anyone else were responsible for the public hangings of some captured rebels of those uprisings, in the city's parks and main square.¹⁰⁷ Several Indian caciques might have still remembered those days, and probably were fearful that the criollos would win the War of Independence. Between the two evils, the Spaniards represented the lesser one. To cacique Manuel Cáceres the ideal solution was the elimination of both contingents. In the midst of the war he and his Indians revolted with the idea of reestablishing the Inca empire.¹⁰⁸ He shrewdly offered support to both the Patriots and the Loyalists, with the idea of waiting

for the opportune moment to do away with both of them. He failed completely. Of curiosity and interest are the various proclamations in Quechua by the Spanish and Argentine authorities, trying to persuade the Indians to join their side, promising them in vague terms many privileges that truly they never intended to give.¹⁰⁹ Both sides called the natives "brothers" and offered to "consider them as equals."¹¹⁰ The Indians were a huge pool of manpower that could not be ignored. They represented an amorphous mass to be used freely by the Loyalists and the Patriots.¹¹¹ The natives were generally indifferent to the issues and fought on the side that offered the best opportunity and which occupied their village or region. Neither the Loyalists nor the Patriots had any higher ideals in regard to the Indians than that they were a force which they needed. Neither the generation of 1809 nor the guerrilla leaders ever thought of emancipating the Indians.¹¹² The guerrilla units represented a more democratic front solely because they were of a cross section of society. None of the Patriots fought for an independent Upper Peru, but only for freedom from the Spaniards, for personal ambition or adventure.

The motive of adventure, loot and a free life was really the most common incentive for the great bulk of the montoneros to participate in the struggle for independence. But surely not all of them were stimulated by these simple material reasons. Those who fought for an ideal did so because they disliked the "tyranny of the Spanish government"¹¹³ and the "Spanish cupidity."¹¹⁴ But beyond these incidental and vague expressions of protest against the crown, nothing of a more definite nature,

such as a declaration of grievances, is ever known to have been formulated by any guerrilla. Yet there is one single word which is mentioned over and over. They fought for the Patria, the fatherland. When guerrilla Padilla sent his record of experiences to his superiors in the United Provinces, he called it a resumé of his services "in defense of the sacred right of the Patria."¹¹⁵ Drummer Vargas in his diary uses the word Patria innumerable times. The partisans called their units "armies of the Patria."¹¹⁶ Those who fought against the Spaniards are known today as Patriotas, to distinguish them from the Loyalists, known in the annals of history as Realistas, or Royalists.¹¹⁷ The war was between Patriotas and Realistas.¹¹⁸ And Patriotas means those who fought for the Patria.

What was the Patria? Once a country with its definite boundaries exists, then it is that country. But such was not the case at that time. There had been only administrative units within the Spanish colonial empire. Upper Peru was part of the Audiencia of Charcas.¹¹⁹ The Audiencia at the time of the beginning of the war in 1809, had been part of the Viceroyalty of Rio de La Plata. When Buenos Aires, in all practicality, broke loose from the empire in 1810, the Loyalist authorities in Upper Peru annexed the Audiencia of Charcas to the Viceroyalty of Lima. What was then the Patria: the Audiencia of Charcas, the Viceroyalty of La Plata or Lima? Or was the Patria each little guerrilla republic? No definite answer can be given. The partisan leaders never did define what they considered the fatherland. Drummer Vargas tells us what the Patria meant to him: "Patria is the soil on which we step and on which we live; Patria is the real cause which we must defend at all costs; for the Patria

we must sacrifice our interests and our lives."¹²⁰ One can see that even this definition is quite confusing. Vargas probably expressed very well what the average guerrilla believed the Patria to be. It did not mean any defined jurisdiction, but the longing for freedom was predominant in their minds and it meant freedom for their soil; as the great montonero, Padilla, expressed it, "We love with all our heart our soil."¹²¹ The concept of freedom was ambiguously amalgamated with the notion of the Patria. Any more definite elaboration of this fusion was not available. The Bolivian historian, Humberto Guzmán, has summarized this amalgamation very well when he writes that "the attachment to the soil inspired the origin and meaning of Patria."¹²² Upper Peru was then still occupied by the Loyalists, but the United Provinces were free, and from those free provinces aid came and more might come. Therefore the guerrilla units looked to them¹²³ for guidance, and attached their divisions to the command of the forces in the United Provinces. The authorities of the free territory never even doubted that Upper Peru was part of their jurisdiction. They called them the "internal provinces"¹²⁴ which still were occupied by the enemy. If the term Patria at the time of the high point of the guerrilla operations had any jurisdictional connotation, one could make a better case for the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata.¹²⁵

The diary of Vargas portrays one evident factor, the strict allegiance of the commander of the unit to the United Provinces.¹²⁶ As a matter of fact, the guerrilla force considered itself as part of the army of the United Provinces. When Captain Moreno sacked Paria, the commander's first worry was of how to explain this insubordination in his

unit to his superiors in Argentina.¹²⁷ Again, when Commander Lira was killed the newly appointed commander, Farjado, was very worried of "what the principal chiefs in Buenos Aires would say and how they would excuse such an atrocious act"¹²⁸ committed in the Ayopaya division. Any thought of acting independently of the United Provinces was inconceivable. As the Patria was used repeatedly, so the references to the superiors in Buenos Aires and Salta are abundant. This alone is a potent proof that there was no idea of pursuing the fight for the purpose of creating an independent Upper Peru.

The Ayopaya partisan republic is not the only case that proves this important point. When the various auxiliary armies from the United Provinces invaded Upper Peru, the guerrilla units always tried to gear their actions to the movements of the invading army. As a matter of fact, the commanding general of the auxiliary army automatically became the overall commander of the Patriotic forces in Charcas.¹²⁹ Of the few records that are available of the guerrilla leaders,¹³⁰ all show that these partisan commanders expected their orders from, and reported their movements, if possible, to the general of the liberating army. When Rondeau's army was defeated in 1815, upon his arrival in Jujuy he received from practically all guerrillas reports of how they intended to maintain the War of Independence in Charcas.¹³¹ Even Muñecas, who operated along the shores of Lake Titicaca, within view of Lower Peru held himself responsible to the United Provinces.¹³² Drummer Vargas plainly tells us about an Indian who had gone to Salta to receive instructions or orders for Lira.¹³³ Too bad that Vargas never talks about the kind of flag that

the guerrilla division used. But it is known that Warnes used as his flag the blue and white colors of the United Provinces.¹³⁴ Supposedly Arenales and Warnes always played the national anthem of the free provinces.¹³⁵ It is very patent that Upper Peru was actually, and in the minds of the guerrillas, a part of the United Provinces. That this sentiment of unity was later destroyed was clearly the fault of the free United Provinces. The next chapter will portray the failure of the auxiliary armies, their cruel behavior, and finally their abandonment of the internal provinces that constituted Upper Peru. This stimulated the desire for an independent Charcas.

Much is made of a letter by the partisan, Padilla, to the Argentine general, Rondeau, written in 1815, in which the guerrilla leader chastizes the general in rough words about the Argentine failure and his unbecoming behavior in Upper Peru.¹³⁶ This letter is often considered as the beginning of a strong feeling for an independent Charcas.¹³⁷ If one wishes to determine the exact date at which, for the first time, a vague expression for an autonomous Upper Peru is available in a document, this letter no doubt could serve the purpose. But one single letter, written probably under emotional strain by a single guerrilla, although indeed a very important one, is not very conclusive. Vargas' diary points out that obedience to the United Provinces was still strong in 1821.

In that year Chinchilla was still the commander of the Ayopaya partisan republic. On February 3, 1821, Miguel Lanza, without any previous notice, showed up in the guerrilla republic.¹³⁸ Lanza probably

had been the founder of this guerrilla faction. After the disastrous defeat of the third auxiliary army from Argentina in 1815, he retreated with the army into the United Provinces. From 1815 to 1821 Ayopaya managed its own affairs and continued the partisan warfare without ever thinking more of Lanza. Now in 1821 he appeared, appointed by the superior in Argentina as the new commander of the interior.¹³⁹ Chinchilla accepted this arrangement.¹⁴⁰ But Lanza immediately accused the ex-commander of having cooperated with the enemy, just as Lira had been accused in 1817. Without any trial, Chinchilla was put before a firing squad,¹⁴¹ and in this way Lanza killed a close friend who in 1811 had helped him escape from a Spanish jail.¹⁴² What justification did Lanza have to do what he did? Chinchilla had been his early companion, he had been elected commander of the whole unit by the soldiers and Indians of the partisan republic. He had maintained the republicuetas alive in those critical years when all other important partisan republicuetas were unable to withstand the Spanish offensive of 1816. Chinchilla had the faithful support of the Indians, who loved him. When the Indian leader, Quispe, who fought under the banner of Chinchilla, requested an explanation from Lanza for his behavior, Lanza responded that "I come to investigate all the acts of Commander Chinchilla by order of the chief commander in Buenos Aires, and to punish him if he deserves it, or to praise him if not."¹⁴³ When the author Vargas, who came to like Lanza's efficiency and enthusiasm, but hated injustice,¹⁴⁴ later asked Lanza many times why he had killed Chinchilla, the Commander mostly evaded, got angry, or stated that he had strict

orders from the superior in Salta to kill Chinchilla.¹⁴⁵ Lanza thought that dissatisfied officers under Chinchilla had communicated wrong impressions to Salta.¹⁴⁶ After Chinchilla's death Lanza streamlined and reorganized the guerrilla unit.¹⁴⁷ He fought bravely until the end of the war.

It looks certain that Lanza did not kill Chinchilla simply because he wanted to or because of personal ambition, but rather because he had instructions from superiors in the United Provinces. Argentina was still the source of authority and the guerrillas did not dispute this right. The idea of an autonomous Upper Peru, that Padilla, in a moment of disgust, had hinted at, had not yet caught on.¹⁴⁸ The guerrillas still fought for the ambiguous Patria, for freedom, for adventure and their own petty ambitions.

It was petty ambitions that were responsible for the deaths of Commanders Lira and Chinchilla. Farjado had enough sense to retire at the right time. The prime purpose of the factions was to fight the enemy, the Spanish forces, but often this became a secondary aim. Partisan squabbles among the members of a faction were always present. Of all the interesting aspects that the history of Ayopaya reveals, one seems to be of special value. The day by day account of the life of the guerrilla republic shows an amazing similarity to the later history of Bolivia. The history of this republiqueta represents a microscopic prelude to the history of Bolivia. For example, one will remember that Lira accused Moreno of making a revolution against him,¹⁴⁹ which was true, and revolutions became only too common during Bolivia's whole

history. They constituted the very blood stream of the political setting of the country and therefore produced "a hurricane of changes and vicissitudes."¹⁵⁰ Was this all not begot from a period before autonomy? The guerrillas are a real part of Bolivian history and they are an important link to independence, but are not the creators of autonomous Bolivia. The independence of Upper Peru was due, among other factors, to two antagonistic but important causes: resentment against Argentina because of her failure to liberate her interior provinces from Spanish rule, and the later intrigues of some Loyalists who, when seeing their cause lost, came out for the second best alternative, the independence of Upper Peru which then would continue to serve as the base for their enterprises, free from any outside interference.

NOTES

¹It is [U], Apuntes, 93, which is the first to give the number of 102. All other authors copy Urcullu; see Luis M. Guzman, Historia de Bolivia (3d ed.; 1896), 23; Mitre in his Belgrano, op. cit. (5th ed.), II, 379, copies Urcullu too.

²Again it is [U], Apuntes, 93, which gives the exact number of nine, without specifying any names. And again all other Bolivian historians, including Mitre, loc. cit., repeats Urcullu. Further, [U], loc. cit., states that none surrendered and here too all Bolivian historians proudly repeat Urcullu. Yet Manuel José Cortés, Ensayo sobre la historia de Bolivia (Sucre, 1861), 93, makes an exception and says that two became Loyalists, but he does not name them. This author is unaware of who they are, and also is unable to name the nine who survived. His research has led him to believe that Miguel Lanza, Eustaquio Méndez, Juana Azurduy de Padilla, Juan Antonion Alvarez de Arenales and probably a certain Mercado survived the war. Only Lanza became a prominent figure in the creation and consolidation of Bolivia. The further pages of the chapter will make it clear that desertion and shifting allegiance to the enemy was an ever-present evil among the partisan forces.

³See Mitre, op. cit., chap. 33.

⁴See G. René-Moreno, "La Audiencia de Charcas," Bolivia y Perú, notas . . . (S. d. Ch., 1905), 201-325; G. René-Moreno, "El Alto Perú en 1783/ documentos históricos importantes," Revista Chilena, VIII (1877), 204-234; Francisco Viedma, "Descripción geográfica y estadística de la provincia de Santa Cruz . . .," in Pedro de Angelis, ed., Colección de obras . . . relativas a la historia . . . del Río de la Plata (Buenos Aires, 1836), vol. III; Captain Andrews, Journey . . . to Potosí . . . in the years 1825-1826 (London, 1827), 2 vols.; Jaime Mendoza, El Mar del Sur (Sucre, 1926), 374 pp.

⁵If one reads the Loyalist correspondence during the war the importance of Cotagaita becomes very clear. Over and over this fortress is named. See Camba, Memorias, chaps. 9, 10; cf. Mitre, Belgrano, II, chap. 33.

⁶Cf. ibid., II, 389-395.

⁷Today known as Padilla.

⁸Mitre, Belgrano, II, 401-403.

⁹Ibid., II, 380.

¹⁰The rebellion in this strategic region of Chayanta (today in the department of Potosí) remains very confusing and obscure, see Mitre, Belgrano, II, 397. It seems that such leaders as Betanzos, Zarate, Cardoso, Fuentes, Umana and maybe Monroy operated from there, see José María Camacho, Historia de Bolivia (14th ed.; 1952), 151. There is an interesting document about some unknown guerrilla warfare around Oruro in ANB, ACH (E. C., 1818), 2, 59 fs.

¹¹Mitre, Belgrano, II, 381.

¹²Very interesting information is available in a curious manuscript sketching the history of Tarija during the war, "Fragmento q. pasa el Gov^{no} y Municipalidad de Tarixa p.^a q. se de ala prensa adornado en estilo, Tarija, y Sep.^e 2 de 1826," ANB, Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 14, no. 19; cf. Bernardo Trigo, Las tejas de mi techo (La Paz, 1939), 89-96; Luis Paz, Historia del Alto Perú. . . (Sucre, 1919), II, chaps. 19-22; Tomás O'Connor D'Arlach, El Coronel Jose Eustaquio Mendez (Tarija, 1893), 25 pp.

¹³BNB, Catalogo Corbacho, nos. 534-545.

¹⁴See Macedonio Urquidí, Compendio de la historia de Bolivia (4th ed.; 1944), 139; cf. Mendoza, "Una cronica," op.cit., 225.

¹⁵See Arenales to San Martín, Vallegrande, August 7, 1814, and Sauses, September 4, 1814, in Uriburu, op. cit., I, 285-294.

¹⁶Infra, chap. 8, n. 9.

¹⁷Urquidí, op. cit., 141.

¹⁸See Julio Díaz, Vida . . . del General Jose Miguel Lanza (La Paz, 1927), 49 pp.; Victor Santa Cruz, "El guerrillero Lanza . . .," Revista Militar (La Paz), no. 154 (August, 1950), 137-144.

¹⁹See Charles Arnade, "Una figure mediocre en el motín del 18 de abril de 1828," BSGS, XLV, 441 (1954), 73-100.

²⁰Up to folio 95v. this diary is published by Gunnar Mendoza in "Una crónica desconocida . . .," USFX, XVI, 37-38 (1951[but published in 1954]), 199-301. The published part of the diary runs from pages 254-301 (hereafter cited as Mendoza, D, page). Pages 199-254 consist of an enlightened introduction by Mr. Mendoza (hereafter cited as Mendoza, Cronica, page). Since this author has consulted the original all citations after folio 59v. will be cited as BNB, D, folio. It should be recalled that the folios before 59v. are printed in Mendoza, D. It has been announced that the whole diary will soon be published in a separate book by Gunnar Mendoza. At the time of writing this chapter the book has not reached the author.

²¹ Mendoza, D., p. 254, et. seqq.

²² BNB, D., f. 156.

²³ BNB, D., f. 157v.

²⁴ It is interesting to note that much information given by most historians in regard to the Ayopaya faction is erroneous when compared with the precise and eyewitness account of guerrilla vargas in his diary. For example, historians speak of a great battle on August 20, 1816, by Chinchilla at Charapaya (Urquidí, Compendio, op. cit., 141; Paz, Historia, II, 377). Yet the entry for August 20, 1816, in the diary (Mendoza, D., pp. 284-286) mentions Charapaya but does not speak of a battle. Again such a chronicler as [U], Apuntes, 86, 88, from whom most modern accounts are drawn, speaks always of Lanza in 1816 and 1817 when really Lanza had left in 1815. This shows that when faced with a single good primary account the standard sources become obsolete and of little value.

²⁵ ANB, ACh (E. C., 1812), f.1.

²⁶ BNB, D., f. 157v.

²⁷ Mendoza, Crónica, 237.

²⁸ A well read Bolivian historian interested in Lanza might have been able to detect the fallacy of Lanza being all the time in Ayopaya, in Manuel Trelles, Cuestiones de límites entre la república Argentina y Bolivia (Buenos Aires, 1872), 195-209, are documents by Miguel Lanza requesting pay for his services in the United Provinces.

²⁹ Mendoza, Crónica, 235-238.

³⁰ Ibid., 210.

³¹ Ibid., 210-211.

³² Loc. cit.

³³ See infra, chap. 5.

³⁴ Viedma, op. cit., 21-23.

³⁵ Ibid., 90-91; Mendoza, Cronica, 212.

³⁶ Alcides D'Orbigny, Voyage dans l'Amérique Méridionale (Paris, 1839-1843), II, 466.

³⁷Cf. Mendoza, Crónica, 213-215.

³⁸Mendoza, D, p. 230.

³⁹"Moosa: en una cañade; vistas abiertas; temperamento templado, tirando a nebuloso; plaza desnivelada; iglesia grande; callejas estrechas; en torno de cerros fragosos; la cañada que se pierde a lo lejos en negros precipicios" (Rigoberto Paredes, Provincia de Inquisivi/ estudios geográficos, estadísticos y sociales, La Paz, 1906, p. 109.

⁴⁰Mendoza, Crónica, 247.

⁴¹Ibid., 246-248.

⁴²See suora, chap. 1, n. 110.

⁴³It might be that further information about Vargas could be found in church records, if such exist, in the village of Moosa. A trip to Moosa would be required for this purpose.

⁴⁴See Mendoza, Crónica, 242.

⁴⁵See Mendoza, D, pp. 254-301.

⁴⁶See loc. cit.

⁴⁷"Diario de un soldado de la independencia alto peruana en los valles de Sicasisa y Hayopaya, 1816-1821," BNB, CR (unclassified manuscript), f. 100v.

⁴⁸Loc. cit.

⁴⁹Loc. cit.

⁵⁰Mendoza, Crónica, 235, n. 174, and p. 280.

⁵¹BNB, D, f. 101.

⁵²Loc. cit.

⁵³"Toda la vesindad desente" (ibid., f. 101v.).

⁵⁴Vargas says, "Lo más era que la misma madama de Lira, doña María Martínez, se empeñaba por la salud de Moreno" (Loc. cit.).

⁵⁵Loc. cit.

⁵⁶"Los Padrinos de Moreno" (loc. cit.).

⁵⁷Loc. cit.

⁵⁸It looks as if this meeting was held in the priest's house since the diary reads, "Todo esto se hablaba en la casa del señor Cura" (ibid., f. 102).

⁵⁹Ibid., f. 103.

⁶⁰December, 1817.

⁶¹Identified here as "Sargento Mayor don Pedro Marquina" (ibid., f. 103v.).

⁶²Loc. cit.

⁶³Ibid., f. 104.

⁶⁴Here again the word patria is used, which was translated by this author as fatherland (loc. cit.).

⁶⁵Loc. cit.

⁶⁶Loc. cit.

⁶⁷December, 1817.

⁶⁸Urquidí, Rectificaciones, 140.

⁶⁹December, 1817.

⁷⁰BNB, D, f. 104v.

⁷¹Loc. cit.

⁷²Ibid., f. 105.

⁷³Loc. cit.

⁷⁴Loc. cit.

⁷⁵Moreno and Miranda were from Cuzco, see Mendoza, Crónica, 295.

⁷⁶BNB, D, fs. 105v.-106.

⁷⁷Ibid., f. 106v.

⁷⁸Ibid., f. 107.

⁷⁹Cf. Mendoza, Crónica, 236.

⁸⁰BNB, D, f. 107v.

⁸¹Loc. cit.

⁸²Captain Carlos Bolaños, Major Juan Gonsales, Lieutenant Manuel Patiño, County Commissioner (subdelegado) Jose Manuel Arana, Lieutenant Gregorio Andrade (ibid., f. 108).

⁸³Ibid., f. 108v.

⁸⁴Ibid., f. 109.

⁸⁵Loc. cit.

⁸⁶Loc. cit.

⁸⁷Mendoza, Crónica, 235.

⁸⁸BNB, D, f. 111.

⁸⁹Ibid., f. 126.

⁹⁰Ibid., fs. 116-128.

⁹¹Ibid., fs. 128v.-156.

⁹²G. René-Moreno was never subject to the blindness of chauvinism. Two contemporary historians, Humberto Vázquez-Machicadeo and Gunnar Mendoza, follow the unbiased path that characterized René-Moreno.

⁹³Urquidí, Rectificaciones, 38.

⁹⁴Mendoza, Crónica, 231.

⁹⁵The document that comes closest to the diary of Vargas is the "Autobiografía del Teniente Coronel don Manuel Asencio Padilla," in Miguel de los Santos Taborga, Documentos inéditos, op. cit., 167-203, also published in BSGS, III-IV, 33-38 (1901-1902). This autobiography is more of a report from Padilla, dated Laguna, June 24, 1815, to his superiors. It lacks the intimacy of Vargas' words, is much shorter and is a kind of glorification of Padilla's own personality (cf. Mendoza, Crónica, 217).

⁹⁶BNB, D, f. 230; Mendoza, Crónica, 230.

⁹⁷Mendoza, D, p. 273.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 261, n. 11.

⁹⁹Mendoza, Crónica, 228-229.

¹⁰⁰For a most enlightened discussion of the role of the Indians in the Ayopaya republic, see Mendoza, Crónica, 223-226; cf. Gustavo Adolfo Otero, "El factor regional en la independencia de Bolivia," Killasuyo, I (1939), no. 2, pp. 21-23.

¹⁰¹"El indio ignora en veces la realidad bélica y sin embargo es victima de ella" (Ibid., 223).

¹⁰²Cf. Camba, Memorias, I, 317.

¹⁰³Interesting are the words of Marquina to his soldiers:
" . . . entra Marquina, manda formar a toda la gente y dice: 'Muchachos: ya conoseis el caracter de los Yndios: conoseis lo crueles que son, que son crueles por condición natural: si caso logran pescar a uno de vosotros, no les dejará hueso sano: conoseis que no entienden rasón alguna, ni tienen un poco de conmiseración con sus semejantes'" (BNB, D, f. 124).

¹⁰⁴ANB, ACh (T. C., 1812), nos. 9, 10, 12; cf. Arnade, Bibliografía, op. cit., 165.

¹⁰⁵BNB, Catalogo Corbacho, no. 316.

¹⁰⁶See Alipio Valencia Vega, Julián Tupaj Katari (Buenos Aires, [1948]), 15.

¹⁰⁷G. René-Moreno, Ultimos dias, op. cit.

¹⁰⁸The movement of Caceres is not very well known and has not been studied thoroughly, see Luis Paz, Estudios . . . de Miguel de los Santos Taborga, op. cit., 155-157; Juan Muñoz Cabrera, op. cit., 220-221; Odriózola, op. cit., III, 49-160; Nicanor Aranzaes, Diccionario histórico del departamento de La Paz (La Paz, 1915), 156-157.

¹⁰⁹"Documentos de la independencia/ proclamas en Quichua," BSGS, XVI, 173-175 (1915), 44-56.

¹¹⁰Ibid., 50.

111 The contemporary Bolivian leftist writer, Alipio Valencia Vega, in his Desarrollo del pensamiento político en Bolivia (La Paz, 1953), 50, is the only writer who clearly says that the Indian was a mobile force used by both contingents ("El indio fue mantenido en su posición secundaria e inferior y fue utilizado tanto por realistas como por patriotas.").

28. 112 Roberto Alvarado, Tres esquemas de historia (n. p., 1950),

113 Mendoza, D. p. 275.

114 Loc. cit.

115 "Autobiografía," BSGS, op. cit., no. 33, p. 135.

116 Uriburu, op. cit., passim.

117 See any standard Bolivian history.

118 G. René-Moreno, "Expediciones e invasiones," Revista de Artes y Letras (S. d. Ch.), V(1885), 484-489.

119 See Alfredo Jáuregui Rosquellas, "La Audiencia de Charcas," BSGS, XXX, 316-319 (1933), 1-53.

120 Mendoza, D. p. 275; cf. Mendoza, Crónica, 229.

121 M. A. Padilla to General Rondeau, Laguna, December 21, 1815, in Jorge Mallo, Administración del General Sucre (Sucre, 1871), 27.

122 El caudillo de los valles, op. cit.

123 Mitre, Belgrano, II, chap. 33, notes.

124 Archivo General de la Nación, Partes oficiales, op. cit.,

125 "Los Gobiernos revolucionarios de Buenos Aires, los Jefes de las expediciones libertadoras como Castelli, Belgrano, etc, en sus notas y proclamas hablan a los pueblos del Alto Perú, de la 'patria'. Y cual era entonces 'la patria'? -- que se entendía en esas oportunidades por ella? La patria era ya 'Las Provincias Unidas del Sur', era el territorio ensangrentado desde el Desaguadero hasta Buenos Aires; era el Alto Perú, era el Tucumán, era el Virreynato todo, cuadrado ante las fuerzas de España" (Arturo Rawson, Argentina y Bolivia en la epopeya de la emancipación, La Paz, 1828, p. 133).

¹²⁶"En verdad, el vínculo formal de dependencia que liga la facción con respecto al Río de la Plata, es patente" (Mendoza, Crónica, 231).

¹²⁷BNB, D, f. 101.

¹²⁸Ibid., f. 107.

¹²⁹Cf. Uriburu, op. cit., passim.

¹³⁰Mostly published in the Gaceta de Buenos Aires.

¹³¹Gaceta de Buenos Aires, no. 53 (1816).

¹³²Loc. cit.

¹³³Mendoza, D, p. 298-299; Mendoza, Crónica, 2311

¹³⁴Mitre, Belgrano, II, 407.

¹³⁵Paz, Historia, II, 312.

¹³⁶Supra, n. 121.

¹³⁷See Urquidí, Rectificaciones, 34-35; José María Marquiegui, Resumen histórico del Chollansuyo, Charcas hoy Bolivia (Sucre, 1938), 75-76.

¹³⁸BNB, D, f. 156.

¹³⁹Mendoza, Crónica, 237.

¹⁴⁰BNB, D, f. 156.

¹⁴¹Ibid., f. 156v.-157v.

¹⁴²See ibid., 157v.-158; the fact that Lanza killed Chinchilla is something completely new in the annals of Bolivian history and it is doubtful that the patriotic historians will even permit this event to enter into the standard histories or textbooks, cf. Urquidí, Compendio, op. cit., 141; Luis M. Guzmán, Historia de Bolivia (3d ed.; Cochabamba, 1896), 27.

¹⁴³"Yo bengo a tomar residencia de todos los hechos del coman-date Chinchilla por el Gefe principal de Buenos Ayres y castigar si lo merece, o premiar en contrario" (ibid., f. 157).

¹⁴⁴Ibid., f. 158-161.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., f. 158.

¹⁴⁶ Vargas identifies these dissatisfied elements as Andres Rodriguez, José Teodoro Murillo, Agustín Contreras, Rafael Copitas, Mariano Flores, Laureano Morales, Mariano Zarate, Agustin Cano. He writes intelligently, "Reunense todos los mal contentos que jamás faltan en ninguna parte, por que un Gefe siempre es odiado por más bueno que sea por que jamás, ni es capás de dar contento a todos, aunque ellos mismos den motivo, por que siempre quieren que la picardia, la alevosia, y el Crimen, se reconosca por merito, y que en ves de castigar quieren que sean premiados los Malcontentos" (BNB, D, f. 156v.).

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., f. 158.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. a somewhat opposite view in [U], Apuntes, 85.

¹⁴⁹ BNB, D, f. 106.

¹⁵⁰ G. René-Moreno, "La nueva constitución i el militarismo en Bolivia," El Independiente (S. d. Ch.), no. 2393 (December 9, 1871).

CHAPTER III

THE ARMIES OF DOOM

Synopsis

The great battles that took place during the War of Independence in Upper Peru or Charcas were fought by the Royalists, directed from the viceroynal seat in Lima, against the expeditions sent by the junta of Buenos Aires to free the inner provinces (also known as Upper Peru, Charcas, or the upper provinces). Those Patriotic armies under the jurisdiction of Buenos Aires were sent from the northern part of the free provinces, which today is northern Argentina. The first auxiliary expedition was commanded by a lawyer, a member of the Buenos Aires junta, by the name of Juan José Castelli. This force entered Upper Peru in October of 1810. Their advance was delayed in the battle of Cotagaita on October 27, but due to a swift movement was victorious on November 7 in the combat of Suipacha (first battle of Suipacha). They then occupied the heart of Charcas, composed of the rich towns of Potosí and Chuquisaca. Castelli and his two subordinate generals, Balcarce and Díaz Vélez, advanced all the way up to the very border of the Viceroyalty of Lima, which is today more or less the frontier between Bolivia and Peru. Here the able Royalist general, Goyaneche, defeated the auxiliary army in the battle of Huaqui on June 21, 1811 (also known as

the battle of Guaqui, Jesús de Machaca, Yuraicoragua, or del Desaguadero). The expeditionary force had to retreat back into the free provinces. General Díaz Vélez was able to unite some of the dispersed soldiers and presented battle again at Suipacha on January 12, 1812 (second battle of Suipacha), but was again routed. This constituted the end of the first auxiliary army.

The second expedition was commanded by the talented and famous General Belgrano. Having defeated the Royalist invaders in the combats of Tucumán, September 21, 1812, and Salta, February 20, 1813, he pursued them into the upper provinces, occupying without opposition the fortress of Potosí and the capital of Upper Peru, Chuquisaca. The able general then decided to march farther north, but unaccustomed to the rough mountain terrain, he was defeated by the new Spanish commander, an expert in mountain warfare, General de la Pezuela, in the combat of Vilcapugio on October 1, 1813. Belgrano was able to reunite his defeated forces and again entered battle at Ayohuma on November 14, but was again beaten. He had to evacuate the stronghold of Potosí and returned to the northern free provinces.

In April, 1815, the third expeditionary army under the command of General José Rondeau began its offensive north. On the very border between today's Argentina and Bolivia the Argentine force inflicted a defeat on the retreating Royalists, on April 17, in Puesto del Marqués. General de la Pezuela's army retreated deep into Upper Peru and Rondeau took possession of Potosí and Chuquisaca. Instead of continuing his advance farther north the Argentine commander lost valuable time.

When he finally decided to open his campaign the Royalists had successfully reorganized their army. In his advance on Oruro Rondeau was checked at Venta Media, on October 20, 1815. He then turned toward Cochabamba, but before reaching the city General de la Pezuela completely routed Rondeau's army on November 27, in the battle of Sipa Sipa (also known as Viloma). It was the worst defeat that the Patriots ever suffered during the whole war. The auxiliary army was completely scattered and Rondeau had to walk alone to Chuquisaca. From here with a small group of loyal soldiers, who had taken the same road, he made his way back to the United Provinces. After the great holocaust of the third auxiliary army no more expeditions were sent into the inner provinces, with the exception of the daring but useless commando raid by Colonel Aráoz de la Madrid in 1817, which reached the very center of the city of Chuquisaca. But the small contingent of the venturesome colonel had to withdraw to the northern free provinces.

All three auxiliary armies were tactless and their behavior was pernicious and mischievous. Castelli was tyrannical and the people feared him. Belgrano was correct but undiplomatic. Rondeau was weak, therefore his army was corrupt, and de la Madrid was highly conceited. By 1816 the inhabitants of Charcas had come to hate the auxiliaries as much as the Spaniards. After the battle of Sipa Sipa the occupied inner provinces were abandoned by the United Provinces to their own fate. The free provinces had entered a period of anarchy; Buenos Aires was opposed to liberating the inner provinces because this would strengthen the provincial forces; and General San Martín came to realize the im-

possibility of marching to Lima through Charcas, and decided to go via Chile. When the war had started in 1809 Charcas had been an integral part of the La Plata jurisdiction. But the failure of the free provinces to liberate the inner provinces and the villainous behavior of the three auxiliary armies, plus their military defeats, created in Charcas a resentment for the free sister provinces. A separatist spirit began to develop, gained momentum, and became a prime factor in the creation of the republic of Bolivia.

In the creation of the republic of Bolivia in 1825 the guerrillas represented a very negligible factor because of their lack of a precise goal, because the majority had gone down to defeat, and because the remaining number were ignored and outsmarted by more politically subtle elements. But the guerrilla warfare had not been the sole militancy against the Royalists. The war was fought by two kinds of forces: "The everlasting battle of montoneras . . . and a series of strategic campaigns between armies of far-away origins."¹ This second struggle was the clash of the Spanish and Patriotic armies. The Spanish legions were directed from the Viceroyalty of Lima,² and the rebels came up from the Plata region with the purpose of liberating the upper provinces, which they considered an integral part of the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires. Once freed these internal provinces could be used as a springboard to invade the Viceroyalty of Lima. These Argentine contingents were known as the auxiliary armies.³

By 1810 the battle lines were drawn. When the war started in Upper Peru in 1809 that region, organized as the Audiencia of Charcas, belonged to the Viceroyalty of La Plata. When in 1810 Buenos Aires, for all practical purposes, severed her relations with the Spanish empire the faithful Royalist authorities in Upper Peru, who had successfully suppressed the revolts in 1809, delivered the Audiencia of Charcas, at their own volition, to the Viceroyalty of Lima.⁴ The authorities in Buenos Aires never recognized this switch, and from their point of view the upper provinces constituted an integral part of the new order within the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires. Truly the upper provinces were occupied

by the enemy; to liberate them was the prime purpose of the auxiliary armies. From a juridical point of view Upper Peru was in a state of flux.⁵ The Patriots looked to Buenos Aires for help and considered themselves part of the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires, as had been the case before the war. The Loyalists approved the secession because of the spirit of revolt that was now prevalent in the Viceroyalty of La Plata, and they looked to Lima for protection and guidance. To them Charcas had reverted back to Lima, to which it had belonged before the creation of the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires. If the Patriots should win the war, the integration of the upper provinces within the jurisdiction of Buenos Aires would be expected.⁶ The spirit of isolation and the wish to separate that were prevalent in Paraguay and the Banda Oriental were mostly absent in the Upper provinces. But in the end this was not the case, and these provinces also withdrew.

The units or armies which marched into Upper Peru from Buenos Aires, with the specific purpose of freeing those provinces, achieved a reverse result. Their military failure and undignified behavior created resentment which became the basis for not wanting to belong again to Buenos Aires. The legions from Buenos Aires, in fact, stimulated the desire for an independent Upper Peru. The brilliant, and without doubt, nationalistic Argentine writer, Bautista Alberdi, has frankly admitted, in speaking of his nation's armies, that they "soon exasperated the people because of their violence, and those lands became more enemies of the Patriots than of the Spaniards."⁷ Alberdi was correct. A well led Argentine army, with reasonable military success, good coordination with

the guerrillas, proper behavior and a polished propaganda apparatus could have liberated the Upper Provinces, and the problem of separation would have never become acute.

The first auxiliary army to enter the upper provinces was under the command of a lawyer by the name of Juan José Castelli, who in his youth had been a student at the famous University of San Francisco Xavier in Chuquisaca.⁸ His force entered Upper Peru in October, 1810. Before crossing the border of the internal provinces Castelli's army, by instruction of Buenos Aires, had already committed a serious mistake. Ex-Viceroy Liniers and some of his associates were put before a firing squad by the auxiliary army, an action which would not be well received in Charcas. The English invasions in 1806 had produced a tremendous shock and fear throughout the whole Audiencia of Charcas.⁹ Everybody was solemnly united against those "hateful islanders,"¹⁰ as the beloved Archbishop Benito María Moxó¹¹ had classified them. And everyone wished the defeat of this "gang of schismatics and heretics,"¹² which was another epithet of Moxó, who in his pastoral letters infused more fear, suspicion and hatred for the English. When the troops of Beresford were defeated everyone felt relieved; now the ingleses would not come to Charcas. It was Liniers who had saved them from those soldiers who the provincial people of Charcas, isolated in their mountains and jungles, thought would want to impose on them the hateful "revolutionary doctrine of Calvin."¹³ Liniers became the hero of all the people of Charcas, and now he had been condemned to death for treason. Without question the high esteem with which Upper Peru regarded Liniers had not completely vanished. And the

man, Castelli, who had carried out the death sentence, was on his way to Charcas to liberate them. Indeed a very bad start.

On November 25, 1810, after an initial defeat and then a surprising victory, the Argentine army entered Potosí, the most important of all towns of Upper Peru.¹⁴ After the victory of Suipacha the pro-Patriotic elements inside Potosí had taken over the town¹⁵ and Castelli's victorious army entered in the midst of cheering partisans. Perhaps the first Argentine mistake was forgotten and with tact and intelligence Castelli could have easily improved his favorable position.¹⁶ Chuquisaca, the capital of the Audiencia, had only days before pronounced itself for Buenos Aires. The guerrillas had liberated Cochabamba, and La Paz too came out in favor of Buenos Aires. The Spanish army retreated to the outskirts of La Paz. It looked as if the upper provinces were free and had accepted the new order in the Viceroyalty of La Plata. But no so. Castelli proved to be the wrong man, for he "had the soul of a Tyrant."¹⁷

Castelli committed another blunder, even greater and bloodier than his first one. He apprehended the president of the Audiencia of Charcas, Nieto, and condemned him to death together with the venerable intendant of Potosí, Paula Sanz, and the Royalist general, Córdova. Although all three were Royalists, none of them were hated by the people, and the death sentence was unnecessarily severe. Francisco Paula Sanz was the most beloved figure in Charcas.¹⁸ He had governed Potosí for twenty-two years and as one Bolivian author says, has become "the idol of the potosinos."¹⁹ He had been the most correct Spanish governor and

his many years in office had been irreproachable."²⁰ President Nieto's ten months of service in Upper Peru had not been enlightened and his rule was quite arbitrary, but he had not caused any terror.²¹ From Chuquisaca Archbishop Moxó wrote Castelli, wanting to know why these three men had been sentenced to death, and requesting in the name of the whole city liberty for them.²² Castelli ignored every request. On Saturday, September 15, 1810, in the main square of Potosí in full view of the terrified inhabitants of the Villa Imperial, who simply could not believe what was happening, the three prisoners were executed. The fatal shots were fired twenty minutes to ten in the morning.²³ The only crime that the condemned men had committed was to have remained loyal to the cause they thought was the best, and not recognizing the governing junta of Buenos Aires. Castelli had accused them of deliberately dismembering the Viceroyalty of La Plata when Nieto and Sanz had united Charcas to Lima.²⁴ Because of this he convicted them, with the ultimate penalty. No court judged them, and the sentence of death was Castelli's word alone.

But even worse, the auxiliary army behaved atrociously, more as a cruel victor than as an ally who wanted to liberate Upper Perú. During the nights the soldiers roved freely in Potosí's dark and narrow streets, showing no respect for the town's citizens, performing all kinds of abuses. Francisco Lacoa was killed by some soldiers who took a fancy to his elegant cloak. Mrs. Terán was robbed of everything she possessed when some Argentinians came to search her house. A certain Faustino Velarde was attacked in the middle of the street, and once dead he was robbed of everything. Another citizen was put to death in cold blood with a saber,

for no reason at all. The soldiers of the auxiliary unit showed little respect for the women, and whoever came to their defense was shot down mercilessly. Potosí came to fear and hate the Argentinians and when, on December 22, 1810, Castelli and his army left the town for Chuquisaca the people of the City of Silver felt a deep relief and that a dreadful nightmare had come to an end.²⁶ The seeds for an everlasting hatred against the Argentinians had been planted.

Castelli's behavior in Charcas' capital, Chuquisaca, also left very much to be desired. Although rumors of his preposterous conduct in Potosí had reached the capital, and the assassination of Nieto, Sanz and Córdova was looked upon with extreme suspicion, still the auxiliary army was received "splendidly."²⁷ Yet Castelli lost not a moment in subjecting the town to his arbitrary rule. He immediately interfered in the town's government by naming a cabildo of his own choice. He decided who would occupy all important positions. On January 5, 1811, Castelli issued a stern proclamation in which he restricted all political and judicial guarantees. Everyone who opposed the auxiliary army would be declared a traitor and liable to court-martial. No one could speak against the government of Buenos Aires; to do so would be "a crime of the first magnitude."²⁸ Anyone who denounced those who voiced an opinion against the government and the Argentine army would be rewarded.²⁹ Because of this, many distinguished citizens were arrested and shipped to Argentina. Not satisfied with this, on February 8 the Argentine commander issued an even sterner proclamation in which he promised that anyone who opposed the government in word or action would be militarily condemned of the

highest crime,³⁰ which meant death. The Argentine nightmare had gone from Potosí to Chuquisaca. The auxiliary soldiers behaved exactly the same way as they had done in Potosí.

To the relief of the capital Castelli and his army left Chuquisaca in March to push their advance north to the border of the Viceroyalty of Lima. He took Oruro and La Paz, and afterwards signed a forty day armistice with the Royalist general, Goyaneche, stopping the lines of battle more or less along the border that separated the two viceroyalties. But Castelli was not true to his word and slowly, in defiance of the armistice, pushed the line farther north. Goyaneche retorted with a surprise attack and completely routed the auxiliary army at Huaqui on June 20, 1811.³¹ Castelli and his defeated army retreated in panic toward Oruro. They had to bypass Oruro because its inhabitants were ready to finish off the hated auxiliaries, an indication that Castelli had repeated his performance of Potosí and Chuquisaca in that mining town.³² Goyaneche too was taken by surprise by his perfect victory. Being a careful soldier, he avoided haste and did not pursue the routed enemy. He took thorough care of the wounded of both sides and gave decent treatment to the many prisoners.

The auxiliary army dispersed in complete disorder toward Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Potosí. In most instances the retreating units plundered towns and villages as they passed.³³ La Paz had some agonizing moments when part of the defeated army came through³⁴ there. There was absolutely no contact among the retreating units,³⁵ but most of them took the road toward Potosí, the strongest fortress in Charcas. Castelli apparently

went to Chuquisaca.³⁶ Again the Imperial City was the host of the Argentine army, which this time used the town to reorganize its decimated ranks. Potosí was not at all happy about it; memories of the previous year were still vivid, and while the army had been north an ugly incident had occurred between the people of Potosí and the little Argentine garrison left behind.

On February 4, 1811, the people of Potosí were celebrating the Feast of the Purification of Mary, as was the custom. Among the highpoints of the festival was an afternoon bullfight. The Argentine officers were seated in a balcony of honor, and the auxiliary soldiers were dispersed among the people, some taking part in the bullfight. At the moment when the main bull of the arena was passing underneath the balcony of honor an Argentine lieutenant jumped up, took out his sword and tried to stick it into the bull from above. Because of a last second sharp movement of the animal he missed, and his sword hit the empty air. The officer lost his equilibrium and in a most hilarious somersault fell from the balcony into the ring. General loud laughter rang through the arena. The lieutenant sprang up, picked up his saber and in a fury swung it around, hurting some Indians who were taken by surprise. Some people who tried to restrain the officer were also struck by the weapon. A sudden and unanimous protest arose among the spectators, who spontaneously fell upon the auxiliaries. Armed with "sticks, rocks and knives"³⁷ they pursued the panic-stricken soldiers and officers, who ran in haste to their quarters to fetch their arms. Tempers ran high. The auxiliary commander ordered his unit to open fire if the people should attack the barracks. The potosinos

meanwhile were advancing in fury toward the soldiers' quarters. Everything was ready for a terrific massacre. Only the last minute frantic intervention of a civic minded citizen by the name of José Guzmán persuaded both sides to lay down arms, and calmly go home. Serious bloodshed had been prevented,³⁸ but now tempers were higher than ever and any slight provocation by the auxiliaries could produce a second incident.

And now in June and July of 1811 the rest of the auxiliary army, completely defeated and demoralized, returned to Potosí. The situation was explosive, and everybody felt that a second February fourth was quite possible. On Monday, August 5, 1811, a drunken Negro auxiliary soldier interrupted a peaceful conversation among some citizens in one of the plazas. When they ignored him he furiously took his knife and attacked them. A fight ensued. The news traveled with speed, and the drunk soldier received help from some of his comrades. The other side was reinforced by more and more potosinos. One auxiliary soldier was killed. The Argentinians ran to their quarters to get their weapons. Armed, they advanced upon the people and opened fire, but the civilians increased their ranks to such a number that the auxiliaries again started to retreat. The people brought out all kinds of weapons and the casualties of the auxiliaries were heavy. From all sides the townspeople harassed them. Many fell wounded but the fury of the potosinos had reached unreasonable heights. Cruelly they fell upon the wounded soldiers, beating them to death. The frenzy of the people had no end, and they now directed their attack against those civilians who had shown favor to the auxiliaries. The Argentinians were not fighting anymore

in a unit, but each was fighting to save his own life from the enraged inhabitants.

The battle of Huacui had been mild compared with this massacre. A priest by the name of Arechabala wanted to intervene and stop the slaughter but apparently both sides shot him to death. Through the whole night the battle continued. Potosí in her wild history had seen many bloody scenes,³⁹ but it had never witnessed such as this. Even the coming of morning did not abate the struggle. Everybody was looking frantically for hidden auxiliaries, and other soldiers fought valiantly to keep the masses away from them. To fall into their hands meant sure death. The people of Potosí were determined to finish with the auxiliary army. By mid-day several cool minded citizens used a last resource to terminate the massacre. They took from the churches of Santo Domingo and San Francisco the images of the Virgin of the Rosary and Vera Cruz and organized a procession through the streets where the heaviest fighting continued unabated. It had a smashing effect. The fight subsided, and a fearful quietness settled over the Imperial City. One hundred and forty-five soldiers had been killed and only nine civilians had lost their lives.⁴⁰ The resentment against the Argentine army abuses, which had accumulated for nearly a year, had caused an explosion much worse than the people had expected.

In the absence of Castelli the auxiliary commander was the future famous Argentine leader, Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, who previous to Castelli's defeat had been named President of the Audiencia. Pueyrredón acted with caution and seeming good will, even though the potosinos had mas-

sacred his unit. He undertook to reconcile the explosive and sharp tempers.⁴¹ On the next day⁴² he ordered his army to dress in gala uniforms and march to the main square. At the same time he invited all the citizens to come to the plaza. Then the auxiliary commander urged both soldiers and townspeople to make peace, forget the past and unite against the common enemy. A real comedy took place; whereas only a day before a furious battle had raged in the Imperial City's narrow streets, now in the colorful square an air of gaiety and festivity reigned. Auxiliaries and Potosinos fell into each other's arms and together with the abrazo they swore forgiveness and to put the past deep, deep away so that no one would even want to remember it. From now on they would be friends and allies. More than 150 men had perished, apparently for nothing. But such a theatrical scene was nothing else than an expression of hypocrisy.⁴³ Pueyrredón had without question done what he honestly believed was necessary to restore reunion and peace. But simply calling everyone to the plaza and then asking that each one should embrace a rival was no real remedy for the deep-seated antagonism caused by the auxiliary army. An investigation was started to determine the cause of the tragedy of August 5.⁴⁴ The Argentinians, who conducted the inquiry, came to the conclusion that the city's priests were responsible for what Pueyrredón called the "revolution of August 5 and 6."⁴⁵ They were accused of inciting the masses to a counter-revolution in favor of Lima. Four priests were arrested and ordered away from Potosí,⁴⁶ which indeed constituted a slight sentence. One can only imagine that if Castelli had been present, what would have happened. It is hardly possible that Pueyrredón's con-

clusion as to the cause for the holocaust was in any way even close to the truth.⁴⁷

In the meanwhile the Peruvian army, under the capable Goyaneche, was carefully advancing toward the south. In a new battle it completely defeated the auxiliary contingent that had been reorganized in Cochabamba.⁴⁸ Pueyrredón, afraid that this news would encourage the potosinos to further acts, boldly announced that Díaz Vélez, the auxiliary commander in the Cochabamba district, had won a splendid victory. The church bells announced this hoax to the Imperial City. But this dishonesty was soon discovered when a Franciscan friar received from a friend, an officer in the Goyaneche army, a detailed account of the battle of Sipasipa. The letter further told of the great magnanimity with which Goyaneche had treated the people of Cochabamba. The news spread like a flash, and tempers again ran high against the auxiliaries. Soon after this Díaz Vélez entered Potosí with his defeated unit, proving that the friar's letter had been only too true. It was now advisable for the Argentine army to evacuate Potosí.

Díaz Vélez, rightly fearing that his defeated unit would only stir up more hostile feelings, and realizing the impossibility of defending Potosí with a disorganized army and an unfriendly town, decided to leave the Imperial City and retreat to Argentina. Pueyrredón and some selected crack units were to remain in town for as long as possible. The Commander and President wanted nothing more than to get hold of the plentiful funds that were deposited in the famous Casa de Moneda.⁴⁹

the San Carlos Bank and other fiscal agencies.⁵⁰ He requested from the potosinos four hundred mules to carry the spoils.⁵¹ A unanimous protest arose among the irate citizens. Pueyrredón tried to calm tempers by saying that he had no intention of carrying the funds to Argentina, but he wished to take them to the Upper Peruvian village of Tupiza so that those valuables would not fall into the enemy's hands.⁵² But the Commander had overreached himself. The town's hostility against his small unit became more acute and the position of the remaining auxiliary contingent was exceedingly precarious. Pueyrredón decided to leave town during the dark of the night without telling anyone. He gave the impression that he was postponing his departure. It was planned that the night of August 25 was the propitious time to make the escape. Everything was set, when at seven thirty of that night his best and most trusted unit mutinied. The Commander decided that he and the remaining forty-five auxiliaries must now, more than ever, take to the road. If in the morning the potosinos realized that part of his troops had deserted, the people would take advantage of his desperate position and liquidate him and his faithful soldiers.⁵³ It was midnight when the Commander and the rest of the auxiliaries entered the Casa de Moneda to load the mules with silver. From twelve till four o'clock they burdened the animals with the silver bars, working in astounding silence. Then at four thirty, very carefully, they moved quietly through the deserted streets with the hope of reaching the open road. Each one was tense, their nerves on edge; it was just like the escape of a thief after a successful robbery. At dawn they had reached the open space and had flanked the majestic silver

mountain.⁵⁴

When the people awoke they realized that they had been duped. The auxiliaries had left and had taken with them the stored riches of their Imperial City. Alarm was sounded, church bells rang, the people organized hastily, looking frantically for weapons. Then like a furious avalanche they rushed out of town in hot pursuit of the auxiliaries. The people's army reached the Argentine unit and a wild skirmish developed. Pueyrredón estimated that two thousand townspeople attacked him,⁵⁵ but they were poorly armed and had no guidance or organization. The Argentine commander had placed his unit in a strategic position and this, plus his far superior weapons, forced the people to retreat toward the Cerro Rico. Pueyrredón again started his march and again the potosinos pursued him. The previous scene was repeated, with identical results. This kind of mobile skirmish continued throughout the whole day until nightfall drove the pursuers back to Potosí. While many of the people had been trying to catch the auxiliaries, the Royalist or pro-Lima faction had quietly taken over Potosí.⁵⁶

In the meanwhile the rest of what once constituted the proud first auxiliary army continued its retreat toward Argentina. Yet even though it had beaten off its pursuers, the retreating contingents had no easy road. The news had spread and the unit was harrassed from all sides in its march through the countryside. Pueyrredón chose secondary roads to escape assaults.⁵⁷ They hoped to reach Tarija, which was the gateway to the lower provinces, as soon as possible. In June, 1810, the peaceful and delightful town of Tarija had come out with great enthusiasm

in favor of the Buenos Aires junta.⁵⁸ When the auxiliary army had come up into the upper provinces six hundred tarijeños joined the ranks of the Argentine contingent and fought valiantly in the victory of Suipacha,⁵⁹ that opened the gates of Potosí and Chuquisaca to Castelli. After this victory three hundred of the Tarija volunteers followed Castelli to Potosí and marched north with him. They asked no pay for their services. But the Argentine commander placed them in unimportant and inferior positions. The soldiers of Tarija became indignant about such discriminative policy and protesting, they returned to their native town.⁶⁰ The same resentment that grew in Potosí mushroomed in Tarija once the volunteers had returned. Tarija did not want anything more to do with the auxiliary army.⁶¹

When Díaz Vélez abandoned Potosí earlier, he too took the road to Tarija and was obligated to take the city by storm. A battle for Tarija developed and an estimated four hundred people perished.⁶² Obviously Pueyrredón could not expect to find a friendly reception there. The people of Tarija had heard that the Argentine commander was carrying the silver of the Casa de Moneda with him and they were determined to wrest it away.⁶³ Due to a last minute truce between Tarija and Pueyrredón, about which we know little,⁶⁴ this was not done and Pueyrredón continued on his way to the lower provinces.⁶⁵ So ended the tragic and inglorious history of the first auxiliary army.

In Potosí enthusiastic preparations were made to receive General Goyaneche, the Royalist victor over the first auxiliary army, with magnificent splendor. Triumphal arches were erected, the city was cleaned

and the balconies were adorned with rich tapestries and palms. It was a gay day, September 20, 1811, when finally the Spanish general and his army entered the Imperial City. People showered him with lovely flowers and exotic perfumes. Then the patricians of the town offered a sumptuous reception, just as they had done when Castelli had come for the first time.⁶⁶ The main contingent of the army under the command of General Pío Tristán continued its advance south in hope of reaching, as soon as possible, the border that separated the lower from the upper provinces. Goyaneche had to remain in Upper Peru because of a serious guerrilla threat at the rear of his army, which was becoming acute and dangerous, especially in and around Cochabamba.⁶⁷ The montoneros were the only ones who maintained the fight alive against the pro-Lima army. Fighting in the countryside and isolated from the auxiliary army, they had not been subjected to the abuses of the Argentinians.

Having freed Upper Peru from the invading army, General Tristán crossed the border and invaded the lower provinces of the Viceroyalty of La Plata. The coin had been turned. The Royalist army overran Salta and Jujuy and was enthusiastically pushing to conquer Tucumán. But Tristán overextended his lines.⁶⁸ He was never able to take Tucumán and victory suddenly turned to defeat. A brilliant Argentine general had been put in charge of the defense, none other than the famous Belgrano.⁶⁹ Just as Castelli's victory in the north had been converted by Goyaneche to a complete defeat, so Belgrano stopped and routed the invading Royalist army in the glorious battle of Salta on February 20, 1813. The victory was complete. Tristán's disorganized bands took the road of defeat north.

Goyaneche, surprised by this upset, decided to evacuate Potosí and march north.⁷⁰

Belgrano, in pursuit of the routed army, entered Upper Peru. This was the second time that the lower provinces invaded the interior provinces, and this force has passed into history as the second auxiliary army. On May 7, 1813, at three thirty in the afternoon, Belgrano and his army were in full view of the famous silver hill of Cerro Rico, at Potosí. Again the inhabitants of that city erected triumphal arches and hung from their balconies the same tapestries that had been used for Goyaneche's entrance. It seemed as if Potosí had become accustomed to the glorious entries of victorious armies, only to see them leave ingloriously. By now the town had systematized its welcome fairly well: up went the arches and out of the chests came the tapestries. Seemingly, nobody cared any more if it was friend or foe. Among the officers of Belgrano was a young captain by the name of José María Paz, whose excellent character, quick mind and delightful disposition would bring him future fame. He was a keen observer and a first class writer. In his splendid memoirs⁷¹ he tells that he felt that the apparent enthusiastic reception of the potosinos was only a farce and facade behind which the fear of the people was detectable.⁷²

Belgrano ruled quite differently from Castelli, and his disciplined army behaved correctly. Unfortunately the Argentine commander's military fortunes were no better than those of his predecessors. The Spanish command had passed to a capable new general by the name of Joaquín de la Pezuela, who quickly decided that the best way to stop Belgrano

was to start a counteroffensive, and with a refreshed army he marched toward Potosí, forcing Belgrano into the open. The Argentine general was not disturbed about this since he was eager to leave the city and start his march north. He requested all nearby guerrilla units to work in harmony with his strategy. But the auxiliary army was unaccustomed to rough mountain fighting, and de la Pezuela inflicted upon Belgrano a daring defeat on the plains of Vilcapugio on October 1, 1813. The decimated army of Belgrano and his lieutenant, Díaz Vélez, who had participated previously in the defeats of Huaqui and Sipasipa (the first battle of Sipasipa), took the road back to Potosí. De la Pezuela did not pursue the routed army, and because of this and the absence of hostility in the town, due to the auxiliary army's good behavior, Belgrano decided to hold Potosí and not retreat. The Spanish commander again forced Belgrano into the open and defeated him for a second time on the plains of Ayohuma on November 14. This was a far more severe defeat than Vilcapugio. Again the auxiliary army retreated to safety in Potosí, where the people received the disorganized army calmly. José María Paz, the chronicler of the happenings in Potosí,⁷³ was deeply impressed by the "urbanity"⁷⁴ of the welcome, and he writes that he "liked very much the reception which was given us, because it was grave, sad, official and sympathetic . . . nobody feared disturbances and hostility."⁷⁵ Paz then rightly states that the potosinos had changed their attitude toward the Argentinians because of the second auxiliary army's correct behavior. Belgrano's force had been decimated and de la Pezuela was pressing hard and beginning a flanking movement, so that the only solution for Belgrano

was to evacuate Potosí and retreat south. The Argentine commander wisely distributed among the people of Potosí, especially the poor, the stores of his army which would have been too heavy to carry on a quick retreat.⁷⁶

On November 18, 1813, the army was ready to leave the Imperial City. At two o'clock in the afternoon the troops were ready in formation in the plaza and the adjacent streets. One hour later Belgrano and the cavalry departed. The infantry was to follow. Naturally people had come to the main square and lined the streets to see the auxiliary army leave. But then something happened. Paz, who had remained behind with the infantry unit, says that they suddenly felt an air of mystery which he could not explain. The people in the streets and the plaza were ordered to leave and go home. Everyone wondered why. The spectators disobeyed and the Argentine soldiers were commanded to disperse them. But this was to no avail, and the onlookers ran from one street to another. The soldiers, the people and most of the officers were baffled by this strange order. Then suddenly a new command was given, ordering that everyone living on the plaza and in the houses near the Casa de Moneda should immediately evacuate their lodgings and retire to at least twenty blocks away. They refused, after which they were told that should they not obey, their lives would be in danger. This too had no effect. Then finally it was decided to tell them the truth, to clear up the mystery; the Casa de Moneda was going to be blown up. A moment of consternation overtook the confused people and it was impossible for them to comprehend such an unbelievable action. The crowd still refused to move. The great amount of dynamite was already in its place. Díaz Vélez had re-

mained behind with his infantry unit in order to light the fuse. Disregarding the stubbornness of the inhabitants, it was now decided to light the fuse anyway. This was done and the heavy gates were closed, but then the huge keys to lock the gates were missing. Frantically the Argentinians searched for the keys; someone had hidden them. Time was short; the fuse was burning and with every second the flame was coming closer to the explosives. There was no more time to lose. Without finding the key, the Argentinians started on their rush out of town in order to be out of danger when the huge and massive building would go up into the air. But the auxiliaries ran into barricades; the streets were blocked. At an earlier time Belgrano had wanted to hold Potosí and the army had closed the streets. When the plan was abandoned the barricades had never been removed. The auxiliaries were frantic. They rushed back to the plaza in search of an open street. It was a race against time. Any moment the Casa de Moneda would explode and would bury the center of town and its inhabitants under the heavy blocks. Luck was with the army, it found an exit, and then raced to the outskirts, not stopping until it had reached the silver hill.

Then they realized that nothing had happened. The explosion had not taken place. Most probably the people of Potosí, seeing that the gates had not been locked, rushed into the Casa and had put out the fuse. Whoever had hidden the key knew that the dynamiting would take place, and to avoid it had made the key disappear. A terrible catastrophe and probably the complete destruction of the main part of Potosí had been averted. A captain by the name of Juan Luna offered to take twenty-five

soldiers and ride back to town and light the fuse again. It was a daring plan, but when he reached the outskirts of town he realized the impossibility of his raid. The furious potosinos would have torn him and his soldiers to pieces. Potosí was raging against Belgrano, who had wanted to destroy their city. It is probable that they would have pursued the auxiliary army as they had done with Pueyrredón, but for their efforts to save the Casa de Moneda and see to it that nobody tried to light the dynamite again. The captain and his unit turned around. The man who had concealed the key was a trusted auxiliary officer by the name of Anglada, who was close to Belgrano and whom the General had appointed commander of Potosí. This Anglada had fallen under the influence of a lady from Potosí with Royalist sympathies, who probably convinced him to betray Belgrano. Once his task was accomplished Anglada deserted to the Royalist side. Although he was a traitor, this officer saved Potosí from a grave disaster.⁷⁷

The idea of dynamiting the Casa de Moneda was a monstrous plan; it was a first class blunder. Mitre, in his excellent biography of Belgrano, which undoubtedly is sympathetic to the General, admits that it was a "barbarous project whose fulfillment would have done more damage to the prestige of the revolution than to the enemy."⁷⁸ Mitre is right. But many Argentinians hated Potosí and had not forgotten the massacre of 1811. To them the blowing up of the Casa de Moneda would not only have deprived the enemy of this important source of money, but it would have destroyed Potosí and its inhabitants.⁷⁹ When a distinguished Argentine army officer referred to the potosinos as those "idiotic and

bloodthirsty people,"⁸⁰ he only expressed the true feeling of many of his compatriots. Without question, however, Belgrano had been ill advised. The General had done so much to heal the wounds left by Castelli's poor behavior and Pueyrredón's thoughtless actions. Of course, his military campaign had been a total failure too, but the good conduct and stern discipline of the second auxiliary army had favorably impressed the people of Potosí and Upper Peru. At the last minute, by wanting to dynamite the most important source of wealth of the internal provinces and thereby endangering the lives of every inhabitant of Potosí, Belgrano had ripped wide open the wounds which he had so successfully healed.

The defeated army crossed into the lower provinces and the Royalist force invaded the United Provinces for a second time.⁸¹ In Upper Peru only the guerrilla units continued their fight with ever increasing tempo. But slowly the situation of the Patriots improved, and with the coming of 1815 everything had taken a turn for the better. The insurrection against the Royalists had spread to Lower Peru, the very heart of the Viceroyalty of Lima. Guerrilla warfare in Upper Peru had intensified, and such montoneros as Warnes, Padilla, Arenales, Lanza and many others were seriously threatening the hegemony of the Royalists. San Martín, as the new commander of the northern army of the United Provinces, had successfully checked de la Pezuela around Tucumán. The guerrilla threat in both Perus and San Martín's able operations forced de la Pezuela to retreat into the inner provinces. In the meantime the United Provinces had finally conquered Montevideo. To everyone a strike into Upper Peru seemed opportune. Only San Martín, with clear

vision and shrewd military instinct, was aware that the road through Upper Peru to Lima was a futile one.⁸² He was already thinking of conquering Lower Peru via Chile.⁸³ He left his command with the hope of organizing an expeditionary army into Chile. But to less enlightened officers the route through Upper Peru looked better than ever. General Rondeau was chosen to command the third auxiliary army. He was a man of extreme simplicity, and was honest, unambitious, mediocre and not well qualified as a soldier. He was a poor choice.

Rondeau lost invaluable time by staying near the border and showing no enterprise in starting the offensive north. The severe discipline that Belgrano and San Martín had imposed on the army of the north now went to pieces under the affable Rondeau. He wished to be moderate and liked by everyone. His troops and officers called him a "good Joe" or "mama."⁸⁴ Finally in April, 1815, the army started its advance, and on the seventeenth defeated the enemy in a place called Puesto del Marqués, located about four leagues south of the village of La Quiaca, which is today on the border between Bolivia and Argentina. The victorious troops, instead of pursuing the enemy, celebrated the victory by consuming the great quantity of liquor found in the enemy's camp. Captain José María Paz, who was again an eye witness of this event, indeed the only extensive⁸⁵ historical source of the third auxiliary army,⁸⁶ wrote that he "had never seen a more disgusting picture . . . nor a more complete drunkenness."⁸⁷ De la Pezuela and his subordinate general, Pedro Antonio de Olañeta, who soon would play a key role in the creation of Bolivia, decided to retreat far north, evacuating Potosí and Chuquisaca and con-

centrating their force in centrally located Oruro. The guerrillas Zarate and Pedro Betanzos, with their Indian units, occupied Potosí on April 28, where they committed some minor misdemeanors. Guerrilla Padilla occupied Chuquisaca. On May 1 the third auxiliary army entered Potosí⁸⁸ and were given the usual reception accorded to any army. Colonel Martín Rodríguez and Captain José María Paz were sent to take over Chuquisaca.

Castelli had been a tyrant and the people had feared him. Belgrano had been a thorough general, and had won the inhabitants' admiration, which he lost when he applied the military principle that the end justifies any means. General José Rondeau was quite different from both. He was good natured but of weak character, and as a consequence his troops and officers committed all kinds of abuses which irritated the people. In Potosí the army organized a commission of recovery,⁸⁹ whose job it was to locate and confiscate the money and goods of the Royalists who had escaped town. The commission distinguished itself by its gross corruption. Captain Paz, who loved honesty and decency, tells that a fellow captain by the name of Ferreira told him that one day when he, the friend, stepped into the room of the commission, its president, Colonel Quintana, was counting the money.⁹⁰ Quintana looked up, and then with no inhibition, told him, "Ferreira, why don't you take some of these pesos?"⁹¹ Ferreira, surprised by this offer, filled both of his hands with pesos. The Colonel then in astonishment said to Ferreira, "What are you going to do with this? Go ahead and take more."⁹² The captain took out his handkerchief and filled it with silver coins. Probably Quintana showed the

same generosity to all his friends. Obviously all the employees of the commission had first opportunity to loot. Captain Paz thinks that even the peons shared heavily in the spoils. However, Rondeau showed some tact and shrewdness when he ordered his troops to camp outside of Potosí on nearby farms.

In Chuquisaca the same dishonesty took place. Commander Rodríguez also searched for money and valuable goods with the hope of confiscating them, using as an excuse that they were owned by Royalists. Captain Paz reports that soldiers and officers were spending huge sums of money which were far beyond their salaries. Soldiers whose pay was low, or at best moderate, suddenly dressed themselves in rich attire. Officers discarded their sabres and had new ones made of pure silver. Everybody took part in the plunder, and lived luxuriously. Only the frantic efforts of three honest officers⁹³ lessened in some small way the immense corruption. It is said by one chronicler that Commander Rodríguez fostered his ambitions and vanity by forcing the Intendancy of Chuquisaca to adopt the federal system of the United Provinces. He then had himself proclaimed Supreme Director of the province of Chuquisaca, giving a sumptuous festival at his inauguration.⁹⁴

Rondeau was losing valuable time by remaining in Chuquisaca and Potosí. Besides, the moral of his army was practically destroyed. The Royalist commander, de la Pezuela, took advantage of the breathing spell by reorganizing his army and putting down the rebellions in Lower Peru, therefore cleaning up his own backyard and acquiring more troops. If General Rondeau had continued his advance immediately after his cap-

ture of Potosí and Chuquisaca, he might have accomplished what the other two expeditionary armies failed to do, in occupying the whole of Upper Peru and perhaps penetrating into Lower Peru. But he lost his chance. Finally in September the Argentine commander decided to open an offensive with the hope of conquering Oruro. Captain Paz writes that the departure from Chuquisaca was scandalous. Everyone including the Commander had attended farewell parties. The march out of town was a parade of drunk soldiers and officers. Paz, bewildered and disgusted, remarked to some of his sober friends that "it would be impossible to win."⁹⁵ His presentiment was correct.⁹⁶

General de la Pezuela was capable and his army successfully blocked the advance of the auxiliary expedition. The offensive bogged down and the Patriots suffered a minor defeat at Venta Media.⁹⁷ Consequently Rondeau gave up the idea of marching on Oruro and swung aside to advance toward Cochabamba. But de la Pezuela was at his best in rough mountain territory, and he raced ahead of Rondeau. The Royalist general then swung around in front of Rondeau before reaching Cochabamba, which meant that the Argentine army ran straight into the Royalists in its march on that city. Rondeau either had to present battle or turn around, retreating over rough territory to Potosí or Chuquisaca. The Argentine general decided to fight.

On November 29, 1815, both armies opened battle in the plains of Sipa Sipa.⁹⁸ Rondeau was completely routed. It was the worst defeat the Patriots suffered during the whole war. The entire Argentine expedition was torn to pieces and retreated in complete confusion. Each

soldier took his own road, to wherever he thought was best. The auxiliary army of General Rondeau vanished from the battlefield. The General behaved valiently and until the end showed courage and calm. He walked with two or three officers, having no contact with his troops, from the battlefield to Chuquisaca. Rondeau covered eighty leagues in eighteen days and arrived at the capital alone.⁹⁹ Then he realized that his army had nearly vanished. But in Chuquisaca the General was successful in gathering some soldiers who had taken the same road. With this fragmentary force he began his march back to the United Provinces, by-passing Potosí and Tarija. No auxiliary army had ever returned in such complete disorganization. Castelli and Belgrano had been defeated, but had returned home carrying the riches of Potosí. The Royalists by one shrewd stroke, due to the ability of General de la Pezuela, had reconquered all of Upper Peru. However they showed a wise reluctance to invade the United Provinces. Again only the guerrillas remained to maintain the war. These montoneros were becoming disturbed about the failure of the auxiliary armies after they had cooperated in good faith with Belgrano and Rondeau. The continuous defeats of the expeditionary forces caused the native guerrillas to lose confidence in them, and disrespect for the Argentinians became noticeable.

On his retreat Rondeau wrote to the guerrilla Padilla requesting him to continue the fighting and to harrass the enemy whenever possible, and promised that his army would return. The Argentine commander finished his letter by asking Padilla to double his efforts and to use all available means in fighting the enemy.¹⁰⁰ Padilla was annoyed with

the request and on December 21, 1815, from Laguna, he answered Rondeau in an angry letter which constitutes a landmark in Bolivian history.¹⁰¹ The letter was cruel and frank; it showed with perfect clarity Padilla's annoyance that had accumulated slowly over a period of time. The guerrilla leader started his letter by saying, "You order me to attack the enemy, from whose hand you have received a most shameful defeat."¹⁰² Padilla then continued, saying that surely he would go on fighting the enemy as he had done for more than five years. He reminded Rondeau that all the people in Upper Peru had fought and suffered, too, for many years, but that this was not their only misfortune since they had to witness the "infamy and mockery of the armies of Buenos Aires."¹⁰³

Padilla continued by saying that these armies had not only ignored the merits of the Upper Peruvian Patriots, but even worse, they had ridiculed and insulted them. The guerrilla from La Laguna stated that "thousands of examples of horror could be cited which had irritated the people,"¹⁰⁴ and which had been caused by the expeditionaries. Then the fearless writer enumerated some of them, which make interesting reading because they tell certain facts that had escaped previous documents. From the very beginning rivalries had existed between the guerrilla units and the auxiliary armies. Such montoneros as Centeno, Cardenas and he, Padilla, at one time or other had been apprehended by the Argentinians. Padilla thought that the real reason for these arrests was nothing more than the jealousy of the Argentine commanders and officers. The partisan leader continued his steaming letter by saying emphatically that "the government of Buenos Aires has shown only a filthy distrust for our people

which has hurt the honor of the inhabitants,"¹⁰⁵ and the consequence of this abominable behavior was that the Argentine occupation was as bad or worse than the Spanish rule. The guerrilla called attention to the fact that whenever the expeditionary forces were able to occupy Upper Peruvian territory, it was because of the decisive help they had received from its inhabitants. But instead of being grateful, the expeditionaries had sacked their homes and cities. The dean of the Charcas montoneros continued his answer with many more hard hitting lines. He reminded Rondeau especially that although the Argentinians were now running away they were so bold as to request the guerrillas to come out and fight the enemy in order to protect "the cowardliness of your army."¹⁰⁶ And Padilla assured the Argentine commander "that the enemy shall not have a moment of rest."¹⁰⁷ The final lines are of a conciliatory mood in which the writer reminded his correspondent that the guerrillas and people of Charcas were honest and of a forgiving nature, and were very willing to forget past excesses. Padilla stated that he did not doubt that when the Argentinians came back they would be received with open arms. Yet he bluntly advised the Argentine general to impress upon his government that the next time it sent an army, it should respect the people's customs, have good and decent authority, and under no circumstances bring officers who wished to steal, and were proud or cowardly. If this advice were followed the guerrilla leader thought that all the provinces could be united in one big patria. The writer concluded his letter by saying that "there is still time for remedy . . . but if not, then"¹⁰⁸ The word "then" with its four dots are the last of the letter.

What Padilla meant was that if his advice was not followed, the inner provinces would depart from the Plata union and take a different road. That is what finally happened. The guerrilla leader proved by this letter to be a sharp observer. Among the partisans of Charcas he was probably the most enlightened and intellectually best equipped.¹⁰⁹ He clearly foresaw the creation of an independent Upper Peru, if the free provinces continued their unintelligent policy with regard to the occupied inner provinces. But since Padilla was ahead of his time he was well aware that the sentiment for separation was not yet prevalent and therefore his classic remark, "There is still time for remedy." In his letter the partisan commander also showed that he did not want to separate Upper Peru. Although in the first part he cruelly enumerated the past abuses of the Argentinians, in the last part of the letter he practically pleaded the General to see to it that all this be remedied, because if not, it would be impossible to avoid the consequences. Padilla wanted to thwart what he probably thought would be a tragic event: the splitting up of the upper and lower provinces. Consequently the guerrilla from La Laguna was not "the precursor of the Bolivian nation,"¹¹⁰ as one respected Bolivian historian has interpreted this letter, but rather was a shrewd observer who was the first Upper Peruvian to foresee the course that the inner provinces might be forced to take.

The battle of Sipa Sipa was definitely a turning point in the history of Charcas. Before Sipa Sipa it is hardly possible to detect sentiments, or even one voice, in favor of the separation and independence of Upper Peru. Rondeau's defeat marks the incipency of this de-

sire to part ways. Padilla felt it, as did the great San Martín.¹¹¹ The Bolivian chronicler, Manuel María Urcullu, cofounder of Bolivia, and the great Argentine leader and historian, Mitre, were well aware of it.¹¹² But the wish for independence was not overwhelming and hardly noticeable; only isolated seeds had been planted and even they had not yet blossomed. The great number of guerrillas still looked to the free provinces for help and inspiration. The majority of these partisans had not even come in contact with the auxiliary armies, and were fighting their own private war. The well-to-do classes were inclined to favor the Royalists rather than the Patriots. Many sincere Patriots had emigrated from the upper provinces and had gone to the free provinces where they fell under the influence of the Argentine system. The lower classes, Indians especially, were inert or of changing allegiance. A well equipped and victorious fourth auxiliary army under a popular general, such as Belgrano or San Martín, could have wiped out the separatist and anti-Argentine sentiments. But after Rondeau's enormous defeat no expeditionary army came up again, and from 1816 until the end of the war the inner provinces were left to their own resources. In 1816 the Royalist army began its great sweep to wipe out the guerrillas. Aid from Argentina was not forthcoming even in this critical year.

The year 1816 marks the beginning of the great anarchy in the United Provinces, which made it impossible to organize a new campaign into the occupied upper provinces. Besides it was now thought, in view of the continual defeats of the auxiliary armies, that the road via Chile into Lower Peru was more feasible, as indeed it proved to be. Due to these

cumulative factors the army of the north, also known as the army of Upper Peru, now again under the command of Belgrano, never started its offensive against Charcas, but rather was on the defensive under the impact of the renewed invasions of the Royalist army from Upper Peru. Only once in 1817, did a small contingent of around 150 men, under the adventurous Colonel La Madrid, execute a commando raid behind the Spanish lines into the upper provinces. La Madrid, a daring soldier with absolutely no ability for military strategy, disobeyed his orders and decided to make an epic march. He surprised Tarija and then sneaked up to Chuquisaca, where he halted his small contingent at the very door of the presidential house of the Audiencia of Charcas. But the President, obviously astonished to see an Argentine unit in the midst of the capital, quickly recovered and forced La Madrid to leave Chuquisaca and retreat all the way back to northern Argentina.¹¹³ This was hardly an army,¹¹⁴ but only a disjointed raid,¹¹⁵ that added nothing to Argentine prestige nor did much harm except to show to the surprised inhabitants of Chuquisaca that another unqualified Argentine commander went on a foolish, useless rampage, merely to write an epic and glorify his name.

Not until 1822 did Salta and Tucumán demand vehemently the organization of a new auxiliary army with the hope of avoiding further Spanish invasions from Charcas,¹¹⁶ which since the beginning of the war had penetrated the free provinces nine times.¹¹⁷ But nothing definite was done and when finally the army was ready to move in 1825,¹¹⁸ it was far too late since the Bolivarian army under General Sucre had already defeated the last remnants of the Spanish legions.

The unintelligent abuses of the three auxiliary armies and the abandonment of the inner provinces were the most important reasons why Charcas separated from the Argentine union. From 1809 until 1825 Upper Peru fought a bitter war against the Spanish forces. Argentinian aid until 1816 was no help, and their armies turned out to be one more enemy instead of an ally. For the next nine years the occupied provinces were abandoned to their own fate, and alone they had to fight the war against the Spanish enemy. Once victorious, they also wanted to guide their destiny alone. The spirit of independence was created during the war. If the United Provinces had liberated their inner occupied provinces during the early or middle stages of the war, an independent Bolivia would never have emerged. But the failure to do this in addition to the preposterous behavior of their expeditionary forces killed any chance of a reunion of the lower and inner provinces. The history of the auxiliary armies constitutes a vital link in the creation of Bolivia.¹¹⁹

NOTES

¹R-M, BB, 207, 49.

²Mitre, San Martín, op. cit., I, 204.

³R-M, BB, 207, 49.

⁴The original documents which prove this switch belonged to the collection of E. O. Rück, now located in the National Library of Bolivia in Sucre. According to Alfredo Jáuregui Rosquellas they were stolen but then recovered. Dr. Rosquellas has published some of them in "Documentos inéditos," BSGS, XLIII, 427-428 (1948), 182-192. He promised to publish the rest of the documents in future numbers of the BSGS, along with a revelation of how the documents were stolen. But this promise was not fulfilled. Again the unpublished documents are missing. In 1953 Dr. Rosquellas died. This author has purchased part of his library but he has never seen these documents. But the documents published in ibid. are sufficient proof that this switch was made. See, too, Rigoberto Paredes, "Ligeros datos sobre la fundación de Bolivia," BSGS, XXXII, 337-339 (1937), 141, n. 1; Paz, Historia, II, 113-114; Camba, Memorias, 29. Indeed already before this switch was made Viceroy Abascal commissioned the governor of Cusco to advance upon La Paz, located within the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires. One should remember this was before 1810. This demonstrates that the Audiencia of Charcas was not well integrated into either viceroyalty, and that it was always in a state of flux. Because of geographical factors the Audiencia tended to gravitate more to its old allegiance in Lima. It is still unknown to this author if the home government approved the switch in 1810 of Charcas from Buenos Aires to Lima (cf. Eduardo Aramayo, "Resumen . . . de documentos secretos . . .," BSGS, XXXIV, 344-346, 1939, 86-101).

⁵Ernesto Díez-Canseco, Perú y Bolivia/ pueblos gemelos (Lima, 1952), 9-10.

⁶Cf. Jaime Mendoza, "La creación de una nacionalidad," BSGS, XXVI, 268-269 (1926), 1.

⁷As cited by Jesus Arocha Moreno, Las ideas politicans de Bolivar y Sucre en el proceso de la fundacion de Bolivia (Caracas, 1952), 10.

⁸Alfredo Jáuregui Rosquellas, "Juan Jose Castelli," BSGS, XLIII, 429-430 (1949), 340-342.

⁹This event is brilliantly sketched in G. René-Moreno, Ultimos Dias, op. cit., I, chaps. 6-9.

¹⁰Carta pastoral de . . . don Benito de Moxó y Francolí (Buenos Aires, 1807), as cited by *ibid.*, I, 106, n. 1.

¹¹See Ruben Vargas Ugarte, Don Benito Mariá de Moxó y de Francolí . . . (Buenos Aires, 1931), 79 pp.

¹²Carta pastoral, *loc. cit.*

¹³Benito de Moxó, Manifiesto proclamatorio, as cited by G. René-Moreno, Ultimos Días, *op. cit.*, I, 98, n. 1.

¹⁴The excellent contemporary Bolivian historian, Humberto Vázquez-Machicado, has a brilliant, yet unpublished, essay entitled, Los orígenes socio-históricos de la nacionalidad boliviana, in which he considers Potosí as the crucial city of Charcas. According to Vázquez-Machicado Potosí held the divergent regions of Charcas together.

¹⁵See Modesto Omiste, Memoria histórica sobre los acontecimientos políticos ocurridos en Potosí en 1810, *op. cit.*, 24-28.

¹⁶Cf. Paz, Historia, II, 128.

¹⁷Jáuregui Rosquellas, "Castelli," *op. cit.*, 341.

¹⁸This author does not know of any biography of Sanz. It would make a fascinating study.

¹⁹Paz, Historia, II, 129.

²⁰Omiste, *Op. cit.*, 27.

²¹BNB, Colección René-Moreno (hereafter cited as C. R-M), Manuscritos de Chuquisaca/ 1624-1903, vol. II, no. 21, vol. III, nos. 1, 4, 6, vol. V, nos. 9, 19; cf. Nicanor Mallo, "Tradiciones/ cosa de aquellos tiempos," BSGS, XXXVII, 371-373 (1941), 57.

²²Moxó to Castelli, La Plata [Chuquisaca], December 11, 1810, in BSGS, XLIV, 433-434 (1950), 49-50.

²³Omiste, *op. cit.*, 33-34.

²⁴[Proclamation of José Castelli], Potosí, December 14, 1810, in *ibid.*, 32-33.

²⁵Cf. Alfredo Jáuregui Rosquellas, "Crónica documental," BSGS, XLIV, 433-443 (1950), 45.

²⁶This intimate account of the behavior of the auxiliaries is splendidly sketched in Modesto Omiste, op. cit., 30. The work of Omiste is of great value since he relied on the accounts of witnesses who still survived (see R-M, BB, 2238, 562). See "Modesto Omiste, "Kollasuyo, II, no. 18 (1940), 52-55.

²⁷Paz, Historia, II, 131.

²⁸La junta provicional gubernativa de las provincias del Río de la Plata . . . a todos los habitantes de esta ciudad de la Plata [Chuquisaca], La Plata, January 5, 1811, in BSGS, XLIV, 433-434 (1950), 57.

²⁹Ibid., 55-59.

³⁰La excma. junta . . . , La Plata, February 8, 1811, in ibid., 60-61.

³¹Many Bolivian historians accuse Goyeneche of breaking the armistice, but the Bolivian writer, Luis Paz, proves satisfactorily that it was Castelli who was responsible for the breach (Historia, II, 143, n. 1); cf. Mitre, San Martín, op. cit., I, 217, accuses Castelli of violating the truce.

³²See Paz, Historia, II, 146.

³³See Modesto Omiste, Memoria Histórica sobre los acontecimientos políticos ocurridos en Potosí en 1811 (Potosí, 1878), 27-28. G. René-Moreno in his BB, 2239, 563, believes that Omiste's second work is even better than his memoirs of 1810.

³⁴See Alcides Arguedas, La fundación, op. cit., 96.

³⁵See the very interesting letter of Francisco de Rivero to Junta Provincial de Potosí, Cochabamba, July 19, 1811, in Omiste, Memoria . . . 1811, op. cit., 23-27.

³⁶Until now it is not clear where Castelli went. Camba in his Memorias, 98, states that Castelli did not stop until he reached Buenos Aires. Paz, Historia, II, 148, writes that the Argentine commander went to Chuquisaca.

³⁷Omiste, Memoria . . . 1811, op. cit., 10.

³⁸Ibid., 9-11, is the only chronicler of this incident.

³⁹ANB, Ach (Papeles relativos a la guerra entre vascongados y otras naciones en Potosí, 1662-1629).

⁴⁰Omiste, Memoria . . . 1811, op. cit., 30-34.

⁴¹Very interesting is the letter of Juan Martín Pueyrredón to the Junta Gubernativa de estas Provincias, Campo Santo, October 4, 1811, in Juan Ramón Muñoz Cabrera, La guerra de los quince años (S. d. Ch., 1867), 226-243, in which Pueyrredón blames his soldiers for not defending him and his officers against the fury of the people. He even states that the soldiers joined the people ("Pues, habiendo en la plaza como 900 soldados a sueldo, no tuve uno solo que me sirviese en aquel conflicto, a escepción de muí pocos oficiales, proqué todos andaban por las calles dando formento a la revolución, ó se encerraban en las casas por temor de que los lastimasen," p. 227). Although this account was written just after the massacre this author believes that it is better to rely on the account of Omiste, who took it from survivors. Naturally any account given fifty years later is in itself a bad primary source. But Pueyrredón's letter is a rationalization to defend himself before his superiors.

⁴²Cf. Paz, Historia, II, 159,

⁴³"No fue mas que una verdadera escena teatral, en cuyo fondo se encontraba la ficción bien encubierta i la hipocresía mas refinada" (Omiste, Memoria . . . 1811, op. cit., 35).

⁴⁴The record of the investigation has not been located.

⁴⁵Pueyrredón to Junta, op. cit., 227.

⁴⁶Omiste, Memoria . . . 1811, op. cit., 37.

⁴⁷Ibid., 36-37. Because of his extreme anti-Catholicism Omiste came to accept Pueyrredón's conclusion. This is very strange, since Omiste throughout his two works emphasizes the resentment of the potosinos for the auxiliaries, due to the latter's monstrous behavior. Paz, Historia, II, 158, n. 1, wonders what reasoning Omiste used to come to such an illogical conclusion. Paz takes issue with Omiste with sound reasoning.

⁴⁸Ibid., 39-40.

⁴⁹See Mario J. Buschiazso, "La Casa de Moneda en Potosí," BSGS, XXXV, 359-361 (1940), 270-275.

⁵⁰See Vicente Cañete y Dominguez, Guía de la provincia de Potosí, 1787 (Potosí, 1952), 838 pp.

⁵¹Cf. G. René-Moreno, Perú y Bolivia/ mas notas, op. cit., 207.

⁵² Omiste, Memoria . . . 1811, op. cit., 41-42.

⁵³ Pueyrredón to Junta, op. cit., 230.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 230-232.

⁵⁵ Loc. cit.

⁵⁶ Omiste, Memoria . . . 1811, op. cit., 45.

⁵⁷ Pueyrredón to Junta, op. cit., 232.

⁵⁸ See Bernardo Trigo, Las tejas, op. cit., 96-97, "Haviendose dado el grito de libertad en Buen^{os} Ayr^{es} quanto lo supó [Tarija] siguió primero q. Salta, Tucumán, y Cordoba, estimulándolas con su exemplo y prestó su ovediencia ala Junta q. se instaló en aquella Capital" (Es fragmento q. pasa el gov^{no} . . . de Tarija . . . ala prensa . . . , Tarija, September 2, 1826, ANB, MI, 14, 19, f. 1).

⁵⁹ Loc. cit.

⁶⁰ "Luego de llegar a Potosí, se distribuyó la fuersa en barrios Cuerpos, y los oficiales q. servian de Capitanes, se les bajo a Tenientes, y Subcesibam.^{te} las demas Clases, quando se advierte que los Cadetes q. llegaron a Potosí sin cooperar a ninguna batalla de las anteriores, fueron nombrados Capitanes; un jucto resentim.^{to} hico q. todos los oficiales Tarijeños se retiracen con el gran disgusto deno seguir la suerte de sus hermanos. Tarija se quedo en cierto modo deslucido" (loc. cit.).

⁶¹ The case of Tarija is one of the most perplexing. As stated above, they joined the auxiliary army with great enthusiasm and cooperated decisively in the battles of Cotagaita and Suipacha (see Luis Pizarro, Tarija/ apuntes histórico-geográficos, Sucre, [1936], 106; Bernardo Frías, Historia del General D. Martín Güemes, Salta, III, 527). After the defeat of Huaqui the revolutionary junta (?) of Tarija issued a chauvinistic manifesto inciting the people of Tarija to arm and rush north to aid the routed Argentine army (Paz, Historia, 148-149). Then suddenly an anti-auxiliary army feeling became prevalent and it is said that the town fought the defeated army with a loss of four hundred men (infra, n. 62). The document cited by this author (supra, n. 58) might be the key to explain this change of sentiment. Probably when the manifesto was published the disgruntled warriors had not yet returned to their native town. It might also be that the three people who signed the manifesto (Paz never cites from where he took the document) do not represent an official body. There is one more point that adds to the confusion. Pueyrredón, in his report home, considered Tarija as friendly territory. Seemingly the fury of Tarija was directed more against Díaz Vélez, who came through the town

first, than against Pueyrredón, who came somewhat later. But as said above, the tarijeños wanted to take away from the Argentine general the silver he carried, but because of unknown circumstances this was not done. Somehow a deal was negotiated. In summary, the history of Tarija remains obscure. This author has never seen or found the book by Tomás O'Connor D'Arlach, Tarija/ bosquejo historico [La Paz, 1932], but it is doubtful that it contains valuable information (see Heriberto Trigo Paz, op. cit., 176-177).

⁶²Trigo, op. cit., 97.

⁶³Paz, Historia, II, 166-167.

⁶⁴What really happened in Tarija is still a mystery. The history of Tarija remains to be written ("Su historia . . . duerme en los archivos de Sevilla, Salta y Tucuman," Trigo, op. cit., 85).

⁶⁵Pueyrredón, in his letter to the governing junta of Buenos Aires, loc. cit., identifies the towns of Potosí and Oruro as the places where the Royalist cause was deeply entrenched. He then speaks of Cochabamba and Chuquisaca as the cities where pro-Buenos Aires or Patriotic sentiment was predominant. Most all Argentine and Bolivian historians seem to accept Pueyrredón's statement. It is said that Oruro and Potosí were mining towns and that the wealthy miners were influential in maintaining the pro-Royalist sentiment. It is stated that Cochabamba and Chuquisaca were inhabited exclusively by merchants, land owners, lawyers and students who tended to favor the Patriotic cause (see Vicente López, Historia de la republica argentina, new ed.; Buenos Aires, 1913, IV, 71). Undoubtedly this hypothesis warrants certain merit, yet this author finds it debatable. The example of Tarija cited above, taken from an unpublished document, tends to indicate that this rural town was probably as anti-Argentine as Oruro and Potosí. Yet Tarija was a completely agricultural center. If one wants to accept the Pueyrredón-Lopez thesis, then Chuquisaca would have to be classified as a Royalist city. All the official employees of the Audiencia lived there. Besides, the rich miners of Potosí did not live in that city most of the time, because of its unusually high altitude and the very rigorous climate. Nearby Chuquisaca, with its delightful weather and its beautiful countryside, was a more ideal residence, not only for the rich aristocracy of Potosí but also for the miners of nearby Chayanta, Porco, Lipez and Chichas. Therefore Chuquisaca should be classified as a Royalist town (see Alfredo Jáuregui Rosquellas, La ciudad de los cuatro nombres, Sucre, 1924, 153 pp.; G. René-Moreno, Ultimos días, op. cit.). But it is true that Chuquisaca contained the University which played a potent role in furthering the opposition to Spanish rule. This all seems to indicate that a far deeper study must be undertaken before accepting the oversimplified solution of dividing the cities of Upper Peru into two categories. This author certainly agrees that there is a grain of truth in the statement that Cochabamba was the most anti-Royalist town. This too warrants an interesting study. It should be remembered that Potosí

felt the impact of the auxiliary armies more than any other town, because of its strategic position. One could make a plausible case by stating that the anti-Argentine feeling was proportional to the amount of contact with the expeditionary armies. For example, the anti-Royalist feeling in Cochabamba was increased to a high pitch when General Goyaneche, in 1813, subjected the city to several days of terror (*infra*, n. 67), just as Castelli had done in a somewhat minor way in Potosí. This author believes that the feelings depended primarily on the amount of contact with and the behavior of the armies.

⁶⁶Omiste, Memoria . . . 1811, op. cit., 46-48.

⁶⁷Cochabamba had rebelled against Goyaneche and had proclaimed for a second time its allegiance to Buenos Aires. The local guerrilla leaders, especially Esteban Arze, were responsible for this second pronouncement. At the approach of Goyaneche Cochabamba refused to surrender and the Royalist General defeated the cochabambinos on the outskirts of the town. Entering the city, the victor had to confront and fight a legion of Cochabamba women, who in an act of extreme heroism wished to show their despise for the General. Many of the women died. Goyaneche, usually of moderate temper, unleashed for several days a reign of terror that even surpassed anything done by Castelli. In this way Goyaneche foolishly aided the cause of the Patriots, which had suffered because of the terror of the Argentine expedition. Yet the history of Goyaneche's entrance, the women's fight and his reign of terror has not been written well. No objective and impartial study exists. Bolivian historians have generally exaggerated the event and have tried to make it a holy epic which distorts objective historical facts. But undoubtedly the Royalists committed a blunder of great magnitude (cf. Urquidí, Rectificaciones, 28-29).

⁶⁸Cf. Camba, Memorias, I, 127.

⁶⁹See "Fragmento de memoria sobre la batalla de Tucumán (1812) por el General Don Manuel Belgrano," in José María Paz, Memorias Póstumas (Biblioteca Ayacucho, vol. 16, Madrid, n. d.), 36-45. Hereafter cited as J. M. Paz, Memorias.

⁷⁰Camba, Memorias, I, 139, calls Goyaneche's evacuation "sorprendente."

⁷¹See *supra*, chap. 1, notes 88, 89. The first edition (Buenos Aires, 1855), 4 vols., is extremely rare but is a delightful and beautiful edition which this author originally consulted in the National Library of Bolivia. The author has changed his citation to the badly done third edition (Biblioteca Ayacucho, vol. 16; Madrid, n. d.), because of its easy availability. The second edition (La Plata [Argentina], 1892), 3 vols., is less rare but not easy to find (cf. G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Perú/ mas notas, op. cit., 208, n. 1).

⁷²J. M. Paz, Memorias, 145.

⁷³"La maltratada campaña de Vilcapugio y Ayouma ha sido escrito de mano maestra por el general Jose Maria Paz, capitan entonces del ejercito argentino que fue deshecho en esas dos jornadas. Los que lo han escrito despues le han seguido en todas sus indicaciones" (Vicente F. Lopez, op. cit., IV, 373).

⁷⁴J. M. Paz, Memorias, 215.

⁷⁵Loc. cit.

⁷⁶For a detailed account of the campaign of Vilcapugio and Ayouma see Mitre, Belgrano, II, chaps. 22-23.

⁷⁷This whole incident is sketched by J. M. Paz, Memorias, 216-220, who was an eye witness.

⁷⁸Op. cit., II, 177.

⁷⁹Cf. J. M. Paz, Memorias, 222.

⁸⁰Publicación Oficial [Gobierno de la Provincia de Santiago del Estero], El Coronel Lorenzo Lugones (Buenos Aires, 1896), 57.

⁸¹Cf. G. René-Moreno, "Expediciones e invasiones," Revista de Artes y Letras (S. d. Ch.), V (1885), 485.

⁸²San Martín to Godoy Cruz, no place given, August 24, 1816, in Mitre, Belgrano, II, 282, n. 34.

⁸³Alfredo Villegas, "Un documento de San Martín conreferencias historicas," Anuario de historia argentina, V (1943-1945), 354-355, 367-369.

⁸⁴J. M. Paz Memorias, 269.

⁸⁵"Faltando en el Archivo General, los documentos de esta campaña (solo existen algunas carpetas sueltas) . . ." (Mitre, Belgrano, II, 266, n. 7).

⁸⁶Other sources are Rondeau's autobiography (see supra, chap. 1, n. 91); Memorias del General Gregorio Aráoz de la Madrid (Biblioteca Ayacucho, vol. 60, Madrid, n. d.), 415 pp. p also the memoirs of General Rudecindo Alvarado which are unknown to this author (cf. infra, chap. 7, n. 97).

⁸⁷ J. M. Paz, Memorias, 367.

⁸⁸ [U], Apuntes, 79.

⁸⁹ Tribunal de recaudación.

⁹⁰ J. M. Paz, Memorias, 281, writes, " . . . en que se hacia el lavatorio del dinero" (*italics mine*). The word lavatorio is translated as washing, which hardly makes sense. Could it be that it is a colloquialism for counting? The word lavatorio is used in the first and second editions too.

⁹¹ J. M. Paz, Memorias, 281.

⁹² Loc. cit.

⁹³ Tomas Tejerina, Lorenzo Lugones (cf. supra, n. 80), Jose Maria Paz.

⁹⁴ This is told by [U], Apuntes, 80-81. Neither J. M. Paz, who was in Chuquisaca, nor La Madrid mentions it in his memoirs; cf. J. M. Paz, Memorias, 290-292; cf. Valentin Abecia, "Introducción," in Miguel Ramallo, Guerrilleros, op. cit., 13.

⁹⁵ J. M. Paz, Memorias, 293.

⁹⁶ G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Perú/ más notas, op. cit., 206, feels sorry that J. M. Paz was not present when the excesses of Castelli occurred. He might have left a more precise and honest picture.

⁹⁷ See J. M. Paz, Memorias, 301-314; La Madrid, op. cit., 87-92.

⁹⁸ The battle is also known as the battle of Viloma or Wiluma, see Rodriguez Casado, Calderón Quijano, eds., Memoria de gobierno del Virrey Abascal (Sevilla, 1944), II, 278.

⁹⁹ J. M. Paz, Memorias, 327; cf. La Madrid, op. cit., 93-101.

¹⁰⁰ Cuartel General en marcha, December 7, 1815, in Miguel Ramallo, Guerrilleros, op. cit., 144-145.

¹⁰¹ In ibid., 145-151; also published in Jorge Mallo, op. cit., 27-28.

¹⁰² Ibid., 27; Ramallo, 145-146.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 146; Mallo, 27.

¹⁰⁴Loc. cit.; Ramallo, 146.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 148; Mallo, 28.

¹⁰⁶Loc. cit., Ramallo, 149-150.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 150; Mallo, 28.

¹⁰⁸Loc. cit.; Ramallo, 150-151.

¹⁰⁹The biography by Ramallo, op. cit., does not give much detail about the early background of the guerrilla, Padilla; cf. Samuel Velasco Flor, Vidas de bolivianos celebres (Potosí, 1871), 13-14.

¹¹⁰Valentín Abecia, "Introduccion," in Ramallo, op. cit., 13.

¹¹¹Supra, n. 82.

¹¹²[U], Apuntes, 85; Mitre, Belgrano, II, 282.

¹¹³This campaign is colorfully sketched in the memoirs, op. cit., 121-174, of La Madrid, yet the Colonel loved to glorify his actions as well as himself.

¹¹⁴Bolivian school texts consider the epic of La Madrid as the fourth auxiliary army, see Antonio Díaz Villamil, Curso elemental de historia de Bolivia (3d ed.; La Paz, 1949), II, 51-52; José María Camacho, Historia de Bolivia (14th ed.; La Paz, 1952), 164.

¹¹⁵"La expedicion que Belgrano confió a Lamadrid en 1817, y que llevo temerariamente hasta Chuquisaca, no pasó de una correría militar a cargo de una division ligera del ejercito del norte" (G. René-Moreno, "Expediciones," op. cit., 484).

¹¹⁶Ibid., 487; Mariano Zorreguieta, Apuntes históricos de Salta en la época del coloniaje (2d ed.; Salta, n. d.), 115, 119.

¹¹⁷G. René-Moreno, "Expediciones," op. cit., 484-489.

¹¹⁸Gabriel René-Moreno has a brilliant unpublished work about the last expeditionary force under the command of Colonel Urdininea, who in 1828 became the third president of Bolivia, and whom he calls "pies de plomo." The work is in the possession of Dr. Humberto Vázquez-Machicado. It is hoped that it will be published soon. See El Correo de las Provincias (Buenos Aires), 17 numbers (November 19, 1822 to April 10, 1823).

119 The relations between Upper Peru and the United Provinces, especially the reasons for letting Charcas fight alone after 1817, are superbly sketched in two books of René-Moreno, Bolivia y Perú/ mas notas. op. cit., and Bolivia y Perú/ nuevas notas. op. cit. These are two outstanding books and anyone interested in more detailed knowledge about the curious relations between the inner and lower provinces should consult them.

CHAPTER IV

DOS CARAS

Synopsis

The guerrilla forces and the auxiliary armies constituted the real veterans of the War of Independence in Upper Peru. Although antagonistic toward each other, both fought for a decisive military and political victory: the defeat of the Spanish army and independence from Spain. If the inner provinces should remain an integral part of the La Plata union, if they should join Lower Peru because of geographical factors, or if they should become independent, was not a live issue of the war. Upper Peru was an isolated region, predominately conservative and narrow-minded; therefore, the number that supported the revolutionary cause was a mere minority. There had been only one liberal island in Charcas, the University of San Francisco Xavier in Chuquisaca, and from its halls emanated the generation of 1809 which started the War of Independence. They had chosen the wrong territory in which to raise the standard of rebellion. They paid dearly for this mistake. The Spaniards killed some of them and those who survived had to leave, mostly for the lower provinces where the ground was more fertile and better prepared for a revolt against Spain.

While the University produced some radical alumni, the narrow-mindedness of Charcas had adverse effects on most other students, and from the University graduated many disreputable elements who had no political convictions except their own well-being. They were contemporary with the generation of 1809. They had little sympathy with the ideals of Moreno, Monteagudo and others. They possessed a clearer foresightedness, not blinded by any youthful idealism, and had a good awareness of reality. To them the idea of independence had little prospect of success in the near future. At the same time, they had no love for the genuine Royalists, those who believed in the sanctity of the crown and in the benevolence of the King. At the University they had learned the cunning political philosophies of Thomas Aquinas and the Jesuit, Suárez, and they had read Machiavelli with absorption. Politics to them meant supporting those who were in power and from whom they could get socially coveted jobs. When there was any indication that a new political force was coming to the forefront, they would swiftly shift to its support in order to jump on the bandwagon in time. Gabriel René-Moreno has given a classic name to this group by calling it dos caras, two-faced.

During the middle years of the war their action acquired a blunt insolence. As the luck of the arms continually shifted, they shifted too. This group of dos caras was composed of a host of minor figures who played this game because they needed jobs. There was one giant, the model and master. His name was Casimiro Olañeta. He was the shrewdest, therefore his actions were the most subtle. Below him were a large number of lieutenants, among whom the best known was Manuel María Urcullu. Others

such as Mariano Calvo, Mariano Calvimontes and Leandro Uzín were efficient conspirators. All of them became outstanding figures in Bolivian politics. This group became the creators of Bolivia, instead of the hard fighting veterans who vanished into nothing and did not even receive pensions of any kind. The weapons the dos caras used were intrigue, machinations, oratory, mass psychology, legalistic craftiness, fraud and lies. Once independence was achieved, they continued their same unethical play, dragging the country into grave anarchy. Casimiro Olañeta became the master of Bolivia until he went to his grave. He loved anarchy and from behind the scenes he pulled the strings. He made and destroyed presidents. During the War of Independence he and his associates became the most potent force for the creation of Bolivia.

Chuquisaca, called La Plata by the Royalists,¹ was the capital of the vast Audiencia of Charcas. It was a proud and picturesque town. Here was neither the noise and clatter of Mexico City or Lima nor the joviality and energy of Buenos Aires or Santa Marta. The city was isolated and far from the stream of world events. Chuquisaca had been founded in 1539² by a distinguished conquistador with a delightful name, Pedro Anzúrez de Camporeñondo. When the fabulous mines of Potosí began to deliver their prodigious wealth the prosperous miners settled in nearby Chuquisaca. The city became the seat of an audiencia and an archdiocese, and in 1624 a university was founded there. Chuquisaca or La Plata is located in mountainous territory, surrounded by a beautiful landscape that shows neither the aridness of Potosí nor the opulence of Cochabamba. The climate is neither warm nor cold. The city is narrow and long, situated at the foot of two steep hills. The town has many churches, pretty houses and a wide and spacious plaza.³ After Mexico City and Lima it had more "colossal fortunes"⁴ than any other city in the colonies. It considered itself the guardian and garden of Potosí, and Potosí was Spain's pride. Chuquisaca was a haughty town because its people thought that it was commanded by the King to preserve and stimulate the imperial city of Potosí. No other town in the Spanish colonies was more proud and conceited than Chuquisaca. Its audiencia ignored and scorned the viceroys and Lima and Buenos Aires and felt completely self-sufficient, responsible only to God and the King.⁵

Around 13,000 inhabitants supposedly lived in Chuquisaca when the eighteenth century came to its end. Of these 4,000 were Spaniards, 3,000 mestizos, 4,500 Indians and 1,500 Negroes and mulattos.⁶ The Spaniards were either gachupines or criollos. Their life was pleasant, effortless and quite uneventful. They were part of the bureaucratic apparatus always present at the seat of an audiencia, of the elaborate ecclesiastic hierarchy existent in the capital of an archdiocese, and professors and students of the University. Some were active in the cabildo, others did nothing except manage their estates, others had the continuous delight of fighting lawsuits, the favorite pastime of Chuquisaca; therefore others, and indeed many, were lawyers. It was an arrogant and content group, extremely conservative and provincial. All maintained that they came from distinguished families in Spain. This was the inner and most important core of Chuquisaca, but it was neither united nor homogeneous, for there were the usual differences between the peninsulares and criollos. The core was divided into many strata, each one looking with disdain on the ones beneath.⁷ The whites formed an isolated group in an isolated town with little specialization or movement, and there was an absence of new blood. The only newcomers to the town were the students from throughout the Viceroyalty, and it was they who brought the spirit of revolution. The narrow provincialism of Chuquisaca created what Bolivian scholars continually refer to as the "mentalidad altoperuana," Upper Peruvian mentality, or as one author has put it, the "collective psychology of Upper Peru."⁸ This characteristic was more pronounced in Chuquisaca than in any other place in Charcas.

It is difficult to enumerate the characteristics of this mentality. Gabriel René-Moreno, Bolivia's superb and only great historian, was unfortunately a dedicated racist.⁹ To him it was "a perverse tendency toward scheming and quarrels" and represented a love for "gossip and mischievous lies."¹⁰ To René-Moreno the reason for this lay in the fact that the mixture between Indians and Spaniards was a bad one and resulted in individuals with false personalities. His basic belief was the "unquestionable superiority of the white race."¹¹ The Indian was false and the whites, either through Indian blood or through close contact, had absorbed his duplicity. Even to the leftist writer, Tristán Maroff, the racial aspect is the vital cause of the morbid mentality.¹² The elegant communist writer, Roberto Alvarado, prefers an economic explanation. To him the inhabitants did not expend their natural energies in the profitable and healthy occupations such as tilling the soil,¹³ which indeed is quite a plausible interpretation. To the nationalist writer, Carlos Montenegro, the extreme individuality was an important causant in determining the psychology of the Upper Peruvians.¹⁴ The modern poet of Sucre, Joaquín Gantier, himself a patrician and a product of conservative Chuquisaca, admits that "unquestionably the Upper Peruvian was deceitful, false, sagacious and intricate,"¹⁵ but that on the other hand he also was "extremely sentimental."¹⁶ In summary, all Bolivian scholars from the far left to the far right admit that there existed a certain peculiarity of behavior in the people of Charcas, which took more precise forms in Chuquisaca. This Upper Peruvian mentality seems to be more the result of an extreme provincialism, due to the

"Andean enclosure"¹⁷ of Chuquisaca, aggravated by a false and distorted feeling of the importance of their town, plus the lack of any profitable economic enterprise.¹⁸ This gave rise to a peculiar character, given to loose play with ambiguous words and phrases in which the individual rarely came straight out for one or the other side, but rather manipulated all beliefs, never deciding for anyone. The classic appraisal of René-Moreno, calling it "two-faced,"¹⁹ has a grain of truth in it. The elementary explanation of Simón Rodríguez, the brilliant teacher who went to Chuquisaca to establish a model school and failed, that it was an extreme egoism is an oversimplification.²⁰ The racist expositions of René-Moreno and Alcides Argüedas make little sense today. René-Moreno's sketch of the Upper Peruvian mentality is correct and sincere, but his reasons for it are erroneous. In one sentence, the society of Chuquisaca was sophisticated and motivated by an unhealthy conservatism.

In this conservative and unenterprising society at the end of the eighteenth century was a certain gentleman by the name of Miguel de Olañeta. He was a criollo born in Chuquisaca, but his father was an ultramariano,²¹ from overseas, a peninsular. Miguel's brother was Pedro Antonio who lived in Salta. Miguel and Pedro²² came from distinguished stock of the village of Elqueta in the Spanish province of Guipúzcoa. Don Miguel's mother came from the same region, belonging to the Marquiegui family. Miguel's father, proud of his Spanish cradle, saw to it that his sons married a girl from Spain.²³ Don Miguel had to go to Spain to take as wife a pretty lady from a distinguished family. He married Doña Rafaela de Güemes, daughter of Francisco de Güemes from

Burgos and Doña Antonia Prudencia Martierena from the town of Yavi.

Don Miguel's newly acquired mother-in-law was the daughter of the Marquis of Toxo.²⁴ Don Miguel and his wife, Doña Rafaela, had only Spanish blood in their veins and had avoided the mixture of Indian blood. Their life in Chuquisaca was uneventful, and they had no worry about earning a living. Neither husband nor wife knew what hard work meant. The wife's family was of substantial wealth and Doña Rafaela inherited most of the fortune of her parents.²⁵ Don Miguel became a regidor of the ayuntamiento,²⁶ which represented the average ambition for any distinguished criollo. Naturally his position on the cabildo did not absorb all his time, and he dedicated some of his plentiful spare hours to business venture.²⁷ Many lawsuits helped him break some of the monotony of the life.²⁸ Besides, the managing of the nearby farms added some color and energy.²⁹ Miguel de Oláneta and his wife were the exact and unequivocal picture of the typical aristocracy of Chuquisaca. From patrician families, trying to maintain their pure blood, no financial worries, and whatever means they had were acquired not through private enterprise but rather through inheritance. His post on the ayuntamiento gave him stature and prestige; he did a little business and as a sideline had estates. Like him and his wife were many others in Chuquisaca and all over the colony.

About ten years after their marriage, on March 3, 1795, a very fragile son was born and it was feared that he would not see the light of the world for many hours or days. But the baby grew strong, and on April 7 was baptized by the famous archbishop, San Alberto, and was given the

name of José/ Joaquín Casimiro.³⁰ He was Casimiro Olañeta, to become Bolivia's greatest and most powerful figure. Casimiro³¹ spent his youth in his native Chuquisaca and little is known about those years. Acquiring later a powerful pen, he never wrote the story of his life, and even if he had it might be of little value, because he was a master in lying and boasting.

Young Casimiro was not sent by his parents to the University of San Francisco Xavier, which was located in Chuquisaca and was the most famous institution in the Viceroyalty of La Plata. They enrolled him instead at the Colegio Real Convictorio de Nuestra Señora de Montserrat (Argentina).³² This was then a conservative school, where one was obliged to prove that he was a Christian, "clean of Jewish and Moorish race, not convicted by the Holy Office and of legitimate matrimony."³³ Casimiro entered Montserrat in 1809, the year the War of Independence started in Charcas. Why his parents sent him to Córdoba, instead of entering him at San Francisco in their own home town, remains a matter of speculation. One Bolivian author believes that the Olañetas were aware of the radical spirit that was becoming noticeable at San Francisco in the first decade of the new century. They were determined not to send their only son into this nest of subversives. Therefore they chose the conservative school at Córdoba as being more suitable to their philosophy.³⁴ Besides, Casimiro's uncle, Pedro Antonio Olañeta, had settled in Salta and become a successful and respectable businessman. This explanation seems feasible and makes sense, but it is a conjecture based on no documental evidence.

Montserrat had some excellent teachers, such as the venerable Dean Funes.³⁵ Among the fellow students of Casimiro were the sons of Viceroy Liniers, the son of the Royalist General Córdoba, and José María Paz.³⁶ Liniers and Córdoba were shot by Castelli in 1810 and undoubtedly Casimiro shared or witnessed the plight and sadness of their sons. The students at the college saw the imprisoned leaders of the La Paz revolt when they were brought through Córdoba on the way to Buenos Aires.³⁷ The real feelings of the student Casimiro Olañeta are not known. By 1810 the faculty at the college was sharply divided between the Royalists and the Patriots. In view of Casimiro Olañeta's later identification with the Royalist cause it would seem to indicate that he had little sympathy for the Patriots. In later years when Olañeta, then the most powerful politician in Bolivia, was accused of having been a "godo pertinaz,"³⁸ he defended himself by saying that when he was at Córdoba, "at the age of fifteen I was so fanatic for the liberty of my country that any kind of persecution of the Spaniards did not satisfy my desire. I did not admit weakness in this matter."³⁹ But Olañeta was the master of falsehood on a grand scale and the sole fact that he emphasized so much his early patriotism is a good indication that he was the very opposite.⁴⁰

Later Casimiro returned to his native Chuquisaca. Probably his father requested that he leave the college which, after 1810, was located in the free provinces and had accepted the new order. Casimiro himself said that he went back to Chuquisaca after the victory of Salta won by Belgrano in 1813. But in the next line he stated that Belgrano imprisoned him, his sole crime being that of his name.⁴¹

His parents fled Chuquisaca when the second auxiliary army was on its march to occupy the capital.⁴² After the retreat of Belgrano, Casimiro enrolled at the University of San Francisco which now had been cleansed of the subversive elements. The pattern is quite clear: when the home town university was heretical his parents sent him away to a conservative school. But when the college of Montserrat became part of the free provinces and accepted the new order, then Casimiro had to return and enroll at the local university which now had become a fortress of the Spanish cause. In March, 1814, Casimiro received his degree, which was a bachelor's in canon law.⁴³ Two months later, on May 24,⁴⁴ he entered the Carolina Academy which was the "forum of Upper Peru,"⁴⁵ where graduates were trained in law, to prepare them especially to work before or with the Audiencia. In modern terms it was a graduate school of law. One had to pass a difficult entrance examination and swear loyalty to the King and the Catholic religion.⁴⁶ At the time when Casimiro entered the Academy its headmaster was the famous, shrewd, archconservative and able Pedro Vicente Cañete. Cañete was a thorough Royalist, although he was a criollo born in Asunción.⁴⁷ Undoubtedly he would not have tolerated any pupil at the Academy about whom he had even the slightest suspicion of being favorable to the Patriotic cause. Only known Royalists could enter this distinguished and conservative school. Casimiro Olañeta passed the entrance examination in good standing. He was questioned for half an hour about chapter two, title nine, book two, of the Justinian code of law.⁴⁸ He knew it thoroughly.

Casimiro's training was interrupted when the third auxiliary army under Rondeau occupied the capital. The young graduate student fled to the Royalist headquarters at Oruro.⁴⁹ Here resided the commander, General de la Pezuela, and his lieutenant, Colonel Pedro Antonio Olaneta who were reorganizing the Spanish army. Colonel Olaneta was Casimiro's uncle, his father's brother who had lived in Salta as a cunning businessman, shipping all kinds of goods to and from Upper Peru, especially between Potosí and Buenos Aires. When the war had started Pedro Antonio, a man of great physical ability and a fanatic conservative, had offered his services to the Royalist army.⁵⁰ Because of his great knowledge of Upper Peru, his extraordinary contacts and his sharp mind, he quickly moved up in the army. He showed excellent military talent, especially for organization and logistics. Unquestionably Casimiro joined his uncle who probably provided him with a job. When Rondeau's army was completely defeated, Casimiro Olaneta returned to Chuquisaca to continue his training at the Academy. He petitioned the Audiencia for an assistantship in order that he might engage in legal practice and observe the workings of that body, and his application was approved.⁵¹ Casimiro must have been an able student and a smooth worker, since he was soon named secretary of the Academy,⁵² which constituted the highest honor that a student in Charcas could achieve. Everything seemed to indicate that the young graduate student had a brilliant career before him.

In 1817 Casimiro felt that he had acquired enough legal experience and requested to be admitted to the final bar examination, which was granted.⁵³ On May 19 he took his oral examination and was assigned to debate a minor inheritance case before the Audiencia as his test question.⁵⁴ He passed the examination "faultlessly and successfully."⁵⁵ Once admitted as a candidate for a degree, he then had to take an oath of allegiance to the Catholic religion⁵⁶ and pay the necessary graduation fee.⁵⁷ After this he was given his diploma of law and became a full-fledged new lawyer. After receiving his degree Casimiro Olañeta dedicated himself to his law career with enthusiasm, proficiency, aptitude and extreme shrewdness. He made a phenomenal rise in the conservative and exceedingly suspicious Audiencia. In 1818 Olañeta became criminal attorney of the Audiencia,⁵⁸ and soon was given many more responsibilities such as associate judge, civil attorney, attorney in the office of Indian protection, as well as attorney in the census office.⁵⁹ These were positions that usually went to established and experienced lawyers.

Five letters of recommendation in the Olañeta files, from high Spanish administrative officials,⁶⁰ show that he was admired and respected and that everyone thought that he had extraordinary talents, a pleasant personality and was a faithful servant of the Spanish crown. One official thought that he was "prudent, sagacious and political," and that in his work he was "quick and clever."⁶¹ Another one wrote that he was an "excelling individual" and that he was "zealous in the cause of His Majesty and the nation."⁶² This notary believed that because of all these extraordinary qualities Casimiro Olañeta had obtained the best positions

which usually go to a man with much more service and greater age.⁶³

In 1820 Casimiro Olañeta requested from the Audiencia a leave of absence in order to join his uncle,⁶⁴ now General Pedro Antonio de Olañeta and the new Royalist commander in Upper Peru. Casimiro seemingly left for Tupiza⁶⁵ where General Olañeta had his headquarters. From 1820 until 1824 very little is known about Casimiro Olañeta, and what is available is mostly from his own account, which from a historical point of view is worthless. He maintained his position on the Audiencia⁶⁶ but he also began his career of conspiracy and backstage politics and treason, which he kept up until his death in 1860.

According to the documents available, nothing in Casimiro's career until 1820 indicates a single breath of sympathy for the cause of the Patriots, although he later stated that when he was fifteen years old he was fanatic for the cause of freedom and the Patriots.⁶⁷ As a matter of fact, his behavior and statements showed an absolute allegiance and partisanship for the Royalists. There is not a word, sentence, or any other evidence of concern for the fate of the native guerrillas. As one modern biographer of Olañeta rightly stated, "To the aristocratic Olañeta the native guerrillas were of no worth; they were poor and ignorant."⁶⁸ Casimiro Olañeta was no soldier or hero of the war. He was a thorough Royalist, from a conservative family. His father's brother was the Royalist commander of Upper Peru. But Casimiro Olañeta was a genius in shrewdness, an unsurpassed intriguer, and especially a man with remarkable foresight.

In view of his later career of continuous plotting,⁶⁹ but at the same time remaining the great power of Bolivian politics, a pattern of behavior becomes noticeable. First of all, he had an ability for making himself acceptable to the people, then he brought the key person or persons under his influence, and his next step was to dominate and manipulate them. With his phenomenal foresightedness he knew exactly when the cause or person he was supporting was slipping, losing popularity and becoming stale. At the moment when discontent was yet in an embryonic stage and not yet gaining momentum, he opened relations with the opposition behind the scenes. At the appropriate time he betrayed the cause he had supported and swung to full support of its enemies. Olañeta then repeated the game over, and so it went.⁷⁰ Later he not only acted in the realm of national politics, but was so unscrupulous as to make contact with foreign powers and invite them to attack Bolivia.⁷¹ At the right moment, when the invaders lost popularity, he waved the Bolivian flag again. In this way he brought to power almost all Bolivian presidents during his lifetime, and at the same time organized most of the revolutions against them, and twice he invited Peru to invade Bolivia. He always worked in the background, and wrote little, so no definite proof could be used against him and he could deny any charge.⁷² When someone accused him he came back with his famous expositions and Folletos.⁷³ his sole writings. In them he showed that his accusers had nothing to prove, except intangible accusations, and then expounded one extravagant lie after the other. His model was Talleyrand, whose name he could not even spell.⁷⁴

By 1820 the Royalist cause was weakening. In the next year a definite crisis was noticeable. Before that time the Spanish army had been in firm control in both Perus. The threat from Argentina had been repelled, anarchy was prevalent in the La Plata provinces and the guerilla threat in Upper Peru had been checked. There was little reason to doubt that the doom of the Patriots was likely. Casimiro Olañeta had no reason at all not to be a Royalist. His background and the favorable situation of the Spaniards only made this course profitable. But then things took a turn for the worse. The surprising victory of San Martín in Chile changed the whole picture. From there the war was carried into Lower Peru, the great sanctuary of the Royalists. Military defeat and reversals resulted in dissatisfaction within the Spanish army, whose command until now had been thought to be efficient and brilliant. A group of young officers rebelled against the old guard. In 1821 they deposed the Viceroy, De la Pezuela,⁷⁵ whose early military victories had been rewarded with the viceregal post. Yet things were still advantageous and unchanged in Upper Peru, and the sense of security that the Royalists experienced in Charcas since the defeat of the auxiliary army was in no way abating. In Upper Peru the control of the Spaniards was stronger than in any place else. But to any intelligent man with a sight beyond the borders of Charcas (and because of the region's isolation this was hard to achieve) the situation was becoming dubious. The fate of Upper Peru was completely tied to the events in Lower Peru. If the heart of the Viceroyalty of Peru were lost, then the fall of Charcas would be only a question of time. Doubtlessly Casimiro Olañeta understood this and was

well aware of the change that was taking place, and realized that the Royalist cause was no longer secure, as the local picture would indicate, but rather was weakening fast.

It is to be assumed as quite possible that Casimiro Olañeta, from around 1820, began to open contacts with the Patriots. The young lawyer started his career as dos caras. In his first and rare Exposition he wrote⁷⁶ that he joined the revolution before the battles of Maypú and Chacabuco, which is without question a gross exaggeration. In 1818 he was rising fast in the Audiencia. Then he stated that the President of Charcas, Maroto, prosecuted him for sympathy for the enemy. He did not say when but he added that the case was never terminated. No document in the complete files of the Audiencia or in Olañeta's university file indicates anything of this nature. If this had been the case he would never have maintained his job in the Audiencia, which he did until 1824. This is without question one of his big lies. Olañeta went even further and had the temerity to write that when San Martín landed in Peru, he wanted to help the invading forces from Chuquisaca, but due to the lack of means this was impossible. He affirmed that he did distribute Patriotic propaganda that was sent to him from Lima via Tacna.⁷⁷ Again he stated that Maroto wanted to put him on trial, but that he escaped and went to his uncle's headquarters in Tupiza. This is very strange; he was accused by the President of the Audiencia of Charcas of subversion and in order to avoid trial he ran away to the Spanish commander of Upper Peru. If he was sincere, why did he not join the native guerrilla force or escape to the free provinces or make his way to the invading forces in Lower Peru?

In his succeeding lines he gave more examples, all very vague, of his efforts to the cause of independence after Maypu.⁷⁸ Casimiro flatly stated that he sent secret messages to the expeditionary force in Lower Peru, informing them of the strength and plans of the Royalist army.⁷⁹ Because of his relation to his uncle he indeed had access to vital restricted information. If Olaneta was right, he admitted that he became a traitor. All this is probably another exaggeration. If he had sent information he would have been the most formidable spy in the Perus, because of his intimate family contact with the commander of the Spanish army, and later Patriotic sources would have mentioned such an invaluable agent. Such is not the case. Casimiro Olaneta never lost his position on the Audiencia, which constitutes quite a perfect proof that he stuck to the Royalist cause. All that he wrote about his trial appears completely false.

Furthermore, in 1822, another great honor was bestowed upon him when he was named representative to the Spanish cortes.⁸⁰ For some unknown reason he did not go.⁸¹ In 1824 he was still criminal attorney of the Audiencia and was responsible for dismissing one of the most sensational trials in Chuquisaca, against two women accused of being witches.⁸² He stated that this was a matter of the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, but not of modern times.⁸³ This demonstrated that the young lawyer had not a provincial or narrow outlook. Everything taken together, it would indicate that Olaneta remained a Royalist until the last moment. Once the Spanish cause was completely doomed he made a spectacular change to the enemy's side in grand style. His statement that he joined the cause

of independence before the battles of Maypú and Chacabuco, however are fantastic exaggerations and defy historical evidence. As the Royalist cause became more and more precarious the young and brilliant lawyer probably began to look to the other side, starting valuable contacts in a most careful disguised manner. It is quite possible and very probable that he slipped some minor information to the enemy, so that if the time of a Patriotic victory ever arrived he had a ready-made case for himself. As the cause of independence improved, Olañeta proportionally increased his contacts. Finally in 1824 he pulled his great master stroke which catapulted him into becoming the most important person in Charcas. It was the plan and work of a true genius.⁸⁴

To those who consider the Upper Peruvian mentality a dishonest quality, the main tendency of which was the love for intrigue, Casimiro Olañeta represents the apex of this complex behavior,⁸⁵ which René-Moreno has immortalized as dos caras. But the existence of one figure as the prototype could weaken one's case, when no other example can be given. Besides, René-Moreno was an excellent historian, but he also was a profound stylist;⁸⁶ he was professor of rhetoric in Santiago, Chile, rather than a teacher of history.⁸⁷ He was painstaking about his style and was a superb artist in this field.⁸⁸ René-Moreno created two prototypes of dos caras, because one would not emphasize his point enough, and also because he could write it into a more beautiful sentence; to him los Olañetas y los Urcullus⁸⁹ sounded melodic. He used it over and over, he made them compadres.⁹⁰ To Casimiro Olañeta, René-Moreno added Manuel María Urcullu as the other example and master of intrigue and treason.

The choice is indeed quite good, although Urcullu never acquired the stature and technique of Olaneta, but rather became a faithful assistant who imitated his young master.

But both played the same game. René-Moreno located the right person when he searched in historical annals, covering the period of the creation of Bolivia, for a second figure who would match Casimiro Olaneta. Urcullu was chosen because he too jumped on the Bolivarian bandwagon at the last moment and became a "creator of Bolivia." The main criterion of René-Moreno for elevating Manuel María Urcullu to the rank of master of double dealings was that he passed on to posterity the notion that Casimiro Olaneta was an "exalted Patriot."⁹¹ Urcullu became the only Upper Peruvian chronicler of the War of Independence, and many later mediocre Bolivian historians, and indeed many foreign ones, used the book by Urcullu as the only source, instead of consulting other documents.⁹² Urcullu not only made Olaneta a dedicated Patriot, but he made him father and creator of Bolivia, an honor that should belong to José Antonio de Sucre. The chronicler Urcullu entitled his work Annotations of the History of the Revolution of Upper Peru. Today's Bolivia, by Some Patriots.⁹³ Urcullu assumed that he was a Patriot and he was determined, by becoming a Patriotic historian, to create an even greater Patriot, Casimiro Olaneta. Then he went even further and made his young master the father of the independent Upper Peruvian nation. Olaneta, a stern Royalist, a great civil servant of the King, who became a Patriot at the last minute, was written into the pages of history as a perpetual Patriot by another Royalist, also a good civil servant of the crown and also turned Patriot just before the

deadline.⁹⁴ Urcullu during the early part of the war had been Olañeta's teacher and superior. What a pair of shrewd compadres! But was Urcullu's early background that of an exalted Royalist? René-Moreno has little proof. He talks about the well known fact that in 1824 Casimiro Olañeta took Urcullu with him into the services of his uncle, General Pedro Antonio de Olañeta.⁹⁵ But then at this time even Bolívar had the distorted idea that the General had become a Patriot, merely because he had a disagreement with the Viceroy.⁹⁶

No biography of Urcullu has been written, nor is even a small essay available. He is simply one of the cases in history, well known in his country's annals, but whose career and life remain vague, mainly because documents are lacking or have not been located. Manuel María Urcullu was born in Chuquisaca on July 16, 1785,⁹⁷ ten years earlier than Casimiro Olañeta. He came from a distinguished family and his father was a peninsular from Viscaya. In high school he was a dedicated and intelligent student. Since he studied in a Catholic seminary, he concentrated on philosophy, theology and Spanish grammar. He had to memorize the Institutas of Justinian. After this Urcullu followed a career similar to that of Casimiro Olañeta a decade later. He entered the University of San Francisco Xavier and then became a student of the Carolina Academy. In 1806 he took his written examination, and the next year his orals before the Audiencia, having to handle a minor civil case as was the usual custom. He then began his legal career holding various positions, similar to those of Casimiro Olañeta at the Audiencia, such as associate judge, criminal attorney and other attorneyships in the various departments of

the Audiencia. Apparently he became a professor at the Carolina Academy.⁹⁸ Being ten years ahead of Olañeta, he was undoubtedly his instructor at the Academy and his senior in the Audiencia. At this time Urcullu was master and Olañeta disciple, roles that were later reversed. Urcullu held many other administrative jobs and whenever there was need of a good lawyer and efficient public servant for a temporary task or investigation, he was called because of his "astonishing knowledge of law," as one Royal official put it.⁹⁹ He was recognized as the "most skillful and most studious lawyer"¹⁰⁰ in the capital. In January, 1816, he was named assessor of the treasury, which was an eagerly desired position in the colonies. It is stated that Urcullu was chosen for this post because "he had not any doubtful spot on his record in regard to his loyalty to the King."¹⁰¹ Urcullu also was a member of the cabildo, to which he was named in 1812 as assesor, and in 1815 he became regidor.¹⁰²

In 1816 the guerrillas in Charcas doubled their efforts to keep the War of Independence alive in the inner provinces, after the disastrous defeat of Rondeau's expeditionary army. Guerrilla Padilla, especially, was hammering at the Spaniards with energy and vigor in order to make them realize that the war had not come to a victorious end because of their perfect victory in Sipa Sipa. Padilla, his wife and a host of other notable guerrillas such as Cueto, Calisaya, Ravelo, Carrillo, Miranda, Torres and Fernández, under the leadership of Padilla, had rallied together and were daringly attacking Chuquisaca in February, 1816. The capital was seriously threatened by their intrepid and desperate assault.¹⁰³ The patricians of the town decided to organize a unit in order to aid

in the fight against those ignorant guerrillas, whose forces had rebelled against the crown. This was known as the regiment of the "notables"¹⁰⁴ or of the "distinguished neighbors."¹⁰⁵ It was none other than Manuel María Urcullu who organized this regiment, and until they procured a professional army officer, commanded the outfit. Urcullu, as later certified by his superior officer, fought bravely against the attacking partisan forces. At one point he was put in charge of a patrol that had to go behind the enemy's lines.¹⁰⁶ The guerrilla army was forced to retreat and its attack ended in complete failure. Urcullu, because of his enterprise and courage, was decorated with a medal which had the inscription, "To the defenders of the right of the King."¹⁰⁷

The next year, 1817, the capital was again the target of a surprise attack when the temerarious but thoughtless Argentine colonel, Aráoz de la Madrid, penetrated, without being noticed, with his little contingent to the center of Chuquisaca. The regiments of the patricians again went into action and Urcullu once more left the bench to take up arms for the King's defense. He fought bravely against the invaders. The commander of the regiment of nobles, Francisco Marui, stated that he saw Urcullu fighting in the front lines, directly in the enemy's line of fire.¹⁰⁸ Because of the decisive defense of the city La Madrid had to retreat and give up his reckless project. And Urcullu said that he was a Patriot! This is what is known as false testimony, or unless perhaps he really was a Patriot in Royalist disguise?

On January 1, 1818, the cabildo of Chuquisaca, as was customary, held elections for town officials. In this election Manuel María Urcullu was again chosen assessor of the cabildo with seven votes, against four for his nearest opponent, José Ygnacio Mendoza. Don Mariano Enrique Calvo was elected regidor with nine votes, against three for his opponent.¹⁰⁹ Calvo was another Royalist criollo, of the same stock as Olaneta and Urcullu, trained in law. He later became vice president of Bolivia and Santa Cruz' most important and influential official.¹¹⁰ The list of those elected or reelected was, as was the usual procedure, presented to the President of the Audiencia, Don José Pasqual de Vivero. In an astounding and unprecedented move Vivero did not consent to the election of Urcullu and Calvo. He certified their nearest opponents instead. The President threatened the Royal notary with dismissal if he, on his own, should certify the election of Urcullu and Calvo. It was sensational news. Vivero accused Urcullu and Calvo of having been disloyal to the Spanish cause and of having cooperated in the past with the Patriots whenever they had occupied the town. The cabildo, with Casimiro Olaneta as its most influential member, felt injured and thought that Vivero had invaded the prerogatives of that body. Urcullu and Calvo objected and protested loudly because they had been accused of "being devoted to the infernal system of the revolution,"¹¹¹ to put it in the words of Mariano Calvo. Later Urcullu and Calvo became high officials in this infernal system. But at that time both felt deeply hurt and they decided to take the issue before the Audiencia in order to vindicate themselves against such "malicious information" which went against their "reputation and

honor."¹¹² Both had the support of the cabildo whose members were all friends and neighbors. Besides, the cabildo felt that Vivero had trespassed his authority by restricting the free will of that body. A common colonial problem of overlapping jurisdiction of governmental bodies had arisen. The case was taken before the Audiencia and it became one of those long and complicated law cases so abundant in the Spanish colonies. Regidores, regentes, escribanos, asesores, letrados, fiscal, procurador, presidente and intendente debated on paper the case of the loyalty of Urcullu and Calvo, and whether the President of the Audiencia had the right or not to disapprove the election of the cabildo.

Out of the forty-three folios of statements and discussion it becomes quite clear that Urcullu and Calvo had shown a lack of political conviction and honesty. It was a clear and palpable example of dos caras.¹¹³ Each had cooperated with the Patriots when they had the upper hand, and when the Royalist army recaptured the capital, La Plata [Chuquisaca], both became again staunch supporters of the crown, violently insulting the Patriots.

In 1813 the Spanish general, Ramírez, had evacuated Chuquisaca because the second auxiliary army under Belgrano had taken Potosí. When the expeditionary forces had entered the capital Urcullu and Calvo had remained in the city and offered their services to the Patriotic authorities. Urcullu had been appointed criminal attorney for the Audiencia, and Calvo had been named regidor of the revolutionary cabildo.¹¹⁴ But both had miscalculated the situation; the auxiliary army was defeated and the Royalist forces reoccupied Chuquisaca. Then Urcullu and Calvo had en-

thusiastically waved the King's flag. A committee had been formed whose purpose it was to investigate those who had cooperated with the enemy (Junta de Purificación). Neither Calvo nor Urcullu had been called before the examining board.¹¹⁵ Probably they had pulled wires behind the scenes to avoid a public appearance. Casimiro Olañeta, who defended both men in 1818, insisted that this meant that both accused had not cooperated with the "infamous revolutionaries."¹¹⁶ (Remember that Olañeta in 1826 affirmed that he had always been an enthusiastic and fanatic Patriot, but when he defended Urcullu and Calvo and tried to show that his clients had been honest Royalists, he called the Patriots "infamous".)

Urcullu and Calvo had been reemployed by the Spaniards later. The first one received a responsible job in the Royal treasury and the latter was named defense attorney for the poor, and became a candidate for the sensitive position of assessor of the city of Potosí. Calvo had failed to obtain this job but had been appointed associate judge on the Audiencia.¹¹⁷ Two years later, in 1815, the third auxiliary army had invaded Upper Peru. General Rondeau had named Martín Rodríguez as president of Charcas. Urcullu and Calvo had repeated the game all over. Calvo again had become regidor of the Patriotic cabildo and his companion, Urcullu, had been named, of all things, secretary to Martín Rodríguez.¹¹⁸ Again the expeditionary forces had suffered defeat at the hands of the Royalist army and had to depart from Chuquisaca. And again the two lawyers had changed their flag and had begun to unfurl the Spanish banner. Calvo defended his actions by stating that he had been forced to accept the position on the cabildo, and that he had wanted to resign. Since he

had been told not to submit his resignation, he had left for the country in order to be away from the council's deliberations. Calvo insisted that he had never taken part in any meetings of the cabildo, but then he admitted that the Argentine authorities had appointed him regidor for a second time because they could find no one else to name to the council.¹¹⁹ This time, Calvo stated, he had gone before the cabildo to publicly announce that "he despised his appointment."¹²⁰ Calvo was unable to present witnesses who would corroborate his assertions.

Urcullu, after the retreat of the third auxiliary army, had been unable to convince the Royal authorities that he was really a sincere Royalist. The Spanish officials had ordered him into exile.¹²¹ Urcullu had appealed and had written a pathetic letter to the Royalist commander of the Upper Peruvian army, General Ramírez.¹²² He inserted this letter into the trial.¹²³ Urcullu had written the General that he was addressing this letter from "the dark corner in which I am, full of sadness and humbly prostrated at the feet of your Excellency."¹²⁴ He had said that he wished that justice and clemency, for which the Commander was so well known, should be given him. Urcullu had recounted that he had gone back to his work in the Royal treasury after the reoccupation of the capital by the Royalist forces. Then suddenly the new Spanish commander, General Tacón, had dismissed him, had wanted to arrest him and had sent out an order for his exile. Urcullu wrote that he had hidden. The lawyer asked Commander Ramírez why General Tacón wanted to send him into exile when he, Urcullu, had shown more loyalty than anyone else. He asked why this

be so when he had been an efficient servant and had fulfilled his job conscientiously. Then the humble Urcullu ventured to answer his own questions. He thought that probably someone who hated him and wanted to do damage to him might have slandered and calumniated him before Tacón.

Urcullu thought that if General Tacón had inquired of honest citizens of the capital, they would have given Urcullu a clean and good recommendation. Besides, if he, Urcullu, could have talked personally with Tacón, the General would have become aware of his mistake and would have changed or rescinded his order. So far Manuel Urcullu had not mentioned a word about his cooperation with the enemy and the fact that he had become the private secretary to the revolutionary president, Martín Rodríguez.

In the next paragraph of the letter Urcullu had written that it was true that "when the infamous Martín Rodríguez usurped the government of this city [Chuquisaca] he obligated me to serve as his secretary, notwithstanding my repugnance and excuses."¹²⁵ To Urcullu, his behavior and the fact that he had despised Rodríguez, that the revolutionaries had insulted him, and that he had escaped, had been so well known in town there had not been any reason to detail it in the letter. Besides, Urcullu had reminded Commander Ramírez, he himself, Ramírez, after the victory of Sipa Sipa, had occupied Chuquisaca and Urcullu had been given back his job in the Royal treasury. Then Ramírez had been elevated to the post of commander of the Royalist army in Upper Peru, because General de la Pezuela had become viceroy. The new commander of Chuquisaca, General Tacón, had then dismissed Urcullu and had even wanted to exile him. Tacón had dismissed him from the job to which Commander Ramírez had appointed him. Again

Urcullu had written that most probably Tacón had been misinformed by some elements that had wanted to ruin his good reputation. General Ramírez had acceded to the request and had suggested to Tacón that he reinstate Urcullu.¹²⁶

President Vivero was not impressed with Calvo's and Urcullu's defense before the Audiencia and still refused to certify their election to the cabildo. In the meanwhile Vivero was transferred and a new general by the name of Maroto took his place as Spanish commander of Chuquisaca and President of the Audiencia of Charcas. Maroto concurred with his predecessor. The Audiencia was sharply divided on the issue and ventured no decision. Maroto then issued the final judgment.. He affirmed that the defense of Urcullu and Calvo before the Audiencia had not proved their point, but had clearly indicated "that they really had served the revolutionary government."¹²⁷ The new general and president concluded that "they shall be punished."¹²⁸ Therefore he did not confirm their elections to the cabildo of January 1, 1818. General Maroto signed his decree on January 21, 1819. The case of Manuel Urcullu and Enrique Calvo to regain their positions on the cabildo had failed.

Three years earlier Urcullu had begun to realize that his actions of 1813 and 1815, when he had cooperated with the revolutionary governments probably because he thought they had a winning chance, were becoming dangerous to him and his reputation as a Royalist. After the battle of Sipa Sipa, when it was clear that the auxiliary forces had suffered a gigantic defeat which would spoil any hopes of a final victory, Urcullu became an enthusiastic Royalist. He fought bravely in the front line of

defense against the Patriots' attacks of 1816 and 1817, although in 1813 and 1815 he cooperated with the invading Patriots. But things looked different at different periods. In 1813 and 1815 it had appeared that the auxiliary armies of Belgrano and Rondeau would be victorious. They had occupied half of Upper Peru and had the Spanish army on the run. The shrewd lawyer, Urcullu, gambled on the expeditionaries' triumph, and lost. The revolutionary attacks of 1816 and 1817 were of a guerrilla nature, with no overall plan, and doomed to failure. Naturally Urcullu had stuck to the Spaniards and even fought for them. This was only natural since he had had to make good his miscalculations of 1813 and 1815..

Strangely enough, Urcullu did not mention in his defense before the Audiencia, which took place in 1818, the fact that he fought like any soldier in the battle line against the attacking revolutionaries. Why not? Could it be that the Audiencia only admitted testimony directly relating to the events under judgement? That would mean that he could not use as testimony his behavior of 1816 and 1817 to defend his actions of 1813 and 1815. Or did Urcullu and Olaneta, who rallied to his defense, purposely fail to bring up his later actions, because to any sensible and intelligent observer the implication of fickleness would be clear? Urcullu's intervention in the four events of 1813, 1815, 1816, and 1817, were twice in favor of the Patriots and twice in favor of the Royalists. A simple analysis shows that he supported whichever side had better prospects. To bring in his behavior of 1816 and 1817, instead of strengthening his case, might have been damaging. Very probably the shrewd Olaneta and the intelligent Urcullu realized this quite well.

There is something else even more perplexing. As said before, President Maroto issued, on January 21, 1819, a final decision that Urcullu and Galvo could not assume their elected positions in the cabildo because they had cooperated with the enemy in 1813 and 1815. On February 18, of the same year, exactly twenty-eight days later, President Maroto, at the request of Viceroy de la Pezuela, decorated Manuel María Urcullu with a medal of the highest order, a medal of solid gold.¹²⁹ This was awarded to him because of his heroic behavior in the fight against the Argentine commando raid of Colonel Aráoz de la Madrid. This is puzzling and makes little sense. It was the play of dos caras in its most extreme form. The Royalist authorities were defenseless against this subtle intrigue. The President of Charcas condemned Urcullu for his cooperation with the enemy in 1813 and 1815, and the Viceroy in Lima decorated him for his services to the King's cause in 1817. In the jungle of Spanish colonial bureaucracy, where one hand knew little what the other was doing, a man who wanted to play the game of dos caras had only too wide a field where to put his philosophy of deceit and intrigue into practice.

From 1819 to 1824 Urcullu disappears into unknown history. Practically nothing about him and his actions during that period has been found. But what has been said for Casimiro Olañeta for that time was probably valid for Urcullu too. As the tide was again turning in 1820, so Urcullu, who had a less international outlook than Casimiro Olañeta, was turning too, probably stimulated by Olañeta. They were neither Royalists, as they affirmed staunchly when accused of having cooperated with the Patriots, nor Patriots, as they energetically insisted later when

accused of being Royalists. They had no political conviction, to them politics was anything that would lead to their own aggrandizement. They would serve the devil if it would be to their advantage. Slowly, in the early twenties, both came to realize, particularly Olaneta, who excelled Urcullu in shrewdness and ambition, that neither under the Royalists nor under the regime of Buenos Aires could they climb the ladder to complete mastery of Charcas. But if Upper Peru were independent, free from Buenos Aires and free from Royalist control perhaps they could rule it. This impulse was not motivated by a desire for the well being of Charcas, but was a scheme to foster their own personal ambitions.¹³⁰ How could they make Upper Peru independent? To stir up anti-Argentine feeling was easy, since it was deep-rooted. But how to overthrow the Spaniards when the Patriots, guerrillas and auxiliary armies had failed for more than a decade, with much loss of life? They decided that they did not need armies or guerrillas. As a pair of clever manipulators they might pull a trick. This strategy could bring doom to the Spaniards. After all, Casimiro Olaneta's uncle, over whom he had tremendous influence, was the commander of the Royalist army in Upper Peru.

NOTES

¹See Charles W. Arnade, "A Sojourn in Sucre," The Quarterly Review of the Michigan Alumnus, LX, no. 10 (1953), 64-70.

²Cf, ibid., 64; cf. USFX, no. 17 (1938), 56-122 (these are several articles referring to the date of the foundation of Chuquisaca, which is in doubt).

³Arnade, "Sojourn," op. cit., 66-68.

⁴José María Dalence, Bosquejo estadístico de Bolivia (Chuquisaca, 1851), 110.

⁵See G. René-Moreno, "La Audiencia de Charcas," Revista Chilena, VIII (1877), 93-142.

⁶Antonio Alcedo, Diccionario geográfico-histórico de las Indias Occidentales (Madrid, 1786-1789).

⁷Naturally the classic work dealing with Chuquisaca is G. René-Moreno, Ultimos días, op. cit.

⁸Alberto Baldivieso, Enfermedades altoperuanas (Sucre, 1929), 1.

⁹See Gustavo Adolfo Otero, Figuras de la cultura boliviana (Quito, 1952), 199-201.

¹⁰G. René-Moreno, Ultimos días, op. cit., I, 118.

¹¹Humberto Vazquez-Machicado, La sociología de Gabriel René-Moreno (Buenos Aires, 1936), 8.

¹²"Melgarejo y el melgarejismo," Selecciones Bolivianas (La Paz), vol. II, no. 6 (1953), 35-41. Mr. Marof [pseud. of Gustavo A. Navarro] has written a humorous novel in which he ridicules the society of Chuquisaca, La ilustre ciudad/ historia de badulaques (La Paz, 1950), 213 pp.

¹³"Los feudales criollos en el poder," Revista de la Federación de Estudiantes de Chuquisaca, vol. I, no. 1-2 (1945), 111-131.

¹⁴Nacionalismo y colonialismo (2d ed.; La Paz, 1943), XVII-XXIII.

¹⁵"Casimiro Olañeta, progenitores y ambiente social en que nació," La Razón (La Paz (November 20, 1949), literary supplement.

¹⁶"El chuquisaqueno es un tipo esencialmente sentimental, de aquel que valora a las personas por la familia o de apellido, es decir dentro de un canon tradicionalista, y tambien por la apariencias objetiva, o sea de las facciones, apostura, traje o manera de presentarse en general. Por esto es que la vida social en Chuquisaca ha sido bien vista -- y los sigue siendo -- por el gusto a concurrir a templos, teatros y salones, por fundar sociedades de beneficencia y cultura. Ahora, como han habido epocas en que se exageraba esta manera de sentir, la sociedad peridó entonces su sanidad y lozania, llegando la ceguera y el fanatismo" (ibid.).

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Cf. Dalence, op. cit., 111.

¹⁹G. René-Moreno, Fragmentos biográficos de Casimiro Olaneta, unpublished manuscript belonging to Humberto Vazques-Machicado, of which this author has a copy; see G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Argentina/ notas biograficas y bibliograficas (S. d. Ch., 1901), 271-272.

²⁰Guillermo Francovich, La filosofía en Bolivia (Buenos Aires, c. 1945), 79.

²¹ANB, Registro de escrituras públicas de la ciudad de la Plata (March 11, 1796), Callejas, 257. Hereafter cited as ANB, EP (date), escribano, folio.

²²ANB, EP (1800), Pimentel, 290; ANB, EP (1801), Valda, 278 and 244.

²³"Lista de los individuos casados residentes en la Plata y a quienes se conminó el ir a reunirse consus consortes," ANB, ACh, 1787 (unclassified document).

²⁴See infra, n.29.

²⁵ANB, EP (March 20, 1800), Callejas, 591; ANB, EP (January, 22, 1795), Callejas, n. f.

²⁶Supra, n. 20; Gantier, "Olaneta," op. cit. (alcalde ordinario de segundo voto); infra, n. 29.

²⁷ANB, EP (1796), Navarro, 496; ANB, EP (1797), Navarro, 46; infra, n. 28.

²⁸ANB, ACh (E. C., September 9, 1797), 129, 4 folios.

²⁹ANB, EP (May 5, 1792), Aramayo, 288; ANB, EP (1797), Navarro, 140; ANB, EP (1791), Navarro, 480.

30"En el Año del S.^r de Set.^s Noveinta y sinco Día Siete de Abril. Yo J. Josef Antonio de San Alverto Arzobispo de Charcas por la gracia de Dios y de la Santa Gede, al concejo de su Magestad etc. Exorcisamos, pusimos el Santo oleo y chrisma a Josef Joaquin Casimiro nacido el día tres de Marzo baptizado en caso de necesidad por el Licenciado Dⁿ Pedro Josef Paraga Theniente de Cura de esta Santa Yglesia Metropolitana Hijo Lexítimo de Dⁿ Miguel de Olañeta y de Doña Rafaela de Guemes fué Padrino el Doctor Don Mariano Peres de Oriundo Clerigo Presvitero: y el mismo Día le confirmamos siendo Padrino F. Francisco del Pilar Religioso -- del Orden de San Francisco lo firmamos.

Jph Ant.^o de Sⁿ Alberto
Arz^o de la Plata"
[rubric]

(Archvio parroquial de Santo Domingo, Sucre).

31"1. Si saven q^e el citado d. d. José Casimiro es Hijo lexmō mió y de d^a Rafaela de Guemes, havido en el lexmō latrimonio q^e contrage con dha Señora--

2. Si igualmente les consta q^e p^r línea paterna es Nieto lexmō de d. Mig.¹ Alexo de Olañeta, y d^a Maxima de Marquiegui Naturales de la villa de Elqueta en la provincia de Guipuscoa y p^r la Materna de dⁿ Francisco de Guemes, y d^a Ant^a Prud^a Martierena, el primero de las montañas de Burgos, y la segda del Pueblo de Yavi, Hija Lexmā de los S^{res} Marqueses de Toxo.

3. Si saven, ó han oido decir q^e asimismo es viznieto de d. Juan de Olaneta, y d^a Magdalena de Ansotegui su Lexmā mug^r de d^a Ana Mar^a de Sostoa; de dⁿ Juan de Guemes, y d^a Mar^a de Herrera y Estes; de dⁿ Alexo Martierene, y d^a Man^{la} Ygn^a Ferr² Campero Marqueses del Valle de Toxo; cuios enlaces todos son de legitimo Matrimonio--

4. Si saven q^e el referido mi Hijo p^r si p^r medio de sus Padres, Abuelos y de más ascendientes es noble Hijo dalgo, notorio de sangre, como descentiente de las casas Solares, de Olañeta, Marquiegui, Ansotegui, Sostoa, Guemes, Herrera, Estes, Campero, y Martierena q^e todos radican en la mencionada villa de Elqueta, y villa de Abionzo montañas de Burgos; cinco docum^{os} protesto excibir en caso necesario.

5. Si saben q^e los ascendientes del enunciado mi hijo, han obtendio en todos tpos empleos onoríficos en la republica.

6. Si saben q^e en tiempo inmemorial, y sin cosa en contrario, que todos los ascendientes de mi hijo han sido Christianos viejos limpios de toda mala raza, y si es el mismo de buenas y loable costumbres, sin q^e sobre el particular haia dado la menor nota de su personal. Dⁿ Miguel de Olañeta vecino y Regidor del Yll^o aiuntamiento de esa ciudad" (ANB, ACh, Expediente de abogados y practicantes juristas, vol. XIII, no. 13, 247-247v.).

32 Bernardo Frías, Historia de Guemes y de Salta (Salta, 1902), I, 466.

³³Ibid., I, 152-153.

³⁴Joaquin Gantier, "Casimiro Olañeta, educación y primeras impresiones," La Razón (La Paz) (December 18, 1949), literary supplement,

³⁵Later when Olañeta came back through Cordoba, in 1824 as a Royalist agent, Funes wrote about it to the secretary of Bolivar but without telling him that he had known him as a student. Seemingly Funes did not remember this young insignificant student of 1809-1812. Funes to Pérez, no place, July 1, 1824, in BNB, C. R-M (Copia de borradores autógrafos y cartas oficios originales de los papeles de Funes existentes en la Biblioteca Nacional de Buenos Aires).

³⁶Damaso Uriburu, Memorias (Buenos Aires, 1934), 30.

³⁷Gantier, "Olañeta, educación," op. cit., 6.

³⁸See infra, n. 39, p. 11.

³⁹Exposición del Dr. Casimiro de Olañeta (Sucre, Imprenta del Ejército [1826]), 1-2 (hereafter cited as Olañeta, Exposición). Olañeta wrote this when someone, under the pseudonym of Mosquetero, circulated a strong attack on him. The pamphlet by Mosquetero has never been located although such authorities as G. René-Moreno, Humberto Vázquez-Machicado and Gunnar Mendoza have searched diligently. This author has also looked in every imaginable place without locating it. Olañeta's Exposición is extremely rare and only one copy is available, located in the National Library of Bolivia. It has not been included in Gustavo Adolfo Otero, ed., Folletos escogidos de Casimiro Olañeta (La Paz, 1939), 197 pp., although it is one of the most interesting writings of Olañeta. This author has been told that it was reproduced in the magazine Kollasuyo, but he has not located it. More information is available in R-M, BB, no. 1464; G. René-Moreno, Fragmentos biograficos, op. cit.; El Condor de Bolivia (Chuquisaca), no. 1 (November 12, 1825), no. 16 (March 16, 1826).

⁴⁰G. René-Moreno in his splendid unpublished study of Casimiro Olañeta, Fragmentos biograficos, op. cit., shows exactly how Olañeta always lied.

⁴¹"La victoria de Salta me puso en aptitud de marchar a mi país nativo. Preso en Jujui por el Jeneral Belgrano sin mas crimen que mi apellido sufrí cuanto la desgracia y la maldad pudieron inventar para aflijirme. Después de una atroz conducta, logre pasara Chuquisaca" (C. Olañeta, Exposición, 2).

⁴²Cf. loc. cit.

⁴³ANB, ACH (Abogados), op. cit., f. 252, contains the diploma.

⁴⁴Ibid., 243.

⁴⁵Luis Paz, La Universidad Real y Pontificia de San Francisco Xavier (Sucre, 1914), 233.

⁴⁶Ibid., 237.

⁴⁷The best study of Vicente Cañete is Gunnar Mendoza, El doctor don Pedro Vicente Cañete . . . (Sucre, 1954), 140 pp; cf. G. René-Moreno, Biblioteca Peruana, op. cit., II, 563-567.

⁴⁸ANB, ACh, (Abogados), op. cit., f. 243.

⁴⁹Ibid., 253; cf. Gantier, "Olañeta, educación," op. cit., 4.

⁵⁰See Vicente F. López, op. cit., VII, 17-18; Miguel Ramallo, Guerra Domestica, op. cit., 12-13.

⁵¹ANB, ACh (Abogados), op. cit., fs. 244-244v.

⁵²Ibid., f. 253.

⁵³Ibid., f. 255.

⁵⁴"Señalanse al Suplicante los autos seguidos por doña Josefa, y don Balerio Flores contra la Testamentaria del finado Presbitero don Yldefonso Cabrera por cantidad de p^s que estas demandan" (ibid., f. 258).

⁵⁵Ibid., f. 253.

⁵⁶Ibid., f. 257v.

⁵⁷Ibid., f. 260.

⁵⁸Ibid., f. 262v.

⁵⁹"Conjuez de la Audiencia, Agente Fiscal en lo civil, y en la Protectoria de los naturales, y en la Defensoria general del Juzgado de Censos" (ibid., 264v.).

⁶⁰José Cabrera (Abogado del Reino y Escribano de esta Audiencia), Mariano José Calvo (Abogado y Escribano de esta Audiencia), Melchor Higuera (primer Notario de esta Curia metropolitana, Escribano de S. M., de Gobierno, y Notario Eclesiastico), Mariano Moscoso (Escribano de S. M. y de los Juzgados de Censos, y primera instancia), Tomás Delgadillo (Escribano de S. M. y actuario de los Juzgados constitucionales de prim^a y segunda elección de esta corte) (ibid., 262v.-265).

⁶¹Ibid., Higuera, 264.

⁶²Ibid., Delgadillo, 264v.

⁶³Loc. cit.; in view of Casimiro Olañeta's later career of treason, these letters look somewhat ridiculous, especially when they speak about his "integrity and character," his "impartiality and disinterestedness" (Higuera, 264), his "virtue" (Delgadillo, 264v.).

⁶⁴ANB, ACh (E. C., 1820), 72, 116.

⁶⁵C. Olañeta, Exposición, 2.

⁶⁶Cf. Joaquin Gantier, "Los Olañeta, el abogado y el militar," La Razón (January 29, 1950), literary supplement.

⁶⁷Supra, n. 39.

⁶⁸Gantier, "Los Olañeta, el abogado," op. cit.

⁶⁹"Su aficción a conspirar y destruir el orden existente se mantenía a gran parte de su ineptitud para crear ni organizar nada. La incoherencia de sus actos el día de hoy es precursora de su inconsecuencia el día de mañana. Su gusto por la palabra solo cedía en ardor a su propensión incontenible a conspirar" (unpublished first draft notes of G. René-Moreno belonging to Humberto Vazquez-Machicado).

⁷⁰Cf. Alfonso Crespo, "Perfil de Casimiro Olaneta," Kollasuyo, IX, no. 65 (1947), 3-11.

⁷¹Cf. Charles W. Arnade, "Una figura mediocre en el motín del 18 de abril de 1828," BSGS, XLV, 441 (1954), 74-100.

⁷²This is one reason why so little is known about Casimiro Olañeta and why no biography of Olañeta, which would constitute the basis for Bolivian history, has been written, even by Bolivian scholars. The work of Felix Reyes Ortiz, Biografía del Dr. Casimiro Olañeta (La Paz, 1860), 53 pp., is a useless piece. G. René-Moreno's unpublished monograph on Olañeta is still the best work. This author has been informed that the Chilean historian, Barros Arana, has written a biographical monograph about Olañeta, but he has not seen or located it yet. The personal library of Mr. Andres Santa Cruz Schulkraft, grandson of the great general, has some holograph letters of Casimiro Olañeta which the author has read.

⁷³See R-M, BB, index under Olañeta; Adolfo Otero, ed., Folleto, op. cit.

⁷⁴In Bolivia Olañeta is known as "el Talleyrand Criollo." On the final day of the author's stay in Sucre he found an unknown holograph letter of Casimiro Olañeta to Angel Moscoso, La Paz, October 2, 1828, (BNB, CR, 441), in which Olañeta wrote, "Quiero hacerme el elogio de decir a V. q^{ue} Tailleran no habría echo más" (*italics mine*).

⁷⁵See chap. 5 of this study.

⁷⁶C. Olañeta, Exposición, 2-5.

⁷⁷"Entonces me dedique a esparcir los papeles públicos que recibía de Lima por conducto del Patriota D. José Julio Rospiglioso Vecino de Tacna" (*ibid.*, 3).

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 3-5.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 4.

⁸⁰ANB, ACh (E. C., 1822), 110; ANB, ACh (Abogados), op. cit., f. 263.

⁸¹If we knew the reason we might have an interesting key to Casimiro Olañeta's doings from 1820 to 1824.

⁸²ANB, ACh (E. C., 1824), 35, 11 fs.

⁸³*Ibid.*, f. 8v.

⁸⁴Felix Reyes Ortiz in his eulogistic biography of Casimiro Olañeta, *op. cit.*, 53, calls Olañeta a genius. The excellent Chilean historian, Sotomayor Valdés, in his Estudio histórico de Bolivia (S. d. Ch., 1874), 145, debated Reyes Ortiz and thinks that, "Su inteligencia era grande, pero no profunda." G. René-Moreno talks about his "ineptitud to organize or create anything" (*supra*, n. 69). This author disagrees with René-Moreno and Sotomayor Valdés, Casimiro Olañeta was a genius in his own way.

⁸⁵"Personaje notable en nuestra accidentada Historia este don Casimiro. Graduado doctor en la Universidad de Charcas, supo ser el especimen mas perfecto de tal grado y clase intelectual en lo que tuyo de malo y de perverso" (Humberto Vázquez-Machicado, Papeles ineditos de Gabriel René-Moreno, unpublished essay).

⁸⁶Cf. G. René-Moreno, Elementos de literatura preceptiva (S. d. Ch., 1891), 529 pp.

⁸⁷The fact that no adequate biography of René-Moreno exists is a dark spot on Bolivian history. The best study is Gunnar Mendoza, Gabriel René-Moreno, bibliografo boliviano (Sucre, 1954), 76 pp.; for a bibliography about René-Moreno see editor's addition in G. René-Moreno, Matanzas de Yanez (2d ed.; Potosí, 1954), 435-436; Enrique Kempff Mercado, Gabriel René-Moreno (Washington, [1953]), 123-124.

⁸⁸Cf. G. René-Moreno, Matanzas, op. cit., xxvi-xxvix.

⁸⁹R-M, BE, passim; G. René-Moreno, Biblioteca Peruana, op. cit., passim; and other historical works of René-Moreno.

⁹⁰Fragmentos biográficos, op. cit.

⁹¹[U], Apuntes, 150, n.

⁹²G. René-Moreno in his Fragmentos biográficos, op. cit., has pointed out those mistakes. His evaluation is reproduced and expanded in Humberto Vázquez-Machicado, Blasfemias históricas/ el Mariscal Sucre, el Doctor Olañeta y la fundación de Bolivia (La Paz, 1939), 15-58.

⁹³One of the most perplexing bibliographic problems to this author is why all Bolivian historians, including René-Moreno (cf. BE, 207, 49), do not explain why they believe the author is Urcullu. If ever an explanation has been given and written it has not come to the attention of this author; cf. Miguel Ramallo, Guerrilleros, op. cit., 27, n. 1. This author discussed this problem with the Bolivian writer, Rafael Reyeros, who believes that the author is C. Olañeta. This writer is well acquainted with the typical style of C. Olañeta and he believes that he did not write the book. Seemingly the attribution to Urcullu should be accepted as true.

⁹⁴Sucre to Bolívar, Ilave, February 5, 1825, in Daniel F. O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre al Libertador, 1820-1826, (Biblioteca Ayacucho, vol. 36, Madrid, 1919), I, 303-305.

⁹⁵In Fragmentos biograficos, op. cit., excerpts in Humberto Vazquez-Machicado, Blasfemias historicas, op. cit., passim.

⁹⁶See infra, chaps. 7 and 8.

⁹⁷The biographic information is taken from some hastily written notes intended for a future biographic study by Samuel Velasco Flor, found by this author in BNB, CR, 387. Seemingly Mr. Velasco Flor had some documents of Urcullu and also had gotten much information from Mrs. Urcullu, whom Mr. Urcullu married at a late age (1832). Mr. Velasco Flor wrote these notes in February of 1866. This author is well acquainted with some of Urcullu's descendants. They do not possess any papers of

their illustrious forefather. Probably files of Urcullu will be located in the future. They might rest in some unsuspected place in Sucre. It is unfortunate that such a file as is available for Olaneta has not yet been located for Urcullu.

⁹⁸From the badly scribbled notes of Velasco Flor it looks as if Urcullu became the President of the Academy ("irijio la Academia de Practicantes juristas en clase de Censor i de Jue Pte.").

⁹⁹Certification by the royal notary, Melchor Higuera [Chuquisaca], October 25, 1823, as copied by Velasco Flor, op. cit. (unpublished).

¹⁰⁰Loc. cit.

¹⁰¹Loc. cit.

¹⁰²Velasco Flor, op. cit.

¹⁰³See Ramallo, Guerrilleros, op. cit., 158-164.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 157.

¹⁰⁵Certification by Pedro Cabero [Chuquisaca], April 10, 1820, in BNB, CR, 387, f. 3.

¹⁰⁶Loc. cit.; "En las veces que la ciudad ha sufrido ataques por los Insurgentes, con la misma voluntad ha peleado en defensa del Rey, y del nombre Español" (certification by Francisco Maruri, La Plata, April 14, 1820, in BNB, CR, 387, f. 3v.).

¹⁰⁷Proclamation by the commander of the Spanish forces in Peru, no place, February 29, 1816, in ibid., f. 1.

¹⁰⁸Certification, op. cit., f. 3v.-4.

¹⁰⁹"Reclamo de los Senores Enrique Calvo y M.¹ M.² Urcullu sobre la vara de Regidor," ANB, ACH (E. C., 1819), 12, f. 6.

¹¹⁰See ANB, ACH (Abogados), vol. XI, no 26 (for José Mariano Calvo); Samuel Velasco Flor, Foro boliviano . . . (Sucre, 1877), p. 11.

¹¹¹ANB, ACH (E. C., 1819), 12, f. 1.

¹¹²Ibid., f. 26 (written by Urcullu).

¹¹³One can only wonder how René-Moreno would have enjoyed these documents of Urcullu which he did not know.

¹¹⁴AMB, ACH (E. C., 1819), 12, fs. 1v., 3v., 36v.

¹¹⁵Ibid., f. 3v.-4.

¹¹⁶Ibid., f. 3v.

¹¹⁷Ibid., fs. 2, 3v., 20-20v.

¹¹⁸Ibid., fs. 2, 36v.

¹¹⁹Ibid., fs. 2, 4.

¹²⁰Ibid., f. 2.

¹²¹Ibid., f. 36v.

¹²²As a reward for his efficient campaigns General de la Pezuela became Viceroy of Peru after the battle of Sipa Sipa. His assistant, General Juan Ramírez, who had occupied Chuquisaca after the battle of Sipa Sipa, became acting commander of the Upper Peruvian army. Ramírez assumed his command on November 12, 1816. Later General La Serna, fresh from Spain, became commander of the Spanish army in Upper Peru, and Ramírez became President of the Audiencia of Quito.

¹²³La Plata, April 17, 1816, in AMB, ACH (E. C., 1819), 12 fs. 20-21.

¹²⁴Ibid., f. 20.

¹²⁵Ibid., f. 20v.

¹²⁶Ibid., f. 20.

¹²⁷Ibid., f. 43.

¹²⁸Loc. cit.

¹²⁹Proclamation of Rafael Maroto, La Plata, February 18, 1819, in BNB, CR, 387, fs. 1v.-2.

¹³⁰It must be said that in 1828 Urcullu remained loyal to President Sucre (Francisco Ignacio Bustos, "Diario de los acontecimientos desde el 18 de abril [1828] . . .," unpublished, original in ANA, Bolivia: representates diplomáticos, 1827-53, 1.3, 3. 6., copy available in Universidad de San Francisco Xavier in Sucre, rectorado). Olañeta organized the plot against Sucre from behind the scenes and later insulted him with bad words, see Charles W. Arnade, "Una figura mediocre," op. cit., p. 78, n. 20.

CHAPTER V

THE GREAT INTRIGUE

Synopsis

The years 1823 and 1824 were crucial in the emergence of Bolivia. Events were beginning to gain momentum and were speedily moving toward the great climax. A basic shift occurred in the whole situation of the Perus. It had its origin with the surprise attack and splendid victory of General San Martín in Chile. This region then became the jumping board for the invasion of Lower Peru, the bulwark of Spanish power in South America. San Martín's great victories were seriously endangering the Royalist army in Lower Peru. The optimistic situation due to the Spanish victories in Upper Peru in the early years of the war had faded into a grim picture. After the battle of Sipa Sipa General de la Pezuela had been elevated to the viceroval chair. It was he who was the Viceroy when San Martín reached the shores of the Pacific.

As the military picture of the Spanish army in the Perus became more dangerous the crown dispatched new army contingents to that area. Most of the new officers who arrived in the Peruvian theater were of a different mentality than the veterans of the Upper Peruvian campaign. The new arrivals were seasoned soldiers of the Napoleonic wars and some had fought too in Tierra Firme against Bolívar. They were hardened and

experienced, and had good training in military strategy. Their political outlook was liberal and some had fought together with the English against Napoleon. All of them were very partisan to the Spanish constitution of 1812 and opposed to a return to the absolutist monarchy. But the old guard, characterized by Viceroy de la Pezuela and General Olaneta, were fanatically conservative and convinced absolutists. A serious rift between the old and new elements began to develop.

Among the outstanding new officers were General La Serna, General Canterac and Colonel Jerónimo Valdés. At first these three were ordered to go to the Upper Peruvian theater. General Olaneta developed a strong hatred for these newcomers. When San Martín landed in Lower Peru all contingents were drawn out of Upper Peru with the exception of that of General Olaneta, who by default became the overall commander of the Spanish forces in Charcas. Viceroy de la Pezuela was unable to defeat San Martín and showed confusion in the critical hours. The new liberal element, who disliked the Viceroy's conservatism, took advantage of this and under the leadership of Canterac and Valdés deposed de la Pezuela and named La Serna as the new Viceroy. De la Pezuela was shipped back to Spain. The crown later approved this coup, and General Olaneta, a close friend and admirer of de la Pezuela, had to accept the new situation. Even worse, Valdés, the most radical of the liberals, was named his superior as commander of the army of the south. Olaneta kept his disgust to himself. Only a single person knew the real feeling of the general, his nephew, Casimiro Olaneta, whom the General trusted.

Casimiro Olañeta, as a shrewd observer, became well aware that the Spanish prospects now looked none too good. The possibility of final defeat was becoming apparent. He decided to play a grandiose game and to take advantage of the weakness of the Spanish armies and Charcas' antagonism toward the United Provinces. What about complete independence for Upper Peru? Around Casimiro several individuals of similar background and Machiavellian tendencies began to rally. To them the idea of the secession of Charcas became more appealing. In previous years they had shifted allegiance many times in order to always secure good and socially accepted jobs. Now their ambition became greater, they wished to become the rulers of Charcas and hand out the jobs. They came to realize that this they could do only if Upper Peru became theirs. They developed a great intrigue to become masters of their land. In the simplest terms, it was to take advantage of General Olañeta's hatred for the new Viceroy and his aides, convince him to rebel against the liberals and uphold the absolutist monarchy. This would submerge the Spanish army in the Perus in civil war and accelerate their final defeat. Then the Machiavellists would emerge as rulers of Charcas. The great intrigue was carefully planned with the aid of some disreputable Upper Peruvian exiles in the United Provinces. Its ramifications were deep and complicated, and historians can only reconstruct the general pattern of the plot since the documents are sparse and vague. Historical evidence and careful deductions can provide an identifiable outline of the intrigue. So far only one Bolivian historian, Marcos Beltrán Ayala, has understood, to a certain point, the conspiracy, but he has misinterpreted it as a Patri-

otic act, ignoring its true nature and the false personalities of the schemers.

The devilish plan was quite successful. But in 1823 the unexpected invasion of Charcas by a dos caras officer, a Royalist turned Patriot, General Santa Cruz, for personal advantage, nearly ruined the plan. Santa Cruz wished to become the liberator of Charcas and to rival Sucre and Bolívar. The Upper Peruvians plotters gave the appearance of cooperating with Santa Cruz, but behind his back they organized doom for the Santa Cruz invasion. The great intrigue was hatched by the future fathers of Bolivia.

The first Spanish commander during the War of Independence in Upper Peru was General Goyaneche. He occupied this post until 1813, when he resigned in the face of mounting difficulties and criticism. He had failed in his invasion of the lower provinces and had been seriously beaten by Belgrano before the walls of Tucumán. His punitive expedition against Cochabamba in 1812, where Goyaneche seemingly lost his temper, had discredited his policy of moderation. The man chosen to succeed him was General Joaquín de la Pezuela, a person of honesty and efficiency. He had a strict military mind, and was well qualified to fight in rough mountainous territory. De la Pezuela was unpolished, conservative, a strict disciplinarian and of no intellectual stature. His three main associates, General Ramírez, and Colonels Olañeta and Aguilera were of the same timber as their commanding general. De la Pezuela relied heavily on Pedro Olañeta, especially in his campaign in southern Charcas. This colonel, a businessman from Salta, knew the southern region of Upper Peru and the northern fringes of the lower provinces as well as his own hand. He had been a ruthless merchant with a huge army of peones, trading goods between Potosí and Buenos Aires. Because of this he fitted well into the army picture. His army of peones, his contacts and his knowledge of the terrain were invaluable. Olañeta's ruthlessness made him a first class soldier. He was an archconservative, narrow-minded, rough but unwaveringly faithful. He was the last general to present battle to the Patriots and he never surrendered, preferring to die in 1825.

Colonel Aguilera operated in the spaciousness of Charcas' east, Santa Cruz de la Sierra. He was native to the region and had qualities similar to those of Olañeta, except that he was of a superstitious nature. Deep in his heart he was a staunch Royalist and in 1828, three years after the end of the War of Independence, he proclaimed, in the most daring episode ever known in Bolivian history, the end of the republic of Bolivia and the renewal of Charcas as provinces belonging to the Spanish crown.¹ Even though it sounds unbelievable, he nearly succeeded. No other Royalist officers in all the colonies were more fanatic, absolute supporters of the Spanish crown than Olañeta and Aguilera, both born in Upper Peru. The third officer in the de la Pezuela circle was General Ramírez. He was more polished than the others, was sociable and a good politician. Yet he was merciless with his enemies.² The staff of General Joaquín de la Pezuela was strictly militarily minded, unpolished, sometimes fanatic, ruthless and honest to the last penny. There was a remarkable homogeneity, perfect understanding, a clear line of responsibility, strict obedience and an admirable discipline. All were convinced Royalists with no thought of changing allegiance. They were complete absolutists who despised the Spanish constitution of 1812, and were suspicious of new ideas or changes.³ Most of the officers on the staff were either American natives, such as Olañeta and Aguilera, or were old veterans in the colonies. They lacked the experience of the Napoleonic wars in Europe. The viceregal seat in Lima was occupied by the venerable Marquis of Concordia, Fernando de Abascal. He held de la Pezuela and his staff in high esteem.⁴

But Abascal was getting quite old and soon somebody would have to take his place. When de la Pezuela achieved his greatest victory at Sipa Sipa in 1815, he was rewarded with the Viceregal chair. On April 15, 1816, he left his headquarters at Cotagaita, the great Charcas fortress which protected Potosí and Chuquisaca, for Lima. In the past three years he had won innumerable victories and he had been just ready to open a decisive campaign against the great guerrilla republiquetas. The second in charge, General Ramírez, was named acting commander until a new commanding general was picked for this vital Spanish colony. Ramírez did not lose time, and instructed Aguilera to wipe out the two most dangerous guerrillas, Padilla and Warnes, which he achieved with success.⁵

Starting in 1815, because of the vital importance of both Perus, new contingents of army officers arrived from Spain and other theaters of war in America. In September of that year were transferred from northern South America such qualified army officers as Ricafort, Espartero, Camba, Carratalá and many others.⁶ The next year a new group arrived from Spain, led by General La Serna and Colonel Jerónimo Valdés, both veterans of the Napoleonic wars. La Serna was appointed as the new commander of Upper Peru. He and his staff arrived in Cotagaita on November 12, 1816.⁷ Acting Commander Ramírez was transferred to assume the presidency of the Audiencia of Quito.⁸ Colonel Jerónimo Valdés, a man who had fought with General Wellington, became acting chief of staff.⁹ In 1818 another contingent was brought to Upper Peru, under the leadership of General Canterac, another veteran of the European theater.¹⁰ Canterac became chief of staff under La Serna, and Colonel Valdés was appointed chief adminis-

trative officer.¹¹

All these new officers, especially the three great ones, La Serna, Canterac and Valdés, represented a completely new school. They were younger and had fought in the Napoleonic wars, serving under the great European generals. They believed in new tactics and showed admiration for the French and English armies. They had a liberal outlook and were well versed in English liberal thought and the streamlined French administration.¹² The new officers abhorred tyranny and absolutism and believed that the War of Independence was the consequence of a wrong policy by Spain. All of them were outspoken partisans of the Spanish constitution of 1812 and felt strongly that only sincere liberalism could save Spain from losing her colonies. These officers and their soldiers were Spaniards from Spain, but were eager and enthusiastic to change tactics, reorganize the army units and streamline the administration. In one sentence, this diverse new element which had come to the Perus was the clear-cut opposite pole of the de la Pezuela school.¹³ But Joaquín de la Pezuela was the Viceroy and they were under his leadership. The unity and homogeneity of the Abascal and de la Pezuela regimes was torn to pieces, and a dangerous rift was in the making. Besides, the new Viceroy had been an efficient and ruthless soldier and these were not the desired qualifications for the viceregal chair. He was a military man and he lacked political shrewdness and tact.

General Pedro Antonio de Olañeta, who had gotten along so well with Pezuela, and whom the commanding general had appreciated, now felt deeply antagonistic toward his new commanding officers. To him they were

young radicals who lacked the experience of being part of the land. He regarded their new ideas with extreme suspicion. Olañeta was ambitious and had hoped to become the supreme commander of Upper Peru, but instead he was being pushed aside by La Serna, Canterac and Valdés. These officers looked upon Olañeta as a man who was useful because of his qualifications and his superb knowledge of the terrain and the people, yet still they never would accept him as their equal. He was not a career soldier, but rather an amateur who had been a merchant. He had neither come from a distinguished school nor had he fought in the European theater of war. Colonel Aguilera felt the same way as Olañeta, but since he operated in a distant territory he was able to act more independently.

In 1820 the Royalist situation was becoming very critical. Viceroy de la Pezuela, who had enjoyed many brilliant victories in Upper Peru, now was presiding over the defeat of the Spanish armies in Chile and Lower Peru. The important province of Chile was lost and the splendid army of San Martín was fighting in the heart of the Viceroyalty. The importance of Upper Peru was vanishing. Commander La Serna, who had become intensely dissatisfied with the Viceroy's command tendered his resignation and requested to be returned to Europe. The Spanish crown recalled him. Before San Martín landed at Pisco, La Serna left Upper Peru for Lima to catch a ship for Spain. But when he arrived in Lower Peru the Argentinians and Chileans had landed and La Serna's unusual qualifications were needed. He decided to remain because of the extreme emergency. General Ramírez was recalled from Quito and was appointed commander of the Spanish army of Upper Peru for a second time, but now

with permanent rank. Since Upper Peru had lost its military importance due to the invasion of Lower Peru via Chile instead of via Charcas, it was decided to pull out most of the crack troops to reinforce the hard-pressed army in Lower Peru. Colonel Valdés and General Canterac rushed to Lima with the cream of the Upper Peruvian army. Then it was decided to transfer the headquarters of the Upper Peruvian contingent to Puno, and General Ramírez left Charcas too. When the situation became even more critical in Lower Peru, Ramírez was transferred to Arequipa. The only general that remained in Upper Peru was Pedro Antonio de Olañeta. By default he became commander of the Royalist army of Charcas, a post he had desired for so long. Theoretically he was still under the command of General Ramírez, but this was more on paper than in practice. Ramírez was forced to operate in Lower Peru, but soon became quite sick. Olañeta's dream had been fulfilled. He was the commander, and the three disturbing officers, La Serna, Canterac and Valdés, had left Upper Peru. His friend, de la Pezuela, was still Viceroy.

The situation in Lower Peru was becoming more precarious every day. San Martín was threatening the viceregal capital. The Royalist army was affected by a feeling of gloom and dejection. Desertion was on the increase and many trusted officers joined the enemy. An entire crack battalion deserted wholesale to the other side.¹⁴ The guerrillas behind the lines increased their activities. Besides, by pulling out most of the troops from Upper Peru that region was severely weakened and exposed. In Upper Peru, too, the guerrillas became more belligerent, especially Lanza who had just arrived from the lower provinces and was

reorganizing the Ayopaya republicueta. If the La Plata provinces would not have been in a state of anarchy, especially the northern provinces, another auxiliary army might have finished with the Spanish forces in Charcas. Now was the time, but the United Provinces did not act. In all, the Spanish position in both Perus but particularly in Lower Peru, had reached a very critical point. Viceroy de la Pezuela, who had shown good qualities as a general, now wavered and became completely unable to cope with the delicate situation. He was afraid to act with energy and preciseness. He vacillated, negotiated, gave orders, then counterorders, and trusted no one.

The main bulk of the Spanish army with its commanding officers, especially the Upper Peruvian contingents, was concentrated in the village of Aznapuquio. Here were La Serna, Canterac, Valdés, Ramírez, Camba and others. These officers had become disgusted with the behavior of the Viceroy. The new element, especially Canterac and Valdés, had never liked the narrow and old-fashioned attitude of de la Pezuela. La Serna was too much of a gentleman to express an open opinion. Others, including Ramírez, who had belonged to the de la Pezuela school, were now disturbed about the Viceroy's indecision. It was decided that the only way to save the situation was to act fast, in order to avoid a defeat. De la Pezuela had to go. General Canterac and Colonel Valdés were the main spokesmen for this sentiment. On January 29, 1821, nineteen officers¹⁵ sent a stringent ultimatum from Aznapuquio to Viceroy de la Pezuela, requesting him to leave his office within twenty-four hours and adding, "You shall make the sacrifice, in considering the general welfare before

your own pride; this will avoid a division or civil war, the consequence of which we would make you responsible before God, the government and the people."¹⁶ They gave him four hours to answer their ultimatum and offered his family and him all guarantees of safety. The rebellious officers demanded that de la Pezuela and his family go aboard the English boat Andromaca, which would continue her voyage to Panama. De la Pezuela protested violently but acquiesced.¹⁷ The revolutionary officers under the leadership of Canterac and Valdés then named La Serna as the new Viceroy, and requested confirmation from the crown, which came promptly.¹⁸

The liberal element had won. The new Viceroy named Canterac as overall commander of both Perus, and Valdés as the chief of staff. Somewhat later La Serna made Valdés a General and divided the army into the army of the north under the leadership of Canterac, and the army of the south under Valdés. Thus he got rid of General Ramírez who had been a de la Pezuela man.¹⁹ The new army of the south, under General Valdés, included Charcas and part of southern Lower Peru. The three companions, La Serna, Canterac and Valdés, who earlier had fought together in Charcas and who had represented a new minority reform wing, now had suddenly become the absolute rulers of the Perus. Most all minor officers accepted the new order. La Serna, a distinguished and just gentleman, was very popular.²⁰

In 1820, due to the Riego revolt in Spain, Ferdinand VII was forced to readopt the constitution of 1812 which he had thrown out upon his return from French captivity. The liberal element of the Royalist

army in Peru felt encouraged about this news and undoubtedly it gave them the much needed incentive to materialize the overthrow of de la Pezuela, which they had contemplated earlier. De la Pezuela had been a thorough absolutist. Pedro Antonio de Olañeta was dismayed at the promulgation of the constitution,²¹ which he hated more than anything else, but he had to swallow the news. Then came the deposition of his beloved and respected superior, de la Pezuela. This was to Olañeta an even more terrific blow. La Serna and the liberals were now his superiors, and the radical Valdés was his direct commander. This was an even worse misfortune. Valdés was the very opposite of de la Pezuela, his old commander in arms. De la Pezuela was a man with an impressive, tall figure. His silvery gray hair gave him dignity, and his impassive stone face inspired deep respect, even fear, but no sympathy. In his presence one felt his dominating and cold character with a fearful impact. One had to listen, to obey and dared not discuss whatever the General said in his icy voice. He always was immaculately dressed. His jacket had beautiful embroidery with many decorations, plus a long and wide braid. He always wore a gold sword and held a beautiful cane which he handled proudly. Behind the lines he wore fancy silk stockings and most expensive shoes from the best shops in Madrid. His campaign uniform was martial, with impressive boots, a wide, dark mantle over his shoulders, and a three-cornered black hat with white strings and blood-red feathers. Everything about him looked impressive and haughty.²² Pedro Olañeta liked it and was deeply influenced.

General Jerónimo Valdés was always nervous and eternally restless. He moved with an amazing swiftness and rushed from one place to another. The General was small, thin, and somewhat bent. He spoke fast and with intimacy, and his eyes sparkled with enthusiasm. One felt attracted to him because of his open and frank personality. His clothes were always worn out, he wore an old vicuña hat and dirty boots. He ate rapidly and disliked fancy food, he always had his meals with his soldiers. The General hated comfort and always slept outside on the ground, having only two ponchos for blankets. Nobody would recognize that he was the commanding general and he was often mistaken for a soldier. He did not care at all about formalities. His soldiers venerated him and his officers respected him.²³ His enemies thought that he was the most able Spanish general,²⁴ and Marshal Sucre had an immense respect for Valdés.²⁵ How could General Olaneta, who believed in strict social divisions, like this very plain general? Valdés was the very antithesis of de la Pezuela and Olaneta.

In the face of the popularity of the Aznapuquio com Olaneta did nothing to dispute the accession of La Serna to the viceregal chair. He accepted the new order without a word, for opposition was useless. The new Viceroy and his associates did not nurse any bad feelings against Olaneta, whom they considered an able general, and he was left in command of Charcas, subject only to the commander of the army of the south, General Jerónimo Valdés. For three years Olaneta nurtured a hatred against the liberals, but La Serna and Valdés were unaware of it. But General Olaneta's shrewd nephew, Casimiro Olaneta, realized it. He knew that

this might be to his own advantage and in Casimiro's mind a devilish plan slowly began to take shape. From 1821 to 1823 the main part of the fighting took place in Lower Peru, and Upper Peru became a theater of minor importance. The United Provinces could have now achieved with little effort what they were unable to do with large and costly endeavors at an earlier period, when three expeditionary armies failed miserably. But the free provinces had become the prey of a vicious anarchy and powerful, egoistical and commercial Buenos Aires opposed any extension of the provincial territory. The free provinces now abandoned the inner provinces to their own fate, even though liberation would have been very easy in view of Spain's critical position in Lower Peru.²⁶

But if military action became less important and noticeable, backstage obscure intrigues and plans by the Machiavellists were on the increase. They saw now quite clearly that the Spanish cause was losing and that the United Provinces' claim was a matter of the past. The loose La Plata union could never again expect to reintegrate the inner provinces within its political jurisdiction. Early abuses and failures and their recent inactivity had shut the door to any eventual hope that Charcas, when free from the Royalists, would want to join their nation. Casimiro Olañeta, as the leader of the Machiavellists, began to attract many more of his equals, such as Urcullu, Calvo, Usín, Calvimontes, Callejo, Antequera, Caverro, the Moscoso brothers and others,²⁷ all graduates of the Carolina Academy and criollo officials of the Audiencia.²⁸ The time had come when they thought that perhaps they could dispense with the Spanish power and take its place. They became a sort of dos caras lodge.²⁹

Many Upper Peruvian Patriots, because of the occupation of their home provinces by Spanish forces, had moved to the free provinces. Some had made their homes in the new country and become absorbed into its society. Others had become figures in Argentine politics with no wish to return. But some had remained in the northern provinces, especially Salta and Tucumán, with the hope of returning as soon as the revolutionary cause triumphed in Charcas. These latter were strong partisans of the United Provinces and naturally thought that if Charcas were freed by the armies of Argentina, then they would return and be put in charge of the administration in Upper Peru.³⁰ The most important figure of this group was a certain José Mariano Serrano, a man of identical background and education as Casimiro Olañeta, but who in his youthful enthusiasm had joined, as a very minor figure, the generation of 1809.³¹ With the failure of the 1809 plot he was forced to leave for the free provinces. He was a man of dubious character, with no sincere political philosophy but rather of a fanatic personal ambition.³² While Casimiro Olañeta was a Royalist dos caras, Serrano was a Patriotic dos caras.³³ Indeed he was very eloquent, and it was Serrano who probably redacted the Declaration of Independence of the United Provinces in 1816.³⁴ Later, in 1825, he wrote the Bolivian Declaration of Independence, thereby becoming the intellectual father of Bolivia. In northern Argentina Serrano was watchful of whoever was winning and in the early twenties it is said that he became a spy for the Spaniards. He was then secretary to the governor of Salta and from this confidential position reported important information to General Olañeta.³⁵ Another Upper Peruvian active in the United Pro-

vinces was Colonel Urdininea, later the third president of Bolivia, who was a close friend of San Martín. He had been named commander of the new auxiliary army which wanted to liberate Upper Peru in a fourth invasion (or fifth, if the raid of La Madrid is counted), but who never moved because of anarchy, opposition of Buenos Aires and the incapacity of Urdininea, whom René-Moreno called "lead feet."³⁶

Serrano, Urdininea and some others, whose names we ignore, realized that in view of the impossibility of liberating Charcas with Argentine armies and of the antagonism that had developed against Buenos Aires in Upper Peru, it was imperative to separate Charcas as an independent unit. This would be the best alternative to integration, which would have meant excellent jobs for them. Since integration was now impossible, it was time to look for another possibility. There developed in the northern free provinces a lodge similar to the one in Chuquisaca.³⁷ The latter was directed by the Royalist intriguer, Casimiro Olaneta, the former by the Patriotic intriguer, Serrano. Both had identical purposes: the independence of Upper Peru as an outcome second best to a Royalist victory, as envisaged by Olaneta, or an integration of Charcas into the United Provinces, as hoped by Serrano. Really this new choice was not bad at all; the Machiavellian Royalists and Patriots would then become the masters of the new country and would no longer be highly paid servants of the crown or the United Provinces. Suddenly the idea of independence became appealing. The aims of the two lodges coincided, although their origins were different and in distant places. Some way they established contact, very probably through their leaders, since Serrano was allegedly

a spy for General Olañeta and Casimiro was with his uncle in the early twenties.³⁸ One of the two intriguers developed a daring plan, most likely Casimiro Olañeta, based on his uncle's hatred for the Viceroy and his liberal officers, which the General had nursed too long already.

From Casimiro Olañeta's own words it is quite clear that in 1823 he was with his uncle, General Pedro Antonio de Olañeta.³⁹ It is probable that in this same year he opened his contacts with Serrano, laying the plan for the overthrow of the Spanish authorities. Then suddenly something not expected by the people of Charcas happened. Colombian troops, full of enthusiasm from their victories in the north, under the command of General Sucre, landed at Callao. They dominated the whole coast. A contingent under General Santa Cruz, with General Gamarra as second in charge, took Arica and started its march east toward the Desaguadero River, the border between the two Perus. Sucre was advancing in central Peru. For the first time since the ridiculous raid of Colonel Aráoz de la Madrid in 1817, six years earlier, an army was invading Upper Peru. Sucre, who never liked Santa Cruz, a Royalist officer who at the right time had changed allegiance, did not agree with his precipitous march into Charcas. Viceroy La Serna and General Valdés rushed south to check the invading army. General Olañeta marched north to meet the enemy. Santa Cruz and Gamarra were aided by the strong guerrilla force of Ayopaya under Lanza, and the invading army took La Paz on August 8, 1823. General Valdés presented battle ^{at} Zepita but was defeated by Santa Cruz.⁴⁰ The revolutionary army marched south and was able to conquer Oruro, the mining city well inside Upper Peru.⁴¹

Casimiro Olaneta realized very well that a new element had entered the complex picture with the unexpected and seemingly successful invasion of Santa Cruz and Gamarra. He acted fast and committed outright treason in company with his colleague, Usín, about which he boasted later as a proof of his Patriotic leanings. He forwarded to Gamarra information about the Spanish army, with which his uncle had trusted him; it was clearcut treason.⁴² Then suddenly, without having been defeated, Santa Cruz turned around and retreated with such speed that it became a complete rout, leaving behind important material and wounded soldiers. He went back to the Desaguadero River and crossed it with his disintegrated and demoralized army. Lanza was left abandoned, and on his dash back to his partisan republic was badly defeated.

Why did Santa Cruz practically run for his life when not even beaten in battle? It remains yet an enigma and the words of a United Provinces editor, "Who knows why?"⁴³ are still remarkably appropriate. Santa Cruz had probably been confident that the stagnant auxiliary army of Colonel Urdininea would move from Salta north into Charcas.⁴⁴ But this did not happen. The division of Urdininea was more on paper than in the barracks,⁴⁵ and the opposition of Buenos Aires made it difficult for Urdininea to take the road to Upper Peru. Besides, it is said that José Mariano Serrano was instrumental in pulling strings that put all kinds of obstacles in Urdininea's way in case he tried to march.⁴⁶ It is still unknown if this is true. But to Casimiro Olaneta and José Mariano Serrano the sudden appearance of a man hopeful of becoming a liberator, the dos caras soldier, Santa Cruz, was none too pleasing. Santa

Cruz, with his slick personality, had moved into Charcas to foster his own political ambitions, undertaking a highly dangerous political campaign. General Sucre understood well the true nature of Santa Cruz' intention and he expressed it quite frankly to Bolívar.⁴⁷ The honest and straightforward Sucre was unhappy about his campaign.

Casimiro Olaneta saw that a new and dangerous rival, with a personality somewhat similar to his, had appeared in the picture and he was afraid that Santa Cruz' campaign might be successful. Therefore, in case this should happen, he wanted to make himself acceptable to the invading general. He supplied him with information about the Royalist army. It is feasible that Casimiro Olaneta and Serrano realized well that Santa Cruz could not win without the opening of a second front from the United Provinces, which would be undertaken by Colonel Urdininea. For years the Royalist authorities had lived with the nightmare that an invasion of Charcas from north and south might take place at the same time, catching them in the middle. If Urdininea marched, even with a reduced contingent, the victory of General Andrés Santa Cruz was certain and he, the mestizo from La Paz, a Royalist soldier who rose through the ranks and then became a Patriot because he was sure that the Spaniards would lose, would become the liberator of Charcas.⁴⁸ From there Santa Cruz could liberate Lower Peru and become another, or even greater, Bolívar. Santa Cruz must not win and it can be assumed that Casimiro requested Serrano, with great emphasis, to do everything possible in order that Urdininea might not move. Then Santa Cruz' expedition, with already overextended lines and harrassed by three able generals, includ-

ing the Viceroy, would be doomed. As a matter of fact, during the days when Urdininea should have departed he was put under arrest and sent to Tucumán for a court-martial, because in a fight he had hurt slightly a subordinate Upper Peruvian officer, an offense that in those rough days was quite common and hardly reason for a court-martial.⁴⁹ Apparently someone wanted to see Urdininea away from his division. And the man who wrote most vitriolically against the Urdininea division, mobilizing public opinion against a new expedition into Upper Peru, was the editor of the Correo de las Provincias of Buenos Aires, Fortunato Lemoine, an Upper Peruvian emigrant from Chuquisaca.⁵⁰ Indeed strange things were going on. Does it not look as if José Mariano Serrano played his game obscurely behind the scenes, doing quite well? Serrano, too, was from Chuquisaca.

Santa Cruz was an able and intelligent man and soldier; he would not have turned around and run for his life, given up a brilliant ambition, just for a trifle. But he realized that without support he could not win, and rather than be encircled he retreated hastily. Urdininea did not march, perhaps because of Argentine apathy or more probably because of the shrewd intrigues of the Upper Peruvian schemers.

Another auxiliary expedition, this time from the north, had failed and as a result had made an aspirant for the title of liberator look very foolish. Besides, the Argentine failure to move, when victory or defeat depended on them, had once more shown that the United Provinces had abandoned their interior provinces, and public opinion in Charcas now became more belligerent against Buenos Aires. To Olañeta and his

colleagues the prospects looked better than ever. The game of dos caras had worked quite well, but this time it was really tres caras. Casimiro had stuck to his uncle as his confidential aide; at the same time he supplied the enemy, Santa Cruz, with military secrets. Yet behind the scenes he mobilized a shrewd intrigue that would see to it that Urdinenea's army, the only hope of success for Santa Cruz, would not march, therefore obligating the Upper Peruvian general to abandon Charcas. The Santa Cruz interlude, which had nearly brought doom to the intriguers' ambitions, had been weathered successfully and now the sun looked brighter than ever. However, it had set back the time-table of the great intri^{due.}gue.

General Olañeta had cooperated faithfully in the defense of Charcas, hindering the advance of Santa Cruz and Gamarra, yet inside himself he was still harboring hate for the Viceroy and his officers, which began to grow stronger and assume completely distorted proportions. It all became a senseless obsession which took the aspect of a persecution complex. He came to despise the Spanish constitutional system even more, and believed that his beloved King had become a prisoner of the constitutional liberals in Spain.⁵¹ General Olañeta believed himself to be the only faithful servant of Ferdinand in the Perus. He later spoke of the "insults" of the liberals.⁵² To him the Viceroy, Valdés and Canterac had become the enemies and jailers of the King. General Pedro Olañeta really suffered because he was sure that the King too suffered.⁵³ At the same time he was sure that once Ferdinand had freed himself from the shackles of the constitution and its supporters he would make him, his

companion in pain, the Viceroy of Peru.⁵⁴ This amalgamation of a true fanatic loyalty and his personal ambition made him believe that La Serna had held him back in his military advancement and rank,⁵⁵ that his letters to Spain had been intercepted and censored, and that he was being isolated in Upper Peru.⁵⁶ As he kept all these impressions to himself they grew even more, so that he finally thought that the liberal trio contemplated killing him.⁵⁷ It reached a very absurd stage when the General received a copy of the newspaper, El Depositario of Cusco, in which its editor, Gaspar Rico, published a badly done anachronistic poem in which La Serna was being made the King of the Peruvian empire from "Tupiza to Tumbes."⁵⁸ Since the Viceroy used this paper in Cusco to publish his announcements, edicts and official correspondence, Olaneta was convinced that La Serna and his associates wanted to separate the Perus from Spain and make the Viceroy king of this new empire.⁵⁹

All these were plain hallucinations of Olaneta. Neither the affable Viceroy nor the simple Valdés, who appreciated a good soldier, nursed any feelings against Olaneta who, queer as he was, was a useful man. The trio was completely unaware of the psychological make-up of General Olaneta since he as yet gave no outward sign. Nor had La Serna any ambition or idea of becoming emperor of the Perus. Busy with his multiple duties and worries he had never even seen the unimportant poem.⁶⁰ It was a joke by the editor who loved filthy words and later wrote another poem in which he buried Bolívar in human excrement.⁶¹ General Pedro de Olaneta had become a truly psychopathic case, although

he was still a good soldier.

In the years 1822 and 1823 Spain was in the midst of a civil war between the absolutists and the constitutionalists. The enemies of the constitution had organized in the castle of Urgel "the supreme regency of Spain during the captivity of Ferdinand VII."⁶² By his captivity they meant his surrender to the liberals. The Urgel rebels wanted to free the King from his forced capitulation to the cortes. The ideas of the Urgel faction were identical with the hopes and aspirations of General Olaneta. Yet the General had not openly expressed his accumulated feelings of ~~despise~~ for the constitutional trio of Peru, La Serna, Canterac and Valdés, his direct superiors. Apparently he had entrusted his intimacy to the only man whom he appreciated in his isolation, his brilliant young nephew, Casimiro. He had made him his personal secretary.⁶³ Casimiro had lost no time and had provided a job in the Olaneta army for his friend, Urcullu, who became treasurer.⁶⁴ Quite probably he got Doctor Uzín, another Machiavellist, a position too.⁶⁵ The General fell under the spell of his devilish nephew, whom he looked upon as a smart and well prepared man with good manners and easy conversation. He thought that he, a rough soldier and ex-merchant, needed someone with more intellectual maturity than he and that Casimiro filled this role.

Casimiro began to stimulate more and more his uncle's hatred for the liberal trio, with the hope of building it up to such a point that it would finally force the General to rebel, therefore inciting civil war within the Spanish army in the Perus. The stage had been set with the hope of pulling this coup in 1823. To incite the General to

action the schemers had carefully spaded the ground and falsified a letter supposedly written by the regency of Urgel, whose beliefs coincided with the General's, requesting him to abolish the constitution in Peru and then offering Olañeta the viceregal chair of Buenos Aires. The letter has never been located. The only one who ever cites it is Urcullu, when he later wrote a poor history of the war.⁶⁶ Casimiro Olañeta, in his rare and relatively unknown exposition of 1826, admitted that he had falsified a letter in the town of Yotala to his uncle that was the incentive for the rebellion of the General.⁶⁷ But the invasion of Santa Cruz nearly spoiled their shrewd plan and the intriguers hurriedly had to restrain the General from rebelling until Santa Cruz was defeated. Therefore the Peruvian expedition retarded the Olañeta mutiny by about one year. The General now became even more convinced that in order to serve his master better he must abolish the constitution and obey the falsified mandates of the regency of Urgel. When one of his subordinate officers requested a better position from General Olañeta, he told him that he should have patience because in three months he, General Olañeta, would be Viceroy.⁶⁸ The conspirators had fooled the General and had planted in his mind wrong impressions and hopes.

That his young nephew had this diabolically clever plan of forcing his uncle to rebel, therefore hoping to bring doom to the Spanish cause, is well documented, but has passed quite unnoticed. Casimiro bragged about it.⁶⁹ He was hardly lying this time, except that he turned things around somewhat, trying to prove his unshaken enthusiasm, sincerity and fidelity to the revolutionary cause. This was not the case.

When his uncle's army entered La Paz victoriously in 1823, Casimiro, in an intimate conversation in the municipality, expressed with daring frankness that since the army of Santa Cruz was defeated "we must now work to introduce disunity among the Spanish chiefs to make America happy."⁷⁰ Then he added with more emphasis that "since the devil has taken the Santa Cruz expedition we must create anarchy and unrest in the army of the King."⁷¹ Later when Casimiro was on a very obscure mission for his uncle in Buenos Aires and Montevideo, he boasted at a party, after having drunk heavily, that it had been necessary to create "the germs of discord." When asked why he was fighting with the absolutist faction he answered that "it does not matter what different roads are taken, but the important thing is to reach the same destination."⁷² Strangely he expressed these feelings freely before Royalists, who passed on the information to their superiors. But nobody took this talkative and boastful young man seriously. As one Royalist witness said later, he thought it was only "bragging without any substance."⁷³ Too late the Viceroy realized that General Olaneta had fallen under the spell of his nephew. When there was no longer chance for remedy Valdés said that "this dope of Olaneta has become a victim of his nephew, Urcullu, Usín and others."⁷⁴ By then the germ of disunity planted by Casimiro Olaneta had grown to catastrophic proportions, causing the collapse and defeat of the Spanish armies in the Perus, and with it the Spanish cause in America.

The commander of the Ayopaya republic, Miguel Lanza, had come out of his impregnable republicueta to join forces with Santa Cruz. Although Lanza was a harsh individual he was never a dos caras. When Santa Cruz retreated to Lower Peru in haste, Lanza was left abandoned with the route back to his Ayopaya republic blocked. He then retreated from Oruro to Cochabamba, the most Patriotic-minded town in Charcas. With the help of its inhabitants he took possession of the city. General Olañeta left La Paz and marched upon Cochabamba. Lanza and his cochabambino supporters met him on the plains of Falsuri, four leagues from the town. In a savage battle on October 16, 1823, the Spanish general defeated the genuine revolutionary army.⁷⁵ Lanza and his routed guerrillas, in an astounding operation, were able to climb the sharp and abrupt mountains to enter their republic, thereby escaping capture. Patriotic historians say that Olañeta behaved cruelly in conquered Cochabamba.⁷⁶ His nephew wrote, vainly as always, that only because of his influence his uncle did no harm to the Patriots.⁷⁷ The storm of 1823 had passed and Charcas was quiet again. General Olañeta left with his army for his headquarters in Oruro. General Valdés was preoccupied with the fight in Lower Peru. General Olañeta had been left again to himself as virtual ruler of Upper Peru. It was time to act and for the great intrigue to materialize.

NOTES

¹This author has collected and copied a fair amount of material about the Aguilera revolt. The material has come exclusively from the National Archive of Bolivia and is contained in the legajos of the Ministerio del Interior and the Ministerio de Guerra corresponding to the year 1828. The author is unaware of any study of the revolt.

²This information is taken from extensive reading of such sources as Torrente, Camba and the Count of Torata and other books sketched in chapter one of this study and more extensively detailed in Charles W. Arnade, "Una bibliografía," op. cit., 159-169.

³"America," El Argos (Buenos Aires), nos. 18, 19 (March 20, 24, 1824); cf. Conde de Torata, ed.; Documentos para la historia de la guerra separatista del Perú (Madrid, 1896), vol. III doble, 147-203. Hereafter cited as T, GS, volume, page.

⁴Cf. R. Casado, J. A. Calderón Quijano, eds., Memoria, op. cit., passim.

⁵See chap. 1.

⁶T, GS, III, 159.

⁷Ibid., II, 158-159.

⁸Camba, Memorias, I, 297.

⁹See John Miller, Memorias del General Miller [translated by General Torrijos] (London, 1829), II, 186.

¹⁰T, GS, II, 158-159.

¹¹Cf. Miller, op. cit., II, 184-185.

¹²Cf. Miguel Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 3-4.

¹³See T, GS, I, II, III, IIIIdoble, IV, passim.

¹⁴Camba, Memorias, I, 467-471.

¹⁵José Canterac, Gerónimo Valdés, El Marques de Valleumbroso, Ignacio Landazuri, Ramón García, Ramón Gómez de Bedoya, Mateo Ramírez, Andrés García Camba, Francisco Narváez, Francisco Ortiz, Antonio Tur, Agustín Otermín, Fulgencio de Toro, José Ramón Rodil, Pedro Martín, Antonio Seoane, Manuel Bayona, José García, Valentín Ferraz.

¹⁶[Nineteen officers] to the Viceroy [Joaquín de la Pezuela], Aznapuquio, January 29, 1821, in T, GS, II, 305-310.

¹⁷Joaquín de la Pezuela to José Canterac [and others], Lima, January 29, 1821 (3 letters), José Canterac and others to de la Pezuela, Aznapuquio, January 29, 1821, in T, GS, II, 310-312 (nos. 2, 3, 4, 5).

¹⁸Confirmation of La Serna, July 29, 1821, in T, GS, IV, 286.

¹⁹"America," El Argos (Buenos Aires), no. 19 (March 24, 1824).

²⁰For a complete analysis of the event of Aznapuquio see the invaluable volumes of T, GS; for an interesting analysis see "America," El Argos (Buenos Aires), nos. 15, 18, 19 (March 10, 20, 24, 1824).

²¹Pedro Olañeta to La Serna, Potosí, February 21, 1824, Pedro Olañeta to El Rey, Potosí, March 6, 1824, Pedro Olañeta to El Rey, La Plata, May 21, 1824, in T, GS, IV, 372-373, 381-385.

²²Vicente Fidel López, Historia de la republica argentina, op. cit., VII, cf. T, GS, III, 480-490 (biographic sketches of de la Pezuela).

²³Miller, Memorias, op. cit., II, 183; Benito Pérez Galdós, Episodios nacionales (tercera serie, Zumalacarreui); Ovilo y Otero, Historia de las cortes, de las armas, de las letras . . . (Madrid, 1851-1853), 7 vols.

²⁴"El mas valiente, honrado y entendido de los generales realistas" (Ricardo Palma, Tradiciones peruanas, Barcelona, 1893, I, 328).

²⁵Indeed General Sucre was very anxious to know General Valdés and after the capitulation invited Valdés to be his guest of honor ("Hagame Vd. el servicio de decirle al General Valdés que deseo conocerlo en el campo de batalla; que mañana le esperó para tomar el asado a las diez, sin etiqueta alguna"). During the dinner Sucre gave the following toast: "Para el que si hubiera nacido en America, habria sido el primer defensor de su independencia, por el General Valdés." When Sucre and Valdés and his guard of honor entered the town of Huamanga one aid-de-camp of Sucre, Colonel Elizalde from Guayaquil screamed, "Mueran los godos," and Sucre turned his horse and raced toward Elizalde. He shook him and told him in strong words to shut up, and said that he was a low coward. Valdés rushed to Sucre, who was furious and would not calm down, and interceded for Elizalde, telling him to forgive this young man, that he did not mind. Both Sucre and Valdés were the best, most honest, most sincere, and most gentlemanly commanders of the War of Independence in South America (see Bernardo F. Escudero, Diario de la ultima campaña del ejercito español en el Perú 1824 que terminó en la batalla de Ayacucho, in T, GS, III-doble, 44, 47-49).

²⁶Gabriel René-Moreno had done an excellent and extremely detailed study of the abandonment of the inner provinces by the United Provinces. It is available in his Bolivia y Perú/ más notas, op. cit., and Bolivia y Perú/ nuevas notas, op. cit.

²⁷Gerónimo Valdés, Exposición . . ., in T, GS, I, 65, 72, 80; cf. T, GS, IV, 59, 86-88, 234; Mariano Torrente, Historia de la revolución hispano-americana, op. cit., III, 511; cf. Beltran Avila, Logia, 14; Charles W. Arnade, "Una figura mediocre," op. cit., 85, n. 60; C Olaneta, Exposición, 4-5.

²⁸See Samuel Velasco Flor, Foro boliviano . . ., op. cit., 8-13.

²⁹Marcos Beltran Avila, Logia, is the first to have realized the formation of a lodge, yet he has misinterpreted it and has called it a patriotic lodge (p. 6), which it was not at all. Beltran Avila, a patriotic historian, was blind to the true nature of this lodge. This author, before he had seen Beltran Avila's book, which is of limited circulation, had come to the conclusion that a secret lodge had been formed. Beltran Avila underestimates the influence of Olaneta and guesses that maybe Uzín was the moving spirit (p. 16). But Uzín was a minor figure who perhaps deserves some study, but this author in his research has missed the name Uzín in crucial documents.

³⁰Originally the author wanted to write a chapter about the influence of the exiles, but due to lack of information and documents he had to give up this task. Seemingly René-Moreno also intended such a study and had similar difficulties. His unpublished Fragmentos biográficos, op. cit., has two or three interesting pages about the exiles.

³¹Velasco Flor, op. cit., 10; ANB, ACh (Abogados), vol. XV, no. 43; José Mariano Serrano, Breves pinceladas sobre algunos puntos interesantes a mi honor (Sucre, 1842), 11 pp.; José Macedonio Urquidí, Figuras históricas (Cochabamba, 1916), 50-74; Agustín Iturricha, "El doctor José Mariano Serrano . . .," BSGS, XXXI, 327-332 (1937), 21-42; Valentín Abecia, "Los fundadores de la república/ José Mariano Serrano," BSGS, XXVI, 274-278 (1926), 214-217.

³²Cf. R-M, BB, nos. 396, 458, pp. 103, 118-119.

³³"Serrano era un dos caras de la peor especie" (G. René-Moreno, Fragmentos biográficos, op. cit.).

³⁴La Prensa (Buenos Aires) (May 26, 1936), numero de gala, reproduced in "El Doctor Mariano Serrano fue el redactor del acta de la independencia según su propia declaración," BSGS, XXXII, 333-336 (1937), 36-38; Juan de Ermita, "El Doctor José Mariano Serrano y el acta de la independencia argentina," BSGS, XXXIII, 343 (1938), 117-122; cf. Serrano, Breves pinceladas, op. cit., 11; Urquidí, Figuras, op. cit., 54.

³⁵El Argos (Buenos Aires), no. 89 (November 5, 1823); El Teatro de la Opinion (Buenos Aires), no. 27 (November 21, 1823); G. René-Moreno, Fragmentos biograficos, op. cit., This is a disputed fact but the author believes it to be true.

³⁶The author is unaware of a study about Urdininea, the best is available in G. René-Moreno, Peru y Bolivia/ notas and Peru y Bolivia/ nuevas notas, op. cit., passim; besides René-Moreno has unpublished notes called Escuadron de Urdininea, apuntes no utilizados o sobrantes (belonging to Humberto Vazquez-Machicado); see Julio Diaz, Los generales de Bolivia (La Paz, 1929), 56-62; Manifiesto del Jeneral Urdininea refutando el mensaje presentado por el gran Mariscal de Ayacucho al Congreso de Bolivia (Chuquisaca, 1828), 4 pp., in BNE, C. R-V.

³⁷[José Mariano Serrano], "Un boliviano," El Fenix de Lima, no. 1 (1827); cf. Rigoberto Paredes, "Ligeros datos sobre la fundación de Bolivia," BSGS, XXXII, 337-339 (1937), 142. It is strange that Serrano published an article in the Fenix, which was a hate sheet whose purpose it was to discredit Bolivia. Serrano was then Bolivian minister to Peru. Seemingly he conspired with this country against the Sucre government in Bolivia. In the article in the Fenix he stated that there was founded, in 1820 in Tucuman, a patriotic lodge of the exiles with the purpose of separating Upper Peru from Buenos Aires.

³⁸Cf. C. Olañeta, Exposición, 4-5; cf. J. M. Serrano, "Comunicado," El Condor de Bolivia, no. 16 (March 16, 1826).

³⁹C. Olañeta, Exposición, 3-5.

⁴⁰General Santa Cruz was later known as "el Mariscal de Zepita," just as Sucre was known as "el Marsical de Ayacucho."

⁴¹See especially "Extracto del diario de las operaciones del ejercito español en la campaña sobre el Desaguadero . . ." (Cuzco, 1824), in T. GS, IV, 246-270; the basic works of Torrente and Camba give good descriptions; see also Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán, Historia del Perú independiente (Lima, 1870), segundo periodo, vol. I, 121.

⁴²"El Jeneral Gamarra escribio reservadamente al Dr. Leandro Uziñ, pidiendole noticias ecsactas de la situacion y disposicion del Jeneral Olañeta . . . interiorisado en las cosas, le dimos noticias de los planes y fuerzas con que contaban los españoles" (C. Olañeta, Exposición, 4).

⁴³"America," El Argos (Buenos Aires), no. 19 (March 24, 1824).

⁴⁴The connection of the Urdininea and Santa Cruz expeditions is accounted with good citations in a seven-page, small print footnote in G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Peru/ nuevas notas, op. cit., 166, n. 1 (pp. 166-172).

⁴⁵See José Domingo de Vidart to José de Santos de Hera, Salta, December 13, 1823, in T, CS, I, 129; El Correo de las Provincias (Buenos Aires), no. 3 (December 15, 1822) (these are statistics of the Urdininea division).

⁴⁶G. René-Moreno, Fragmentos biograficos, op. cit.

⁴⁷See correspondence of Sucre to Bolivar, May 27, 1823-January 5, 1824, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 33-140, especially Sucre to Bolivar, Lima, May 27, 1823, pp. 33-46.

⁴⁸No adequate history about the figure of Santa Cruz exists, the standard work, Alfonso Crespo, Santa Cruz (Mexico City, 1944), 344 pp., is poor and written without documents or historical criticism. Crespo could have used the splendid seven thousand letter collection of General Santa Cruz's grandson in La Paz, who is only too anxious to have scholars work in his splendid library. But as Mr. Santa Cruz informed this author, Crespo did not engage in research in this library. The figure of Santa Cruz is indeed very great and important, and merits a good biography. The private collection of Mr. Santa Cruz is splendidly indexed in a thorough catalog located at Mr. Santa Cruz's house, Andres Santa Cruz Schmhkafft, Indice alfabetico, chronologico de cartas y oficios del Mariscal Andres de Santa Cruz, Indice alfabetico, chronologico de cartas y oficios al Mariscal Andres de Santa Cruz.

⁴⁹José Domingo de Vidart to José Santos de Hera, Salta, December 13, 1823, in T, CS, I, 129; the Urdininea case is contained in El Republicano (Buenos Aires), no. 8 (January 25, 1824), which this author was unable to obtain. See G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Peru/ nuevas notas, op. cit., 172.

⁵⁰Correo de las Provincias (Buenos Aires), nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, supplement to 13, 14, 16, 17 (November 19, 1822-April 10, 1823).

⁵¹Pedro Antonio de Olañeta to El Rey, Potosi, March 6, 1824, La Plata, May 21, 1824, in T, CS, IV, 372-373, 381-385.

⁵²Ibid., IV, 372.

⁵³"Soy un español honrado que, durante el ultimo gobierno, he sufrido lo que no es creible" (P. A. Olañeta to Jerónimo Valdés, Potosí, February 26, 1824, in T, CS, IV, 365).

⁵⁴Cf. ibid., IV, 367.

⁵⁵"Sin embargo, no esta de mas exponer que el año 16 era yo un Brigadier con despacho Real, cuando algunos Tenientes se hallan hoy proximos a mi graduación" (loc. cit.).

⁵⁶P. A. Olaneta to El Rey, La Plata, May 21, 1824, loc. cit.

⁵⁷P. A. Olaneta to Manuel Ramirez, Potosí, June 8, 1824, T. GS, IV, 387.

⁵⁸El Depositario de Cuzco, no. 103 [or 100?] (November 25, 1823), in T, GS, IV, 500-504, also in Beltran Avila, Loria, 39.

⁵⁹P. A. Olaneta to El Rey, La Plata, May 21, 1824, in T. GS, IV, 283 and n. 2; cf. T, GS, IV, 390, 393-394; "Vindicación del General Olaneta al papel escrito en Cuzco por el General D. José de la Serna" [Cuzco, February 27, 1824] in El Argos (Buenos Aires), no. 37 (May 22, 1824).

⁶⁰La Serna to Minister of War, Cuzco, March 20, 1824, in T, GS, IV, 115-118; cf. T, GS, IV, 86-88, I, 83.

⁶¹Beltran Avila, Loria, 40.

⁶²Antonio Ballesteros y Beretta, Historia de España . . . (Barcelona, 1934), VII, 194.

⁶³Ortiz, Biografía, op. cit., 7; Joaquín Gantier, "Casimiro Olaneta . . .," La Razón (La Paz) (January 29 and February 26, 1950),

⁶⁴[Samuel Velasco Flor], unpublished biographic notes of Manuel María Urcullu, op. cit.

⁶⁵C. Olaneta, Exposición, 6; Miguel Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 36, gives a somewhat different explanation, holding the Argentine lodge responsible for the falsification, but his chronological interpretation is wrong since he has them doing it in late 1824. Besides, he does not support it with documents.

⁶⁶[U], Apuntes, 127-128; cf. Manuel Ramirez to Jerónimo Valdés, La Plata, May 15, 1824, in T, GS, I, 131.

⁶⁷"Una carta escrita de Yotala al Jeneral Olaneta cuya copia mostré a los padres muy patriotas Clemente Enriquez y Manuel Padín y al Coronel Fermin de la Vega fue el origen de la revolución. Yo les aseguré que el fin que me proponia era la division de los espanoles para lograr

el triunfo de la libertad" (C. Olañeta, Exposición, 5). The letter has never been located.

⁶⁸Mariano Guillen to Valdés, Oruro, June 21, 1824, in Camba, Memorias, II, 566.

⁶⁹"Por los papeles públicos me impuse a fondo de la destrucción del sistema constitucional español. Conocía el carácter de mi tío, sus ideas, y el odio a los liberales. Tampoco se me ocultaba la disposición de la Serna, Valdés y sus satélites. Aproveché las circunstancias, e invité al Jeneral Olañeta a un rompimiento con el virrey. Destruimos la constitución, y empecé la guerra entre ellos" (C. Olañeta, Exposición, op. cit., 5).

⁷⁰Jerónimo Valdés to Mariano Guillén (transcribing a letter of Antonio de la Riva), Oruro, June 21, 1824, in Camba, Memorias, II, 565.

⁷¹Mariano Guillén to Valdés, Oruro, June 21, 1824, in Camba, Memorias, II, 566.

⁷²"Carta del capitán de navío Jacinto de Vargas al Ministro de Marina, sobre las andanzas de Olañeta en Montevideo," AGI, Papeles de estado, Buenos Aires, 79, as cited by Humberto Vázquez-Machicado, "La delagación Arenales en el Alto Perú," Revista de Historia de América, no. 10 (December, 1940), 96-97, also cited by Beltrán Avila, Logia, 42-43.

⁷³Jerónimo Valdés to Mariano Guillén (transcribing a letter of Antonio de la Riva), Oruro, June 21, 1824, in Camba, Memorias, II, 565.

⁷⁴La Serna to Canterac, Cuzco, June 12, 1824, in T, GS, IV, 159; Beltrán Avila, Logia, 14, mentions that the private confessor of General Olañeta, Father Emilio Rodríguez, played a potent role in the lodge, influencing the General decisively. Yet this author has not seen the Father's name in documents, but he is mentioned by G. René-Moreno in his Fragmentos biograficos, op. cit. Probably he played an important part.

⁷⁵Cf. Urquidí, Rectificaciones, 42.

⁷⁶Loc. cit.

⁷⁷C. Olañeta, Exposición, 4-5.

CHAPTER VI

A HOUSE DIVIDED

Synopsis

Once the invasion of Santa Cruz had been weathered it became high time to put the great plot into action. In the last days of 1823 General Olaneta, instigated by his nephew, Urcullu, Uzín and others, began his rebellion. Without giving any previous notice he and his army departed for the south and entered Potosí and Chuquisaca, where he deposed the Spanish authorities and appointed a new government, with himself as the absolute ruler of Charcas. He issued several manifestos in which he abolished the constitutional government and proclaimed the absolute monarchy. His principal proclamation was dated February 12, 1824, and was cosigned by Casimiro Olaneta. The dos caras schemers were all named to high positions while Casimiro Olaneta was officially appointed private secretary to the General.

When Viceroy La Serna and the commander of the army of the south, General Valdés, received the news of the events in Upper Peru they were quite confused and thought at first that it all was the consequence of personal rivalries between General Olaneta and General Maroto, President of Charcas. The Viceroy commissioned General Valdés to go with his army to Upper Peru and find out personally what really had happened. Valdés

was to meet Olaneta and negotiate with him. Because of the imminent campaign against Bolívar in the north La Serna wished to treat Olaneta with kid gloves, because he needed his army in the coming offensive. General Valdés slowly advanced in Upper Peru and opened correspondence with the rebel commander, with the hope of convincing him to come to terms or meet him at a conference table. The delicate negotiations were handled mostly by Casimiro Olaneta. The rebels felt yet too weak to make war on the Loyalist army and tried to gain time by evasions. But General Valdés daringly moved every day closer to Potosí, the headquarters of General Olaneta and his staff. Therefore the Secessionists finally accepted the bid for a conference and both sides met on March 9, 1824, in the little village of Tarapaya, located on the outskirts of Potosí. Here a compromise agreement was signed, in which General Olaneta was named commander of the Spanish army in Upper Peru but subject to the Viceroy and the commander of the army of the south. General Olaneta had wanted to be named overall commander of the provinces of Río de la Plata, subject only to the Viceroy in Lima.

General Valdés had faith in the treaty of Tarapaya and began his return to Lower Peru. But once Valdés had left, General Olaneta began to ignore completely the stipulations of the Tarapaya agreement and rebelled again. His nephew, Casimiro Olaneta left on a mysterious mission for Buenos Aires in the free territory. General Valdés was forced to remain in Oruro and again started to negotiate with General Olaneta, pointing out to the General the damage he was doing to the Spanish cause. The intended spring offensive against the Colombian army had to be post-

poned in view of General Olaneta's mischievous behavior. General Valdés and Viceroy La Serna used all imaginable means in trying to convince Olaneta to stop his secession. But Manuel María Urcullu and his associates, in the absence of Casimiro Olaneta, saw to it that the General did not give in to the Loyalists' offers and demands. Finally on June 4, 1824, the Viceroy was forced to depose Olaneta as commander of the Spanish army in Upper Peru and ordered him to appear before a court-martial, or return to Spain to present his case. Olaneta refused and General Valdés opened campaign against the Secessionists with the intent of capturing General Olaneta.

The Separatist War, as this fight between the Spanish armies is known, lasted from June until August, 1824. It was a severe and colorful struggle with both armies scoring victories and suffering defeats. Finally on August 17 General Valdés completely defeated part of the Secessionist army at Lava and brought victory for the Loyalists very near. A few days later Valdés was informed of the complete defeat of the army of the north under Canterac in Lower Peru, at Junín. The Viceroy requested Valdés to abandon Charcas and march north with his army in order to strengthen the disorganized Spanish army in Lower Peru. Leaving the battlefields of Charcas, General Valdés was forced to appoint General Olaneta overall Spanish commander of Upper Peru. By default the rebel General had won the war of the Spanish armies. General Olaneta, more than anyone else, was responsible for Bolívar's victory and the defeat of the Spanish army in Peru. Simón Bolívar acknowledged Olaneta's help and proclaimed the mutinous General a liberator.

By the end of 1823 the situation in the Perus looked more optimistic for the Royalists. The ambitious expedition of Santa Cruz had been stopped without any great battle. The near loss of Upper Peru had been avoided, and the movement of encirclement with Argentine aid had not materialized. General Sucre was forced to retreat far north. The revolutionaries in Peru had split into vicious factions, with Bolívar, Riva Agüero and Torretagle competing for supreme leadership. The Patriots had lost Lima and Callao was surrounded. This harbor constituted an enclave in Royalist territory. Everything seemed to indicate that the able Spanish trio of La Serna, Canterac and Valdés, whose intimate friendship was valuable in avoiding petty rivalries, could win a decisive victory over the divided enemy. La Serna was ready to start an offensive soon, with the hope of pushing the enemy into Colombia.¹

The army of the north under Canterac had eight thousand troops, with its headquarters in Huancayo. The Viceroy in Cusco had one thousand soldiers under his direct command to guard the temporary viceregal capital. General Valdés in Arequipa, as commander of the army of the south, had three thousand men under his personal order, watching southern Peru. General Olañeta commanded four thousand men with whom he maintained the Spanish hegemony over Upper Peru. His center was in Oruro. Theoretically he was part of the army of the south and was responsible to Valdés in Arequipa, but because of the isolation of Charcas he acted quite independently. It had been decided that once the rains came to an end, in April or May, the great push against the revolutionary army in northern Lower Peru could start. Canterac would lead the march with his army,

but Valdés with his three thousand men would be transferred north to augment the army of Canterac. Olaneta would move north too and take his position along the Desaguadero River, the border between the Perus. There he would remain and watch southern Lower Peru and Upper Peru in case the enemy wanted to land behind the Spanish lines. Olaneta would become the vital vanguard of the Royalist army. The whole plan was a shift of all three army units north. A preliminary offensive would take Callao.² The plan was good and success was very possible. All depended on good discipline and strict obedience by the three units, plus perfect coordination. But in the very last days of 1823 something unexpected happened that shattered the Royalist design and opened the door for a push south by Bolivar.

Suddenly, just before New Year's, General Olaneta, with his whole army, munitions, stores and money evacuated Oruro and instead of marching north, turned south. From Challapata he wrote the Viceroy that he was moving to Tupiza because of the danger of an Argentine invasion. But he swung to Potosí and entered that city on January 4, 1824. The commander of the city, General La Hera, was just ready to dispatch some troops to reinforce the Spanish army in Lower Peru. General Olaneta ordered the contingent not to go. He then demanded that La Hera go with him to Chuquisaca to depose the President of the Audiencia, General Maroto, a man whom Olaneta disliked and feared. La Hera refused to follow Olaneta's matiny and a fight ensued between his small contingent and the army of Olaneta. The commander of Potosí, in view of Olaneta's superiority, had

to surrender and was told to leave Upper Peru.³

After his victory in Potosí General Olaneta wrote a stinging letter to the President of the Audiencia, General Maroto, requesting him to resign and depart from Upper Peru. Maroto wanted to negotiate.⁴ Olaneta gave no answer and decided to advance with his army to Chuquisaca to force the President to leave. Before he left Potosí the General issued a proclamation to the people of the Perus, in which, for the first time, he announced publicly his intentions and reasons for rebellion and separation from the Viceroy. He said to the people that he had been educated in the Catholic religion and that he had been taught to always obey the King and to remain, whatever happened, faithful to him. He was a man of truth and liked frankness. Therefore he could no longer tolerate the vicious innovations that ill minded people had introduced in their beloved nation. These elements had "spilled all the poison of their false philosophy" and by doing so had insulted religion and the King, which were "the most sacred objects." But fortunately he was going to eliminate those "partisans of the destructive system." He assured the people that those enemies would never more govern, and that his soldiers and he, General Olaneta, would work with great enthusiasm for the rights of religion and the crown. He would fight for them and he requested the people to support him in this task.⁵

Soon the General and the bulk of his army left for the capital, Chuquisaca. Maroto abandoned the town in haste and fled north.⁶ On February 11, 1824, the rebel General entered Chuquisaca in an impressive parade. He was received with great enthusiasm and flowers, perfumes,

and hails to his army were abundant. The patricians of the town especially, who considered the Olañeta family as one of their own, received the rebel General in grandiose style. At night a colorful ball with the attendance of all society took place in honor of General Olañeta.⁷ The next day he proclaimed, in five articles, the new rules and laws of his government. Introducing the edicts Olañeta stated that since the constitutional monarchy had been proclaimed he "had in secret shed tears" because of its fatal consequences. But he had been "chosen by Heaven" to correct this. He was willing to die together with his army for the cause of God and King. He had only one wish from the people: that they obey strictly the new absolutist government. Therefore he was proclaiming five edicts and demanded absolute compliance. The constitution was abolished and the government would be as it had been in 1819, an absolute monarchy. All democratically elected officials would lose their posts with the exception of the cabildo. No written or oral expression in favor of the constitution was permitted, which would be considered subversive. All files of the just abolished constitutional government must be handed over to the Audiencia. Everyone who had been a partisan of the absolutist regime would regain his position if he had lost one, and should receive indemnity. This edict was written by the two schemers, Casimiro Olañeta, who incidentally wrote all the edicts and correspondence of his uncle, and Manuel María Urcullu.⁸ The proclamation was countersigned by Casimiro Olañeta.⁹

The General then proceeded to appoint his own supporters to the vital administrative jobs. His close relative, Colonel Guillermo Marquiegui, was named President of Charcas. Urcullu, Callejo and Cabero, three members of the dos caras lodge, were named judges of the Audiencia. Casimiro Olaneta became personal secretary to the General, a post he had held unofficially for more than a year. One of the General's brothers, Gaspar Olaneta, was appointed governor of Tarija.¹⁰

The rough General Aguilera, who operated in the open and isolated west of Charcas, joined the absolutist rebellion.¹¹ Once his government was solidified, General Olaneta returned with his army to Potosí, and on February 21 issued the same edict of government there which he had proclaimed in the capital, adding two more articles to it. He forbade strictly any talk against the Catholic religion and promised to punish those who did not comply with their religious duties. He ordered that on February 22, in the principal church of Potosí a high mass with a Te Deum be celebrated, giving thanks for the abolition of the constitution and the restoration of the absolutist government. All government employees and principal citizens were ordered to attend the event. Besides all churches should be illuminated for three days as a token of enthusiasm for the new order. Identical celebrations should take place in the other towns of Charcas.¹²

The dos caras had won the first round and the secession of General Olaneta from the viceroval authority had been achieved. The "government of General Olaneta,"¹³ as the distinguished ed Vicente Lecuna calls it, had started. It lasted fifteen months and constitutes the prelude to the creation of Bolivia.

In the meanwhile some news of the strange doings of General Olaneta had reached Lower Peru and the Viceroy and his two able generals felt mystified.¹⁴ General Olaneta had given two vague reasons for his march south. He had talked about the imminent danger of an Argentine invasion.. This the General supported with supposed confidential information that he had received from his spies in northern Argentina.¹⁵ The Viceroy could hardly believe this news since the Urdininea division had not moved during the critical period, and there was less reason to march now. Moreover La Serna had sent a representative, General Espartero, later famous in Spanish history, and a qualified assistant to Salta to negotiate a permanent truce with the northern provinces of Argentinian. This mission had been well received and had found out that the information that Olaneta had got from his confidential agents, telling him that an Argentine offensive was near, had been faked.¹⁶ It is probable that José Mariano Serrano and his associates had written the letter with this confidential information, with the same intention as the faked letter from the regency of Urgel. Besides, Espartero and his able secretary, José Domingo de Vidart, a Royalist native of Salta, had seen that the Urdininea division was more on paper than a matter of reality. They had not seen a single soldier between Humahuaco, a village near the border between the inner and lower provinces, and Salta.¹⁷ The Viceroy was quite sure that Olaneta's indication of danger from the United Provinces was false. General Olaneta also had protested against General Maroto, President of the Audiencia in Chuquisaca.¹⁸ The trio came to believe that Olaneta had engaged in his undisciplinatory action because he

had disliked and feared General Maroto.¹⁹ La Serna was as yet unaware of the real nature of General Olaneta's rebellion and thought that petty rivalry was the cause. He decided to use tact and moderation, for he needed the army of Olaneta. It was agreed to send General Valdés into Charcas to meet General Olaneta and settle the differences amiably.²⁰ Valdés was delayed somewhat because of illness,²¹ but on February 17, from Puno, he opened correspondence with the rebel General, advising him to put aside personal quarrels and ambitions and consider the damage that anarchy in the Spanish army would produce. He requested the General to meet with him.²² A flow of letters between the two took place, with Valdés using restraint and reason, and Olaneta writing in very ambiguous terms but expressing some of his long accumulated passions.²³ On February 26 the mutinous General proposed seven points which he deemed necessary for an understanding.

He insisted that in both Perus the constitution be abolished. General Olaneta then demanded that he be made commander of all the provinces of Río de la Plata and responsible to the Viceroy in Lima only in regard to political matters. In return he offered to support the Spanish army in Lower Peru, with a minimum of four thousand men, in its fight against Bolívar. All promotions of military and administrative personnel which he had decreed should remain valid. Once agreed to these demands, General Valdés could under no circumstances remain in Charcas but must retreat to Lower Peru. General Olaneta terminated his letter of demands by stating that he would send him private secretary, Casimiro Olaneta, to settle some minor details.²⁴ In summary, Casimiro Olaneta,

who wrote and inspired all these communications of his uncle, demanded independence for the General. Since the General wanted the command of all the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, this seems to indicate that the Olanetas had the ambition and hope of conquering and overthrowing the government of the free provinces from Charcas. This might be an explanation of why the general was appointed, in the fake Urgel letter, Viceroy of Buenos Aires rather than Lima. The youthful Casimiro Olaneta in his moment of success was even considering that Charcas was too small for his ambitions, and had begun to think of terms of the old Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata. So in Upper Peru another ambitious, provincial caudillo was in search of power in the United Provinces. Buenos Aires rightly feared the liberation of the inner provinces, which would only add more territory, power and caudillos to the provincial forces and therefore prolong the vicious anarchy. Later Casimiro Olaneta acquired more maturity and adjusted his aspirations to his prospects of success. He came to limit his ambitions to Charcas.

Two days later, on February 28, the General wrote another letter to Valdés in which, among other things, he told him that he had received with great rejoicing the good news that the Spanish armies had recaptured the port of Callao. He informed Valdés that he had ordered the celebration of a high mass with a Te Deum, and the illumination of Potosí, to give thanks and express a general public enthusiasm for such a splendid victory of the armies of the King.²⁵ Olaneta well realized that with the capture of Callao the Viceroy was more anxious than ever to come to a quick settlement with him, in order to move north and meet

Bolívar. The day after the General wrote of his joy concerning the victory at Callao, from Oruro General Valdés ordered the abolition of the constitution in the jurisdiction of the army of the south.²⁶ Valdés probably wished to undercut Olaneta since the General had used the constitution as the main pretext for his disagreement with the commanding trio. Valdés then continued to advance, always writing to the General with extreme moderation and tact. In Venta Media he met with Casimiro Olaneta and gave the young man his counterproposals. He would not agree to making the General independent and insisted that the line of authority must be as it had existed before Olaneta's secession. Olaneta would be military commander of Upper Peru, responsible to the commander of the army of the south and the Viceroy. General Valdés would have the right to dispose of Olaneta's troops as he deemed necessary. Olaneta's appointments would be respected and General Maroto would not be returned as President of Charcas. Casimiro took the proposed terms with him to show them to his uncle and to study them.²⁷ Still the rebel General refused to meet Valdés and was trying to gain time, since he knew that time was in his favor. Valdés was in a hurry to come to a settlement and he continued to advance upon Potosí, Olaneta's headquarters and strong-point. Olaneta was unwilling to fight the approaching army.

But Valdés had come to realize that he did not possess superior and advantageous striking power. General Aguilera was ready to march on Cochabamba and thereby dangerously outflank him.²⁸ Valdés and Olaneta met in the small village of Tarapaya, about fifteen miles from Potosí. Although General Olaneta had tried to avoid seeing Valdés, the close

proximity of the invading army to Potosí had forced him to change his mind and accept Valdes' offer to talk things over personally. The rebel General was accompanied by his nephew. Some sharp negotiations took place, each side holding some good cards. Valdés was in a rush to come to an honorable settlement and depart north to join the army of Canterac. He was unwilling to lose time in a war between the two Spanish armies, and besides he had daringly overextended his lines. The Olanetas knew all this very well. However they felt yet unprepared and not ready to take up arms against Valdés, who was the ablest Spanish general in America. Moreover, Valdés' army was in combat formation on the very outskirts of Potosí. But the rebel General had the trump card. He could sign away whatever advantages he had won in his secession as long as Valdés agreed to leave him and his army in Charcas, and would himself leave for the north. Once Valdés withdrew, the Olanetas could do again whatever they pleased. The final advantage lay with them. On March 9, 1824, both contenders signed an agreement known as the treaty of Tarapaya. General Olaneta would not be called to account for his secession. He would remain military commander of Upper Peru but responsible to General Valdés as commander of the army of the south. The final authority would be the Viceroy. General Olaneta was required to furnish whatever aid was needed in Lower Peru. The maximum strength of Olaneta's army was precisely detailed and he was not allowed to increase the size of his army beyond the agreed stipulation. General Maroto would not be returned as President of Charcas and General Aguilera was named in his place. Olaneta's appoint-

ments and promotions would remain valid. General La Hera would not be reappointed as military commander of Potosí.²⁹ To show his good faith, Valdés, as soon as the treaty was signed, had his army turn around and retreat with speed to Oruro, ordering his cavalry to continue without interruption to Arequipa.³⁰

From Oruro Valdés wrote a detailed letter to the Viceroy, enclosing the Tarapaya agreement for his approval. Valdés stated frankly that he was not pleased at all with his diplomatic achievement but due to the overall circumstances it was the best he could get. He felt that granting the command of extensive Charcas to Olaneta was giving him too much power, and in view of his unpleasant behavior it constituted approval of outright insubordination. But Valdés wrote that there was nothing else he could have done. He had learned that Olaneta and Aguilera would have dispersed their forces in order to maintain active guerrilla warfare in case no agreement would have been reached. And Valdés believed that because of this plan "it would have been very difficult to fight Olaneta,"³¹ it would have required a large army and much time. If he had decided to open war on Olaneta, the General asked, ". . . and Bolívar would attack, with what troops would we fight him?"³² Valdés reminded the Viceroy that because of the victory at Callao it was now "necessary to throw north every possible force."³³ The same day Valdés wrote a letter to Canterac, also sending him the treaty plus a copy of his letter to their mutual friend, the Viceroy. To the commander of the army of the north Valdés expressed identical opinions, adding that he had agreed to the Tarapaya treaty only because he wanted to join him as soon as

possible in their march on Bolívar.³⁴ Valdés knew very well that all depended on the good faith of Olaneta and evidently he decided to take a chance. He was wrong. In General Olaneta's hands now lay the fate of the Spanish cause in the Perus, and an unscrupulous man like Casimiro Olaneta was only too eager to take the best advantage of it.

With the remaining infantry units General Valdés decided on a bold move from Oruro before returning north. He made up his mind to march into the impregnable Ayopaya republic and defeat the guerrilla Lanza who had recuperated from his narrow escape at Falsuri and had again become aggressive. Lanza was diligently taking advantage of the dissention in the Spanish army and had made some daring incursions around La Paz. Valdés, with a crack unit, climbed the rough mountains, narrow passes and small valleys in search of the guerrilla commander. At Palca he surprised the partisan fighter and took him prisoner. It was the first time that this republicueta had suffered a severe defeat in its own territory. General Valdés treated Lanza with great dignity and honor, acknowledging him as a brave enemy. This was quite in contrast with the behavior of General Aguilera in 1816, when this savage Spanish officer defeated the great guerrillas Padilla and Warnes and beheaded them, and exposed their heads in public. The dignified treatment by Valdés of Lanza showed the splendid and human nature of this general. Later General Sucre was very anxious to meet General Valdés to express personally his great admiration and the respect he felt for this great enemy commander.³⁵ Apparently Lanza took advantage of the General's generous treatment and escaped straight back to his mountain refuge.³⁶ Valdés'

short campaign into Ayopaya had been so strenuous that the General collapsed with a severe illness upon his return. It became doubtful if he would survive, and this naturally retarded his return to Upper Peru.

General Olaneta, from the moment Valdés had turned around, began to ignore completely the stipulations of the Tarapaya treaty. He never fulfilled his verbal pledge to issue a public proclamation in which he would announce his reunion with the Viceroy. He refused to submit to the army of the south and never dispatched to its headquarters correspondence, copies of his files, accounting reports, statistics of his units and other matters that were part of the administrative routine. He kept his brother-in-law, Colonel Marquiegui, as President of Charcas, therefore assuming the political administration of Upper Peru. He ordered all provincial authorities and other employees to deal with him, General Olaneta, directly instead of with the viceregal capital. On his stationery he used the letter head "Commander of the Provinces of Río de la Plata." He moved his troops as he pleased and increased the strength of his units in complete disregard of article seven of the Tarapaya agreement. When requested to send troops to Lower Peru for defensive and offensive maneuvers, he only gave evasive answers and never sent the men.³⁷ One author states that he opened contact with most guerrilla units, requesting their allegiance.³⁸ The most perplexing of all moves was the departure of Casimiro Olaneta, as soon as the treaty of Tarapaya was approved, to the free provinces. Casimiro went to Buenos Aires and Montevideo on a completely obscure mission, the motives of which remain still today unexplained.³⁹

Valdés and La Serna still had hopes of bringing Olaneta to his senses, although more and more they realized that he was being influenced by some disreputable elements. They needed him. General Valdés used every imaginable means to convince and influence the stubborn rebel General. He applied the same efforts in regard to General Aguilera. The proposed spring offensive had been postponed because of Olaneta's secession. Valdés asked the bishop of La Paz and high ecclesiastical officials in Chuquisaca to intervene and convince Olaneta that he was bringing doom to Spanish arms. He thought that because of the General's deep Catholic feeling this might be of avail.⁴⁰ General Olaneta ignored every move.⁴¹ When Casimiro Olaneta had departed for Argentina he had left Urcullu and Usín with the General with strict instructions to maintain the rebellion at all costs. Casimiro later wrote that these two men worked very hard in fulfilling his orders.⁴² By June, 1824, the Viceroy and General Valdés realized the complete futility of further appeasement and it was decided to act sternly. This they should have done in January, when the secession had started. Then it might have saved the Spanish cause in the Perus, but June was far too late. Before undertaking any drastic steps against the rebel General the Viceroy consulted the attorney of the Audiencia and the advisory attorney to the viceregal office. Both concurred with the Viceroy.⁴³

On June 4 Viceroy La Serna issued an ultimatum to General Olaneta. He offered the rebel General two choices. Either he would appear before him at Cusco and be judged for a court-martial together with General Maroto and General La Haza, whom Olaneta had accused of disobeying him,

or if General Olaneta preferred, he could leave for Spain to present his case to the King. La Serna gave Olaneta three days to make up his mind to which of the two procedures he accepted. If the General wished to go to Spain he could take whatever officer or administrative official he wished with him to support his case. The Viceroy would use every possible means to facilitate their voyage to Spain. Olaneta was given eight days to leave Potosí for Cusco or Spain. He was to hand over the army of Upper Peru to General Valdés or to whomever Valdés would appoint for the transfer. He assured him that all officers and soldiers of the Olaneta army would retain their rank, and their services to Olaneta would not be held against them. The Viceroy gave his personal word that Olaneta's family would be protected and that nothing would happen to them. In case Olaneta refused to obey this ultimatum the Viceroy would feel it necessary to order the commander of the army of the south, General Jerónimo Valdés, to use his forces to arrest the rebel General.⁴⁴

The Viceroy appointed the Intendant of Puno, Tadeo Gárate, a man of absolutist leanings and of personal influence with the King, but an obedient public servant,⁴⁵ to implement the ultimatum and render legal advice to Olaneta. On June 14 General Valdés forwarded, from Oruro, the ultimatum plus a personal letter of his won in which he enumerated in polite terms the disobedience of Olaneta since the Tarapaya agreement. He terminated his letter by saying that "you should remember that you are a Spaniard . . . and that the only blood that should be shed must be in defense of the King and the nation. This is my wish and it should be yours too."⁴⁶

Naturally General Olaneta refused to obey the ultimatum of La Serna and he gave his answer in a long and detailed manifesto to the people of the Perus, written by Manuel María Urcullu in the absence of Casimiro Olaneta.⁴⁷ The proclamation reads seven large printed pages⁴⁸ and is a detailed account of the rebel General's antagonism for the commanding trio. He again emphasized his fanatic absolutist and religious feelings and that he despised the "representative system because it always has led the people to a frightful abyss of crime and misfortunes."⁴⁹ He insisted that the Viceroy and his commanding generals belonged to the party that wished confusion and wanted to "destroy all principles of morality and honor."⁵⁰ The General disputed the legality of La Serna occupying the viceregal chair because he had usurped this post from General de la Pezuela. After having become rulers of the Perus the revolutionary Spanish generals had wanted to eliminate him, General Olaneta, at all costs because he had remained faithful to the absolutist King and had been a friend of de la Pezuela. The General stated that he had signed the treaty of Tarapaya in good faith but that General Valdés had ignored its stipulations. The Viceroy had named people who supported him to army and governmental positions, instead of consulting with General Olaneta about these appointments. Besides, the Constitutionals had requested that Olaneta send troops which amounted to half of his army to fight Bolívar. The real purpose for this order had not been to strengthen their army but to debilitate his units. Olaneta accused Valdés of opening a campaign on the guerrilla Lanza for the sole reason of remaining in northern Charcas territory that was supposed to be under

Olaneta's command. General Valdés had concentrated his army in Oruro to check him. He even went so far as to bluntly accuse the commander of the army of the south to have offered twenty thousand pesos for his death. The mutinous General of Charcas ended his long manifesto by saying that he had decided to die for the King and the Catholic religion rather than submit and accept the plans of the traitorous and usurped government of La Serna and his aides. He assured the people that he would fight if the Constitutionals opened war on him. General Olaneta was well aware that this was his declaration of war. The struggle between the Spanish armies in Charcas had started, a combat that passed into the pages of history as the "Separatist War"⁵¹ or, as the splendid Argentine newspaper, El Argos, called it, "the battle between the liberals and serviles of Spain in Upper Peru."⁵² This fratricidal struggle was the direct cause for the emergence of Charcas as an independent country.⁵³

Six days after this manifesto, on June 26, 1824, General Olaneta issued two more proclamations which showed that he had accepted the fact that war had broken out between his Secessionist army and the army of the south. He published a proclamation to his own officers and soldiers. The General congratulated them for having given him their unqualified support up to that point. He assured his army that he had done everything possible to avoid war, but that the other side had not shown good faith. Now that it had been decided "to fight for the sacred cause of King, religion, and humanity,"⁵⁴ he requested them to always try to convince their brothers on the opposite side to join in their struggle for the righteousness of the King. At the same time he also issued a

call to the officers and soldiers of the army of Valdés. He asked them to leave their army because they were fighting for a general and viceroy animated by personal ambitions. He asked them to come and join his army, which was waging a sacred fight for "the sweet and paternal government of the King."⁵⁵ By addressing the soldiers of Valdés and tempting them to desert the army of the south, General Olañeta had closed the door completely to a last minute understanding. The war had started.

General Valdés had approximately five thousand men to battle the Secessionists, with some good mountain artillery. It was neither a superior army nor was it a deficient unit. General Olañeta had one thousand men less but he had a crack unit, mostly Upper Peruvians who were accustomed to the difficult climate and terrain.⁵⁶ The General was a rough soldier who insisted on stern discipline and hard work. Among his officers he had two of the toughest men in the whole Spanish army: the bloody and intrepid General Aguilera, and Colonel José María Valdés, better known as Barbarucho, the Barbarous. The latter's savage courage was proverbial. In 1821 he and some of his soldiers had worked their way into Salta through impassable roads and had killed the great Argentine montonero leader, Güemes.⁵⁷ Such officers as Francisco López and Carlos Medinaceli were of great sagacity and later were among the founders of the Bolivian army.⁵⁸ Indeed the absolutist Secessionist army became the nucleus upon which the army of the new republic was built. It is with this Royalist background that one has to deal when evaluating the Bolivian army, which became the force of power and misfortune in Bolivian history. López and Medinaceli shifted allegiance to Sucre's army in

the last weeks of the War of Independence. Olaneta had a better and tougher army, but Valdés' was larger and better equipped. Olaneta was a good fighter but his troops feared him. Valdés was more prepared in the military sciences and his soldiers loved him. Therefore the armies were equally balanced from an overall point of view and nobody could predict who would win.

Valdés was with his army in Oruro. Olaneta was situated with some of his units in Potosí. The bulk of his army, under Colonels Marquiegui and Valdés, was stationed in Chuquisaca. General Aguilera had moved slowly from Santa Cruz toward Cochabamba but without occupying it. General Valdés left Oruro with his army in late June, 1824, toward Vilcapugio. Here he was informed that the Olaneta army was split between Potosí and Chuquisaca. Therefore the advancing General decided to change his route and, instead of marching straight on Potosí, go through the Chayanta province and cut in between the two towns, thereby separating the Secessionist units. This was an effective move because General Olaneta realized that he was being outflanked and that his army was in danger of being cut in two.⁵⁹ He evacuated Potosí and retreated toward Tarija by the way of Cinti. As all the retreating armies from Potosí had done before, he too took with him the accumulated riches of the Casa de Moneda and the silver banks. Besides he seriously damaged the mint. Colonel Marquiegui and Barbarucho (Valdés) followed Olaneta's move and left Chuquisaca, taking the road toward Laguna where General Aguilera had concentrated a unit. General Valdés occupied Chuquisaca and dispatched his second in command, General Carratalá, to occupy Potosí. The Con-

stitutional general was received by the inhabitants with the usual routine. The old days of the auxiliary invasions had returned to the Imperial City: armies entered gloriously and left in defeat. This time it was the Constitutional army and the Absolutist forces instead of the auxiliaries and the Royalists.

General Valdés named a new President of the Audiencia, General Vigil, and appointed new personnel at the Audiencia. After three days in Chuquisaca General Valdés left the capital, on July 11, 1824, with around one hundred men in pursuit of Barbarucho.⁶⁰ General Valdés advanced with tremendous speed and on July 12 he saw the vanguard of Colonel Valdés at a place called Tarabuquillo. General Valdés decided on a daring move. He ordered his army to halt and then he, one aid-de-camp and two volunteers⁶¹ galloped toward the enemy's rear guard and shouted to them to halt. Valdés then addressed the Secessionist soldiers and asked them to do everything possible to stop this war among brothers. The General's unprecedented courage had an astounding effect and the whole battalion that constituted the rear and twenty-five other soldiers gave in and were ready to follow General Valdés. Barbarucho, who had been at the head of his retreating column, was informed of what was happening, and rushed back with his nearby soldiers and opened fire on Valdés. The horse of General Valdés and that of his aide collapsed, mortally shot. The two volunteers were wounded. When Barbarucho had commanded his soldiers to fire they had obeyed him because they feared the rough colonel, but they also loved their old commanding general and therefore they had all spontaneously pointed their guns at the horses instead of at Valdés.

Not one single soldier of Barbarucho had thought in that split second of shooting the General. This saved Valdés' life. He and his aide and volunteers ran back to their lines and the General,⁶² furious at the outrageous act, ordered a general attack. A fierce battle ensued and lasted from noon until darkness, when Barbarucho, whose unit was starting to disintegrate under the heavy firing power of the Constitutionals, slipped into the dark of the night and took to the hills.⁶³ Barbarucho had suffered heavy casualties and Valdés had lost quite a few men too.⁶⁴

Valdés then advanced south, crossing rough mountain terrain and dangerous rivers. At Laguna he met an Aguilera unit commanded by Colonel Ignacio Rivas who, with his soldiers and officers, abandoned the Secessionist side and joined the army of General Valdés.⁶⁵ The General, aware of the dubious character of Aguilera, decided to open negotiations with him by correspondence, with the intent of convincing him to stay aloof of the war. As Aguilera was undecided about who would win this battle between the Spanish armies he accepted the bid to sit still.⁶⁶ It was his intention to wait and see who would be the probable victor. In his march south General Valdés was unable to locate Barbarucho, who had completely disappeared with his remaining army after his escape from the battlefield of Tarabuquillo.

The Constitutionalist general, Carratalá, had remained with his small unit in Potosí. Then on July 14, at seven o'clock in the morning, while Carratalá was sleeping in his room at the Casa de Moneda, a commando unit led by Colonel Marquiegui and Colonel Pedro Arraya, a renegade guerrilla leader,⁶⁷ made its way to Potosí. Arraya worked his way into

the room of Carratalá unnoticed and forced him, in his pajamas, to come with him. He was taken out of Potosí as a prisoner of the Secessionists. It was a daring raid. When Carratalá's soldiers saw that their commander had disappeared they dispersed and left for Oruro.⁶⁸ Marquiegui and Arraya took Carratalá to San Lorenzo, near Tarija, and handed him over to Eustaquio Méndez, another famous guerrilla, who had shifted sides as he thought would benefit him most⁶⁹ and now joined the Olañeta army. Seemingly many of the guerrillas who had survived the 1816 impact, with the exception of Lanza, had become as dos caras as many doctores and Royalist officers. Barbarucho, who had evaded General Valdés successfully, had decided to turn north and make an attack on Potosí. He reached the town on July 18, but to his surprise found it without Loyalist troops. He then realized, or was informed, that his colleagues, Marquiegui and Arraya, had already achieved what he intended to do. He took advantage of the situation and entered the Imperial City, raided it, and then the next day departed for the south again.⁷⁰

General Valdés, unaware of what had happened in Potosí, continued his advance south in the direction of Tarija, where he believed Olañeta to be. On July 26 he reached San Lorenzo and to his great surprise found Eustaquio Méndez, turned enemy, holding as prisoner Valdés' highest officer, Carratalá, whom the General thought was in Potosí. Méndez had no intention or desire to fight Valdés and he switched sides again, joining the Valdés army and turning Carratalá, whom his fellow ex-guerrilla,

Arraya, had entrusted to him, over to the General.⁷¹ The Constitutional commander continued his advance and occupied Tarija without incident.

General Olañeta had retreated toward a little place called Libilibi, not far from today's border between Bolivia and Argentina. Here he was joined by Marquiegui and Barbarucho.⁷² In the absence of active participation by the Aguilera unit, the reunion of the Secessionist forces at Libilibi constituted their whole army. From Tarija General Valdés dispatched the freed Carratalá with over five hundred troops, wounded soldiers and heavy equipment, back to Potosí in order to re-occupy and hold this vital fortress.⁷³ Valdés himself decided to advance with the rest of his unit in pursuit of Olañeta and force him to present battle. The Secessionist army abandoned Libilibi and retreated farther south. Valdés overtook them at a place called Abra Rota.⁷⁴ It was August 1, 1824, and it was getting dark. Valdés decided to wait until morning to battle the enemy. During the dark of the night General Olañeta decided on an escape. He split up his army, ordering each unit to take a different road. He sent Colonel Marquiegui and his brother, Gaspar Olañeta, with the heavy equipment and luggage to march farther south toward the free provinces. Barbarucho was ordered to go north to Suipacha and, if possible, Potosí; Medinaceli was to go to Cotagaita, the great fortress that protected Charcas from the south; and Colonel Ostria should go to Cinti to stir up the dense population in this vineyard region. General Olañeta himself would march back to Tarija.⁷⁵ It was Olañeta's plan, as Valdés had warned the Viceroy earlier, to fight a sort of guerrilla war-

fare.⁷⁶ All units slipped out undetected. When morning arrived the surprised General Valdés realized that the enemy had left. He had some bad hours trying to figure out the tracks of the horses and the footprints; they were all over and led in all directions. He finally detected the different routes that the enemy had taken. Valdés decided to follow the route of the most abundant and marked tracks, which led south, thinking that they belonged to Olañeta himself. This was a mistake because he pursued the Marquiegui contingent. On August 5, 1824, Valdés reached the column of Marquiegui and Gaspar Olañeta, which was moving very slowly due to the heavy equipment, at Santa Victoria. The Secessionists surrendered without a fight. Valdés treated his prisoners with friendliness and great tact, as was his custom.⁷⁷ The Loyalist General then turned around and took the road north.

August 5, 1824, the day that Valdés achieved his victory at Santa Victoria, was an eventful day and really a bad one for the Constitutional army. This same August 5, General Olañeta surprised Tarija and reoccupied it, taking the garrison left behind by Valdés prisoner.⁷⁸ On the very same day Barbarucho too achieved a great victory. In his march north he had learned that Valdés had sent Carratalá back to Potosí with a great contingent of Loyalist soldiers, and he decided to surprise them. On that night Carratalá had halted at a place called Salo, or Chacapa.⁷⁹ He was unaware of the danger and thought that the Olañeta army was far away and had gone south. Carratalá and his unit had put their rifles away and had let the horses graze while they were preparing to rest. Suddenly Barbarucho and his soldiers, with loud screaming

resembling an Indian ambush, fell upon the surprised Constitutionlists. It all was a matter of seconds and no one had time to run for his rifle. In one stroke the Carratalá contingent had been captured along with their heavy equipment and some valuable armaments.⁸⁰ General Carratalá certainly had bad luck: he had fallen into the enemy's hands twice without even having on either occasion a chance to fight.⁸¹ But that was not all; the Loyalists suffered other reverses on that fateful August 5. General Aguilera had made a move to throw his army into the fight on the side of Olaneta. He broke off negotiations and moved east, taking the wealthy agricultural town of Totorá, where he took prisoner the small constitutionalist garrison. From there he dispatched Colonel Francisco López to Laguna to capture the unit of Colonel Rivas, who had deserted to General Valdés. On August 5 López surprised Rivas and his army and took all of them prisoners. Rivas was sent to Aguilera, who put him immediately before a firing squad, together with two associates.⁸² In all it was a very good day for the Secessionists, only somewhat spoiled by Valdés' capture of Marquiegui and Gaspar Olaneta and their soldiers.

On this same August 5, so eventful in the Separatist War in Upper Peru, about one thousand miles north of the Charcas battlefields two armies were camping close to each other, unaware that on the next day, August 6, 1824, they would clash ferociously. It was the army of General Simón Bolívar and the Spanish army of the north under General Canterac. August 6, 1824, was the day of the great battle of Junín that brought doom to the Spanish power in Lower Peru. It was the day that General Valdés and his army of the south were supposed to have been north with

Canterac. Bolívar would not have dared to attack the united Spanish army. On August 5 when General Olaneta was winning many victories with his Secessionists, he did not know that many miles north of Tarija, where he was, in central Lower Peru the fateful result of his wrongdoing would be a matter of hours. And more than one thousand miles south, in Buenos Aires, over two thousand miles from the battlefield of Junín, was Casimiro Olaneta, scheming as ever.⁸³ His great intrigue to bring defeat to the Spanish armies by introducing rebellion in their midst was being fulfilled on this August 6. But in those days communications were slow, and no one knew for some time afterwards what had happened on those two days in August. General Valdés was happy about his capture of Marquiegul; General Olaneta was happy about his capture of Tarija; Barbarucho was happy about his capture of Carratalá; General López was happy about his capture of Rivas. Far away north, General Canterac was confused about the position of Bolívar; General Bolívar was wondering whether to attack Canterac ^{or not}. Far away south Casimiro Olaneta was having a good time in Buenos Aires. All were unaware that the climax was about to be reached.

General Valdés was soon informed of the various misfortunes of his Loyalist army in Charcas, although the news of Junín had yet to travel more days. This was exaggerated by some misinformation about the movement of Aguilera, who, it was said, had taken Chuquisaca and was throwing the bulk of his great unit into the fight, advancing with the purpose of capturing Potosí and Oruro.⁸⁴ This was not true. Aguilera was still hesitating and had stopped about ten miles from the capital, again

taking a wait-and-see attitude. But Valdés' situation was quite grave. He was isolated with his army far south, while the Secessionists occupied the road north, including the strong fortress of Cotagaita. This citadel blocked any advance to Potosí. The Loyalist General decided to take a chance and try to break through to the Imperial City. He outflanked Tarija to his left and then swung back east, advancing straight toward Cotagaita, occupied by Barbarucho. The Secessionist colonel, Medinaceli, was close by in Suipacha. At Cotagaita Valdés decided on a desperate plan. He commanded General La Hera to maintain Barbarucho in check by making a flanking movement which would look as if La Hera wanted to surround Cotagaita. In the meantime Valdés, with the bulk of his army, would move to his left into the despoblado,⁸⁵ a desert-like region, and then swing back northeast toward Potosí. It was a daring move since he was ready to sacrifice part of his army in order to disorient the enemy, and then march into the despoblado, which no army had yet crossed. La Hera fulfilled his mission but his unit was torn to pieces and he himself was severely injured.⁸⁶ Valdés by this time had gone into the despoblado, and the wounded La Hera and his surviving soldiers rushed into the despoblado too and evidently were able to catch up with Valdés. Barbarucho and Medinaceli decided to pursue them, but then hesitated. A violent disagreement between the two Secessionist officers took place and as a result Medinaceli turned around.⁸⁷ Apparently Barbarucho wanted to go into the despoblado, while Medinaceli was opposed to it. Barbarucho went after Valdés, but the Loyalist commander had won enough time and now swung to his right again, out of the despoblado into the

royal road (camino real) that led to Potosí. He had successfully bypassed powerful Cotagaita. On August 16, 1824, General Valdés reached the abandoned mine of Lava, about thirty miles from Potosí.⁸⁸ It was a cold night, the troops were tired and Valdés felt good since he had just heard that Aguilera had not occupied Chuquisaca and that Potosí was also unoccupied. It was decided to make a halt and use the mine shafts for sleeping, protected from the biting cold of the cordillera.

Late at night Barbarucho, with around six hundred soldiers, reached Lava and decided on a frontal attack early in the morning. The Constitutionalist had seen Barbarucho's arrival and prepared for the battle. On August 17, as soon as dawn had arrived, both sides clashed with savage impact: the Loyalists, well situated in the mine, and the Secessionists, throwing one line after another against the shafts and hills with the hope of taking the mine by assault. Both factions collided with the cry of "Long live the King." The fratricidal war had reached its summit.

But the Constitutionalist were well entrenched in the mine which turned out to be an unexpected fortress. Barbarucho's frontal assaults were savage and courageous, but militarily unfeasible and senseless. Then the attacking colonel decided to throw his whole army in one great wave against the shafts with the hope of forcing his way in. Just as he was ready to attack the cavalry of General Valdés, led by General Ferraz, stormed from behind the hills and surrounded the entire army of Barbarucho. A severe fight ensued and the Secessionists lost many soldiers. Their situation was hopeless and everyone, including Barbarucho,

surrendered. The Secessionists had lost half of their army and the remaining three hundred all became prisoners of the Constitutionals.⁸⁹ The captured men, as well as the Loyalists, were convinced that General Valdés would court-martial and condemn Barbarucho to death because of his unbecoming behavior at Tarabuquillo when he opened fire upon the General while he was negotiating a truce. Instead Valdés received Barbarucho with great courtesy and was personally interested in seeing that he received immediate medical attention and a thorough rest.⁹⁰ The Loyalists had lost very few soldiers, but one casualty was the sad loss of a close friend of General Valdés, General Ameller, who was mortally wounded in this battle.⁹¹ All injured soldiers of both sides were rushed to Potosí for proper care.

General Valdés stationed his victorious army at Puna, a village in the neighborhood of Potosí, giving the command to General Ferraz. He decided to go to Chuquisaca with a small unit and have a personal talk with General Aguilera, who was still waiting and watching. In the meanwhile General Olaneta had advanced north with the hope of recapturing Potosí, but when he reached Cinti he was informed of the defeat and complete capture of the Barbarucho contingent.⁹² He decided to halt his advance and remain at Cinti. But the defeat at Lava had seriously demoralized the Secessionist army and some officers began to open secret conversations with General Ferraz at Puna, offering to desert Olaneta. Ferraz, in the absence of his superior, General Valdés, was unwilling to assume any responsibility in this matter. This was a serious mistake since by it the Constitutionals lost their last chance to terminate

the Separatist War.⁹³ A few days later the mutinous officers of General Olaneta abandoned their idea of desertion because of an unexpected turn of events.

The Constitutionalist commander had entered Chuquisaca without any incident and soon left the capital in search of Aguilera. On August 25 General Valdés was in Yamparacé, a village near Chuquisaca, when finally the news of the great catastrophe of Junín reached him, along with an urgent request to move his army of the south out of Charcas into Lower Peru to aid the Spanish armies retreating before the advancing Bolívar. Immediately he wrote General Olaneta a letter in which he informed him of the bad news from the north. Valdés told Olaneta that their war was terminated and that he and his army would rush to Lower Peru. He named General Olaneta absolute commander of the Spanish armies in Upper Peru. Valdés suggested that he reorganize his troops in order to be ready for an invasion from Lower Peru or even the United Provinces. He hoped that General Olaneta would not hesitate to send his northern contingents, such as those stationed in La Paz, to Lower Peru if needed. The Loyalist General suggested that Olaneta shift the bulk of his army to Oruro and La Paz and have ready plenty of ammunition in case the defeated Spanish army in Lower Peru would have to retreat into Upper Peru. Valdés wrote that he would free all Secessionist prisoners he had taken and he hoped that General Olaneta would reciprocate in the same way. He asked Olaneta to send the freed Constitutionalist prisoners straight to Lower Peru since they were needed there. Valdés thought that the most important

part of his army's equipment that had fallen into Olaneta's hands at Salo should be forwarded to him, but that Olaneta should keep all heavy apparatus.⁹⁴ General Valdés dispatched Colonel Miranda to take the letter to Olaneta personally.

Without awaiting Olaneta's reply, General Valdés immediately began his march north. On August 28, 1824, he evacuated the capital and two days later left Potosí. In the first days of September the Constitutionalist army traveled via Oruro and La Paz into Lower Peru.⁹⁵ General Olaneta answered Valdés in vague terms, telling him that he was satisfied with his appointment as overall commander of Upper Peru and that he would fight as any other Spaniard against the Colombian invaders.⁹⁶ These were his official words, yet in his talk with the personal representative of General Valdés, Colonel Miranda, he expressed some rather opposite opinions. He said that it was too bad that the soldiers of Barbarucho at Tarabuquillo had missed their chance to kill General Valdés. Moreover, the rebel General expressed frankly his joy over General Canterac's great defeat at Junín. Miranda communicated these words to Valdés.⁹⁷

On September 5, 1824, Olaneta entered Potosí, which had already been occupied by an advance Secessionist patrol,⁹⁸ in great pomp. The usual grandiose reception was given to the victorious General.⁹⁹ The potosinos had lost count of the innumerable receptions they had given to triumphal invading armies. Here at Potosí General Olaneta had his army diary published, in which he glorified his great campaign. He did not say a word about the battle of Junín, but rather stated that his vic-

torious army had so severely defeated the Constitutionalist that they had fled Upper Peru, abandoning Chuquisaca and Potosí and other towns without a fight. He accused General Valdés of brutality and said that he had forced the prisoners, including Barbarucho, to walk to La Paz. Olaneta added that Valdés then had condemned Barbarucho to death, leaving the impression that Colonel Valdés had been killed.¹⁰⁰ This was absolutely not true since Barbarucho later reappeared in the war. He was the last Spanish officer to surrender to the Bolivarian army in the Perus.¹⁰¹ After Olaneta had reestablished his government as it had been before the invasion of General Valdés, he started to move north. He was in Oruro on October 2, 1824, when, through General Arenales, governor of Salta, he received a letter from Bolívar,¹⁰² who had proclaimed General Olaneta as a liberator.¹⁰³

The war had taken a new turn. The great intrigue had been successful but the schemers had not expected that a new great and ambitious man by the name of Simón Bolívar, hardly known in Upper Peru in 1823, would appear on the scene as a liberator. And this Colombian general, of honest and thorough Patriotic convictions, proclaimed the fanatic absolutist, General Pedro Antonio de Olaneta, as a liberator, a small liberator, not as great as Bolívar, but a true liberator. The strange war in Charcas was becoming stranger. The government of the "liberator," General Olaneta, had begun.

NOTES

¹Camba, Memorias, II, 133.

²Jerónimo Valdés, "Exposición . . . ," in T, GS, I, 88.

³P. A. Olañeta to La Hera, Potosí, January 22, 1824; Convenio hecho entre los Sres. Mariscales de Campo, D. Pedro Antonio de Olañeta y D. Jose Santos de la Hera, Potosí, January 22, 1824, and P. A. Olañeta to Jose de la Serna, Potosí, January 28, 1824, in T, GS, IV, nos. 206-208, pp. 253-257.

⁴P. A. Olañeta to Rafael Maroto, Potosí, January 29, February 4, 1824, Rafael Maroto to P. A. Olañeta, La Plata, January 27, 1824, Yotala, February 1, 1824 (2 letters), La Plata, February 7, 1824 (2 letters), in T, GS, I, 148-156.

⁵"El General Olañeta allos pueblos del Perú," Potosí, February 4, 1824, in T, GS, I, 156-157; also in Camba, Memorias, II, 187-189, also in EL Argos (Buenos Aires), no. 14 supplement (March 8, 1824).

⁶P. A. Olañeta to R. Maroto, Pilcomayo, February 10, 1824, La Plata, February 13, 1824, R. Maroto to P. A. Olañeta, Moromoro, February 11, 1824, Ocuri, February 19, 1824, R. Maroto to La Serna, Moromoro, February 12, 1824 (2 letters), in T, GS, I, 148-156.

⁷Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 30-42, gives a very detailed picture with minute incidents of Olañeta's reception. Unfortunately he does not tell the source of his information. The author's imagination seems to have played an important role in this description.

⁸Beltran Avila, Logia, 30.

⁹"Proclama de Olañeta estableciendo el sistema absoluto," La Plata, February 12, 1824, in EL Argos (Buenos Aires), no. 26 (April 17, 1824), also in T, GS, IV, 358 (but without any signature).

¹⁰Beltran Avila, Logia, 30-31.

¹¹Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 40; Beltran Avila, Logia, 58-61.

¹²In T, GS, IV, 361-362.

¹³Documentos referentes a la creación de Bolivia (Caracas, 1924), I, chap. 1. Hereafter cited as Lecuna, D, volume, page.

¹⁴See triangular correspondence among La Serna, Canterac and Valdés in T, GS, II, IV (index).

¹⁵P. A. Olañeta to La Serna, Challapata, December 25, 1823, in T, GS, IV, 352.

¹⁶José Domingo de Vidart to José Santos de la Hera, Salta, December 13, 1823, in T, GS, I, 128-131.

¹⁷Loc. cit.

¹⁸Cf. P. A. Olaneta to La Serna, La Paz, September 27, 1823 (2 letters), in T, GS, IV, 342.

¹⁹La Serna to Jerónimo Valdés, Cusco, February 10, 1824 (2 letters), in T, GS, IV, 82.

²⁰Loc. cit.

²¹See Valdés to Canterac, Yura, January 30, 1824, in T, GS, IV, 270.

²²J. Valdés to P. A. Olañeta, Puno, February 17, 1824, in T, GS, I, 159-164.

²³See correspondence between Olañeta and Valdés in T, GS, I, IV (index); cf. "La diplomacia de los papeles entre los generales realistas," in Beltran Avila, Logia, chap. 3. Seemingly Mr. Beltran has interpreted documents carelessly and is lax in his citations.

²⁴P. A. Olañeta to J. Valdés, Potosí, February 26, 1824, in T, GS, IV, 365-368.

²⁵P. A. Olañeta to J. Valdés, Potosí, February 28, 1824, in T, GS, I, no. 225, p. 370-371.

²⁶Decree, Oruro, February 29, 1824, in T, GS, I, 168-169.

²⁷See Beltran Avila, Logia, 50-51.

²⁸[Jerónimo Valdés] to La Serna, Oruro, March 13, 1824, in T, GS, IV, 280-282.

²⁹The treaty is available in T, GS, I, 184-185; Camba, Memorias, II, 432-434; Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 46-47; Beltran Avila, Logia, 53-54 (condensed version).

³⁰Jerónimo Valdés, "Exposición," in T, GS, I, 71.

³¹[Jerónimo Valdés] to La Serna, Oruro, March 13, 1824 in T, GS, IV, 281.

³²Loc. cit.

³³Ibid., 282 (*italics* in the original).

³⁴"He transigido, o mejor diré, he hecho armisticio con el pícaro de D.P. [Don Pedro for Pedro A. Olañeta] porque así convenía por razones que la adjunta copia [letter to the Viceroy] y también porque dentro de poco debemos tener ordenes de S.M., en cuyo caso, si continua este teatro, ya tendrá buen cuidado de obedecer ciegamente, y si vienen otros actores que lo manejen como les acomode: yo he tendido presente el estado de las operaciones de Usted, y por lo mismo no dudé pasar por todo. El Virrey puede ya disponer hacia ese frente, de todas las tropas que estan del Cuzco hacia allá" (J. Valdés to Canterac, Oruro, March 13, 1824, in T, GS, IV, 279-280).

³⁵See supra, chap. 5, n. 25.

³⁶The action of Valdés at Palca and subsequent doings of Lanza remain obscure. Valdés, in T, GS, I, 71, gives few details; Ramallo, Guerra doméstica, op. cit., 48, says that Lanza remained a prisoner of Valdés until the battle of Ayacucho. Sanchez de Velasco, Memorias para la historia de Bolivia (Sucre, 1938), 126-127, says that Lanza escaped. This author thinks that the last cited author is probably correct, although his book has many errors. But Lanza operated in Bolivia before Sucre's arrival, and occupied La Paz in advance of Sucre's army.

³⁷See all the detailed correspondence in T, GS, I, IV (index), during the period of March to June. For a synopsis, although deficient and confusing, and not following a real line of continuity, see Beltran Avila, Logia, chaps. 3, 4; Camba, Memorias, II, chaps. 25, 26; Ramallo, Guerra doméstica, op. cit., 48-53.

³⁸Beltran Avila, Logia, 68. The relationship of the guerrillas with Olañeta remains a mystery in view of the lack of documentary evidence. It is possible that some guerrillas cooperated with Olañeta since by now everybody realized that the support of Olañeta meant the continuation of dissention in the Spanish army and therefore would aid the Colombian advance from the north.

³⁹See infra, chap. 7.

⁴⁰Cf. Valdés, "Exposición," in T, GS, I, 73.

⁴¹The correspondence of Olañeta from March to June, 1824, in T, GS, I, IV (index).

⁴²C. Olaneta, Exposición, 4.

⁴³Cf. Camba, Memorias, II, 226.

⁴⁴"Bando contra Olaneta," Cuzco, June 4, 1824, in T, GS, I, 199-201, and in Camba, Memorias, II, 579-582.

⁴⁵See Camba, Memorias, II, 215.

⁴⁶J. Valdés to P. A. Olaneta, Oruro, June 14, 1824, in T, GS, I, 209.

⁴⁷Camba, Memorias, II, 228, attributes the manifesto to C. Olaneta. This is wrong since in June, July and August of 1824 C. Olaneta was in Buenos Aires and Montevideo (C. Olaneta, "Artículo comunicado," El Condor de Bolivia, Chuquisaca, no. 19, April 26, 1826). It was written by Urcullu, see G. René-Moreno, Perú y Bolivia, nuevas notas, op. cit., 157.

⁴⁸"Manifiesto del General Olaneta a los habitantes del Perú," Potosí, June 20, 1824, in T, GS, IV, 391-398 (with good notes by the editor, Conde de Torata, son of General Valdés). Also published in El Argos (Buenos Aires), no. 64 (August 21, 1824).

⁴⁹Ibid., T, GS, IV, 191.

⁵⁰Loc. cit.

⁵¹T, GS, 4 vols.; cf. Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit.

⁵²"America," El Argos (Buenos Aires), no. 15 (March 10, 1824).

⁵³Bolivian histories do mention the war very incidentally but do not give it the necessary importance. See [U], Apuntes, 127-145; see Manuel José Cortes, Ensayo sobre la historia de Bolivia (Sucre, 1861), 87-91; Ramon Sotomayor Valdés, op. cit., 38-39; Camacho, op. cit., 169-173; Enrique Finot, Nueva historia de Bolivia (Buenos Aires, 1946), 175-176; Arguedas, Fundacion, op. cit., 216-222; Luis M. Guzman, op. cit., 40-43; Paz, Historia, II, 586-600; Urquidí, Compendio, op. cit., 153-154; Ordonez y Crespo, op. cit., 181-182; Munoz Cabrera, op. cit., nothing; Pedro Kramer, Historia de Bolivia (La Paz, 1899), nothing; Sabino Pinilla, La creación de Bolivia (Biblioteca Ayacucho, vol. 17; Madrid, n. d.), 79, n. 1; Miguel Pacheco Loma, Resumen de la historia de Bolivia (Oruro, 1948), 324; Demetrio F. de Cordova, Historia de Bolivia (Sucre, 1911 [?]), nothing; Antonio Díaz Villamil, Curso de historia de Bolivia (3d ed.; La Paz, 1949), II, 90-92; Sanchez de Velasco, op. cit., 128-146; Lecuna, D. I, cxxi, cxxxiii, Manuel Sanzetená, Bolivia en su periodo de grandeza (Oruro, 1948), 14-15; Julio Diaz A., Sucre, organizador y conductor de ejércitos (La Paz, 1950), 83.

⁵⁴ Cuartel general en marcha, June 26, 1824, in T, GS, I, no. 59, pp. 209-210, also in Camba, Memorias, II, 444-445.

⁵⁵ Cuartel general en marcha, June 26, 1824, in T, GS, I, no. 60, pp. 210-211, also in Camba, Memorias, II, 446-447.

⁵⁶ Cf. Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 54-55; Mariano Torrente, Historia de la revolucion hispano-americana (Madrid, 1830), III, 464.

⁵⁷ See Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 30-36.

⁵⁸ Histories of the Bolivian army are extremely deficient, the standard one is Julio Díaz A., Historia del ejercito de Bolivia (La Paz, 1940), 782 pp.

⁵⁹ See Torrente, op. cit., III, 464.

⁶⁰ Ibid., III, 465, says one hundred men.

⁶¹ Ibid., III, 465, mentions two aid-de-camps; Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 58, mentions two aid-de-camps and four soldiers. This is seemingly incorrect since Valdés, "Exposición," in T, GS, I, 74-75, speaks of one aid-de-camp and two volunteers.

⁶² See Torrente, op. cit., III, 465.

⁶³ For the battle see ibid., III, 465-466; Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 57-60 (some errors); Camba, Memorias, II, 231; and the interesting document entitled "Diario de operaciones del ejército real del Perú, en campaña que ha sostenido contra los constitucionales, el año 1824" (Potosí, 1824), as reproduced in Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 95-103. The original copy is available in the Biblioteca de la sociedad Geografica Sucre. This diary is very biased in favor of the Seccessionists. Hereafter cited as Diario.

⁶⁴ As in any battle each side said the other had heavier casualties. Cf. Diario, 96-97.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 97.

⁶⁶ J. Valdes to Francisco Aguilera, Oruro, June 18, 1824 (2 letters), Yamparaes, July 11, 1824, Culpina, July 24, 1824 (2 letters), in T, GS, nos. 156, 157, 167, 168, 169, pp. 308-309, 317-322.

⁶⁷ Cf. Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 60-61.

⁶⁸Ibid., 62, says the soldiers left for Oruro, Olañeta's diary and Torrente do not mention anything about the Constitutionalist soldiers; Camba, Memorias, II, 232, says the soldiers remained in town which is probably wrong because Barbarucho found Potosi empty (Diario, 97).

⁶⁹Today Eustaquio Méndez is recognized in Bolivia, especially in Tarija, as a great hero. He is known as the "Moto Méndez" (see Bernardo Trigo, Las tejas de mi techo, op. cit., 326-330). Yet this author has seen some original documents which do not make Méndez look too good.

⁷⁰Diario, 62. Torrente and Camba evidently have ignored this attack.

⁷¹This is acknowledged in the Secessionist diary (Diario, 97-98).

⁷²When the unit of Colonel Rivas of the Aguilera army deserted to the Loyalists, Colonel Marquiegui had been in serious danger of being apprehended by the deserters, with the aid of the army of General Valdés (Torrente, op. cit., III, 465).

⁷³Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 66, says he had six hundred soldiers with him; Olañeta's diary, op. cit., 99, says seven hundred men.

⁷⁴Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 66, calls it "Abra de Quenta," Camba, Memorias, II, 233, calls it "Abra de Qeta," Diario, 98, calls it "Abra rota" which seems more probable.

⁷⁵This division is taken from Diario, 98, Torrente, op. cit., III, 467, has the army separate into three units. But since the Diario is a primary record of Olañeta himself his division should be considered correct.

⁷⁶See supra, n. 31.

⁷⁷"Me ha conducido con la mayor generosidad respecto a los oficiales y soldados prisioneros que he tomado" (J. Valdés to P. A. Olañeta, no date, no place, because of partial destruction of the last part of the letter, in T, GS, IV, 323); cf. Torrente, op. cit., III, 467.

⁷⁸Cf. Diario, 99.

⁷⁹Pedro Cortéz to Capitan Gral. de Buenos Aires, Tupiza, August 16, 1824, in El Argos (Buenos Aires), no. 72 (September 11, 1824) (Cortéz calls the place Chacapa).

⁸⁰Cf. Diario, 99.

⁸¹Carratala later, by bribing his guards, was able to escape

(P. A. Olañeta to J. Valdés, Cinti, August 30, 1824, in Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 82-83, 68).

⁸²Valdés, "Exposición," in T, GS, I, 75; cf. Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 69.

⁸³Casimiro Olañeta, "Artículo comunicado," El Condor de Bolivia (Chuquisaca), no. 19 (April 6, 1826).

⁸⁴Torrente, op. cit., III, 468.

⁸⁵Pedro Cortéz to Gob^o de Buenos Aires, Tupiza, August 16, 1824, in El Argos (Buenos Aires), no. 72 (September 11, 1824); cf. Camba, Memorias, II, 234; Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 70.

⁸⁶Diario, 100-101.

⁸⁷This information is not given in any of the sources that describe the war, but only in a very interesting article, "Alto Perú," El Argos (Buenos Aires), no. 78 (September 29, 1824).

⁸⁸See Torrente, op. cit., III, 469-470.

⁸⁹See J. Valdés to La Serna, Campo de batalla en la Lava, August 17, 1824, in T, GS, IV, 322; Olañeta in his Diario, 101, admits this loss.

⁹⁰Torrente, op. cit., III, 470-471; "La gloriosa acción de La Lava, en q. han quedado en mi poder el Coronel Valdés y 34 oficiales mas con unos 600 de tropa [?], me daba motivos de engreirme; mas yo nada quiero, sino que se conduya toda desavencia" (J. Valdés to P. A. Olañeta, Puna, August 19, 1824, in T, GS, IV, 322-323).

⁹¹Camba, Memorias, II, 235.

⁹²Cf. Diario, 101.

⁹³Torrente, op. cit., III, 472.

⁹⁴J. Valdés to P. A. Olañeta, Yamparáes, August 25, 1824, in Camba, Memorias, II, 459-460.

⁹⁵Cf. Diario, 101-102.

⁹⁶Cf. P. A. Olañeta to J. Valdés, Cinti, August 30, 1824, in Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 82-83.

⁹⁷Vicente Miranda y Cabezon to J. Valdés, Puna, August 31, 1824, in Canba, Memorias, II, 460-462.

⁹⁸Diario, 101.

⁹⁹Ibid., 102.

¹⁰⁰Loc. cit.

¹⁰¹See infra, chap. 8.

¹⁰²See infra, chap. 7.

CHAPTER VII

"LIBERATOR" AND TRAITOR

Synopsis

The complicated and interesting events of Charcas reached a dramatic climax in the final months of 1824 and the beginning of 1825. The center of this drama was General Pedro Olañeta and Casimiro Olañeta, his nephew.

For General Bolívar the rebellion of the Spanish general, Olañeta, in Charcas was an unexpected gift from heaven, which suddenly turned his critical situation in Lower Peru to bright prospects. The Liberator decided on an offensive in view of the detainment of Valdés' powerful army in Upper Peru, and was able to defeat General Canterac decisively at Junín. Bolívar acknowledged Olañeta's indirect aid and proclaimed him a liberator, assuming that the Separatist General had joined the Patriotic cause. A period of careful negotiations followed the victory of Junín, during which Bolívar wooed Olañeta intensively. The rebel General said neither yes nor no to Bolívar's offer to integrate his army into the United Army of liberation. Bolívar and Sucre were at a loss to explain the mysterious conduct of General Olañeta, but as long as he maintained his rebellion and did not send aid to the hard-pressed Spanish army in Lower Peru, the Patriots were content to let him go on with his

strange doings. When the remainder of the Royalist army under Viceroy La Serna was defeated and captured in the battle of Ayacucho on December 9, 1824, the problem of General Olañeta was the next to be solved. Bolívar and Sucre continued to be cordial to the General with the hope of averting a new military campaign.

But General Olañeta still behaved mysteriously. He did not come to the aid of the Spanish army in Lower Peru, yet he answered Bolívar and Sucre in vague and evasive terms, giving no indications of what he was going to do. Even more enigmatic was the behavior of the General's shrewd secretary, his nephew, Casimiro Olañeta. During the Separatist War he left for the free provinces with the purpose of purchasing arms for his uncle's army. Due to his connections he was able to get a pass into the United Provinces. Besides looking for arms he engaged in very obscure doings, seemingly all with the purpose of fostering his ambitions. From Buenos Aires he tried to open correspondence with Bolívar, advising him to attack the Spanish army. At the termination of the Separatist War Casimiro was again at his uncle's side, convincing some guerrilla units to join the Secessionist army. Casimiro was outwardly working with great zest for his uncle's absolutist regime.

After the complete defeat of the Spanish army at Ayacucho on December 9, 1824, Lower Peru was liberated and the only obstacle to the end of the war was the presence of the army of Olañeta in Upper Peru. Bolívar and Sucre continued their policy of moderation by inviting the Spanish General to become an integral part of the army of freedom. The Separatist General was as evasive as ever and Bolívar and Sucre felt even

more puzzled. In the first days of the new year, 1825, it became clearer than ever that General Olaneta was not willing to come to terms with the army of liberation. Yet Sucre was not too enthusiastic about engaging in a new campaign and was still hopeful of finding some way to convince the Spanish General to join them. Olaneta was disposed to sign a four-month truce. But then his nephew committed outright treason and informed Sucre in a confidential letter that his uncle only wanted to gain time in order to receive reinforcements, with which to fight the Bolivarian army later. After this treacherous letter Casimiro abandoned his uncle and fled to Sucre, who made him auditor of the Bolivarian army and confidential adviser. The commander of the United Army of liberation realized that nothing was left but to fight General Olaneta.

At the beginning of 1824 the situation of Bolívar and his army was far from encouraging. The Peruvian army and republic had completely disintegrated. At this critical time Bolívar was in the little village of Pativilca, north of Lima. He realized very well that in view of the defeats, defections and outright treason in the Peruvian army, he and his Colombian expeditionary force would be unable to resist the combined attack of the two Spanish armies under Canterac and Valdés. Therefore on February 13, 1824, he outlined to General Sucre a precise plan of retreat to the north into the department of Trujillo.¹ He hoped that there he could hold out until reinforcements from Colombia arrived. Bolívar's correspondence from January through March was pessimistic. On February 16 he thought that his only wish was to keep his army "intact, and conserve ourselves at all costs; the year must not end with us not remaining in Peru."² Nine days later he wrote to Santander that if the reinforcements did not come, "I shall order General Sucre and the army of Colombia to withdraw, and, as for myself, I shall go to the devil."³ On March 14 Bolívar was in Trujillo, pessimistic as ever, and asking frantically for more troops from Colombia to save him.⁴ The prospects about everything were bleak and Bolívar was only too frank in making it known. On April 9 he said to Sucre that he believed that without help from Colombia they could not hold out for more than three or four months.⁵ A few days later Bolívar received the amazing news of the rebellion of General Olaneta and that the Spanish army of the south under General Valdés had gone into Upper Peru, instead of coming north to join the Canterac army. On April 14 he wrote an exuberant letter to Sucre. His whole spirit seemed to have

picked up, and he thought that in view of this unexpected turn of events the Colombian army should prepare for an offensive in May against Canterac.⁶ Certainly General Olaneta had done more for the hard-pressed Colombian army than anyone else.

As more and more details reached the Bolivarian headquarters the Colombian General began to prepare for the great attack. Yet General Bolívar did not know the underlying motive of the Olaneta secession very well. He thought that perhaps the Spanish General had embraced the cause of liberty, and that it was obvious that Olaneta would join the Patriotic cause. Bolívar was quite convinced that General Olaneta had become a Patriot.⁷ Therefore on May 21, from Huaraz, he wrote the Secessionist General his first letter. Bolívar expressed his satisfaction that General Olaneta had parted ways with "the hateful party that until today has oppressed this unfortunate part of the world." Bolívar told Olaneta that he was convinced that the General had taken this step because of his convictions and belief in the cause of freedom. General Bolívar then expressed his distaste for the Spanish constitution, which he classified as a "monster of undefinable forms." He thought that the constitutional government of Spain was a regime of many heads, and all with tyrannical dispositions. Bolívar felt, too, as he indicated to Olaneta, that the infamous constitution "had trampled the church [and] the throne." He then told the Spanish General in Upper Peru that he ought to embrace the cause of liberty and freedom because it was the cause that was destined to win. Bolívar confided to Olaneta that he would start an offensive south against the Spanish army in Lower Peru, and if Olaneta would maintain the rebellion

it would mean that he would have done an invaluable service to the Patriotic cause. Then, Bolívar added, he would consider Olaneta and his army as beneméritos del Perú y de la América. At the same time Bolívar astutely reminded his correspondent that should the Patriotic army be defeated then General Olaneta would not be compromised because he could say that he had served the King faithfully. Bolívar implied to Olaneta that by continuing his secession he had nothing to lose. But he added that he was absolutely convinced that his army could not be defeated. The Colombian leader suggested that General Olaneta thoroughly consider the whole situation of America and that undoubtedly he would come to the conclusion that the Spaniards had not a single chance. Bolívar then added several reasons why he was sure that the cause of freedom would soon win. The commander of the United Army terminated his eloquent and diplomatic letter by suggesting to General Olaneta that he should send a confidential delegate to his headquarters in Lower Peru and personally see the great strength and enthusiasm of the Patriots.⁸

It is not to be believed that Bolívar was expressing a deep seated political conviction in this letter, but rather he was wooing General Olaneta.⁹ He was anxious to see the rebellion continued because it would bring victory within easy grasp. This indeed is what happened. Although the letter was written on May 21, 1824, it took four months to reach Olaneta. The letter went via Chile to General Arenales, governor of the province of Salta, who forwarded it to Olaneta.¹⁰ When it reached Olaneta on October 2 in Oruro, the army of Bolívar had already severely

defeated the Spanish army of the north under Canterac at Junín on August 6 and General Olaneta had won the Separatist War by default. Seven days after the victory of Junín, Bolívar issued a proclamation to the people of Peru announcing to them the good news. Bolívar told the people that "two great armies harass the Spanish in Peru, the United Army [under Bolívar] and the army of the brave Olaneta." Bolívar then announced to the people that "Olaneta and his illustrious companions are worthy of American gratitude." The commander of the United Army then declared General Pedro Antonio de Olaneta a liberator.¹¹ Seemingly, in the absence of an answer from Olaneta to his letter of May 21 (which was not the fault of Olaneta since he did not get the letter until October), Bolívar made it appear that General Olaneta had thrown his lot with the army of freedom. Although Bolívar, under the impact of the first news, thought that the rebel General had joined him, on November 26 he expressed to General Santa Cruz a different opinion. He said that it was his belief that General "Olaneta would never be a Patriot and will be always more godo than the enemy."¹² But on the same day he wrote to General Sucre that he regarded "it as certain that Olaneta can never be a friend of these Spaniards, but a conjecture is not a fact; hence, you must always have eyes in the back of your head."¹³ It seems quite clear that Bolívar was undecided and in the dark about Olaneta's intentions. This is only understandable. What really mattered at this moment for the United Army was that Olaneta continue his secession and therefore deprive the hard-pressed Spanish army of reinforcement and an escape route. As long as Olaneta did this Bolívar was satisfied and willing to go along with the obscure doings of the Gen-

eral.

The first important step was the defeat the remainder of the Spanish army in Lower Peru. In view of Canterac's defeat, the Viceroy, La Serna, an able general, had put himself at the head of the Spanish army and had fused the decimated army of the north and the army of the south, worn out from its campaign in the Separatist War. General Sucre, who had been given the task of defeating the Spanish army in Lower Peru by Bolívar, started a brilliant campaign in southern Lower Peru, which culminated in the perfect and artfully executed battle of Ayacucho on December 9, 1824. The whole Spanish army surrendered to Sucre and among the captives were Viceroy La Serna, Generals Canterac, Valdés, Carratalá and Ferraz, all veterans of long campaigns in Upper Peru, and many others. The only force that remained was the small garrison of Callao and the large army of General Olaneta in Upper Peru. After Ayacucho only Charcas remained to be freed, the same land where the War of Independence had started sixteen years before. But strangely enough, the victorious United Army did not even know if the Spanish commander of Upper Peru had joined them or was still fighting for the King. The curious drama of Upper Peru was ready to start. Would Olaneta receive the victorious Sucre as a companion in arms or would he meet him as a foe? And what about Upper Peru, did it belong to the United Provinces, to Lower Peru, or did it wish separation? Sucre had just won a great battle but an even greater task awaited him.

General Olaneta answered Bolívar's letter of May 21, on October 2, in vague but interesting lines. He told Bolívar that he agreed with his judgment about the constitution. Olaneta then added that La Serna had usurped the viceregal chair from Pezuela. The separatist General assured Bolívar that because of his military victory he was the ruler of Upper Peru and that he was "convinced that I am working for the benefit of America." Olaneta said he thought "a solid system was the solution of all the problems that had beset America". What did Olaneta mean by a solid system? Vagueness was a quality of Olaneta's pen. Then he asked Bolívar to review all the events in Peru and Tierra Firme and the evident conclusion would be that the "vices of a popular government are only too obvious." Indeed an interesting thought to put before Bolívar, and really the only sharp and clear sentence in the whole letter. Olaneta ended his letter by saying that "I wish we could make our sentiments uniform, and give a day of rejoicing to America and humanity."¹⁴ Really a strange correspondence between the great Patriot, Bolívar, and the fanatic absolutist, General Pedro Antonio de Olaneta. The rebel General did not say a word about sending a confidential representative to Bolívar's headquarters as the latter had suggested. What about Casimiro Olaneta, might his uncle not want to send him? What had happened to this master schemer, originator of the idea of rebellion?

Casimiro Olaneta had left for Buenos Aires and Montevideo as soon as the treaty of Tarapaya was signed, but the exact date of his departure is unknown. Casimiro was accompanied by an assistant, a mysterious priest. They were able to go into the free provinces with the

help of a pass personally written by Governor Arenales of Salta.¹⁵

Governor Arenales was the ex-guerrilla leader who, although born in Spain, embraced the revolutionary cause as early as 1809. After the defeat of Rondeau he went into northern Argentina, distinguishing himself as a brave and patriotic soldier. Arenales represented one of the purest and most honest partisans of the War of Independence. In his uprightness, probity and integrity he resembled General Sucre closely. Arenales was the very antithesis of Casimiro Olañeta. The dos caras Casimiro said that Arenales helped him to get into the free provinces because he had been his confidential agent, forwarding to the Governor of Salta restricted information about the Spanish army. Casimiro wrote that "nothing happened in Peru that I did not write to Arenales; the intentions of my uncle, the situation of the army of liberation, its strength and whatever was important."¹⁶ Obviously this is probably a gross exaggeration, yet Casimiro admits to have served as a spy for Arenales. A fine game the dos caras Patriot and Royalist played: Casimiro as secretary to his uncle, the Spanish commander in Upper Peru, spied for Arenales, the Patriotic governor of Salta, and José Mariano Serrano, the secretary and aide of Governor Arenales,¹⁷ is accused of having spied for General Olañeta. Each one of the comrades spied for his friend's superior. This means that Casimiro and José Mariano exchanged information: I tell you this that I heard from my superior so you can tell yours, and you tell me about your boss so I can tell it to my superior. Indeed the two great schemers, today considered as fathers of Bolivia, Casimiro Olañeta and José Mariano Serrano, were a fine pair of shrewd operators with not an

lota of political convictions and ethics.

One can understand quite well that Casimiro Olañeta had no difficulty in getting a pass into the free provinces. In Salta he met Serrano and his friends¹⁸ and from there continued to Tucumán and Córdoba. No one disturbed Casimiro, and the safe-conduct pass of Arenales opened the gates to all cities and provinces in Argentina to him. In Córdoba he probably went to visit his alma mater and found out that his old teacher, Dean Funes, was in Buenos Aires and held the position of confidential agent of Colombia and of Bolívar to the United Provinces.¹⁹ Undoubtedly Casimiro made it a point to take advantage of this. According to Olañeta, in July he was in Buenos Aires and in August in Montevideo.²⁰ The next known record of the young schemer is that in December he was back in Cochabamba at the headquarters of his uncle.

What was Casimiro doing in the free provinces? He said, as does José María Paz, that he had been sent to purchase arms for the Secessionist army.²¹ He had 18,000 pesos with him to pay for the weapons. This sounds reasonable, since General Olañeta needed arms for his army and the only place he could get them was through Buenos Aires. Upper Peru was an isolated region with roads only from Buenos Aires and Lima, and the rebel General was fighting against Lower Peru. Casimiro's companion, the mysterious priest, was supposed to continue to Spain to take important messages to the court. General Valdés thought that Casimiro himself was going to Spain and he suggested to the Viceroy that he speed information to Madrid to apprehend this "perverse and revolutionary Doctor Casimiro Olañeta."²² Valdés was right when he called him perverse, but revolution-

ary was hardly correct. The nephew of General Olañeta was doing many other things besides looking for arms. Everything he did is obscure and René-Moreno, the only one ever to have exposed Casimiro, has to admit, after searching for more facts, that Casimiro Olañeta was engaged in "mysterious errands."²³

He did not go to Spain and he did not get arms, but without question he kept for himself or split with his companion, the priest, the 18,000 pesos. In 1826, once Bolivia had been created, many of the Upper Peruvian emigrants to the free provinces returned to their home soil. The majority had been unlike from their best known companion, José Mariano Serrano, honest and convinced Patriots who had suffered as many as sixteen years of hardship in foreign lands. These people knew Casimiro Olañeta very well and spoke of him as "colla doscaras disfrazado de patriota faroleante."²⁴ Some of them tried to expose Casimiro²⁵ and one of them, a conscientious citizen of Santa Cruz by the name of Manuel Castro, together with his friends, stopped Casimiro one night in Chuquisaca and demanded that he publically account ^{for} what had happended to the 18,000 pesos.²⁶ Another Patriot, under the psuedonym of Mosquetero, published in Salta a frank attack against Olañeta, and he too wondered where the 18,000 pesos went.²⁷ Casimiro was unable to defend himself in a convincing way. He said he gave the money to the priest who might have spent it. Then he added in the next lines that this companion was supposed to have gone to Spain as a courier, but that he had stayed, probably to spend the 18,000. After this Olañeta wrote that he went to see this man, whose name he never gave, to fetch the documents which the priest was supposed

to have taken with him to Spain, so that he might send them to the court.²⁸ If Casimiro went to get the letters from the priest, why did he not demand the 18,000 pesos? And this was a considerable amount of money, around thirty to forty thousand dollars.²⁹ René-Moreno rightly asks if Casimiro gave him the money, and this is hardly understandable, why did he not demand a receipt; one does not give so much cash to anyone without any proof.³⁰ Then, furthermore, if the priest remained with the money, why did Olañeta not do anything: sue him, investigate where he went, identify him by name and take other steps that anyone would immediately undertake in such circumstances? It seems clear that Casimiro simply took the money for himself. The mystery about this affair is that he did not claim that he returned the money to his uncle, since in 1826 General Olañeta was already dead. Young Olañeta was not only unethical about his political doings but also about finances.

Mosquetero and the newspaper, Mensajero Argentino,³¹ also accused Casimiro of having entered into negotiations in Montevideo with a Brazilian agent with the intentions of offering Charcas' great productive east to the Brazilian empire.³² Casimiro denied this violently in March, 1826, and said that the only time he met the Brazilian agent was in the theater.³³ A month later, in April, he again denied this charge in a letter to the editor of the Bolivian newspaper, El Condor. Here he took a different line of defense by writing that he knew that the governor of Mato Grosso had invited his uncle, General Olañeta, to invade Mato Grosso. Casimiro said that General Olañeta was enthusiastic about this project but that Manuel María Urcullu intervened and persuaded the General not to undertake

such a "wild plan."³⁴ The master schemer said that all this took place in July of 1824, while he was in Buenos Aires, so therefore he did not have anything to do with this matter.³⁵ Yet only a month earlier Casimiro had admitted that in August, 1824, in Montevideo he had met a Brazilian agent. All this sparse information points to another intended great intrigue and maybe interesting details rest in Brazilian archives. It would not be surprising if in these Brazilian records (if they exist) the name of Casimiro Olañeta is often cited.

Young Olañeta had something else to worry about since a great new army was advancing toward Upper Peru. This had been a victorious army all the way from Tierra Firme. Casimiro Olañeta decided it was high time to contact Bolívar. He took advantage of the fact that Funes was in Buenos Aires, and he talked to this venerable old man extensively.³⁶ Casimiro said that he wrote a letter to Bolívar, from Buenos Aires, through Funes.³⁷ Apparently Funes never forwarded the letter to Bolívar, but rather told him what Casimiro had said. There is no letter from Casimiro Olañeta to Bolívar written in Buenos Aires in the practically complete collection of correspondence to Bolívar.³⁸ But indeed Funes did refer Casimiro to Bolívar.³⁹ It can be inferred that Casimiro wrote favorably to Bolívar about his uncle and tried to convince the Colombian leader of the Patriotic sentiments of General Olañeta. At least that is what Bolívar understood.⁴⁰ He also informed Bolívar of the split in the Spanish army and suggested him to advance, since this was the opportune time for an offensive. The news of the great southern push had not yet reached Casimiro Olañeta in distant Buenos Aires.⁴¹

This is all that is known about the strange machinations of the rebel General's secretary in the free provinces. Casimiro, with his usual disregard for truth, said that he returned to Upper Peru because Bolívar wanted him to go back to aid the Patriotic cause.⁴² This is not true. No letter of Bolívar written in 1824 to Casimiro Olañeta exists in the complete correspondence of the Colombian liberator. Indeed, in December of 1824 Bolívar could not even remember the name of this "relative of Your Lordship who recently resided in Buenos Aires," as Bolívar put it in a letter to General Olañeta.⁴³ René-Moreno, who became so disgusted with the lies and exaggerations of Casimiro Olañeta, wrote that Casimiro always gave the appearance of discussing matters with heavy documentation, but that he always added that either a friend of his had the documents, or that he had mislaid them, or that he would publish them later, or many other excuses. Instead Olañeta gave long quotations in Latin or cited Lamartine, Hugo, Goethe, Shakespeare, Dante, Cicero and others. He never presented the documents or proof. Moreno rightly said that Casimiro's defenses, expositions, writings, debates and letters to editors are great "documented argumentations without documents."⁴⁴ It is probable that Casimiro returned to Upper Peru at his own volition at the end of August or beginning of September to rejoin his uncle.

His first task was to make a journey to the Ayopaya republic to meet the guerrilla Lanza and convince him to join ranks with General Olañeta.⁴⁵ The ascent of the dos caras Doctor Olañeta, neatly dressed in his black suit, white shirt, black tie and black hat, into the rough mon-tonero republic to confer with the rugged, harsh and unpolished guerrillas

must have been a strange episode. Unfortunately the diary of drummer Vargas for these last years of fighting has been lost. He might have detailed in an unsurpassed style and manner the appearance of the stiff-collared doctor from Chuquisaca in their midst. Casimiro was able to convince the plain Lanza that his uncle was now fighting for the Patriots, and the guerrilla leader accepted the false assurance of the young Olaneta in good faith. Lanza was simply deceived by a smooth manipulator and talker, and he honestly admitted it later to Bolívar, asking apology for his stupidity.⁴⁶ By then he had learned from experience, and in February of the coming year of 1825 Lanza was the only one to warn Sucre about Casimiro Olaneta, and to advise him not to trust and deal with this dangerous man.⁴⁷ Sucre ignored Lanza and three years later paid dearly for it, because then Casimiro Olaneta betrayed the victor of Ayacucho and had him expelled from Bolivia, or as Casimiro wrote to a friend, "... when I kicked him from his sultanic throne."⁴⁸ In this same letter he called Sucre "el carajillo."⁴⁹ The sad part is that General Lanza had to die defending Sucre, killed by bullets for which Casimiro was indirectly responsible. All this happened in April of 1828.⁵⁰ In 1824 Lanza was duped because he was honest but not overly intelligent. Marshal Sucre had heard in Cusco after the victory of Ayacucho that in the mountains Lanza was being called "Doctor," and therefore he appointed him President of La Paz.⁵¹ "Doctor" Lanza nearly ruined the finances of La Paz in a few months because of stupidity,⁵² and Sucre had to admit to Bolívar that Lanza was "a mule" and that he was "an animal with two feet plus honesty", but "who did not even know how to talk."⁵³ René-Moreno wrote that the best way

to describe Lanza was with three b's, standing for "benemérito, battler and brute."⁵⁴ It is understandable that the slick Casimiro had an easy time of convincing the man with the three b's. But this "brute mule," once fooled by Casimiro had enough intelligence to see through him. If Sucre had listened to this "animal with two feet" in 1825, Bolivia's history might have been different. On December 23, 1824, Casimiro was back in Cochabamba with his uncle. On this day the nephew wrote a confidential letter to Bolívar, since he knew that the day before General Olaneta had received a letter from the Liberator and had immediately answered it. Casimiro wanted to show Bolívar that he was more important than his uncle.

It should be recalled that Bolívar took the initial step and wrote to General Olaneta, for the first time from Huarez on May 21, or more than two weeks before the battle of Junín. In his letter the Liberator congratulated Olaneta for his secession. The rebel General did not receive this letter until October 2. On October 6 Bolívar decided to write a second letter to General Olaneta, offering him friendship and hoping that the General would be an integral part of the new order in America. He suggested that the General open negotiations with General Sucre who had been authorized to deal with him.⁵⁵ In view of again not having received an answer to his letter Bolívar decided to write a third time on December 15, six days after the victory of Ayacucho, repeating his earlier thoughts and saying that he had heard indirectly from a young relative of the General in Buenos Aires, who had expressed the opinion that General Olaneta was honest in his Patriotic convictions. Bolívar thought that

this was encouraging and again congratulated the General for his secession and offered him a solid future with the liberating army. He then added that Olaneta should settle the details of integration of his army with Marshal Sucre.⁵⁶ Nine days later, on December 24, Bolívar received the long delayed answer of General Olaneta to his first letter. Although this answer was full of ambiguous statements, Bolívar immediately took his pen to write Olaneta his fourth letter, expressing joy for the General's good words. Bolívar wrote that "the victory of Ayacucho will never let us forget what we owe you; more than ever we should thank you for the opportune diversion of the Spanish army that you have undertaken in Upper Peru." Bolívar repeated that Marshal Sucre had the authority to sign an agreement with him.⁵⁷ On December 22 General Olaneta answered Bolívar's communication with a short letter, saying only that General Valdés had left behind many foci of subversion which had required his close attention. Now he had finished this unpleasant clean-up campaign and he was determined and ready to move up to the Desaguadero River in order to open negotiations with Marshal Sucre.⁵⁸ Olaneta dispatched an identical letter to Sucre, with whom he was supposed to negotiate.⁵⁹

The next day Casimiro Olaneta wrote, unknown to his uncle, a confidential letter to Bolívar. He asked the Liberator to honor his confidence and not divulge this letter. In it Casimiro hinted to Bolívar that he was the power behind his uncle and that he had been responsible for General Olaneta's secession. He said that he was a partisan of the Patriots and that he had long been persecuted by the Royalists. He repeated his favorite phrase that it did not matter which road one takes

as long as one reaches or works for the same goal. He added with strong emphasis that "I belong entirely to the revolution." Casimiro politely informed Bolívar that "as secretary and friend of General Olaneta I am informed of many details which are impossible to confide in a letter," and he wrote that it would be too hazardous to enumerate them because it might endanger his plan. Casimiro did not even hint what his plan was, but in this intelligently calculated letter he seemingly wished to maintain the great Bolívar in a state of suspense. Then he wrote that the army of General Olaneta would belong to Bolívar, but because of many difficulties this could not yet be openly announced. Without coming straight out, he hinted that a serious split had developed in the midst of the Secessionist army, between those favoring union with Bolívar and those opposed to it. He did not write what the attitude of his uncle was, but he stated that Patriotic elements, or as he identifies them, the liberal elements (liberal within the absolutist army!), were decided to join Bolívar. Naturally he gave the impression that he, Casimiro Olaneta, was the leader of this liberal faction and he recommended especially Manuel María Urcullu, whom he called the auditor of the Olaneta army. He ended his letter by extravagant eulogies such as, "What a day it will be when all Americans united will sing around the tree of liberty hymns of gratitude to our liberator. It looks as if it is very near."⁶⁰ Casimiro Olaneta and Manuel María Urcullu were now ready to sing songs of gratitude to Bolívar, yet it had not been long since Casimiro, defending Manuel María before the Audiencia, spoke of the "infamous revolutionaries," and Urcullu was damning the Patriotic cause in every part. Was Casimiro

ready to betray his uncle and join the Bolivarian bandwagon, or was he trying honestly to gain time to convince the rebel General to come to terms with the United Army? All was enigmatic and Marshal Sucre was quite baffled. It would have been easier to fight an open war than to solve the riddle of Upper Peru.

Already before the battle of Ayacucho Sucre had received authorization from the commander of the United Army, General Bolívar, to draw up a treaty of defense with General Olaneta, or an alliance or any other feasible agreement that would integrate the army of Olaneta within the United Army.⁶¹ Sucre immediately informed General Olaneta of his delegated power and apparently asked him to set up the machinery for an agreement (this letter has not been located).⁶² This was before the successful battle of Ayacucho and the problem of Olaneta and Upper Peru was still secondary. But with the victorious battle of December 9, 1824, when nearly the whole Spanish army was captured, the Upper Peruvian theater required first hand attention. In the capitulation of Ayacucho the defeated Viceroy and the commander of the army of the south, General Valdés, wanted to include the army of Olaneta in the stipulations of the surrender, but Marshal⁶³ Sucre refused this because he said that he considered the army of Olaneta an integral part of the liberating force.⁶⁴ As strange as it may sound, Sucre probably did this to prove to General Olaneta that they really meant it when he and Bolívar had assumed Olaneta to be an ex officio member of the United Army because of his secession.

But in view of any concise and clear cut answer by the rebel General the whole matter became a huge riddle. Marshal Sucre felt not at all enthusiastic about starting his campaign in Charcas. Three days after the victory of Ayacucho Sucre asked Bolívar that he be relieved of any further task.⁶⁵ Eleven days later Sucre thought that General Santa Cruz should undertake the campaign of Upper Peru because he felt that the whole problem of Charcas was too "delicate" for him.⁶⁶ On December 25 he repeated the same thought because he "did not want to become involved in this mess that prevails in Upper Peru."⁶⁷ General Bolívar was unwilling to let Sucre go, since he was his best general and one with a straight and honest character, a quality that Santa Cruz did not possess. Bolívar simply ignored Sucre's complaints, and it was Sucre who had to solve the confusion of Charcas. When Marshal Sucre complained about the complex situation of Charcas he did not have in mind only the strange and puzzling behavior of General Olaneta, but also other factors that made the whole situation even more complicated. To whom did Charcas belong: to Buenos Aires, to Peru, or was independence feasible? On January 8, 1825, Sucre wrote to Bolívar that he had heard that Arenales of Salta was ready to move into Charcas⁶⁸ and he, Sucre, felt that a clash of interests would take place, and he added, "... and this is what I am most afraid of." Sucre reminded Bolívar that if he moved into Upper Peru he would be in a country "that is not part of Peru and does not wish to belong to it, but seems to want to belong to itself." He prophetically wrote in the next line that he could foresee⁶⁹ "that we shall get ourselves into a maze of trickery."

But Marshal Sucre was not excused and Bolívar paid no attention to his beloved General's desire to retire.⁷⁰ Sucre unenthusiastically accepted his new task with his usual resignation and conscientiousness. On New Year's Day of 1825 he began his new campaign or diplomatic maneuver. First of all he wrote a letter to General Olaneta in which he expressed the line of policy that had been adopted to deal with the rebel General, considering him a new member of the Bolivarian army. He told him he was sending his personal aide, Colonel Antonio Elizalde, to draw up an agreement with the Olaneta army.⁷¹ Next he wrote a letter to General Aguilera in which he expressed identical sentiments as those stated to Olaneta and asked Aguilera to join the United Army which was beginning its march into Upper Peru.⁷² The same day he wrote another letter to the great guerrilla leader, Lanza, who had joined the Olaneta army. Since he had heard that Lanza was a qualified man he named him President of La Paz and requested him to march to La Paz and prepare the city for the entrance of the Bolivarian army, ten thousand strong.⁷³ Another letter was sent to the ex-guerrilla leader, Pedro Arraya, who had joined the Secessionist army, to whom he also wrote that he was starting his march with the Bolivarian army into Upper Peru.⁷⁴ The same January 1 he dispatched other letters to the municipalities of La Paz, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Potosí, informing them of the forthcoming entrance of the United Army into Charcas with the sole object of "guaranteeing its liberty."⁷⁵ Marshal Sucre was still completely confused, as anyone else, about the doings of General Olaneta. Already General Valdés and General Canterac after Ayacucho had smilingly told Sucre that it was

now his turn to try to figure out General Olaneta. They thought that he would not be more successful than they had been.⁷⁶ To Lanza Sucre frankly stated that "the uncertain behavior of General Olaneta in the meanwhile embitters my heart."⁷⁷ Marshal Sucre then decided to wait for the return of Colonel Elizalde and see what he brought back from the headquarters of General Olaneta.

As the first days of the new year of 1825 were passing by it became more and more apparent that General Olaneta had decided to fight and not accept the offer to become a member of the Bolivarian army. After the Spanish disaster of Ayacucho the Audiencia of Cuzco had named, on December 16, 1824, General Pío Tristán, commander of Arequipa, as the new Viceroy. But this last viceroy in Spanish America lasted less than one month, and Pío Tristán submitted without a fight to the Ayacucho surrender terms.⁷⁸ Not so General Olaneta; although he had had an active correspondence with the United Army he was unwilling to come to terms, but was determined to create confusion and keep the United Army guessing.

On January 4, 1825, General Olaneta issued from Oruro two more of his famous proclamations. He spoke to the people of both Perus, accusing the defeated army of Viceroy La Serna of treason and incapacity when it capitulated at Ayacucho. He told all the inhabitants that such a small defeat would never destroy his enthusiasm and determination. It was his firm intention that should the new Viceroy, Pío Tristán, surrender, the Spanish army in Upper Peru would never do the same and in the end final victory would be theirs, because they defended the sacred cause of the King and religion.⁷⁹ A similar proclamation was addressed to his

soldiers and officers.⁸⁰ Four days later he wrote two letters to the new Viceroy, Pío Tristán, unaware that he was ready to lay down his arms. Olaneta told him that he was not at all surprised at the defeat of the army of La Serna, which constituted the culmination of his many crimes. He assured the Viceroy that he had a good army and with it could keep the Colombian units in check until he would get reinforcements from Spain via Tarapacá. In the second letter he emphatically stated that he never would surrender but would fight to the last man.⁸¹ Indeed these words by General Olaneta were sincere in view of his refusal later to surrender. He was determined to fight the United Army of Bolívar and Sucre, but he needed time until he could get more ammunition and weapons. As he had parried General Valdés the year before, he now wished to repeat the same strategy with Marshal Sucre.

Therefore on January 13 Olaneta concluded a four-month truce with Colonel Elizalde, Sucre's personal representative. It was stipulated that until General Olaneta could consult "with whom he should do it," indeed strange words, about the feasibility of joining the Bolivarian cause a temporary truce would be signed which would last four months. The United Army would remain north of the Desaguadero River and the Secessionist army south of the same river. The guerrilla army of General Lanza would be allowed to stay in its montonera republic of Ayopaya. Article four provided that the region of Tarapacá, which constituted the northern coastal Atacama desert that was part of the province of Arequipa, would remain in the hands of the Secessionist army.⁸² This was the crucial article of the La Paz treaty because General Olaneta,

after the departure of the army of General Valdés, had occupied the Tarapaca region in order to have access to the Pacific coast, his only exit from isolated Upper Peru.⁸³ This reflected very clearly the General's plan, expressed confidentially to the new Viceroy, that he wanted to wait until he could get reinforcements. He needed Tarapacá and was unwilling to give it up although it was an integral part of Lower Peru. The draft of the treaty of La Paz was quite favorable to the absolutist commander and it provided him with the necessary breathing spell. Would Marshal Sucre accept this draft and be caught in the trap? The treaty of La Paz represented the same line of policy that General Olañeta had adopted when he signed the treaty of Tarapaya, but Marshal Sucre was in a much more favorable position than General Valdés had been. General Olañeta repeated another feature of his Separatist War exactly. After Tarapaya he had sent his nephew, Casimiro, to the free provinces to purchase arms, and now as soon as the La Paz treaty was drawn up, he again dispatched Casimiro to try once more to acquire arms and ammunition, but this time he sent him to Iquique in Tarapacá to establish contact with the island of Chiloé, the only other remaining Spanish strongpoint. He hoped to get aid from Chiloé. Casimiro was to be accompanied by another individual, General Pablo Echeverría.

This general had been Spanish commander of Puno and had accepted the capitulation of Ayacucho.⁸⁴ In view of the stipulations of the surrender terms Echeverría had requested the new Bolivarian commander, General Alvarado, to let him return to Spain. ~~Al~~ Most all of the Spanish officers had gone back to their homeland from the port of Quilca. but

Echeverría asked Alvarado to grant him permission to return home via Buenos Aires since his family resided in Oruro.⁸⁵ Alvarado had no objection to the request of the Spanish General, and kindly gave him five hundred pesos to finance his trip because Echeverría was short of funds. All Royalist officers had given their word of honor not to take up arms against the Patriots again. This had been a stipulation of the surrender terms of Ayacucho which the Royalists, including Echeverría, had accepted under oath. As soon as Echeverría had entered Upper Peru he broke his word of honor and his oath and joined the army of General Olaneta, offering to procure for the rebel General arms from Chiloé and even Brazil.⁸⁶ Therefore General Olaneta decided to send his nephew and Echeverría to the port of Iquique in Tarapacá to try to get ammunition, giving them ten thousand pesos to pay for the purchase.⁸⁷ As soon as General Olaneta had signed the truce treaty of La Paz and forwarded it to Marshal Sucre for his signature, Casimiro and Echeverría left for the coast. But before Casimiro departed he committed his first serious treason on a grand scale.

On January 12, a day before the treaty of La Paz was signed by the rebel commissioner, and only a few days before his departure for Tarapacá, Casimiro Olaneta wrote two letters to Marshal Sucre. One was official correspondence in which he expressed his usual Patriotic sentiments, and told the Marshal that he would be very happy and anxious to meet the victor of Ayacucho, "It would be the happiest moment of my life." Casimiro then suggested that Sucre personally meet his uncle to work out a peaceful solution. It was a harmless letter in the usual flowery style of Casimiro Olaneta.⁸⁸ He then wrote a second letter, longer and marked

confidential. Here he reemphasized that it was he who had convinced his uncle to rebel in order to create a split in the Spanish army. He added that his uncle was signing the truce treaty only in order to gain time and get the necessary reinforcements. The traitor then told Marshal Sucre that his uncle's army was only four thousand men strong and was of low morale because they were unable to get the necessary food, since Lanza occupied the fertile valleys of La Paz. Besides, Casimiro said that the soldiers had not received their pay and were badly equipped. He gave Sucre the impression that Colonels Arraya and Medinaceli were ready at any moment to desert his uncle and proclaim the Patriotic cause. The rebel General's nephew declared that he was completely sure that should Marshal Sucre cross the Desaguadero River the Olaneta army would disintegrate because of "desertion, hunger, tiredness and the lack of any enthusiasm to serve the tyrants any more." The most amazing aspect of this letter of treason is that in it Casimiro vaguely admitted another treason. In confusing words he said that he had informed General Arenales, the governor of Salta, of all this through a confidential agent of his. Was this agent Serrano? But then even more vaguely he wrote that he had worded the letter so that Arenales' ambition would not jeopardize Sucre's plan.⁸⁹ This seems to mean that in this letter to Sucre he hinted that he would prefer the Marshal to General Arenales. Since the letter to Arenales in Salta has not been located it can be assumed that to the governor of Salta (whose secretary was another dos caras, Serrano) he wrote just the opposite; that he would prefer United Provinces' hegemony to that of the Bolivarian regime. This is the first hint that

Casimiro had already begun to play the Patriots against each other.

The last paragraph of this letter was also interesting. Casimiro told Sucre that after a career of "constant persecution by the Spaniards, of exiles, prison terms, confiscations and even death sentences" he would now make his last effort for the liberty of his fatherland. He said, "I am intending to join you as a parliamentarian and never return to the territory of the tyrants whom I have served with the only purpose of making permanent the discord that I have introduced and that I have maintained until the end." Then Casimiro offered his services to the Marshal by writing, "Please have the goodness of rewarding me by admitting me as a simple enlisted soldier in your cavalry unit until the end of the war. My fatherland demands my sacrifice and I am ready to make it in order to enjoy liberty in the midst of my family." He wrote Sucre that he was enclosing a dictamen, a memorandum, which unfortunately has been lost to history. Its existence might even magnify the treason of Casimiro. Underneath his signature he added a note stating that Sucre should forgive his bad handwriting,⁹⁰ but because of the fear of being discovered writing this letter, he had worked in haste. This is a monstrous case of treachery and lies. This letter was brought to light by the Peruvian historian, Paz Soldán, who located it, bought this priceless manuscript and published it in its totality in his history.⁹¹ Seemingly most Bolivian historians are not acquainted with this letter or refuse to admit its existence. Marshal Sucre answered the correspondence of Casimiro in an elegant tone, saying "Receive, my dear Doctor, the expression of my cordial friendship."⁹² Probably Casi-

miro did not receive this communication, as he already was on his way to fulfill his desertion. But before departing to the enemy's side he first sacrificed the life of a Spaniard to make himself more acceptable to the Patriots.

After General Olaneta had signed the treaty of La Paz and forwarded it to the United Army's headquarters, Casimiro and General Echeverría left for the region of Tarapacá in order to secure arms from the port of Iquique. Neither the rebel General nor Echeverría was aware that Casimiro was ready to commit treason. Showing no sign of his forthcoming switch to the enemy, Casimiro departed with Echeverría for Tarapacá. When they reached the village of Tarapacá, capital of the region, Casimiro overpowered his fellow companion, took away his documents and money, and handed him over to the local authorities with an order to send him as a prisoner to Arequipa, capital of the province to which the partido of Tarapacá belonged.⁹³ Casimiro then took the road to Puno, evidently carrying with him the ten thousand pesos.⁹⁴ Somewhere on the road from Tarapacá to Puno another dos caras friend of Casimiro, Mariano Calvimontes, joined him in order to go to Puno with him.⁹⁵

It was in the morning of February 3 at Puno, Lower Peru, when General Rudecindo Alvarado, in poor health, left the city for a journey south.⁹⁶ Several days earlier Marshal Sucre had arrived in Puno with the Bolivarian army. He had given Alvarado permission to undertake his trip. About ten miles from the city limits, which Alvarado must have reached in the later morning, he suddenly met a man whom he was amazed to recognize as General Olaneta's nephew, Casimiro. Alvarado stopped him

and in harsh terms asked what he was doing. He then found out that the young man had deserted his uncle and was on his way to meet the Marshal. Alvarado felt highly displeased by such foul play and he tells us in his memoirs that he left Casimiro standing in the road and departed without any more words. "I must confess that I felt disagreeable by this emergency [encounter] and I did not hide it, and I interrogated this person with no courtesy because of his abandonment of his uncle and benefactor; finally, I turned around and continued on my way," is what Alvarado wrote in his diary.⁹⁷ Although Marshal Sucre had a poor opinion of General Alvarado and did not recommend him highly to Bolívar because he lacked ability,⁹⁸ Alvarado who had never met Casimiro before, immediately realized his bad character, which most people were unable to do. Casimiro and his companion, Calvimontes,⁹⁹ after their unpleasant encounter with the Patriotic general, Alvarado, continued their trip, probably reaching Puno around noon of February 3. This exactness of date and hour will be an important factor in discounting an existent historical myth. This interesting new interpretation will be included in the next chapter.

Casimiro went directly to meet the victor of Ayacucho, who was highly impressed with the young man. The first thing that Casimiro told Sucre was to stop the shipment of arms to Iquique as fast as possible. He handed over the papers he had taken away from Echeverría.¹⁰⁰ It is quite certain that he did not give Sucre the ten thousand pesos, and he must have kept them for himself. With the money he took from the Buenos Aires mission plus the Tarapacá funds, Casimiro by now had become a rich man. One can ask how much he must have embezzled when he was the

confidential secretary of his uncle and when Urcullu, his associate, was the auditor of the Secessionist forces. The night of February 3 Sucre rushed a letter to Bolívar, requesting him to stop the arms that General Olaneta might get via Iquique. Then the Marshal added,

This Don Olaneta who is very patriotic and looks as if he has talent, I shall appoint as general auditor of the army [United Army] which is the best position I have available for him here: he has been oidor of the Audiencia of Chuquisaca [sic].¹⁰¹ In summary, I will treat him with all distinction, since besides meriting it, they tell me that he has great influence in all the province [sic, for Upper Peru or Charcas].¹⁰²

The Marshal's faithful private secretary, José María Rey de Castro, who was with Sucre when Casimiro met the liberator of Peru for the first time, tells that Sucre indeed was quite impressed with the young man. He states that the facility of words, the relaxed attitude, the great energy of Casimiro Olaneta captivated everyone, and "it was impossible to resist the sympathy which he inspired in all of us."¹⁰³ The Marshal felt enthusiastic about this new addition to his army. He liked Casimiro Olaneta and was aware that he needed the young man in his coming campaign in Upper Peru. Casimiro at his side was worth many divisions. But the Marshal, with his honesty and correctness, was unaware of the true character of the man he had hired. Three years later he realized his mistake and confided it to Bolívar,¹⁰⁴ but then Sucre could not say that no one had warned him. Undoubtedly Rudecindo Alvarado expressed to Sucre his feelings about Casimiro. And another pure Patriot who had just been tricked by Casimiro rushed a frank warning to Sucre.

Marshal Sucre was quite worried about the supposed war material that General Olaneta might get via Iquique. As he rushed a letter to Bolívar to ask him to stop the shipment, he also wrote a letter immediately to guerrilla General Lanza and requested him to send some of his partisan units into Tarapacá to stop or intercept the shipment for General Olaneta. He informed Lanza that he knew the arms were on their way because Casimiro Olaneta, who had joined him, had informed him of it.¹⁰⁵ On February 6 Lanza responded to the letter and wrote Sucre that already half of a division of his montonero army had left for Tarapacá to fulfill the requested mission. In the next paragraph Lanza warned Sucre about Casimiro by stating that "this individual, who realizes the desperate situation of General Olaneta, has had the temerity to desert to our side; as I know his character I am well acquainted with the shrewdness of both [nephew and uncle]." The guerrilla General said that he wished that Marshal Sucre would realize and comprehend the character of this bad man. He then added, "I take the liberty to suggest that you ought to send Doctor Olaneta to a distant country," because it would be "very prudent and would be a very welcome precautionary step."¹⁰⁶ Yet the Marshal ignored this sensible and timely advice from a man whom he later called an animal.

Casimiro did not leave Sucre's side until the victorious army entered Chuquisaca. From his desk as auditor, but more so as informal adviser to Sucre, Casimiro directed with unsurpassed mastery and genius the fall of his uncle. The Marshal and his Bolivarian army did not have to fire a single shot. Casimiro, probably through his agents, convinced

his dos caras aides, Urcullu in Chuquisaca and Uzín in Potosí, to prepare the rebellion against his uncle.¹⁰⁷ He convinced Colonels Araya and Medinaceli to switch allegiance at the proper moment, therefore planning a classic betrayal.¹⁰⁸ General Olañeta trusted Urcullu, Uzín, Araya and Medinaceli blindly. The rule of General Olañeta then began to collapse under the impact of the intrigues of his nephew. In April the General died from a shot fired by Medinaceli's rebel unit. Casimiro was indirectly responsible for the death of his uncle, who had done so much for him. He was not only a traitor, but a murderer. To his credit it can be said that because of the successful play of intrigues by Casimiro, a bloody campaign was averted, which saved many lives. Strangely, Casimiro never adopted this line of defense when, in the late thirties, he was severely criticized for his unbecoming behavior in 1824-25.¹⁰⁹

Yet not only the death of his uncle can be attributed to him, but also that of his companion to Tarapacá, General Echeverría, whom he deceived in such an underhanded fashion. As Echeverría had broken his word of honor and his oath never to take up arms again against the Patriots, Marshal Sucre was infuriated and ordered the Prefect of Arequipa to put him before a firing squad. "He is perfidious, ungrateful and very infamous, and has despised the generosity with which he has been treated . . . he must die for a thousand reasons . . . I repeat, he must be shot without delay," ordered Marshal Sucre.¹¹⁰ Later Sucre repented his harsh action in view of a personal imploration by Echeverría's wife. The Marshal rushed words to suspend the execution but the letter was delayed and reached Arequipa too late. Sucre felt deeply about this unfortunate incident.¹¹¹ But it was Casimiro who had betrayed Echeverría and there-

fore was responsible as much for the death of this Spanish general as Echeverría was himself.

In 1840 the Ecuadorian politician, Francisco Mariano de Miranda, when exposing Olaneta's betrayal of Santa Cruz, wrote him an open letter in which he told Casimiro, "Abusing the confidence of your uncle, the Spanish general, Olaneta, who favored you with the position as his secretary, you sold him vilely to his enemies and handed him over to death, making yourself the political Judas of the apostolate that surrounded the last remains of Spanish power in America." Miranda then continued in even stronger terms, ". . . in view of your subsequent treasons you can be classified as a traitor par excellence and an assassin." He compared him with Brutus.¹¹² Casimiro was unable to answer the grave charges of Miranda satisfactorily. He could only say, "After the battle of Ayacucho I honorably left my uncle in the village of Paria [near Oruro] in order to join General Sucre in Puno. I did not desert treacherously and infamously; I left him with his explicit permission and knowledge, which he expressed in a letter I think I have in my files and which I published in 1826 to answer similar charges."¹¹³ Casimiro talked of his exposition of 1826, of which only one complete copy and another incomplete, exist today in the National Library of Bolivia. René-Moreno, when he wrote his monograph on Casimiro Olaneta knew only the incomplete copy, which belonged to him.¹¹⁴ He wrote then, "The letter mentioned does not appear in any of the eight pages [of the exposition] that in this moment lie before me."¹¹⁵ Casimiro was lying: he had not published this letter in 1826. Nowhere in the twelve pages of the complete copy of his

exposition is the letter, or even a mention of it.¹¹⁶ When Casimiro wrote that he thought he had it in his files he was giving his usual "documented defense without documents."

Alvarado and Lanza exposed Casimiro in 1825, but Sucre needed the young Olaneta in his forthcoming campaign. The Ecuadorian, Miranda, the Guatemalan, Irisarri, and the Chilean, García del Río, also unmasked the powerful Bolivian politician.¹¹⁷ René-Moreno, with some documents from the dusty shelves of archives, sketched fragmentarily the true career of this man in an essay, but the patriotic considerations of the publishers did not permit the essay to see print. He classified Olaneta as "perverse."¹¹⁸ Bolivian historians continue to glorify Casimiro Olaneta, and are exemplified by one who writes that the name Casimiro Olaneta means "liberty, justice, disinterest, patriotism, action and fire."¹¹⁹ And this author wrote a biography of Casimiro! Only the contemporary Bolivian historian from La Paz, Vázquez-Machicado, has the courage to place this glorified man in his proper perspective, and pleads that the "myth of Olaneta is to be revised, reduced to its true place, role and size . . . Let us tear down this absurd historical web and weave with the true thread the positive truth."¹²⁰

Sucre and Casimiro Olaneta were ready to march into Charcas to defeat General Pedro Antonio de Olaneta and then reorganize Charcas. But who was going to be the father of the new nation: Antonio José de Sucre or José Casimiro Olaneta?

NOTES

¹Bolívar to Sucre, Pativilca, February 13, 1824 (because so many editions of the letters of Bolívar are available, the citations will be only of the letters and not the books from which they were taken); cf. Vicente Lecuna, Cronica razonda de las guerras de Bolívar (New York, 1950), III, 377-379.

²Bolívar to Sucre, Pativilca, February 16, 1824.

³Bolívar to Santander, Pativilca, February 25, 1824 (translation taken from Lecuna and Bierck).

⁴Bolívar to Bartolomé Salom, Trujillo, March 14, 1824.

⁵Bolívar To Sucre, Trujillo, April 9, 1824.

⁶Bolívar to Sucre, Otusco, April 14, 1824.

⁷Bolívar to Martin Jorge Guise, Huamachuco, April 28, 1824.

⁸Bolívar to P. A. Olañeta, Huaraz, May 21, 1824.

⁹Cf. Lecuna, Cronica, op. cit., III, 423.

¹⁰See P. A. Olañeta to Juan Alvarez de Arenales, Oruro, October 2, 1824, in Lecuna, D, I, 2.

¹¹Proclama, Huancayo, August 15, 1824, in Vicente Lecuna, Proclamas y Discursos del Libertador (Caracas, 1939), 290.

¹²Bolívar to Santa Cruz, Chancay, November 26, 1824.

¹³Bolívar to Sucre, Chancay, November 26, 1824 (translation from Lecuna and Bierck).

¹⁴P. A. Olañeta to Bolívar, Oruro, October 2, 1824, in Lecuna, D, I, 4-5.

¹⁵"Su correspondencia y el pasaporte que me dió para Buenos Ayres, llamandome patriota distinguido, ecsisten en mi poder originales" (C. Olañeta, Exposición, 8); G. Rene-Moreno, Bolivia y Peru/ nuevas notas, op. cit., 559, n. 1.

¹⁶Exposición, 8.

¹⁷See Agustín Iturricha, "El Doctor José Mariano Serrano, a los ochenta años de su fallecimiento," BSGS, XXXI, 327-332 (1937), 32; see Humberto Vázquez-Machicado, "La delegación Arenales en el Alto Perú," Revista de Historia de America, no. 10 (1940), 87-123.

¹⁸Ramallo, Guerra domestica, op. cit., 36.

¹⁹Cf. Gregorio Funes to Bolívar, Buenos Aires, July 19, 1824, in Memorias del General O'Leary (Caracas, 1880), XI, 120-121.

²⁰"Artículo comunicado," El Condor de Bolivia (Chuquisaca), no. 19, (April 6, 1826).

²¹Exposición, 6; see Beltrán Avila, Logia, 69.

²²J. Valdés to La Serna, Oruro, June 23, 1824, in T, GS, IV, 310.

²³Fragmentos biográficos, op. cit.; this author has not seen the interesting legajo (supra, chap. 5, no. 72), located in Sevilla about the doings of Casimiro Olañeta in Buenos Aires and Montevideo.

²⁴G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Perú/ nuevas notas, op. cit., 559, n. [1].

²⁵El Condor de Bolivia (Chuquisaca), no. 1 (November 12, 1825), no. 16 (March 16, 1826), no. 19 (April 6, 1826).

²⁶G. René-Moreno got this information from an old citizen of Chuquisaca, witness of the event (Fragmentos biograficos, op. cit.).

²⁷See supra, chap. 4, n. 39.

²⁸C. Olañeta, Exposición, 6.

²⁹J. Villasana Haggard, Handbook for Translators of Spanish Historical Documents (Oklahoma City, 1941), 106.

³⁰Fragmentos biográficos, op. cit.

³¹The editors of the Mensajero Argentino were Juan Cruz Varela, Agustín Delgado, Valentín Alsina, and Francisco Pico. No. 1 was published on November 18, 1825, and it ended its career on July 9, 1827. It was a government mouthpiece.

³²See C. Olañeta, Exposición, 11; C. Olañeta, "Artículo comunicado," op. cit.; this author has not seen the Mensajero Argentino, no. 24, the facts are inferred from Olañeta's reply in El Condor.

³³C. Olaneta, Exposición, 11.

³⁴"Artículo comunicado," op. cit.

³⁵Loc. cit.

³⁶C. Olaneta, Exposición, 7.

³⁷See C. Olaneta to Bolívar, Cochabamba, December 23, 1824, in Lecuna, D. I., 8.

³⁸Cf. O'Leary, Memorias, op. cit., XI, 548.

³⁹Cf. Gregorio Funes to Bolívar, Buenos Aires, July 19, 1824, in ibid., XI, 122.

⁴⁰Bolívar to P. A. Olaneta, Lima, December 15, 1824.

⁴¹Cf. C. Olaneta to Bolívar, Cochabamba, December 23, 1824, in Lecuna, D. I., 8.

⁴²C. Olaneta, Exposición, 7.

⁴³Bolívar to P. A. Olaneta, Lima, December 15, 1824.

⁴⁴Bolivia y Perú/ nuevas notas, op. cit., 290-291.

⁴⁵[U], April, 143-144.

⁴⁶Miguel Lanza to Bolívar, n. p., December 13, 1824, as cited by G. René-Moreno in his Fragmentos biograficos, op. cit., and said to be located in the Paz Soldan archive.

⁴⁷See infra, n. 106.

⁴⁸C. Olaneta to José Mariano Armaza, Chuquisaca, April 27 [1828] in the private library of Andres Santa Cruz in La Paz, Bolivia.

⁴⁹Loc. cit.; cf. Humberto Vazquez-Machicado, Blasfemias historicas, op. cit., 66.

⁵⁰For a discussion of Olaneta's intervention in the events of April, 1828, see Charles W. Arnade, "Una figura mediocre," op. cit., 74-100.

⁵¹Sucre to Bolívar, Potosí, January 29 [sic for March 29], 1824, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 294-295.

- ⁵² Sucre to Ministros del Tesoro Publico de la Paz, Chuquisaca, June 15, 1825, ANB, MI, 8, 63.
- ⁵³ Sucre to Bolívar, Potosí, January 29 [sic], 1824, op. cit.
- ⁵⁴ Fragmentos biograficos, op. cit.
- ⁵⁵ Bolívar to P. A. Olaneta, Sañaica, October 6, 1824.
- ⁵⁶ Bolívar to P. A. Olaneta, Lima, December 15, 1824.
- ⁵⁷ Bolívar to P. A. Olaneta, Lima, December 24, 1824.
- ⁵⁸ P. A. Olaneta to Bolívar, Cochabamba, December 22, 1824, in Lecuna, D. I., 6.
- ⁵⁹ P. A. Olaneta to Sucre, Cochabamba, December 22, in ibid., I, 7.
- ⁶⁰ C. Olaneta to Bolívar, Cochabamba, December 23, 1824, in ibid., I, 8-10.
- ⁶¹ T. De Heres to Sucre, Sañaica, October 6, 1824, in O'Leary, Memorias, op. cit., XXII, 507-508.
- ⁶² Cf. Sucre to P. A. Olaneta, Cuzco, January 1, 1825, in Lecuna, D. I., 39; P. A. Olaneta to Sucre, Cochabamba, December 22, 1824, in Lecuna, D. I., 7.
- ⁶³ After Ayacucho Sucre was made a marshal (O'Leary, Memorias, op. cit., XXII, 606).
- ⁶⁴ Sucre to P. A. Olaneta, Cuzco, January 1, 1825, in Lecuna, D. I., 39.
- ⁶⁵ Sucre to Bolívar, Huamanga, December 12, 1824, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 265-266.
- ⁶⁶ Sucre to Bolívar, Andahuaylas, December 23, 1824, in ibid., I, 274.
- ⁶⁷ Sucre to Bolívar, Abancay, December 25, 1824, in ibid., I, 277.
- ⁶⁸ For a detailed exposition and background of the Arenales expedition see G. René-Moreno, Ayacucho en Buenos Aires (Madrid, n. d.), 303 pp.; Humberto Vázquez-Machicado, "La delagación Arenales," op. cit., 87-123.

⁶⁹Sucre to Bolívar, Cuzco, January 8, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 279.

⁷⁰See R. Blanco-Fombona, Cartas de Bolívar (Biblioteca Ayacucho, vol. 59; Madrid, 1921), 279, n. 2.

⁷¹Sucre to P. A. Olaneta, Cuzco, January 1, 1825, in Lecuan, D, I, 39-40.

⁷²Sucre to F. Aguilera, Cuzco, January 1, 1825, in ibid., I, 40-41.

⁷³Sucre to J. M. Lanza, Cuzco, January 1, 1825, in ibid., I, 41-42.

⁷⁴Sucre to Pedro Arroya, Cuzco, January 1, 1825, in ibid., I, 42-43.

⁷⁵See ibid., I, 43-44.

⁷⁶Sucre to Bolívar, Cuzco, January 15, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 283.

⁷⁷Sucre to Lanza, Cuzco, January 1, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 42.

⁷⁸See Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán, Historia del Perú, op. cit., 2d periodo, vol. I, 284-286.

⁷⁹Ibid., 2d periodo, vol. I, 292.

⁸⁰Ibid., 2d periodo, vol. I, 293.

⁸¹P. A. Olaneta to Pío Tristán, Viacha, January 8, 1825 (2 letters), in ibid., 2d periodo, vol. I, 385-386; cf. P. A. Olaneta to Rudecindo Alvarado [Viacha, January 8, 1825], in ibid., 2d periodo, vol. I, guide, p. 66, no. 843.

⁸²Treaty available in Lecuna, D, I, 12-13; in T, GS, IV, 408-409.

⁸³See Camba, Memorias, II, 365.

⁸⁴Sucre to the Prefecto de Arequipa, Chuquisaca, May 11 [1825], in ANB. MI, 3, 66.

⁸⁵"Justicia ejecutada en el Brigadier Echeverría," La Estrella de Ayacucho (Arequipa), no. 7 (April 23, 1825). The name Echeverría in documents is also spelled Echavarría and Echevarría, cf. G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Perú/ nuevas notas, op. cit., 561, n.

⁸⁶Cf. Sucre to the Prefecto del Departamento de Arequipa, Sicuani, January 23, 1825, in Lecuna, D. I, 63.

⁸⁷"Justicia ejecutada en el Brigadier Echeverría," op. cit.

⁸⁸Casimiro Olaneta to Sucre, La Paz, January 12, 1825, in Paz Soldán, op. cit., 2d periodo, vol. I, no. 19, 384.

⁸⁹"En el acto que recibí las capitulaciones en Oruro [treaty of La Paz?], se las remití por un propio de mi confianza [Serrano?]; mas creyendo que no era posible llevar hasta el fin el empeño de la crueldad, tampoco le hice advertencias que habrían sido útiles" (C. Olaneta to Sucre, La Paz, January 12, 1825, reservado, in Paz Soldán, op. cit., 2d periodo, vol. I, no. 19, 384-385).

⁹⁰The handwriting of C. Olaneta is very awkward, and there are very few holograph letters of him. The private library of Mr. Andrés Santa Cruz has some of these rare letters. Casimiro had the custom of writing without any margins, in a small and cramped style.

⁹¹Supra, n. 84.

⁹²Sucre to C. Olaneta, [Santa Rosa], no date, in Lecuna, D. I, 71-72.

⁹³This interesting and little known fact is in "Justicia ejecutada en el Brigadier Echeverría," op. cit.

⁹⁴Loc. cit.

⁹⁵Cf. Tomas O'Connor D'Arlach, ed., Recuerdos de Francisco Burdett O'Connor (Tarija, 1895), 109-110.

⁹⁶See Sucre to Bolívar, Puno, February 3, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 301.

⁹⁷"Recuerdos historicos de Sr. Brigadier General D. Rudecindo Alvarado . . .," in Ministerio de Educacion de la Nación, Dirección General de Cultura [Argentina], Selección de documentos del Museo Historico Nacional (Buenos Aires, 1952), I, 185.

⁹⁸Sucre to Bolívar, Puno, February 1, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas, op. cit., I, 299.

⁹⁹Strangely, Alvarado does not mention Calvimontes, who O'Connor said accompanied Casimiro Olaneta (supra, n. 95).

¹⁰⁰ Sucre to the Prefecto de Arequipa, Chuquisaca, May 11 [1825], in ANB, MI, 8, 66.

¹⁰¹ Sucre is wrong, Casimiro Olaneta was never an oidor of the Audiencia. He occupied the position of fiscal of the various offices. Cf. Humberto Vázquez-Machicado, Blasfemias históricas, op. cit., 36, in which this excellent Bolivian historian severely criticizes Alfredo Jauregui Rosquellas from Chuquisaca for transcribing the error of Sucre, when Jáuregui was at one time director of the National Archive where the Audiencia records are located. See Alfredo Jáuregui Rosquellas, Antonio José de Sucre (Cochabamba and La Paz, [1928]), 110.

¹⁰² Sucre to Bolívar, Puno, February 3, 1825, op. cit.

¹⁰³ "Recuerdos del tiempo heroico," as reproduced in Universidad San Francisco Xavier, XII, 29-30 (1943-1944), 83.

¹⁰⁴ Sucre to Bolívar, Chuquisaca, April 27, 1828, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., II, 249.

¹⁰⁵ This letter has not been located. Lecuna published the Sucre files from December, 1824, to February 3, 1825 (D, I, 14-32). This author has located all the letters of Sucre of 1825, starting with February 10. The letters between February 3 and 10, the days of Sucre's march toward La Paz, are still missing.

¹⁰⁶ Lanza to Sucre, La Paz, February 3, 1825, in ANB, MI, 3, 11.

¹⁰⁷ Sucre to Leandro Usín, Oruro, March 16, 1825, Chuquisaca, May 28, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63. Sucre to M. M. Urcullu, Chuquisaca, May 20, 1826, in BNB, CR, no. 337; Sucre to Bolívar, Ilave, February 5, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 303; cf. Beltrán Avila, Logia, 132-133.

¹⁰⁸ C. Olaneta to Sucre, Cochabamba, January 12, 1825, reservado, op. cit. (supra, n. 88).

¹⁰⁹ For all his defense pamphlets see G. René-Moreno, BB, index.

¹¹⁰ Sucre to the Prefect of Arequipa, La Paz, March 8, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 66.

¹¹¹ Sucre to the Prefect of Arequipa, Chuquisaca, May 10 [1825], in ANB, MI, 8, 66.

¹¹² Carta del Dr. Francisco Mariano de Miranda al Dr. Casimiro Olaneta (Quito, 1840), 3-4.

¹¹³ C. Olaneta, MI defense o conclusión (La Paz, May 28, 1839), 11.

¹¹⁴Cf. G. René-Moreno, BB, no. 1464, p. 375. René-Moreno is wrong, the Exposición is dated March 10, 1826. However, René-Moreno did not have a complete copy.

¹¹⁵G. René-Moreno, Fragmentos biograficos, op. cit.

¹¹⁶This author had made a complete copy from the single example in BNB, C. R-M.

¹¹⁷See BB, index.

¹¹⁸Biblioteca Peruana, op. cit., II, no. 1137 (132), p. 495.

¹¹⁹Felix Reyes Ortiz, Biografía del Dr. Casimiro Olañeta, op. cit., 53.

¹²⁰"Papeles ineditos de René-Moreno" (unpublished).

CHAPTER VIII

FROM PUNO TO CHEQUELTE

Synopsis

By the end of January, 1825, it had become quite evident that General Olaneta was unwilling to come to terms and that it was absolutely necessary to invade Charcas with a powerful army to fight the Separatist Spanish general on the battlefield. On January 24, 1825, Sucre gave Olaneta a last chance to make a settlement, but if not he would battle him with the whole impact of his army of liberation. But the General gave no answer and began to retreat south to the fortress of Potosí. This move was a necessity because the Spanish army was disintegrating, due mainly to the intrigues of the dos caras who were convincing many of Olaneta's officers to leave him and join the Bolivarian army. The first garrison that deserted the Olaneta army was that of Cochabamba, followed by Oruro, Vallegrande and many other towns, including the capital, Chuquisaca. The turncoat officers now became enthusiastic partisans of the Patriotic cause, and General Sucre had difficulty in restraining their newly discovered eagerness. At the end of February of 1825 General Olaneta and his small remaining army were restricted to Potosí and the fortress of Cotagaita, but he decided to hold out, even in view of his serious situation, and resist until the last. Among his officers

that remained with him was a Colonel Medinaceli who confidentially was in contact with Casimiro Olañeta, and who was waiting for the right moment to capture the General. Medinaceli outwardly made the General believe that he would fight with him to death.

Marshal Sucre entered La Paz in the midst of a jubilant reception on February 7, and two days later he issued a decree for the calling of an assembly in April. This assembly was to decide the future of the provinces of Charcas in harmony with the wishes of the United Provinces and Lower Peru. The decree of February 9 is the basic cornerstone of the Bolivian republic. Most Bolivian historians and some foreign ones have assumed that Casimiro Olañeta was the real author of the decree, and therefore have made him the father of the new nation. Although this looks logical, a careful study of available documents proves conclusively that Marshal Sucre was the sole author of the decree and that it was the product of his own ideas and deliberations. He thought that this assembly would be the practical solution to the confused jurisdictional problem that constituted Upper Peru. During his permanence in La Paz Sucre laid the basis for the efficient organization of the provinces and demanded from his army correct behavior in Charcas.

On March 12 Sucre started his march on Potosí and the valiant Irish colonel, Burdett O'Connor, led the vanguard of the army of liberation. Sucre thought that he might have to fight a decisive battle but General Olañeta abandoned Potosí on March 28 and the same night an advance patrol of the Bolivarian army occupied the Imperial City. Olañeta retreated

south toward the Argentine border, but on March 30 Colonel Medinaceli committed his stab in the back and mutinied. General Olaneta and Medinaceli clashed on April 1 in a battle at Tumusla in which the General was mysteriously wounded. Olaneta died the next day. The fantastic career of General Olaneta had come to a tragic end, and he died defending the King. The only remaining Spanish unit was a small contingent under Colonel Valdég, alias Barbarucho, which surrendered at Chequelte on April 7, bringing the war in Peru to a successful end. On April 9 Marshal Sucre proclaimed the victorious end of the War of Independence in Spanish America from Potosí, after he had received the news of the surrender of Barbarucho at Chequelte. In its campaign in Upper Peru the Bolivarian army had not fired a single shot, but Olaneta's Spanish divisions disintegrated by themselves. Casimiro Olaneta was mostly responsible for this, and his intrigues saved many lives. The war that had started on May 29, 1809, in Chuquisaca finished in Chequelte on April 7, 1825.

Even before Casimiro Olañeta had joined Marshal Sucre in Puno at noon on February 3, 1825, the commander of the United Army of liberation had come to the conclusion that there was little choice except to move his army into Upper Peru and fight the Separatist General. On January 19 Sucre had decided to leave Cuzco and advance with his army toward Upper Peru in campaign formation.¹ This sudden decision had been taken in view of accumulated evidence that General Olañeta was not going to come to terms. The Marshal had read the warlike proclamations of General Olañeta to the people of the Perus and to his own army; he had been informed of the letters of Pío Tristán and other communications Olañeta had written to the various Spanish pockets that held out and refused to accept the Ayacucho surrender, inciting them to go on fighting.² Then he received the letter of treason by Casimiro Olañeta, in which the young man informed Sucre of the real intentions of his uncle to gain time in order to strengthen the Separatist army for an eventual attack on the Patriots. Naturally this communication put the mysterious behavior of General Olañeta in a clearer light. But what had infuriated Sucre more than anything else was that the Spanish General had dispatched Colonel Valdéz, alias Barbarucho, on a raid into the province of Puno, across the Desaguadero River, in order to seize fifty thousand pesos of tribute money. Seemingly Barbarucho failed in this bold attempt.³

Marshal Sucre felt little disposed to let this provocative act pass by without informing Olañeta of his displeasure. On his way from Cuzco to Puno, in the little village of Santa Rosa, he wrote a stringent letter to Olañeta, which amounted to an ultimatum. He told the rebel

General that he had had confidence in his good faith and therefore had not protected the Desaguadero border. Sucre told Olaneta that he did not know if he was more surprised or more indignant when he first was informed of the raid of Colonel Valdéz, which he classified as a "perfidious action." But Sucre added that it was "painful to use our arms against soldiers with whom we offered to share our laurels." Yet the Marshal did not close the door completely and did not make this letter a declaration of war, because he told the Spanish General that he was still willing to forget all the past abuses and offer peace and friendship to them once more. But if General Olaneta was unwilling to accept it, the "ray of Ayacucho will put terror among the ungratefals." Sucre gave Olaneta twelve days to make up his mind but demanded that he evacuate La Paz and Oruro and concentrate his army in Potosí, while the Bolivarian unit would occupy northern Charcas. Then an assembly of the people of Charcas should decide about the future of their provinces. He terminated this letter by reminding the General that the United Army had begun its advance.⁴

But Marshal Sucre's letter was superfluous and General Olaneta apparently never answered it, since he had something else besides the Bolivarian army to worry about. His own regime began to crumble. Casimiro Olaneta, his nephew and secretary whom he loved so much, had laid a careful plan of subversion, and early in the morning of January 14, four days before Sucre sent his qualified declaration of war, the Royalist garrison of Cochabamba, revolted and proclaimed the cause of freedom and apprehended those who wished to remain faithful. The turncoat commander of the Cochabamba rebellion was Colonel Antonio Saturnino Sánchez and he

said that he had decided to join "the sacred cause of our liberty."⁵ Immediately the brand-new Patriots, who had suddenly become so fond of the principle of liberty and freedom, organized a revolutionary army and were ready to advance east and south from Cochabamba.⁶ The Marshal received the good news on January 26 and he immediately dispatched another letter to the rebel General, telling him that this was conclusive proof that the people of Upper Peru, as well as Olaneta's own army, were more than willing to join the side of the Patriots. He hoped that General Olaneta would realize the futility of continuing to oppose the generous offers of the Patriots, and he reiterated the wish that the General would join the army of freedom. At the same time he warned Olaneta not to undertake any punitive moves against Cochabamba.⁷

Marshal Sucre expected that Olaneta would evacuate La Paz in view of the events of Cochabamba.⁸ Indeed he was right, because Olaneta realized that the enemy in Cochabamba would outflank him. On January 28 the Spanish Separatist army departed in haste from La Paz, taking the road to Oruro. The next day the guerrilla leader, Lanza, with his Ayopaya unit, entered La Paz and proclaimed the cause of freedom in this mountainous metropolis.⁹ The rebel General was retreating quickly with one thousand to 1,500 men,¹⁰ losing nearly three hundred soldiers who deserted.¹¹ Approaching Oruro, Olaneta had to swing around in order to avoid the city because the turncoat ex-guerrilla leader, Colonel Arraya, had come out for the Bolivarian cause and wanted to stop the Spanish General on the outskirts of the town. Olaneta and Barbarucho were able

to avoid Arraya. It was Casimiro Olaneta who had convinced Arraya, before he left for Puno, to rebel at the opportune moment. But Arraya missed his chance to catch Olaneta.¹² The Spanish General continued his march south in haste in order to reach the safety of the fortress of Potosí. There he stopped and was ready to reorganize his decimated army. Barbarucho and Colonel Medinaceli, whom he trusted, remained at his side.¹³ But Medinaceli was working hand in hand with Casimiro and was waiting for the chance that Arraya had missed. Barbarucho could not be bought, and he was loyal to the last moment.¹⁴

In view of General Olaneta's retreat to southern Charcas Marshal Sucre advanced leisurely with his liberating army toward the Desaguadero River. He left Cuzco on January 19, was in Sicuani on the twenty-third and entered Puno, the last Lower Peruvian town before the river, on February 1. Here he stopped for several days. Two days later, on February 3 at noon, he was joined by Casimiro Olaneta, and the next day the Bolivarian army departed for La Paz. On February 4 the army was in the little village of Acora on the shores of Lake Titicaca. The next day the advancing army camped in Ilave and then continued its march under continuous and heavy rain. Even so it was a victorious march. In the densely populated villages along the shores of the lake the army was received with great expressions of sympathy. Each of these indigenous villages had built triumphal arches and the inhabitants in their colorful vestments surrounded the Bolivarian army, singing gay songs and dancing to the rhythm of Aymara music. Casimiro Olaneta was proudly riding next to the adored young Marshal, stimulating his interest in Upper Peru. On Feb-

ruary 6 they crossed the Desaguadero River in the delicate but elegantly built rafts of totora reeds. The Marshal then requested that the army stop its march so he could see the grandiose ruins of Tiahuanacu at his leisure. Later, in Laja, a delegation of distinguished citizens of La Paz was waiting to greet the Marshal. As he approached La Paz they met more and more people who had hiked all the way from the city, mostly out of curiosity, to see the advancing army. On February 7 the Bolivarian army reached the outskirts of La Paz, seeing from the cold Alto (today's airport) the city lying underneath as if it were in the center of a great hole. Everyone, soldier and officer, was overtaken by the grandiose view, especially of the majestic beauty of the ever snowy Illimani which towered powerfully over the canyon in the bottom of which lay La Paz. The army was welcomed thunderously and all the way from the Alto down into the center of the city it had to march under triumphal arches. From the balconies in the main streets hung sumptuous and rich tapestries. In the main square the young Marshal, surrounded by lovely ladies, had to listen to sweet oratories. Sucre, with his modesty and shyness, stood smiling and blushing. Only the people of Quito, after his victory of Pinchincha, had given him a similar welcome, but then he had to share it with Bolívar, who was never too shy to enjoy these adorations. Even the rough guerrilla veterans of the Ayopaya republicueta participated in the welcome of the Bolivarian army. During the night and the entire next day the Marshal and his main officers had to go through the rigor of many banquets and parties. 15

After the festivities had calmed somewhat, on February 9, 1825, Marshal Sucre, as commander of the United Army of liberation, issued his famous decree which is the very cornerstone of Bolivia's independence. He started out by telling the people of Charcas that the purpose of the entrance of the Bolivarian army into Upper Peru was to free them from the Spanish rule, but under no circumstances to intervene in the domestic affairs of the provinces. But the decree emphasized that it was necessary that the provinces should be governed by some authority. It stated that Upper Peru had belonged to the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires but that this region now lacked a government that represented all its provinces, and therefore the inner provinces had no possibility of turning to Buenos Aires. The decree was explicit that any final solution for the provinces should be based on an understanding of the provinces of Charcas with the government of Lower Peru and with whatever government there was in the Río de la Plata. Because of all these complications Upper Peru would be under the authority of the commander of the United Army of liberation, which was Marshal Sucre, until an assembly of legally chosen Upper Peruvians had decided what the provinces wanted to do. Sucre ordered that this assembly should start its deliberations on April 29 in Oruro. The army of liberation would accept the resolution and wishes of this body. The commander then forbade strictly any intervention by his army in the proceedings of the assembly. There were seven articles detailing the procedure of election of the delegates to the congress. The decree was signed by Antonio José de Sucre and Augustín Geraldino, his personal secretary, in La Paz on February 9, 1825.¹⁶ It has passed into the annals of history

as the decree of February 9. This was then the basic document out of which came the assembly that declared the independence of Upper Peru. Its international implications, as well as the opposition of Bolívar to the February 9 decree, are well described by competent authors.¹⁷

As the decree was signed by Sucre and elaborated without the knowledge of Bolívar, consequently the Marshal should be called the father of Bolivia. Yet Bolivian historians as well as foreign authors assume that the real author of the decree was Casimiro Olañeta. It is said that Casimiro, as soon as he joined Sucre in Puno, convinced him to write this proclamation.¹⁸ Urcullu, the chronicler of those days and compadre of Casimiro, was the first to attribute authorship of the decree to Casimiro.¹⁹ Because of Olañeta's inspiration in the writing of the famous February 9 decree this Upper Peruvian politician is today considered as father of Bolivia. Casimiro Olañeta himself wrote that, "In Acora [the village on Lake Titicaca] I inspired the great philosopher and marshal, Sucre, with the idea of independence of the provinces of Upper Peru, and the foundation of a new republic, which came to be called Boliviana by the assembly of deliberation to which I belonged."²⁰ These claims would indeed make sense in view of Olañeta's ability of scheming and plotting and would be the logical final result of his great intrigue. If Casimiro was able to convince his uncle to rebel and bring doom to the Spanish cause against heavy odds, it might have been easy work to "inspire," as Casimiro stated, the young Marshal who was then at a loss about what to do with the inner provinces.

All this would look quite convincing and leave little room for doubt. Yet an impartial analysis of documents will reveal that the decree of February 9 was written by Marshal Sucre alone and was the product of his own judgment, and that Casimiro Olañeta was absolutely not the author of this famous edict. Already René-Moreno, in his unpublished essay on Casimiro Olañeta, has assumed that he could not have written or inspired it. Humberto Vázquez-Machicado, using the René-Moreno essay, elaborated and expanded his thesis.²¹ Yet neither author had conclusive proof, although in their deductions they made a good case. Both writers based their conclusions mostly on a thorough study of the intimate letters of Sucre to Bolívar, in which it is apparent that already before the Marshal arrived in Puno he had reached the conclusion that Upper Peru wished to be on its own, and that therefore an assembly should decide its fate. This can be further corroborated by the letter of the Marshal to General Olañeta from Santa Rosa, which constituted really an ultimatum. It should be recalled that in this Santa Rosa ultimatum the Marshal requested the rebel General to retreat to Potosí and said that an assembly should decide the future of the provinces of Charcas.²² Indeed it is absolutely true that the letters of Sucre show that he conceived the idea of an assembly himself, before he reached Puno on February 1, 1825. Furthermore, because of a newly published source, unavailable to René-Moreno and Vázquez-Machicado, one can show definitely by a simple process of chronology that Casimiro Olañeta had nothing to do with the decree of February 9.

It can be established that Sucre finished the decree on the night of February 2 at Puno, because the Marshal wrote on February 3 to his friend and superior, Bolívar, "Last night, thinking about the business of Upper Peru, I arranged the ideas into the enclosed decree in order to be published upon my arrival in La Paz, if it looks feasible then."²³

Therefore the Marshal says specifically that he wrote the decree on the night before, February 2, and was sending a copy to Bolívar. Urcallu assumed that Casimiro Olaneta arrived in Puno on February 1, and from this reference most all Bolivian historians and the Peruvian, Paz Soldán, have said that Olaneta joined Sucre on the first of the month.²⁴ In view of

no other definite indication René-Moreno and Vázquez-Machicado accept this date.²⁵ If Casimiro was with the Marshal on the first, then it would be very conceivable that he could still have inspired the decree, even taking Sucre's earlier ideas into consideration. Here then lies the weakness of the René-Moreno, Vázquez-Machicado deduction. But if Casimiro arrived in Puno on the first, where is the proof? Sucre never specified the exact date when the young man joined him; the Marshal's secretary, Rey de Castro, does not cite a date and neither does Colonel O'Connor, who was with Sucre.²⁶

But it was General Alvarado who gave more details than anyone else about the arrival of Casimiro at Puno. It should be recalled that when Alvarado left Puno for a trip to Argentina he encountered Casimiro Olaneta about ten miles from town as he was going toward Puno to join Sucre.²⁷ Therefore, if the date of the departure of Alvarado could be determined, then one would have the exact date and approximate hour of the arrival of Olaneta in Puno. General Alvarado

in his memoirs does not tell the day of his departure from Puno. Yet Sucre, in his letter of February 3, the same one in which he enclosed a copy of the draft of the decree for Bolívar, wrote the Liberator that "Alvarado has left this morning from here."²⁸ Here then is conclusive proof that Alvarado left Puno on the morning of February 3 and that after riding three leagues, about ten miles, he encountered Casimiro who was on his way to meet Sucre. Alvarado probably encountered Olaneta in the late morning and by then Casimiro still had to walk or ride ten miles more. Therefore he must have reached Puno around noon of February 3, 1825. Through this chronological analysis, with the aid of the recently published memoirs of General Alvarado in Buenos Aires, one can show decisively that Casimiro Olaneta could not have been the author or inspirer of the basic decree of February 9, 1825. The decree had already been written the night before the arrival of Casimiro Olaneta at Puno, when he and Sucre met for the first time. The assumption of Rene-Moreno and Vázquez-Machicado based on a study of Sucre's letters proves therefore to be correct. The Bolivian historian who later wrote that Humberto Vázquez-Machicado was "nuts" because of his analysis²⁹ might look quite foolish himself in view of this new conclusive proof.³⁰

Sucre said that he had a long talk with Casimiro Olaneta on February 3, which coincides with the date of arrival.³¹ Whether Olaneta told about the wishes of Charcas to become independent on this day remains speculation. Sucre does not mention anything specifically. Casimiro might have done it but at the same time it is not very probable that Sucre, who just had met the young man, showed him the draft of the decree

which he had written the night before. On February 4 the army was in the little village of Acora³² and again Sucre and Casimiro had a long conference about the problem of Upper Peru. Casimiro told Sucre, as we know because Sucre wrote it to Bolívar, that the people of Charcas had come to dislike the United Provinces and that it would be very difficult to join the inner provinces to Buenos Aires. Casimiro insisted that Upper Peru wanted either independence or to belong to Lower Peru, but he thought that men of judgment of Charcas wanted to belong to Lower Peru if the capital would be in Cuzco.³³ This more or less coincides with what Olaneta himself wrote when he said that he influenced Sucre in Acora. Olaneta was correct in the fact that he and Sucre debated the question of Charcas seriously and extensively in the village of Acora. And Olaneta wrote this in 1839, which meant that he recalled very well this little village fourteen years later, probably because the discussion they had on this day was such a serious and important one.³⁴

Again, it can be assumed that the Marshal did not yet confide to Casimiro Olaneta the fact that on February 2 he had worked out a decree which would let the people of Charcas choose whatever solution they wished to adopt. Sucre was in certain ways modest and shy, and he disliked boasting about what he had accomplished. When, on February 9, Sucre published his decree Olaneta naturally assumed, as anyone would, that because of his talk in Acora Sucre had written the decree, and he probably honestly believed that he had inspired the Marshal. The case is that both Sucre and Olaneta had one and the same idea, that of granting independence to Upper Peru. Naturally Casimiro adhered to this pro-

posal because of personal motives; Sucre, because he honestly felt that it was the most feasible solution. The real and sole author of the decree of February 9 is Sucre, but Olaneta did not know it and assumed that he had influenced the Marshal. In this narrow sense, based on the authorship of the February decree, Sucre, not Casimiro Olaneta, is the father of the new nation. But looking from a broader point of view, Casimiro Olaneta indeed was the most powerful personality in the emergence of Bolivia, mostly because of his masterful intrigues in 1824 and 1825 and his influence and control of the Upper Peruvian intelligentsia. To Casimiro Olaneta and Marshal Sucre goes without question the credit for the creation of Bolivia, and only to them. Both are the fathers of the nation; the one because of shrewd intrigues and scheming, the other because of a honest, forceful and clear policy.

General Olaneta remained passively in Potosí while Sucre stayed in La Paz, laying the foundation for a free Charcas. The tension between the two opposing armies had relaxed somewhat. The Marshal was in no hurry and was hoping that the Separatist army would collapse by itself, therefore avoiding useless bloodshed. When the new Patriots of Cochabamba were eager to march against Olaneta via Chuquisaca, the Marshal was quite worried about their enthusiasm. He said to Bolívar that if this Cochabamba contingent clashed with Olaneta it might be defeated, and besides "one should never trust a contingent that has just deserted."³⁵ Sucre felt quite relieved when the Cochabamba troops turned around and retreated to the city.³⁶ The new commander of Oruro, Colonel Ortega, taking things into his own hands, had threatened Olaneta with a strong

letter. When Sucre was informed of this he reprimanded Ortega severely.^{305,37} But the Colonel continued to be insubordinate, showing no sympathy with Sucre's policy of moderation. The Marshal wrote him a blistering letter, and called Ortega an "insolent" officer. He said to the Colonel, "I do not know where you have learned to be disorderly. In the last few days I have noticed that you have been very ostentatious and I am very tired of it . . . I want more exactness, less show of authority and noise, as you are doing."³⁸

The Marshal was extremely particular that the United Army behaved properly and was a model of good conduct and excellent organization. He gave strict orders that perfect harmony between the troops and the people "will be severely punished and even condemned to death."³⁹ He told his officers that when they travelled they should never ask or demand aid from the people except of those specified in their travel orders. If any soldier or officer abused his authority the municipalities should put a pair of shackles on him and send him straight to the superior headquarters of the United Army.⁴⁰ The Marshal was also concerned about good clothing and food for his army. As soon as he reached La Paz he requested that three thousand good and comfortable overcoats be made because of the severe cold.⁴¹ He stated in an order that "the food should be good, abundant and nutritious."⁴² Besides he requested that the "horses should be treated with great care and special neatness."⁴³ The Marshal wanted to see that the army of liberation was worthy of its title. But above anything else, Sucre wanted to avoid further bloodshed. His favorite phrase was that he wanted to economize American blood, and that anyone who saved

even "one single drop of American blood" has rendered an "important service to humanity."⁴⁴ With this in mind he addressed letters to practically all officers of the army of General Olaneta, offering them all kinds of guarantees and positions with their same ranks in the United Army of liberation.⁴⁵

In the meanwhile Casimiro Olaneta was working actively from his, trying to persuade many of his Upper Peruvian Royalist friends to desert the cause of his uncle. Sucre with his moderation and correctness, and Casimiro with his ability for scheming were quite a successful combination. On February 12 the garrison of the rich village of Vallegrande, belonging to the Aguilera unit, switched allegiance and joined the Sucre army.⁴⁶ The Marshal had wooed Aguilera in three long and detailed letters, but Aguilera was undecided.⁴⁷ When Vallegrande deserted Aguilera surrendered to the new turncoat officers who sent him as a prisoner to La Paz.⁴⁸ On February 14 the garrison and city of Santa Cruz followed the example of Vallegrande,⁴⁹ and joined the Bolivarian army. It must be said that Aguilera himself did not switch allegiance, but surrendered. On February 22 the Separatist colonel, Francisco López, Spanish commander of Chuquisaca, defected to Sucre.⁵⁰ This made the Marshal extremely happy, as it was in the capital. He hurried a letter of gratification to López, saying that "the army of liberation and I give you our thanks for having joined our ranks." At the same time he ordered López to watch that General Olaneta did not try to march east with the intention of making an escape into Brazil. He also wrote López not to get overly enthusiastic and march on Potosí to fight Olaneta, but rather to remain in Chuquisaca.⁵¹

General Olaneta was waiting attentively in Potosí to see what Sucre would do, and when he intended to leave for Potosí. He dispatched the daring Barbarucho across the mountain range into the Altiplano to gather information about the United Army.⁵² He also called together a war council of his trusted officers, including the malicious Medinaceli. The main issue before the council was whether to surrender or fight until the last, in view of the critical situation. No one wished to surrender except Colonel Mendizábal, but wanted to go on to the last and, in case of final defeat, avoid falling into the hands of Sucre or the turncoats.⁵³ Medinaceli, who was in communication with Casimiro, was still waiting for the opportune moment to apprehend the General and hand him over to Sucre. But General Olaneta was unaware of it. If his army collapsed completely he wanted to make his way to the Arenales unit in Salta and surrender to him.⁵⁴ Strangely enough, General Arenales, the long time Patriotic veteran, was a close friend of General Olaneta.⁵⁵ Olaneta's home town was Salta and he had many friends there, and besides his wife resided in this northern Argentine city. The General was set to hold out until the very last, and then to go alone to meet Arenales.

One of the first things General Olaneta did in Potosí was to issue another proclamation, trying to create the impression that he had not cooperated with Bolívar. The Liberator had published Olaneta's first letter written from Oruro on October 2, in which the Separatist General seemingly showed sympathy with the Bolivarian cause.⁵⁶ Now the General accused Bolívar of having made changes in the letter which made him,

General Olaneta, appear as having worked in association with the Liberator. However it looks as though the version published by Bolívar was the correct one, and that Olaneta was the one who doctored the letter.⁵⁷ In any event, Olaneta published Bolívar's version in the proclamation and next to it, his own version.⁵⁸ In the original version the letter was addressed to "Simón Bolívar, Liberator of Colombia and Dictator of Peru," but in the revised letter it read only to "General Simón Bolívar." In the Olaneta version, which can be assumed is the falsified one, many additional sentences and phrases such as "my love for the King and Spain," and "dignity of the throne" are added. Whereas in the Bolívar rendition Olaneta wrote that he thought that "a solid system" was the appropriate solution to all the problems of America, the Separatist General now changed this to say that the "monarchical system" was the one he believed in. And the final sentence in which General Olaneta wrote in grand style, "I wish we could make our sentiments uniform, and give a day of rejoicing to America and humanity," was changed to ". . . give a day of rejoicing to Spain, to America and humanity."⁵⁹ The General had given a completely different meaning to the letter by the few changes and additions. In October the General had negotiated with the Liberator because he wanted to bring doom to the cause of the Constitutionals, whom he hated. Later this letter was embarrassing to him since the hateful trio, La Serna, Canterac and Valdés, had been eliminated. Now he wanted to deny any show of sympathy with Bolívar.

The proclamation of General Olaneta in itself was of little importance, except to show that the General was determined to fight the Bolivarian army with the same intensity and hate as he had used against the Constitutionals. He would not spare any means, even if dishonest, to damage the enemy. Now that his army was in a position inferior to the powerful unit of Sucre and victory was out of the question, he decided to try terrorist methods and even to poison Marshal Sucre. After a long search for the appropriate man to undertake this distasteful job, he finally located a Swiss mercenary soldier and adventurer who had fought with the Lanza guerrilla unit.⁶⁰ The man's name was Paul Ecles; he was about forty years old, quite illiterate, tall, robust and blond.⁶¹ Indeed a rare specimen in those regions, Ecles was willing to undertake the task. He was provided with some arsenic poison in a small capsule and was supposed to make his way to the Bolivarian headquarters, and then at the appropriate moment slip into the kitchen and drop the capsule in the pot where the chocolate to be served to Sucre was boiling.⁶² The Marshal was known to be fond of chocolate and consumed it regularly at every meal. Ecles was also asked to try to poison his ex-commander, General Lanza.⁶³ Once his main purpose of killing the Marshal was achieved, he was to collect from some Spaniards in La Paz his reward of 16,000 pesos.⁶⁴ But in case Ecles might fail the General was still on the lookout for another person whom he could persuade, for another 16,000 pesos, to kill Sucre.⁶⁵ Ecles left for his mission and took the road to Oruro. What advantage General Olaneta could see in killing Sucre and Lanza is hardly understandable, except that the Spanish General wanted to go down

in defeat causing as much trouble and damage as possible.

By the middle of March the Marshal felt that he was ready to move with his army toward Potosí. In more than a month in La Paz he had carefully and diligently reorganized his United Army. Since his entrance into Upper Peru over 1,800 Upper Peruvians had been added to the army, all of them from units that had deserted General Olaneta.⁶⁶ Sucre now commanded 6,100 men, while Olaneta had only 1,300 left. The Bolivarian cavalry outnumbered the Separatists by six to one.⁶⁷ Sucre's precise instructions to all the commanders during the months of February and March show that he wanted to march on Potosí with a powerful army and force the Spanish General to evacuate the city without a battle, by impressing him with the superior might of the United Army.⁶⁸ Finally, after many days of delay,⁶⁹ the army left La Paz on March 12 for Oruro, where Colonel Ortega had gathered three thousand soldiers.⁷⁰ The Marshal left the Colombian division in La Paz to continue its rest from the hard campaign in Lower Peru. Only the Peruvian and new Charcas units were called upon to advance on Olaneta, and the tough but humorous Irishman Burdett O'Connor was put in charge of this combined Peruvian army.⁷¹

The Irish commander led the march to Oruro while the Marshal, accompanied by the dos caras, Casimiro Olaneta and Mariano Calvimontes, followed at an appreciable distance.⁷² At the Altiplano village of Ayoayo Sucre was nearly killed when his horse stumbled and fell, almost crushing its rider.⁷³ Fortunately the Marshal only smashed his left hand. When O'Connor reached Oruro on March 14, a day ahead of Sucre, he

was met by a strange, tall, blond man in a military jacket, who could not speak either Spanish or English, but who gave O'Connor a small capsule and some documents signed by General Olaneta. O'Connor, to his amazement, after having finished reading the letters carefully, realized that they were instructions to poison Marshal Sucre and General Lanza, plus letters addressed to four Spaniards in La Paz to pay a reward after the death of Sucre. The blond soldier was none other than Ecles, who really was a good fellow, and had repented his action and decided to surrender. The Irish commander rushed the news to Sucre, who immediately requested Casimiro Olaneta and O'Connor to subject Ecles to a long questioning in order to find out more details. Yet Ecles acted confused and besides could speak only German, and his questioners were unable to locate anyone who spoke this language. Sucre decided to make Ecles understand that he should immediately leave the Perus and return home. The Marshal gave him enough money to make his way back to Switzerland.⁷⁴ At the same time he wrote to La Paz, ordering the apprehension of the four Spaniards.⁷⁵ But Sucre was quite upset about the Ecles affair and wrote a strong letter at once to General Olaneta, saying, "It is impossible to believe that a man like you who boasts about moral and religious principles can even think of such a horrible attempt . . . Such a crime can only fit into an evil and corrupted heart, and speaking frankly, I never thought you were capable of this." Then Sucre warned Olaneta that he had given strict orders that if any officer of the United Army was murdered or poisoned he would take Spanish hostages and put them before a firing squad.⁷⁶

On March 19, 1825, the powerful United Army left Oruro, toward its great targets, Potosí and General Olaneta.⁷⁷ But before the departure the Marshal requested one of his staff officers of the Oruro garrison to go in search of a spacious house with a large hall in which to hold the meetings of the forthcoming assembly of the deputies of Charcas who would decide the future of the Upper Peruvian provinces. Sucre said that this place must be "clean and decent."⁷⁸ The Marshal intended to make a flanking movement by taking the road to Chuquisaca and occupying the capital before Potosí, if this became necessary. In this way he wanted to force the Spanish General to evacuate Potosí and retreat south instead of east toward Brazil. From Chuquisaca Sucre thought that he could march south faster, on better roads, than Olaneta, and therefore cut off his retreat.⁷⁹ But he said that this was a flexible plan and depended on the movements of Olaneta and he would make his final decision of whether to march directly on Potosí or to go via Chuquisaca once he crossed the cordillera and had reached Vilcapugio. He wrote the commander of Chuquisaca, Colonel López, that should Olaneta leave for the capital he should evacuate the town rather than risk a battle.⁸⁰ The Bolivarian army advanced on the high Altiplano along the shores of Lake Popo and made its first stop at Challapata. Here Colonel O'Connor remained somewhat longer than Sucre in order to integrate a new Upper Peruvian unit.⁸¹ Sucre and Casimiro Olaneta went ahead toward the next village of Condo, twenty-seven leagues from Oruro and the last stop before crossing the Cordillera de los Frailes.⁸² At Condo most of the army units would concentrate for a final review and then begin their powerful

push toward Chuquisaca and Potosí.⁸³

On their way from Challapata to Condo on the dry and desert-like Altiplano, with whistling winds and biting cold, a serious conversation took place between Sucre and Casimiro about the future of Charcas. What was said remains a matter of speculation since it escaped history as most intimate and casual conversations do. Probably Casimiro, in view of a closer acquaintance with Sucre than before, felt more confident and aggressive and insisted more on the need of making the Charcas provinces independent from Argentina and Lower Peru. In Acora Olañeta had given the impression that Upper Peru might wish to join Lower Peru, but now he emphasized this solution less and less. It is quite possible that Sucre listened attentively but remained noncommittal and left the final decision to the forthcoming assembly called by him. But then even if this body would declare independence it would not be effective until the approval of the United Provinces and Lower Peru was granted according to the stipulations of the February 9 decree. René-Moreno was right when he said that there were three conflicting sovereignties in Charcas in 1825; first the wishes of Upper Peru, second the congress of Lower Peru, and third the congress of the United Provinces.⁸⁴

The illustrious Jaime Mendoza thinks that a fourth one should be added, the will of the United Army of liberation under Sucre.⁸⁵ Perhaps Olañeta now asked Sucre to intervene in the future deliberations of the Upper Peruvian congress and throw his weight in favor of independence, or maybe to use the army of liberation to oppose the claims of sovereignty by Argentina and Lower Peru over Charcas. Undoubtedly the Marshal politely

refused such drastic action and wished to leave unchanged the ambiguity of the decree of February 9. All this is pure speculation, for the only thing that is known is that an important talk took place on the road from Challapata to Condo, and that Casimiro Olañeta was somewhat upset and wanted to dramatize the need of an independent Upper Peru. He left Sucre's side, turned around with his horse and galloped back toward Challapata.

O'Connor, after having finished his little administrative task at Challapata, left the village to catch up with the Marshal. To his surprise he found Casimiro Olañeta on the road, waiting alone for him. Casimiro rushed to the Colonel and said that he wished to talk to him and ask him a question. O'Connor, always friendly and affable, was only too glad to have Casimiro Olañeta ride along with him on the dusty trail. Casimiro told the Irishman that he and Sucre had talked about the future of Charcas and the decree of February 9, and whether the provinces should join Argentina or Lower Peru or become independent. After this Casimiro, with his bouncing enthusiasm and shrewd mind, asked O'Connor, "I wish to know your opinion, Colonel, in regard to this matter which is so important to us."⁸⁶ Casimiro had a great ability to make other people believe in the right moment that their judgment was vital and was what counted, therefore stimulating their egos. O'Connor was only too glad to tell Casimiro his ideas, and stated that since he was actively engaged in this campaign in Upper Peru he had with him many maps of the country and had studied them carefully. Besides, before coming into Upper Peru, he had made it a point to become acquainted with the history and problems of the

provinces in order to have a good background. He told Casimiro that if the country was as rich from Challapata south to the Argentine border as it was from the Desaguadero to Challapata, a road which he had just covered, "I don't see any reason why it should be added to Lower Peru or to Argentina."⁸⁷ O'Connor said that as soon as Casimiro heard this answer he spurred his horse with great enthusiasm and galloped away toward Condo. Indeed O'Connor must have been somewhat surprised at such odd behavior, but then gave it little thought. The Irish Colonel reached Condo at night and immediately went to see Sucre to let him know of his arrival. O'Connor had completely forgotten his strange conversation with Casimiro several hours ago but when he entered the room everyone got up and ran to embrace the perplexed Irish Colonel, calling him the "founder of a new republic."⁸⁸ O'Connor seemingly took it as a joke, and later when he served Bolivia with great distinction⁸⁹ never insisted on being called the inspirer of the republic. Casimiro Olaneta was making sure that Sucre would not turn his back on the idea of ultimate independence for Charcas, and on the long road from Puno to Potosí the young man, more than anyone else, exercised great influence over Sucre. This little episode of Casimiro Olaneta and the Irish Colonel, Burdett O'Connor, shows the great charm, warmth and outward expression of sincerity and enthusiasm Casimiro was able to exhibit and therefore convince people with utmost ease. No one can ever deny the true genius of this brilliant but dangerous man. Besides, the conversation of the Altiplano once more proves that Casimiro and Sucre stand as the co-authors of Bolivia.

From Condo the army began to cross, on March 24 the steep Cordillera of the Monks by the way of Vilcapugio,⁹⁰ reaching Lagunillas two days later. Here Sucre issued a proclamation to the army of Olaneta, telling it that its commander, General Olaneta, was a rebel to the Spanish cause and a traitor to the American cause. He asked them to desert and come over to the Army of liberation.⁹¹ In view of the possibility that General Olaneta might abandon Potosí at any moment it was decided to advance straight on the Imperial City. On the night of March 28 the powerful United Army camped in the alfalfa fields on the outskirts of Potosí where the many mules of the silver mines grazed. A patrol unit under the revolving turncoat, Colonel Arraya, dared to make its way into the city⁹³ and found out that General Olaneta had evacuated with his reduced army at eleven o'clock that morning⁹⁴ in a state of complete confusion. Arraya and his soldiers, because of the late hour, decided to camp in the middle of the main square.⁹⁵ Around one hundred of Olaneta's soldiers had deserted and hidden in the town in order not to have to go south with him.⁹⁶ As all retreating armies from Potosí did, and as General Olaneta had previously done during the Separatist War, he took with him around sixty thousand pesos in gold from the Casa de Moneda.⁹⁷ The next day the whole Bolivian army entered Potosí, and its inhabitants were somewhat taken by surprise since they had had no previous information of the proximity of the Sucre contingents. They had missed their chance to prepare the usual grandiose reception for a victorious army. But some quickly improvised festivities were organized to honor the young Venezuelan commander.⁹⁸ Sucre was none too enthusiastic about Potosí; he thought that

the town was full of godos, and had a horrible climate and was much too cold.⁹⁹

The next several days are somewhat confusing and records do not agree in details. Olaneta had decided to continue the war and had told Sucre on March 22 that even if everyone was now against him he would go down fighting because his honor and his fidelity to the King demanded it.¹⁰⁰ For him only two choices existed: either to die or to give himself up to his friend, Arenales. The Spanish General dispatched Medina-celi to the fortress of Cotagaito while he had the daring Barbarucho take the road to Chuquisaca with five hundred men, to ransack some of the rich villages in the valley. It is possible that the Colonel undertook one of his surprise raids even into the capital to get hold of funds.¹⁰¹ Olaneta himself left Potosí with around four hundred soldiers for the next village south, known as Vitichi, a center of goatherds and where cordovan leather was manufactured by the villagers.¹⁰² Near the abandoned mine of Lava, well-remembered from the Separatist War, the General was nearly captured by some of his deserters.¹⁰³ From Vitichi he dispatched his aide, Colonel Hebia, to reinforce the troops of Medina-celi at Cotagaito and guard against the approaching force of Arenales from Salta.¹⁰⁴ But on March 30 Medinaceli finally decided that it was time to give his stab in the back. He had promised since January to the dos caras to finish with the General at the right moment, but for some unknown reason had postponed it.¹⁰⁵ If Medinaceli wanted the honor of capturing Olaneta and handing him over to Sucre, it was now or never.

On this March day Medinaceli proclaimed the Bolivarian cause in Cotagaita.¹⁰⁶ Hebia, who was on his way to reinforce Medinaceli, was informed of the treason in Tumusla, and he immediately turned around and raced back to Vitichi to consult with Olaneta about this critical situation. The Spanish General decided to advance on Cotagaita to battle the traitor while he was moving north toward Vitichi to apprehend Olaneta. The armies met on April 1 in the afternoon at Tumusla, a village situated on Tumusla Creek, about 111 kilometers south of Potosí.¹⁰⁷ One distinguished author writes that Olaneta had seven hundred men while Medinaceli commanded only three hundred soldiers,¹⁰⁸ but this is undocumented and is hardly possible.¹⁰⁹ Olaneta was severely defeated and wounded, and Medinaceli affirmed that he surrendered to him.¹¹⁰ The next day, on April 2, Medinaceli informed Sucre in a short statement that the General had died of the wounds he had received in the battle.¹¹¹ So came to an end the career of the great and most complex Spanish General, who brought doom to the Spanish cause in the Perus but refused to come to terms with the Patriots, preferring to die for the King. All the time he had said he would die for his master and he kept his promise.

Olaneta had infuriated everyone including the affable Sucre, who the same day as the battle of Tumusla had said that General Olaneta was "the most abominable delirium of Spanish despotism."¹¹² A German author even thinks that Olaneta had wanted to conquer all South America,¹¹³ while an Argentine editor dismisses all this and says that the General was an "imbecile who lived without honor and died without glory."¹¹⁴ The Chilean, Bulnes, wonders if it will not "be difficult for posterity to concede to

this man the rehabilitation and admiration that is due to everyone who serves in one or another camp, under different banners, for a great cause or the sovereignty of his homeland, because Olaneta did not frankly join one or the other side."¹¹⁵ Torrente, the best Spanish historian of the War of Independence, says that Olaneta's tragic death was proof of his innocence and that he was the unfortunate victim of some malicious advisers.¹¹⁶ General Olaneta was never considered a traitor at the court and when the King was informed of the great defeat of Ayacucho, in the royal cedula of May 28, 1825, he named General Olaneta as the new viceroy.¹¹⁷ It was not known then in Spain that the General had died nearly two months before in defense of the crown. The General's great ambition to become viceroy, of which his nephew had so dishonestly taken advantage, had finally come true. This time the assignment was genuine, but too late, for the General already rested in his grave, probably in the frozen ground of Tumusla.¹¹⁸ He was a victim of his fanatic loyalty to the crown and of an abominable treason by two Upper Peruvians whom he had always trusted, Casimiro Olaneta, the creator of Bolivia, and Carlos Medinaceli, future general of the Bolivarian army.¹¹⁹ Only a year later Sucre had to admit to a close friend that Medinaceli and Arraya were "very bad" people.¹²⁰

The battle of Tumusla still remains something of a mystery.¹²¹ Urcullu, who after all was nearby and on his way to talk to Olaneta, affirms that only a single shot was fired, by an unknown soldier, with the intent of murdering the General.¹²² Urcullu's statement seems correct, especially in view of Medinaceli's laconic letter giving no details of

the battle but simply saying, "The action was decided at seven o'clock [and] General Olaneta has just died at this moment [April 2]." ¹²³ Where are the surrender terms, and the account of how many soldiers perished in the battle? Medinaceli never elaborates and Sánchez Velasco, another chronicler of this war and probably a witness, says that Sucre, when informed of the death of Olaneta, was annoyed and suspected foul play. ¹²⁴ The assumption that there was no fight at Tumisla has quite valid grounds in view of the absence of primary material that sketches the battle.

Marshal Sucre, as soon as he entered Potosí, had had a talk with Urcullu who probably had come up from Chuquisaca. ¹²⁵ During the invasion of the Bolivarian army Urcullu had outwardly taken a neutral attitude, but maintained good relations with General Olaneta, who trusted him until the very last and relied heavily on his advice. ¹²⁶ At the same time he was in intimate contact with Casimiro Olaneta and the turncoats of Chuquisaca. Sucre took advantage of Urcullu's good standing with General Olaneta and requested him to go and seek the General, and convince him of the futility of further resistance and also offering him fair surrender terms. ¹²⁷ At the same time Sucre had received information from Medinaceli through the dos caras, Uzín, that the Spanish Colonel was definitely planning to switch allegiance and fight General Olaneta any day. ¹²⁸ The Marshal was convinced that Medinaceli was serious and he wrote to Bolívar, "I am hopeful that Medinaceli will catch Olaneta and send him to me." ¹²⁹ But Sucre was also afraid that the traitorous Colonel might fail in his attempt and therefore decided to stay as short a time as possible in Potosí and depart for a position nearer Medinaceli

in case the Colonel needed help. The Marshal promised Medinaceli that he would leave Potosí on April 2,¹³⁰ but because of administrative reasons was delayed.¹³¹

On the next day the advance units under O'Connor departed in the later morning for their campaign to the south and Sucre was ready to follow on April 4. About ten miles from town O'Connor was stopped by a messenger of Medinaceli, who informed him of the victory of Tumusla and the death of Olaneta. O'Connor then halted his advance and turned around to return to the city, leaving his army at Lava.¹³² The messenger, after having told the Irish Colonel the good news, went ahead to inform Sucre of the happy events of Tumusla. He reached Potosí around noon when Sucre had just finished his lunch and retired for a short rest. Jose María Rey de Castro, the Marshal's faithful and diligent personal secretary, rushed to Sucre's room with the news.¹³³ Sucre was not too pleased by Olaneta's death because he had wanted to capture the General alive and convince him of his wrong attitude toward the United Army "and show him how generous we are," as he told Bolívar.¹³⁴ He suspected that some foul play had taken place.¹³⁵ Casimiro Olañeta rushed to Sucre's side and when informed of the news gave the appearance of deep pain, and it is said that he was shaken because of his uncle's death.¹³⁶ Apparently Casimiro was also a good actor. Marshal Sucre hastened a letter to Medinaceli to congratulate him on his victory. At the same time he wrote another letter to the Colonel, ordering him to see to it that the widow of General Olaneta be treated with great respect and that anyone who insulted her should be severely punished. In a third letter the Marshal

asked Medinaceli to congratulate, in his name, all the soldiers and officers who had fought at Tumusla against Olañeta.¹³⁷

The only remaining Spanish force in the Perus was the unit of Colonel Valdez, alias Barbarucho, who had taken the road to Chuquisaca and then disappeared. Sucre estimated that Barbarucho had with him between four and five hundred men.¹³⁸ The Marshal decided that O'Connor could handle the situation and therefore commander the Irish Colonel to go in search of Valdez. Sucre gave O'Connor precise instructions, especially that he should take all precautionary steps because Barbarucho was the boldest and most cunning officer that the Spanish army had. The Marshal had great respect for the ability of the venturesome Valdez and he was unwilling to suffer a defeat by the last small Spanish unit just at the very end of the war. O'Connor had 1,300 men with him while Medinaceli's force was estimated at around seven hundred men, made up mostly of the defeated Olañeta contingents. Medinaceli was ordered to obey the command of O'Connor. Therefore the Irish Colonel had two thousand soldiers against the five hundred of Barbarucho.¹³⁹ The Marshal then wrote a letter to the enemy Colonel in which he said that "a courageous officer always should be treated with respect," but that Valdez' situation was completely hopeless and that to surrender would be no shame but would only shorten the war and save lives. He offered the same terms to Valdez as had been negotiated at Ayacucho.¹⁴⁰ The problem was how to get the letter to Barbarucho, since everyone was at a loss as to where he was. O'Connor carrying the letter with him, departed on April 4 along the road from Potosí to Cotagaita, and in Lava joined his army which he had left behind.¹⁴¹

Barbarucho had been in Yamparaez on March 30, near Chuquisaca, and then had begun to move south, apparently to rejoin General Olaneta.¹⁴²

On April 2, the day of the death of his beloved commander, Valdez was in Mataka and in the last three days had lost half of his troops by desertion. The last Spanish Colonel wished to continue to San Lucas with the probable purpose of making his way to the Argentine border.¹⁴³ Yet his small force was disintegrating completely and the Colonel then decided to swing east and go to the fortress of Cotagaita and surrender.

On April 7 he reached the royal highway at a place called Chequelte by Sucre and Urdininea,¹⁴⁴ and Vichacla by O'Connor,¹⁴⁵ situated somewhat south of Tumusla and north of Cotagaita. Here at Chequelte Valdéz met Colonel Urdininea of the advance guard of the little Arenales expedition that was coming up from Salta. Days earlier Urdininea had deserted the Argentine army and joined the Bolivarian army.¹⁴⁶ Valdez surrendered to the enigmatic Urdininea who had switched from one ally to the other. Urdininea then dispatched Valdéz with some guards to Potosí to present himself to Sucre. A few miles north Barbarucho met O'Connor who was still searching for him and his nonexistent army. The Irish Colonel was astounded when he suddenly saw Barbarucho as a prisoner, going to meet Sucre, and he felt somewhat annoyed at his failure, but took it in good humor.¹⁴⁷

At around midnight of April 8 Sucre received the news of the surrender of Barbarucho at Chequelte¹⁴⁸ and the next morning, April 9, he issued a proclamation to all the authorities of Upper Peru, informing them of the capture "of the last enemy that re-

mained in Peru." He stated that with this surrender he was declaring "the absolute and final end of the war."¹⁴⁹ The same morning of April 9 a high mass with a Te Deum was celebrated with the attendance of all the authorities to give thanks for the successful end of the war in the Perus.¹⁵⁰

From the Desaguadero River to Chequelte the powerful army of liberation had not fired a single shot at the enemy. The Spanish army had disintegrated by itself, by the sole presence of the Bolivarian army in Charcas and by the successful schemes of the dos caras who had found many officers ready to abandon the lost Spanish cause. The war came to an end after sixteen long years and the schemers emerged as the real victors. The next step was to make their land independent of Lima and the United Provinces, and to become its masters. In Marshal Sucre they found a credulous man who was willing to cooperate with the Upper Peruvian doctores because he trusted their sincere patriotism.

NOTES

¹Cf. Sucre to Bolívar, Cuzco, January 19, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 286-287.

²Cf. Rudecindo Alvarado to Sucre, Puno, January 10, 1825, in Paz Soldán, op. cit., 2d periodo, vol. I, appendix, no. 19, p. 386; Sucre to Bolívar, Cuzco, January 15, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 283; cf. Sucre to the Prefect of Cuzco, Quiquijana, January 21, 1825, in Lecuna, D. I, 59.

³Little is known about the invasion of Barbarucho except for what is cited in the letter of Sucre to Olaneta, infra, n. 4; cf. Sucre to Rudecindo Alvarado, Cuzco, January 3, 1825, in Lecuna, D. I, 47.

⁴Sucre to P. A. Olaneta [Santa Rosa], January 24, 1825, in Lecuna, D. I, 68-70.

⁵Antonio Saturnino Sanchez to Sucre, Cochabamba, January 15, 1825, in Gaceta del Gobierno (Lima), February 24, 1825; J. M. Lanza to Sucre, La Paz, February 6, 1825, Yanacachi, January 18, 1825, in ANB, MI, 3, 11; cf. José Macedonio Urquidí, La última revolución de Cochabamba (Cochabamba, 1943), 114 pp.

⁶Ibid., 76.

⁷Sucre to P. A. Olaneta, Ayaviri, January 26, 1825, in Lecuna, D. I, 73; cf. Sucre to Bolívar, Ayaviri, January 26, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 292.

⁸Sucre to J. M. Lanza, Lampa, January 27, 1825, in Lecuna, D. I, 73-76.

⁹J. M. Lanza to Sucre, La Paz, January 30, 1825, in El Sol del Cuzco (Cuzco), no. 7 (February 12, 1825); J. M. Lanza to Sucre, La Paz, January 31, 1825, February 1, 1825, in ANB, MI, 3, 11.

¹⁰The exact number in Olaneta's army is hard to determine. Sucre's letters speak of different strengths at different times (cf. Lecuna, D. I, chap. 2; ANB, MI, 8, 63).

¹¹Sucre to Javier Aguilera, La Paz, February 9, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 66; J. M. Lanza to Sucre, La Paz, February 1, 1825, in ANB, MI, 3, 11.

¹²Sucre to Bolívar, Ilave, February 5, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 303.

¹³Cf. Lecuna, D. I., 108-109.

¹⁴Cf. Gonzalo Bulnes, Ultimas campañas de la independencia del Perú, 1822-1826 (S. d. Ch., 1897), 626-628.

¹⁵José María Rey de Castro, "Recuerdos del tiempo heroico," op. cit., XII, 29-30 (1943-1944), 83-86.

¹⁶Lecuna, D. I., 94-96.

¹⁷See G. René-Moreno, Ayacucho en Buenos Aires, op. cit.; Jesus Arocha Moreno, Las ideas políticas de Bolívar y Sucre en el proceso de la fundación de Bolivia (Caracas, 1952), 51 pp.; Sabino Pinilla [sic], La creacion de Bolivia (Biblioteca Ayacucho, vol. 17; Madrid, n. d.), 371 pp. S. Pinilla is not the author of this book, see Enrique Finot, "Dos obras apócrifas de la literature boliviana," La Razón (La Paz) (November 6, 1945).

¹⁸For a detailed discussion of the attitude of Bolivian writers about the authorship of the decree of February 9, see Humberto Vázquez-Machicado, Blasfemias históricas, op. cit., passim.

¹⁹[U], Apuntes, 150.

²⁰C. Olañeta, Mi defensa o conclusión, op. cit., 11.

²¹Blasfemias históricas, op. cit.

²²See supra, chap. 7, n. 92.

²³Sucre to Bolívar, Puno, February 3, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 302.

²⁴[U], Apuntes, 150; Paz Soldán, op. cit., 2d periodo, vol. II, 5.

²⁵See Vázquez-Machicado, Blasfemias históricas, op. cit., 63.

²⁶José María Rey de Castro, op. cit., XII, 29-30 (1943-1944), 83; F. Burdett O'Connor, Independencia americana (Biblioteca Ayacucho, vol. 3; Madrid, n. d.), 161.

²⁷See supra, chap. 7, n. 97.

²⁸Sucre to Bolívar, Puno, February 3, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 30 (*italics mine*).

²⁹Alfredo Jáuregui Rosquellas, "La fundación de Bolivia," BSGS, XXXVIII, 383-385 (1942), 155.

³⁰It must be stated that Enrique Finot, Nueva historia de Bolivia (Buenos Aires, 1946), which is the best one volume history of Bolivia, accepts completely the proof of Humberto Vázquez-Machicado and has eliminated the old myth that Casimiro Olañeta inspired the February 9 decree (p. 181, n. 1).

³¹Sucre to Bolívar, Puno, February 3, 1825, op. cit., 301-302.

³²Cf. Vázquez-Machicado, Blasfemias históricas, op. cit., 73, n. 101.

³³Sucre to Bolívar, Ilave, February 5, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 304.

³⁴"Posteriormente se dijo que el decreto del 9 de febrero, lo expidió Sucre por consejos de don Casimiro Olañeta, por entonces joven, incapaz de sugerir ideas de determinaciones a un personaje de la talla del vencedor de Ayacucho, como era el de precipitar la formación inesperada de una república. Olañeta en la exposición que publico en 1826 [sic] en la que enumera sus servicios a la causa de la independencia no menciona ese hecho, que pudo haber sido considerado por el como un timbre de gloria" (M. Rigoberto Paredes, "Lígeros datos sobre la fundación de Bolivia," BSGS, XXXII, 337-339, 1937, 146).

³⁵Sucre to Bolívar, Puno, February 3, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 301.

³⁶Sucre to the Comandante Jeneral de la division de Cochabamba, La Paz, February 11, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

³⁷Sucre to Ortega, La Paz, February 28, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

³⁸Sucre to Ortega, La Paz, March 1, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

³⁹Sucre to Francisco O'Connor, no date, no place, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁴⁰Sucre to the President of Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, June 11, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁴¹Sucre to the Comandante Jeneral de la division de Cochabamba, La Paz, February 11, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁴²Sucre to the President of Potosí, Chuquisaca, June 20, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁴³Sucre to O'Connor, no date, no place, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁴⁴Sucre to Commander Michel, Oruro, March 16, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁴⁵Letters of Sucre of February, March, and April, passim, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁴⁶Sucre to the Ministro de Estado en el Departamento de la Guerra del Peru, La Paz, March 2, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 115; Sucre to the Secretario de Estado del Despacho de Guerra, La Paz, March 8, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 122; Sucre to the Prefecto del Departamento del Cuzco, La Paz, March 2, 1825, in El Sol del Cuzco, no. 13 (March 26, 1825); Sucre to Pedro Jose Antelo, La Paz, March 1, 1825, ANB, MI, 6, 31.

⁴⁷Sucre to Aguilera, Cuzco, January 1, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 40-41; Sucre to Aguilera, La Paz, February 22, 1825, ANB, MI, 8, 66; Sucre to Aguilera, La Paz, February 22, 1825, ANB, MI, 8, 63; cf. Sucre to the Ministro de Estado, La Paz, March 2, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 115.

⁴⁸Sucre to the Secretario del Despacho de la Guerra etc., La Paz, March 8, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 122. Much more material about the Vallegrande movement, and especially about Aguilera, is located in ANB, MI, 6, 31.

⁴⁹Sucre to the Secretario del Despacho de la Guerra, La Paz, March 8, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 122; Sucre to the Municipalidad de Santa Cruz, La Paz, March 5, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63; Sucre to Jose Menacho, La Paz, March 5, 1825, ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁵⁰Sucre to the Ministro de Estado en el Departamento de Guerra, La Paz, March 8, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 120; Sucre to the Secretario de Estado del Despacho de la Guerra, etc., La Paz, March 8, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 122; Sucre to the Prefecto del Departamento del Cuzco, La Paz, March 2, 1825, in El Sol del Cuzco, no. 13 (March 26, 1825); Sucre to Francisco López, La Paz, March 5, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63; Sucre to the Municipalidad de Chuquisaca, La Paz, March 5, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63; Francisco López to Carlos Maria Ortega, Plata Libre [Chuquisaca], February 25, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 110-112.

⁵¹Sucre to Francisco Lopez, La Paz, March 5, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁵²Beltrán Avila, Logia, 154.

⁵³Torrente, op. cit., III, 514; Camba, Memorias, II, 367; Pinilla, Creación, op. cit., 113; cf. Conde de Torata, "Prologo," GS, IV, p. 11, n. 2.

⁵⁴Juan Martín Leguizamón, Limites con Bolivia (Salta, 1872), 59, n. 1.

⁵⁵Ibid., 39.

⁵⁶See Lecuna, D. I., 4.

⁵⁷The version published by Bolívar is the same as the one published later by General Valdés' son in his GS, I, no. 74, pp. 225-227. Yet this is not conclusive proof because the Count of Torata might have gotten the letter from Bolívar's publication, rather than from his father's archive. However, Bolívar had no reason to doctor the letter, while General Olaneta did have.

⁵⁸This proclamation has never been known and this author located one copy attached to a letter from the Commander of Oruro [Colonel Ortega] to Sucre, Oruro, February 28, 1825, in ANB, MI, 3, 12. Evidently Ortega got hold of a copy of the proclamation and forwarded it to Sucre. No other copy has ever been known to exist.

⁵⁹Pedro A. de Olaneta, Conducta del General Disidente Don Simón Bolívar en sus comunicaciones con el General Realista Don Pedro Antonio de Olaneta (Potosí, February 22, 1825), in ANB, MI, 3, 12.

⁶⁰Sucre to [Lanza], Caracollo, March [14 or 15, damaged], 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁶¹José María Rey de Castro, Recuerdos, op. cit., XII, 29-30 (1943-1944), 88.

⁶²Loc. cit.; F. Burdett O'Connor, Independencia americana, op. cit., 162.

⁶³Sucre to [Lanza], Caracollo, March [14 or 15], 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁶⁴Loc. cit.

⁶⁵Sucre to P. A. Olaneta, Oruro, March 16, 1825, in O'Leary, Memorias, op. cit., XXIII, 77-78.

⁶⁶Sucre to the Secretario de Estado del Despacho de la Guerra [Colombia], La Paz, March 8, 1825, in Lecuna, D. I., 121-123.

⁶⁷See Lecuna, D. I., 121; Sucre to Bolívar, Condo, March 24, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 321.

⁶⁸ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁶⁹Sucre to Bolívar, March 12, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 315.

⁷⁰Sucre to Ortega, many letters during February and March in ANB, MI, 8, 63; cf. Sucre to the Secretario de Estado el Despacho de la Guerra [Colombia], La Paz, March 8, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 121-123.

⁷¹See Beltrán Avila, Logia, 156.

⁷²Burdett O'Connor, Independencia americana, op. cit., 162.

⁷³Sucre to Bolívar, Sicasica, March 13, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 317-318.

⁷⁴Burdett O'Connor, Independencia americana, op. cit., 162-163; José María Rey de Castro, Recuerdos, op. cit., XII, 29-30 (1943-1944), 88, has a somewhat different version, stating that Ecles went to see Colonel Ortega, commander of Oruro, rather than O'Connor.

⁷⁵Sucre to the President of La Paz [Lanza], Caracollo, March [14 or 15], 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁷⁶Sucre to P. A. Olañeta, Oruro, March 16, 1825, in O'Leary, Memorias, XXIII, 77-78.

⁷⁷Sucre to the Ministro de la Guerra del Perú, Oruro, March 18, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 133.

⁷⁸Sucre to Rufino Martínez, Oruro, March 16, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁷⁹Sucre to the Ministro de la Guerra del Perú, Oruro, March 18, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 133-135.

⁸⁰Sucre to Francisco Sanchez [sic for López], Oruro, March 15, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁸¹Burdett O'Connor, Independencia americana, op. cit., 164.

⁸²Sucre to the Ministro de la Guerra del Perú, Oruro, March 18, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 133.

⁸³Cf. Sucre to Bolívar, Condo, March 24, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 321.

⁸⁴G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Perú/ nuevas notas, op. cit., 511.

⁸⁵Jaime Mendoza, "Advenimiento de la nacionalidad boliviana," Revista del Instituto de Sociología Boliviana (Sucre), I, 1 (1941), 6.

⁸⁶Burdett O'Connor, Independencia americana, op. cit., 164.

⁸⁷Loc. cit.

⁸⁸Ibid., 165.

⁸⁹See G. René-Moreno, "Vida del Jeneral José Ballivian," Anales de la Universidad (S. d. Ch.), LXXXVIII (1894), 414.

⁹⁰Sucre to Francisco López, Oruro, March 15, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁹¹Langunillas, March 26, 1825. This proclamation is seemingly available only in José Maria Rey de Castro, op. cit., XII, 29-30 (1943-1944), 91.

⁹²Burdett O'Connor, Independencia americana, op. cit., 165.

⁹³[U], Apuntes, 151.

⁹⁴Sucre to the Prefect of Arequipa, Potosí, March 29, 1825, in Manuel de Odrizola, Documentos históricos del Peru (Lima, 1863-1877), VI, 265.

⁹⁵Sánchez de Velasco, op. cit., 151.

⁹⁶Loc. cit.

⁹⁷Sucre to Carlos Medinaceli, Potosí, April 1, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁹⁸Jose Maria Rey de Castro, op. cit., XII, 29-30 (1943-1944), 92.

⁹⁹Sucre to Bolívar, Potosí, April 3, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 324.

¹⁰⁰This letter of Olaneta to Sucre is unlocated, but Sucre cites it in Sucre to Carlos Medinaceli, Potosí, April 1, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

¹⁰¹Little is known about the raids of Barbarucho. There are some badly damaged letters of Francisco López to Sucre, March and April, in the library of the University of San Francisco Xavier (Rectorado), Sucre; cf. Sucre to Bolívar, Condo, March 24, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 321; Sucre to Bolívar, Potosí, January 29 [sic for March 29], 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 293; Sucre to the Prefect of Arequipa, Potosí, March 29, 1825, in Odrizola, op. cit., VI, 265.

¹⁰²Hesperiohylo [pseud.], "Descripción histórica y corográfica de las provincias de Chichas y Tarija," Mercurio Peruano, vol. II, no. 39 (May 15, 1791), 36.

¹⁰³Sucre to Bolívar, Potosí, January 29 [sic for March 29], 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 293.

¹⁰⁴Torrente, op. cit., III, 514; the Conde de Torata, "Prologo," GS, IV, p. lli, believes that Torrente is the most accurate source for these last days of the campaign.

¹⁰⁵Emilio Medinaceli, "Tumusla, batalla que sello la independencia de Bolivia," El Diario (La Paz) (January 11, 1953), literary supplement; cf. G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Perú/ nuevas notas, op. cit., 493.

¹⁰⁶Emilio Medinaceli, "Tumusla," op. cit., calls his article a "historical rectification" and says that his distinguished forefather proclaimed the Patriotic cause on March 25, not 30, yet he gives no documentary proof of this. The unpublished letter of Sucre to Medinaceli, April 1, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63, indicates that Medinaceli did not switch until March 30, but that he wrote a letter to Olaneta on March 29, probably telling the General that he was shifting. From where did Emilio Medinaceli get March 25? Does he think he can justify his forefather's treason by making it five days earlier? Medinaceli's action was one of the most unethical of the war. In the letter of Sucre to the Minister of War of Peru, Potosí, April 3, 1825, in Lecuna, D, I, 143, Sucre wrote explicitly that Medinaceli shifted to the Patriots on March 30.

¹⁰⁷G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Perú/ nuevas notas, op. cit., 493.

¹⁰⁸William Bennet Stevenson, Memorias (Biblioteca Ayacucho, vol. 15; Madrid, n. d.), 259.

¹⁰⁹Cf. Sucre to Bolívar, Potosí, January [sic for March] 29, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 293.

¹¹⁰Carlos Medinaceli to Sucre, Tumusla, April 2, 1825, in Emilio Medinaceli, "Tumusla," op. cit.

¹¹¹Loc. cit.

¹¹²Sucre to Carlos Medinaceli, Potosí, April 1, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

¹¹³Carlos Matzenauer, Bolivia in Historischer, Geografischer und Kulturelle Hinsicht (Vienna, 1897), 24.

¹¹⁴El Tiempo (Buenos Aires (July 9, 1828).

- ¹¹⁵Gonzalo Bulnes, op. cit., 629.
- ¹¹⁶Torrente, op. cit., III, 511.
- ¹¹⁷In Camba, Memorias, II, 213-214.
- ¹¹⁸This author was unable to determine if Olaneta was taken home to Salta to be buried.
- ¹¹⁹See Julio Díaz A., Los generales, op. cit., 128-133.
- ¹²⁰Sucre to León Galindo, Chuquisaca, July 7, 1826, in Carlos Blanco Galindo, ed., Cartas del General Antonio José de Sucre (La Paz, 1918), 45; cf. Sucre to Leon Galindo, Potosí, October 7, 1826, in ibid., 104.
- ¹²¹Cf. Pinilla, Creación, op. cit., 116-117.
- ¹²²[U], Apuntes, 151-152.
- ¹²³C. Medinaceli to Sucre, Tumusla, April 2, 1825, in E. Medinaceli, "Tumusla," op. cit.
- ¹²⁴Sánchez de Velasco, Memorias, op. cit., 152.
- ¹²⁵See supra, chap. 7, n. 107.
- ¹²⁶Juan Martín Leguizamón, op. cit., 59, n. 1.
- ¹²⁷[U], Apuntes, 151.
- ¹²⁸Sucre to Medinaceli, Potosí, April 1, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.
- ¹²⁹Sucre to Bolívar, Potosí, Jan. 29 [sic for March 29], 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 293.
- ¹³⁰Sucre to Medinaceli, Potosí, April 1, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.
- ¹³¹Sucre to the President of Potosí and Municipality of Chuquisaca, Potosí, April 2, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.
- ¹³²Burdett O'Connor, Independencia americana, op. cit., 166; Sucre to Bolívar, Potosí, April 4, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 330.
- ¹³³José María Rey de Castro, op. cit., XII, 29-30 (1943-1944), 92.

¹³⁴ Sucre to Bolívar, Potosí, April 3, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 323.

¹³⁵ Sanchez de Velasco, op. cit., 152.

¹³⁶ Loc. cit.

¹³⁷ Sucre to C. Medinaceli, Potosí, April 3, 1825 (3 letters), in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

¹³⁸ Sucre to José María Urdininea, Potosí, April 3, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63; Sucre to Francisco O'Connor [Potosí, April 3, 1825], in ANB, MI, 8, 63; Sucre to Bolívar, Potosí, April 3, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 323.

¹³⁹ Sucre to F. O'Connor, [Potosí, April 3, 1825], in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

¹⁴⁰ Sucre to José María Valdez [Barbarucho], Potosí, April 4, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

¹⁴¹ Sucre to Bolívar, Potosí, April 4, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 330; Burdett O'Connor, Independencia americana, op. cit., 166-167.

¹⁴² Sucre to Medinaceli, Potosí, April 3, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

¹⁴³ Sucre to José María Urdininea, Potosí, April 6, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

¹⁴⁴ Sucre to José María Urdininea, Potosí, April 9, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63; infra, n. 149.

¹⁴⁵ Burdett O'Connor, Independencia americana, op. cit., 167.

¹⁴⁶ G. René-Moreno, Avacucho en Buenos Aires, op. cit., 101, n. 1. Much information is contained in an interesting letter by Arenales to Sucre, Salta, February 6, 1827, in ANB (unclassified document, complete copy in author's hands).

¹⁴⁷ Burdett O'Connor, Independencia americana, op. cit., 167.

¹⁴⁸ Sucre to José María Urdininea, Potosí, April 9, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

¹⁴⁹ Circular letter by Sucre, Potosí, April 9, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

¹⁵⁰ José María Rey de Castro, op. cit., XII, 29-30 (1943-1944),
93 (Rey de Castro called the place of Váldez' surrender Chequeltañi).

CHAPTER IX

THE TURNCOAT ASSEMBLY

Synopsis

The Assembly that was called according to the stipulations of the February 9 decree became the final instrument that was responsible for the creation of an independent Upper Peru. The original law provided for a simple and quite democratic electoral process in which the countryside had a chance to be well represented. Later the dos caras elements managed to amend the law, writing a much more restrictive electoral legislation. The cities with their Royalist and dos caras traditions were favored over the countryside with its guerrilla environment. Due to various reasons, such as the disfavor of Bolívar to a pronouncement by the people of Charcas until the Peruvian and Argentine congresses had clarified their position, the continued occupancy of the department of Potosí by General Olaneta, electoral irregularities, and the impossibility of holding elections in many parts on the prescribed dates delayed the inauguration of the Assembly from April until July, 1825. Because of the cold climate the meetings were transferred from Oruro to Chuquisaca.

Finally on July 10 a quorum was available to commence the Assembly's meetings. Marshal Sucre and his army had left the capital a few days earlier in order to leave the delegates completely on their own.

Nearly two-thirds of the delegates were alumni of the University of San Francisco Xavier and many of them belonged to the Catholic hierarchy. Only two were veterans of the War of Independence and of these young Ballivián, future president of Bolivia, was of dubious character. It was an assembly of people who had been high officials in the Spanish government and who at the last moment had shamelessly shifted allegiance. They were all set to declare the provinces separated from Argentina and Peru and become independent. This was not because of Patriotic and civic considerations, but because in an independent Charcas they would be the masters. From the outset the Assembly was guided by two men, José Mariano Serrano and Casimiro Olañeta. They were the power and the giants of the meetings. As the final result was a foregone conclusion the sessions from July 10 to August 6, when independence was declared, were hardly exciting and colorful, but rather dull and pedantic. Olañeta and Serrano engaged in bombastic and grandiloquent oratory that was silly and ridiculous. A few sensible speeches were heard, such as the one from a delegate of La Paz by the name of Gutiérrez, who opposed separation with solid arguments. A delegate from Potosí, Manuel Montayo, read a speech in which he defended separation and independence on clear and well argued grounds. As the delegates from Santa Cruz did not arrive until August 6 the Assembly had to postpone the final vote until this day, dragging out the meetings with repetitious speeches. On August 6 the great moment had come and the Assembly voted down union to Argentina unanimously, union with Lower Peru by forty-five to two, and then by an overwhelming majority declared the independence of Upper Peru.

The Declaration of Independence and Separation was written by Serrano with the aid of Olaneta, Urcullu and some others. It is a faulty piece of literature with grammatical errors and a style full of gongorismos and adulations. Bolivia had been created on paper but long years of struggle lay ahead to implement independence and separation. This complete history of the consolidation of the new republic remains to be written.

The decree of February 9, 1825, which called for an assembly to determine the future of the four provinces of Upper Peru, also embodied the electoral procedure for choosing its deputies. Each of the five provinces, La Paz, Santa Cruz, Potosí, Chuquisaca, and Cochabamba, were subdivided into partidos. Article two of the decree stipulated that each partido would elect one deputy to the assembly. The election procedure was simple and provided that in the capital of each partido the cabildo and all property owners who had an annual income of three hundred pesos or more should form a local assembly and elect the deputy that would represent the partido. The qualifications for a deputy were that he must be at least twenty-five years old and have a minimum income of eight hundred pesos a year and have resided in the partido no less than four years. The assembly of the partido must then certify the election of its delegate.¹ This electoral law was part of the decree of February 9, which was written by Sucre alone. It was an easy system, uncomplicated and fairly liberal for the time, which brought the election down to the provincial level with no extravagant property qualifications.

Unfortunately this amateurish and unsophisticated procedure was later changed and elaborated into a much more complex electoral system, seemingly written by a shrewd expert in political procedure. It was still part of the February decree and simply constituted an amendment or elaboration of the original and basic decree worked out by the Marshal. The provision for one delegate for each partido was changed to one to three, according to the relative importance of the provinces. In this way each partido in Potosí was to name three delegates while the provinces

of La Paz and Cochabamba were given only two for each of their partidos, and Chuquisaca and Santa Cruz were awarded one. This could have been a deserved improvement but it had as a consequence that Potosí, the most strongly Royalist province, had the largest representation, while more populous Cochabamba and the valleys of Chuquisaca, strongpoints of the guerrilla forces, were not adequately represented in comparison. The system of electing the representatives to the Assembly was made much more complicated and by indirect election. First there were to be held parochial elections within each parish, by all citizens with the prescribed income, who would choose four electors. After this all the parish electors within a partido would meet in the capital of the partido and elect from their midst a certain number of electors representing them. These new electors would then go to the capital of the province where all the electors of the partidos would assemble and elect the stipulated number of deputies allowed to that province. The qualifications for the representatives were now changed to read that they had to be resident only of the province as a whole rather than of the various partidos. In all it was a three times removed election: parish, partido and province, and although the number of deputies was based on the partido, the final selection was made from the entire province.² In this way the preponderance of the small villages and populated countryside with its plain people of grass roots ideas and guerrilla habits was eliminated as the predominant factor in the election and enabled the dos caras elements to be elected deputies. Who wrote this complicated and shrewd electoral law remains unknown. But it is easy to deduce that it probably

was elaborated by the two Upper Peruvian aides who accompanied Sucre from Puno to Potosí, Casimiro Olaneta and Mariano Calvimontes. Olaneta's experience on the Audiencia made him an expert in these political refinements, a trait that Sucre lacked completely.

The Assembly met on July 10 in Chuquisaca, and not on April 29 in Oruro as stipulated in the February decree. This delay was due to a number of reasons, especially the sudden coolness of Bolívar to the calling of the Assembly until the delicate question of Argentina's right of control over Charcas had been more thoroughly studied.³ A further reason was that the province of Potosí, which would send the largest delegation to the Assembly, was in the enemy's hands until the first days of April,⁴ therefore not permitting an election in this department on the specified days but only in late April.⁵ The meeting of the Assembly was postponed several times,⁶ and on June 3 Marshal Sucre gave up the idea of holding it in Oruro, because too many delegates had protested that the climate and high altitude of the city was not propitious for an intensive debate. He decided that the Assembly should be held in Chuquisaca on June 24.⁷ The original idea of holding the meeting in Oruro was a good one and would have taken the debate away from the oppressive Royalist environment of the capital, a strongpoint of the dos caras faction. Perhaps they were responsible for engineering the transfer, but more probably the bad climate of Oruro was an honest impediment to holding the meetings there. Further delay because of the lack of a quorum was responsible for the sessions not starting until July 10, 1825.⁸

Whether the forty-eight delegates were elected honestly in strict accordance with the law remains an unanswered question, due to the absence of primary material, especially on the provincial level. The electoral law was restrictive in nature and the huge department of Santa Cruz could send only two delegates because in the large partidos of Cordillera and Chiquitos not a single man could be found who qualified for the position of deputy. These partidos, because of their universal illiteracy, were unable to even name the necessary electors.⁹ Some irregularities did take place in La Paz, but the facts were ~~suppressed~~ by the Assembly.¹⁰ But the Marshal did his utmost to have clean elections. He wrote to the commanders of the provinces to watch for any irregularities and he made them personally responsible for seeing that the electoral law was obeyed strictly.¹¹ To the commander of Cochabamba he said that "the election must be free so that the people have no complaint."¹² He wrote his officers to punish severely and dismiss any provincial or parochial officials who exerted pressure in the elections.¹³ When finally the day had come that the meetings were ready to start, Sucre left Chuquisaca with his army so that the Assembly might deliberate far away from the United Army and no one could say that Sucre had intervened through persuasion or coercion.¹⁴ He was sincere in the belief that the Upper Peruvian delegates should decide the future of their lands on their own, without any advice from outsiders. On July 1, after delaying his trip many times¹⁵ because the Assembly had continuously postponed its inauguration, the Marshal and his army left Chuquisaca for Cochabamba.¹⁶ Everything was ready for the great inauguration.

Finally after many delays and obstacles the long awaited Assembly was opened on July 10 in the city of Chuquisaca, capital of the old Viceroyalty of Charcas. The meetings were held in the assembly hall of the old, great, famous and respectable house of studies known as the Royal and Pontifical University of San Francisco Xavier. This institution of higher learning was the intellectual center, not only of the extensive territory of the Audiencia of Charcas, but of the huge Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata. From these same halls sixteen years earlier had come the cry of independence and the University was the cradle of subversion which produced such leaders as Mariano Moreno, Monteagudo, Castelli and all the great generation of 1809. Finally after many years of war the struggle had come to an end and again the halls of the University served as host to an assembly of men who wanted to deliberate about the future of Charcas. But these men were different from the generation of 1809, who had given their lives for the cause they upheld, but did not see materialize.

Thirty-nine delegates were present at the inauguration, and nine were absent and had not yet arrived in the capital.¹⁷ Among their midst were such names and dos caras as Casimiro Olaneta, Manuel María Urcullu, Angel Mariano Moscoso and José Mariano Serrano, the only survivor of the generation of 1809 because he lacked conviction and became a dos caras. Almost all the other delegates were obscure people who are unknown in the annals of the War of Independence and who probably were subservient to the doings of the dos caras. Of the forty-eight delegates only two had the distinction of being veterans of the war. Miguel Lanza and José

Miguel Ballivián were delegates from La Paz and their records were unblemished, especially that of Lanza.¹⁸ Most of the delegates were returning to their alma mater, the University, and held the doctoral degree from this studious and highly sophisticated institution. A careful investigation of the records of the University and the tax records, since each graduate had to pay a specific fee, reveals that thirty of the forty-eight representatives graduated from the University of San Francisco.¹⁹ But since the University archives as well as the tax records are incomplete it can be assumed that out of the eighteen non-graduates it is possible that a few might also have studied at the University. The preponderance of the University in preparing the environment for the War of Independence is an established and known fact. The influence of the University of San Francisco in the emergence of Bolivia is less known, but it is an undisputable fact. But there is no relation between the generation of 1809 which was patriotic and idealistic in thought and the generation of 1825 which was of ex-Royalist allegiance and Machiavellist in their doings. It was an assembly of doctores who never had the welfare of the people at heart, but rather were motivated by hopes of personal gain. Casimiro Olañeta, José Mariano Serrano and Manuel María Urcullu were the prototypes of this class and they became the giants and leaders of the Assembly. The other doctores only followed their lead in most instances.

The first part of the day was dedicated to voting on the credentials of all the delegates and determining if they were the legally elected deputies of their partidos. A preparatory commission had already

examined the certifications of the delegates and found everyone in perfect order. The Assembly in full accepted the recommendations of the commission and all of the thirty-nine delegates present were seated. The same procedure was followed with the rules which also were accepted, as worked out by an advance committee. After having terminated this routine, always necessary in any assembly, the delegates voted to name the president of the Assembly and José Mariano Serrano, the famous dos caras who had resided in Salta during the war, was elected.²⁰ Serrano had been named by Marshal Sucre before his departure as provisional president of the Assembly, in order that someone might act as leader in the beginning minutes of the first day.²¹ This sole intervention by Sucre was enough to gain the permanent presidential chair of the Assembly for Serrano. Jose María Mendizábal from La Paz, who was a priest and who had been an ardent Royalist, holding a responsible position in the Holy Office,²² was named vice-president. Manuel María Urcullu was chosen to write down and edit the minutes of the Assembly's deliberations.²³ Thanks to Urcullu's pen the actions and discussions of the delegates were passed on to posterity, and the originals are today deposited in a safe of the Banco Central in La Paz. But Urcullu was careful not to write down the heated debates, therefore altering the real truth.²⁴ Doctor Angel Moscoso and Doctor Ignacio Sanjinés were elected as secretaries to aid President Serrano in his multifold duties. These people were chosen unanimously and had seemingly been agreed upon by the dominant dos caras faction beforehand. It should be noted that Casimiro Olañeta was not elected to any post, which was in keeping with his professed policy of

shying away from responsible positions and handling matters from behind the scenes. That Olañeta was the power and unofficial leader of the Assembly was a fact accepted by Sucre and which he indirectly pointed out to Bolívar.²⁵

The next act was for the executive delegates to take the oath of office, and as no precedent existed, it was decided that the President was to be sworn in by the Vice-President and then the Vice-President was to be sworn in by the newly sworn President.²⁶ Serrano and Mendizábal were asked to swear that they would uphold the Catholic religion and fulfill their duties as delegates to the Assembly and to keep secrecy when this was demanded by vote. The secretaries took the same oath before the President. After this Serrano delivered his inaugural speech. It was a pompous speech and of baroque style.²⁷ The President asked:

Where is the fatal monster surrounded by injustice, ambition and fanaticism which has converted these provinces into a city of tyranny, a place of blood and a symbol of slavery? Where is the iniquitous power which desolated our lands, burned our villages, put in mourning our families and dared to think that its ominous power was eternal? I ask these questions and then receive this pleasant answer, that from the Gulf of Darien to the Amazon, from the Amazon to the Rimac, from the Rimac to the Desaguadero, from the Desaguadero to the Maule, from the Maule to the La Plata, the free people in one ardent and respectful cry respond that Bolívar and Sucre have destroyed forever the Lion of Iberia and have wrested from its terrible clutches the lands of the Perus and made unshakable the cherished liberties in all the continent of Columbus.²⁸

The subsequent words of the President were as pointless and bombastic as his beginning sentences, and he did not express any constructive thought nor did he define the purpose and importance of this assembly. The presi-

dent terminated his address by asking the delegates that they always "conserve the purity of the fire of liberty, confirm the hatred for the tyrant and tyranny and behave in order, justice and constancy in order to build the happiness of our constituents and their descendants."²⁹ The hypocrisy of Serrano's words reflected the hypocrisy of his past career.

Once he terminated his speech the President declared the Assembly of the Upper Peruvian provinces officially inaugurated. It was then decided to name a commission of five delegates which would go to the cathedral to give thanks and ask for divine inspiration. The committee left the assembly room and crossed the spacious plaza where they were joined by the various town guilds³⁰ and then entered with solemn dignity into the huge cathedral, an impressive monument made of solid stone but "without defined style."³¹ A high mass was then celebrated and the "Doctoral Doctor," Pedro Brito,³² delivered from the beautiful pulpit of the Holy Spirit an intense and majestic religious and patriotic sermon. At the moment of the elevation of the Holy Eucharist a deafening artillery discharge and ringing of all the bells of the many churches of Chuquisaca thundered and rang through the calm air of this festive day.³³ The religious ceremony finished, the commission, still accompanied by the guilds and surrounded by the many curious onlookers, returned to the halls of the University where the President and the remaining delegates proclaimed an open house for the many guests and spectators. Distinguished citizens of the capital took this opportunity to express to the Assembly and its President their best wishes for success. Serrano was busy expressing his gratitude and assuring the en-

thusiastic citizens that they could be confident that the fate of their homeland was in qualified hands.³⁴

After the public demonstration had come to an end the Assembly gathered to listen to the speech that Marshal Sucre had left to be read. It was a substantial speech of around five thousand words and in contrast with Serrano's address, was simple, straightforward, candid, businesslike, and of great maturity and honesty.³⁵ The Marshal outlined to the Assembly the reasons why he had issued the February 9 decree. He thought that although it might appear that by issuing a call for the Assembly he had usurped some power, this was a necessity because of the "complicated circumstances."³⁶ He then explained why the meeting of the Assembly had to be postponed from April until July, and he hoped that it was justified. In the last part of the message the Marshal said that he must account to the legislators for the record of his short period of military government, from the time he crossed the Desaguadero River until the opening of the Assembly. With great honesty he then outlined his administrative actions, detailing his fiscal policy first. He emphasized that he had avoided any collection of taxes to support his army, and furthermore he had done his utmost to eliminate or reduce the abusive emergency war taxes that the Spaniards had levied. Step by step the Marshal told the legislators how in the period of five months, while he was fighting Olaneta, he had democratized and put the government of the Upper Peruvian provinces on a sound and businesslike basis. The Marshal was honest; indeed he was much too modest. In the more than one thousand letters located in the unknown copybooks of Sucre, complete

copies of which rest in the library of this author, a confirmation of the words of Sucre becomes only too evident. He really did much more than he told the legislators, but his modesty did not allow him to give more details. At the end of his administrative account Sucre told the Assembly that he was sorry that he had been unable to provide any public services during his short government, but that he had studied many possibilities of building schools and colleges, and he hoped that the new government would take advantage of his preliminary steps. He terminated his speech by saying that:

This is, gentlemen, my simple report of my operations since I passed the Desaguadero; it is written with the frankness of a soldier and my conduct has been submitted to your judgment. If you should approve I shall repose happily in the future; but if your kindness attributes to me some services to your fatherland, I say that they are not mine but are of the legislators of Colombia, to whom I owe my principles; to the Liberator, Bolívar, who has been my torch, and to the United Army, which is the protector of the good cause.³⁷

What the response was to this simple and straightforward speech from the Upper Peruvian doctores, with their love for subtle words, was not written in the record.³⁸ But as soon as the speech had been read Casimiro Olañeta stepped to the rostrum to deliver his address. Casimiro is today recognized as the greatest orator that Bolivia has ever produced. He swayed the masses with absolutely useless and senseless words that were full of patriotic ardor. His gestures, intonation, sharp look and imposing figure, in addition to his immaculate dress, were all designed to help his oratory. He never spoke from a prepared draft, and every word was completely spontaneous.³⁹ Unquestionably Olañeta was the

best orator in the hall and he surpassed Serrano in the ability to speak. The President's words were pompous but not persuasive, while Olaneta was pompous but convincing, and able to speak the language of his audience.⁴⁰ He could give a dirty and filthy speech, to make himself acceptable to the lower class disreputable elements,⁴¹ while in the next moment he could address the aristocracy with the words and ease of a perfect gentleman. Casimiro Olaneta was a great orator and a great demagogue. The record does not transcribe Olaneta's first speech to the Assembly, but says only that the energetic and youthful speaker asked the delegates to possess great moral fortitude in order to face the heavy task that confronted them.⁴²

After all this speechmaking Serrano announced that the Marshal had left with him the insignia of investiture of the president of the department (Chuquisaca) in order that the Assembly could elect the president, who would assume office during the days of deliberation. In this way Sucre wanted to remove any suspicion that he wished to interfere in the discussions through the president of the department. The delegates were delighted by this show of correctness, a magnanimity on the part of the Marshal, but as it was late in the day and everyone was hungry and tired, it was decided to postpone the election until the next day. The inaugural day had concluded⁴³ and probably the spirit of festivity, which the Gaceta de Chuquisaca in its first number, the first newspaper sheet in the history of Charcas, thought was an expression of "the patriotic enthusiasm" and resulted in "revolution of gaiety,"⁴⁴ continued into the late night. One should hardly believe that the gaiety was due to a deep sense of patriotism, but in Chuquisaca responsibilities were easily sacrificed for

enjoyment, and such an unusual occasion as the inauguration of an assembly to determine the destiny of its land was enough cause for everyone, foe and friend, to have a good time.

The final process of the birth of a new nation had started and the member of the Assembly were well aware of the importance of the moment. Yet these men who had come to debate about the future of Charcas, with the exception of one or two, did not deserve this honor. They were a group of demagogues who had usurped the seats that belonged to the veterans of the sixteen-year war and who had veiled their records of allegiance to the King. They had come to the halls of the University to debate their own personal future with complete disregard for the welfare of Charcas and its people. It was hardly the place to give from the rostrum a clean record and express an intense preoccupation with the progress of Upper Peru, as Sucre did, and ask the dos caras to judge his record. The Marshal had done more in five months than these people, once in power, would do in five decades. To the chuquisaqueños July 10, 1825, simply meant one more day of holiday and festivities that was part of their calendar of many days of rest and merriment.

The next two meetings of July 11 and 13 were of a preparatory nature. The Assembly chose General Santa Cruz, whom Sucre had left in charge until the Assembly would name a president, as the executive of Chuquisaca,⁴⁵ therefore respecting the choice of the Marshal. Santa Cruz, the eminent dos caras general, had been elected a deputy from La Paz, but he had refused to accept the honor because he considered himself a Lower Peruvian, and despised his native upper provinces.⁴⁶ Three more

late delegates had joined the meetings⁴⁷ and after the election of Santa Cruz as executive of the department it was decided to appoint several committees which would do some spade work. Among these was one which was requested to draft a dignified and worthwhile answer to the address of the Marshal.⁴⁸ Then came the touchy problem of how to proceed in the proper way in discussing and elaborating the crucial issue before the Assembly, the future status of Charcas. After long discussion, how heated is unknown due to the defective minutes of Urcullu, it was decided that this problem should not be referred to a committee but would be debated before the whole Assembly. Obviously some delegates had wished to name a committee which would study the problem and then present its findings and suggestions to the entire body. Once this faction, and who they were is again not known, had been defeated, one delegate suddenly rose and questioned the propriety and feasibility of debating this vital issue until the missing delegates from Santa Cruz had arrived. The delegate won his point and the Assembly decided to dismiss the meetings until the eighteenthth, five days later, with the hope that the representation from Santa Cruz would have arrived by then. But before suspending the meetings the delegates entered into a great debate about how they should be addressed. Finally modesty won over ambitious titles, and it was voted that they should be called Señor, but that President Serrano must be addressed as Excelencia, because this term had been used by Sucre in his communications to the Assembly. The executive members of the Assembly, such as the secretaries, should be given the title of Señoría. It was also decided by majority vote to employ two aides,⁴⁹ and someone suggested that they ought

to hire a janitor which everyone thought was a good idea. A certain Juan de Dios Campusano was proposed for the job and was accepted as suitable, and the delegates voted to give Juan a salary of twenty-five pesos a month. After this they went into a five-day recess.⁵⁰ It is said that the real reason for this recess was not the absence of the Santa Cruz members, but to allow time for backstage political maneuvering.⁵¹

The Assembly again convened on July 18 and began to tackle the problem of the future organization and jurisdiction of Charcas. Serrano was the one who opened the debate; he stepped down from the presidential chair and asked Vice-President Mendizábal to preside. The President, who had resided many years in the United Provinces and had been the author of the Declaration of Independence of 1816 at the Congress of Tucumán, now came out for the separation of Upper Peru from other political jurisdictions, which meant Argentina and Lower Peru. Serrano gave powerful geographic and ethnological reasons why the inner provinces should become independent. He brought out that the long anarchy reigning in the lower provinces certainly was not inviting for reunion. As the record does not transcribe these speeches, except to outline the main thoughts, the historian is at a loss to reconstruct the exact ideas of the speaker. Seemingly Serrano, in this first speech in favor of separation and the creation of an independent nation, already hinted that the most powerful reason to justify separation was the necessity of a proper political balance among the new nations in South America. By this Serrano implied that if the inner provinces would join either the United Provinces or Lower Peru, it would mean the strengthening of one at the expense of the other, and would

cause serious disturbances. Indeed this later became the single most important and immediate reason for the separation of Charcas. It was a realization that Upper Peru must become a buffer between the Bolivarian nations and Argentina. If Serrano outlined this point with clarity, which is doubtful, he showed excellent foresight and put the separation of Charcas upon a sound and practical premise. This realization of the balance of power politics was recognized by Argentina and Peru, and therefore they did not deter the independence of these provinces. The record also states that the President took issue with some of the objections that might arise against separation, but the recorder did not tell what these objections were.⁵² Serrano finished his speech by indicating that he had expressed his sincere convictions, but that if the Assembly should decide against separation the provinces should join Argentina rather than Peru.⁵³ This was naturally a logical thought because of the President's long residence in the lower provinces.

The next speaker was Casimiro Olañeta who, although he did not occupy any distinguished position, had taken the liberty of delivering a speech on the inaugural day. Now he was again the first to rush to the rostrum to follow the President. Serrano and Olañeta were the two giants of the Assembly.⁵⁴ Casimiro too, as was natural, came out decisively in favor of separation, and he explained with great ardor to his attentive audience that the provinces possessed all the ingredients for independent life. Then the young man said that not only had Charcas the economic wealth necessary for a successful new country, but also would produce "great men for the administration and state leadership."⁵⁵ Olañeta, by

saying that in Upper Peru leaders would emerge that could guide the destiny of the new nation, was indirectly referring to his own ambition. He wanted independence for Charcas because in this way he would become its leader. If the provinces should join either Argentina or Peru Olañeta's effectiveness would vanish, since his influence in Buenos Aires and Lima was negligible. In this second speech to the Assembly Casimiro showed his personal ambition which was the guiding motive in his fight for separation since 1823. Politely but firmly Olañeta argued with the President's assertion that if separation was voted down the provinces should vote for union with Argentina.⁵⁶ To Olañeta there was no other solution than separation permissible. With Serrano and Olañeta taking the lead in favoring separation, the final decision of the Assembly was a foregone conclusion.⁵⁷

Although the creation of a separate and independent Upper Peru was an inevitable result the dos caras leaders had no intention of rushing the final vote through the Assembly. They wished to give an outward appearance of a long, thoughtful and democratic debate. President Serrano, who at the same time was the incognito editor⁵⁸ of the absurd Gaceta de Chuquisaca, wrote that the vital question of organization of the provinces was an "enormous task" which had to be discussed, "thinking thoroughly about the most minute and imperceptible combinations." The editor thought that the Assembly did not want to "construct a building on a base of sand."⁵⁹ All these were words which under impartial historical analysis fade into nothing. Most of the delegates wished separation because the new country they advocated would be under their leadership, and

they wanted to perpetuate the old system. As one honest Bolivian writer says, the only ones who would harvest fruits from separation and independence "were the doctores and godos" and these were the ones who played the game of "intrigue in the assembly of 1825."⁶⁰ But as doctores intri-
gantes they had to talk and debate, even though they had an unanimous idea, and because they debated, Serrano wrote that he thought that this august assembly "should be the school where the democratic governments could learn to combine the elements of their existence."⁶¹ Yet not all of the delegates wished separation, but the number of those opposed was so small they had no voice or influence.

Again in the next session of July 21 the two giants, Serrano and Olaneta, monopolized the rostrum and spoke in favor of separation. It now became a struggle of oratory between the two and each wanted to impress the Assembly with his superior knowledge and more intense patriotic feelings. In the previous session Serrano had spoken for separation, but had said that union with Argentina was the second best solution. Then Olaneta had taken issue with the President's weakened attitude for separation. Now in this fifth session Serrano thought that Olaneta had implied some shortcomings that might be the consequence of an independent Charcas. Had Casimiro Olaneta really done this? The records do not say a single word, but give the impression that young Casimiro had insisted all the way through that separation was necessarily the only acceptable solution.⁶² Yet Serrano by implication accused Casimiro Olaneta of having given a vague speech and having used double talk, from which he inferred that the young man had hinted that an independent Charcas would create such problems as

defense, lack of a governmental bureaucracy, antagonism of the United Provinces, and the impossibility of defending itself against the ambitions of the Holy Alliance. Serrano proceeded to debate each of these objections, and then outlined in detail many more reasons why he thought the provinces should not join Argentina or Peru. Serrano concluded his long speech by requesting the delegates to realize that independence of Upper Peru was the most feasible solution, but that they should depart from the United Provinces in a spirit of brotherhood, just as two brothers who depart from their parents' house, each one to take care of his own family, but always remaining good brothers and desiring each other's mutual happiness. As soon as Serrano finished Olañeta demanded the floor and probably refuted Serrano's accusation and demanded more strongly than ever the separation of the provinces. Then with great emotion he asked the delegates and the people of Charcas to recall the long abandonment of Charcas by the United Provinces during the war, leaving them to fight the Spanish forces alone. Here Olañeta hit a sore spot, the great obstacle that made it impossible for Argentina to demand the provinces now, since Charcas had liberated itself and defeated the Spanish forces by its own efforts.⁶³ Not even the Bolivarian army had had to shoot a single rifle against the enemy. The Serrano-Olañeta oratory was getting ridiculous, since each one tried to outdo the other, and appear more patriotic before the assembly of ex-godos.

Finally after Olañeta had concluded, the delegate from La Paz, Eusebio Gutiérrez, asked to be recognized as the next speaker, and in a vigorous speech he opposed separation and insisted that the provinces

should join Lower Peru. Unfortunately the record does not detail this first speech of a minority member, whom Argüedas calls "upright, cautious and observing,"⁶⁴ but only says that Gutiérrez thought that the provinces "lacked political virtues, true patriotism, civic enterprise and elements of security" necessary to become an independent nation. How the delegates received the speech of Gutiérrez remains a matter of speculation since Urcullu did not record it.⁶⁵ The fact that the speaker came from La Paz is a powerful reason for his wanting union with Lower Peru. La Paz was always more inclined toward Lima, Cuzco and Arequipa than Chuquisaca, and the city was a geographical part of the Titicaca basin. Gutiérrez was followed by one of the worst and most disreputable doctores of Charcas, Angel Mariano Moscoso, who with his three brothers represented the most vicious dos caras mentality.⁶⁶ Delegate Moscoso took issue with Gutiérrez and thought that the provinces had every imaginable element required for a successful independent life. He insisted that Charcas had not only the physical and political attributes but also possessed intellectual maturity which was a great asset for separation. With the Moscoso speech finished, the fifth session came to an end, and so far only the home delegates from Chuquisaca had spoken, with the exception of the daring speech by Gutiérrez. Olañeta and Serrano were willing to let many more days of debate pass before the final vote.

The next day the delegates assembled for their sixth session and again the whole day was dedicated to continuing the debate.⁶⁷ The first speaker produced a somewhat unexpected surprise. Vice-President Mendizábal, a deputy from La Paz, born in the United Provinces and grad-

uated from the University of San Francisco Xavier in theology,⁶⁸ came out against separation and favored union with Lower Peru. Mendizábal thought that Charcas lacked enough resources, especially a good seaport, and that the two Perus complemented each other and would make a powerful nation. Mendizábal was completely accurate in this line of reasoning, and nearly one century later the Spanish scholar, Carlos Badia Malagrida, in his superb study, El factor geográfico en la política sudamericana,⁶⁹ showed with a scientific and scholarly mind what Mendizábal had already suggested in Bolivia's first national assembly. But Mendizábal was not intellectually honest, and he never presented his case with the forcefulness and dedication of his fellow delegate, Gutiérrez. The Vice-President said that this was only a suggestion and oratorical exercise and that in the end he might vote against union with Lower Peru and come out in favor of separation.⁷⁰ Seemingly Mendizábal was unfolding his acquired Upper Peruvian mentality of never talking straight, but toying with all causes and ideas. Mendizábal suggested that a commission be appointed to study the resources of the provinces and compare them with the probable expenditures. The Vice-President thought that by comparing income with expenditures one could find out if the inner provinces possessed the necessary economic resources to become an expanding nation.

Again Olañeta demanded the floor, and in strong terms assailed the assertion of Gutiérrez that Charcas did not have the necessary civic spirit and patriotism to qualify as an independent nation. He then thought that Mendizábal's objections were groundless and that the Vice-President's request for a commission to study the economy of the provinces

was unfeasible because they had not yet organized the fiscal administration. Casimiro was wrong in this assertion and he knew it, because Marshal Sucre had thought that this issue would come up and on June 31, the day before his departure from Chuquisaca, had sent to Serrano a letter with an enclosure listing the income and expenditures of each of the provinces in great detail. The Marshal noted that deficit financing could be expected as long as the interest on the loans negotiated by the Spanish authorities were honored.⁷¹ Probably because of the unpromising picture of the Marshal's financial account, Olañeta and Serrano suppressed the document and did not present it to the Assembly.

Gutierrez again took the floor and reaffirmed his position, and added that the capital of the Perus ought to be in Cuzco or Arequipa, since Lima was too far from Charcas. Gutierrez was quite correct in this demand, and already half a century earlier the great intendent of Potosí, Pino Manrique, an outstanding personality of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, had asked the crown to transfer the capital of the viceroyalty to Cuzco, which would bring unity to the two Perus.⁷³ René-Moreno thought that if Pino Manrique's advice had been followed, an independent Upper Peru would have emerged.⁷⁴ But Gutierrez' speech was a voice in the desert. He was followed by Doctor Enríquez, a delegate from Potosí, who spoke in favor of an independent Charcas, but suggested that the Bolivarian army should guarantee the sovereignty of the new nation for a certain time and see to it that anarchy and civil war would not develop. Delegate Centeno from Cochabamba concurred in this idea and insisted that the protection of the Bolivarian army was needed for a long time. With

this speech another session came to an end, without any hint of when the delegates would vote on the vital issue of separation, or union with Argentina or Peru. The two delegates from Santa Cruz had not yet arrived and seemingly no vote would be taken until they had reached Chuquisaca and expressed their opinions.

The next day the great debate was continued.⁷⁵ The Assembly voted down the motion of Mendizábal to have a committee study the economic and fiscal potentials of Charcas. A long list of delegates stepped to the rostrum and all of them spoke in favor of separation.⁷⁶ Of these, Arellano from Potosí gave the most chauvinistic oration by implying that the people of Charcas were of superior quality and therefore could not belong to another nation. Delegate Porda from Cochabamba thought that because the provinces had belonged to the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata when the war started was no reason why they should belong to the United Provinces now, since the colonial demarcations were a product of an authority that had vanished by defeat. Porda was followed by Mr. Montoya from Potosí who gave one of the most sensible and clear speeches, because he put the need for separation and an independent Upper Peru upon a pragmatic basis. Charcas should become an independent nation because this was the best political expediency in the touchy game of international politics. Montoya said that he thought that the provinces had all the necessary ingredients to become an independent state. But even more important, Charcas needed to become a separate nation because should the provinces join lower Peru it would cause the enmity of the United Provinces, and Argentina would not rest in its effort to detach the provinces from Peru.

Should Charcas join the United Provinces exactly the same would happen with Peru. In both cases the provinces would suffer constant fear of an attack by one of their neighbors. The only way to avoid this dilemma was not to join either of them, but to create an equilibrium between Peru and Argentina. This argument was sound and acknowledged reality.⁷⁷ What Montoya did not foresee was that if independent, the provinces would always be an easy prey for Argentina or Peru.⁷⁸ Not until 1842 did Bolivia consolidate her independence, because she had to fight constant efforts at reintegration by Peru and Argentina.

The eighth session⁷⁹ was a continuation of the previous meetings and one by one the delegates delivered their speeches, insisting on separation and repeating old arguments. Delegate Sanjines, secretary of the Assembly and another doctor of Charcas,⁸⁰ thought that Upper Peru possessed all the elements, animal, vegetable and mineral, in quantity and abundance to become an independent nation. He finished his speech with a novel and original idea by reminding his fellow delegates that should they join one of their neighbors it would later be impossible to separate from this union, should they find it detrimental to their well being. But if they became an independent nation and later realized that this was a wrong step, it would be easy to join Argentina or Peru. What the delegate from Potosí suggested was that they would lose nothing if they tried separation as an experiment. The next speaker also came from Potosí, and Mr. Trujillo thought that they should become independent but leave a provision for the possibility of federation with their neighbors. Delegate Garcia

from Potosi believed that the reasons expounded by Montoya in the previous session were correct and that he concurred with them. This was the day for the populous delegation from Potosi to monopolize the rostrum, since García was followed by another potosino, Tapia, who also believed that the policy of a buffer state between Peru and Argentina was the only feasible solution for Charcas, because otherwise the provinces would be exposed to constant trouble.

The next, and last, speaker was again President Serrano, who addressed the Assembly in a long and detailed speech.⁸¹ He said that it was absurd that the provinces should join Lower Peru because that country had a constitution full of "great vices," such as a single chamber legislature. The President then went into much detail about this constitution, and the gist of his objection was that the executive was subservient to the legislature. He thought, too, that a United States of Peru was hardly possible, and that there was a great difference between the mentality of the people of the United States and those of the Perus. Serrano thought that the provinces possessed an adequate port in Cobija (between Antofagasta and Tocopilla), which could be built up, with some expense. After this the President continued to debate all the objections that had been brought against separation during the many days of discussion. He concluded his address by saying, indeed with great foresight, that the only real danger in the creation of a new country was anarchy, but that this could be avoided by the abnegation and patriotism of its leaders. And since the provinces had before them an example of what anarchy could do, in the United Provinces, it was hardly imaginable that

they would want to imitate this neighbor.

This was the last speech in the long but uninteresting and colorless debate on the future of Charcas. It was then decided that the issue had received enough discussion and someone moved that in view of the overwhelming feeling in favor of separation and independence of the provinces the debate should be terminated, and a commission appointed to write the Declaration of Independence. The proposal was seconded and passed with a great majority. The commission was then named without opposition and the delegates appointed were Serrano, Olañeta, Urcullu and Dalence from Chuquisaca, Manuel Mariano Centeno from Cochabamba, and Vice-President Mendizabal and Jose María de Azín from La Paz. Each one of them was a dos caras and had received his degree from the University of San Francisco Xavier. The two veterans of the war, Lanza and Ballivián, never had voiced their opinions and the record does not transcribe a single speech or suggestion by them.

While the commission was drawing up the Declaration of Independence, the Assembly dealt with some minor matters. On August 1 it held its first secret meeting because the credentials of the missing Santa Cruz delegates had been submitted and there was an accusation that they had been elected by fraud. In its secret meeting the Assembly reviewed the credentials and no conclusion was reached, but it was decided that the Santa Cruz delegates should be given their seats.⁸² In its public sessions of August 1 and 3 the Assembly discussed vehemently a proposal presented by Casimiro Olañeta and supported by Urcullu, that the delegates should draw a salary. It was finally voted that the members

should receive a salary of two thousand pesos a year and that those from La Paz and Santa Cruz, because of the distance, should be given an additional two hundred pesos for travel expenses. But it was stipulated that those who drew another salary of over two thousand pesos should not be eligible for the pay. The new law also said that it was left up to the honesty of the delegates to declare their other income, therefore they themselves would have to decide if they could draw their salary as members of the Assembly.⁸³

On August 3, 1825, in the Assembly's tenth session, the commission finished its task of writing the Declaration of Independence, but due to the continued absence of the delegates from Santa Cruz the great moment in which the provinces would declare themselves independent was again postponed.⁸⁴ This session and the next of August 4 dealt with the touchy problem of how to enter into negotiations with Bolívar.⁸⁵ This last session was partially secret and it was decided to name a commission in the near future that would meet with Bolívar and request his approval for separation. Several projects were presented by Vice-President Mendi-
zabal, including one to name the new country "Bolívar."⁸⁷ Its approval, although unopposed, was delayed until after the Declaration of Independence was officially voted upon and passed.

On August 6, the day of the first anniversary of Junín, a year after the provinces were in the midst of the Separatist War, the delegates assembled for the great moment in order to vote and proclaim the separation of Charcas from any other jurisdiction and become a sovereign nation.⁸⁸ This act should have taken place earlier but not until this-

this day had the delegate from Santa Cruz, Antonio Vicente Seoane y Royle⁸⁹ arrived in the Assembly. Serrano gave the official welcome to Seoane and then informed him of what they had done and discussed in the previous meetings. Seoane then gave a short speech in which he said that he was in favor of separation and independence of the provinces and that Santa Cruz had fought valiantly for the Patriotic cause during the whole war. Unquestionably a thunderous applause was given to the delegate who had come from the far away east.

Finally the high point was reached. The President announced that he would step down from the presidential chair as they now would vote whether separation, union with the United Provinces or union with Lower Peru was the wish and vote of the provinces. Serrano thought that as he had been a most active member in the discussions, someone more impartial, who had not engaged in the long debate, should take his place in order to count the vote. General Miguel Lanza, the great guerrilla leader and only veteran of distinction in the Assembly, was invited to take over the Presidency during this sublime moment. Lanza deserved this honor and this was the only honestly patriotic act of the Assembly of turncoat godos. Lanza announced the first choice to be voted on, that the departments of Upper Peru join the United Provinces. One by one each of the forty-seven delegates announced his vote of "no." Not a single delegate voted in favor of this proposition. This was the sterile harvest that the La Plata provinces collected for their years of blunders and abandonment. Then Lanza, in his hoarse and unpolished military voice, read the second proposition

to be voted on: that the provinces of Charcas join the republic of Lower Peru. Again the loud sound of noes echoed in the gilded hall,⁹⁰ but when the President called the name of Eusebio Gutiérrez from La Paz, for the first time, in a clear voice, the word "sí" was heard. The hope that separation would be approved by an unanimous decision was spoiled by Gutiérrez' unwavering conviction. Again the noes resounded and then there was a tense moment when Lanza called the name of Jose Maria Mendizabal, the Vice-President, who in his initial speech had favored union with Peru but had said that he was not sure if this was an honest patriotic conviction. Mendizabal, with his voice of a great orator, clearly said "no." Historical imagination allows one to say that a loud cheer rang through the long and narrow hall. But one more "sí" was heard when the delegate, Juan Manuel Velarde from La Paz, joined his colleague Gutiérrez in voting in favor of union of the Perus. The final vote was forty-five to two.

The great moment came when Lanza announced the third proposition that "the departments of Upper Peru declare themselves a sovereign state independent from all other nations in the old and new world."⁹¹ It was a foregone conclusion that this would carry by an overwhelming majority, but even so it was a tense moment. Casimiro Olañeta's, José Mariano Serrano's and Manuel María Urcullu's great intrigue was to come to its victorious fulfillment. Each one of the delegates said "sí" in a loud and clear voice and only two noes were counted. By a vote of forty-five to two the independence of Upper Peru was declared on Saturday, August 6, in the beautiful assembly hall of the University of San Francisco Xavier. Not a single chronicler has written in detail what happened on this mem-

orable day, and the historian must rely on the sketchy and badly written assembly record.⁹² It is unknown if the Assembly, after the vote, had a period of great rejoicing and applause. The record says that after the vote the secretary, Moscoso, rushed to the rostrum and read the Declaration of Independence that had been written by the committee appointed for this task. It is said that the author was José Mariano Serrano,⁹³ who in 1816 had written a similar document, the Declaration of Independence of the United Provinces. The document, even the patriotic historians admit, was defective in style⁹⁴ and even in grammar.⁹⁵ It was a pompous and bombastic piece of literature⁹⁶ which started by saying, "That the lion of Iberia furiously jumping from the columns of Hercules to the empires of Montezuma and Atahualpa, has for many centuries torn to pieces the unfortunate body of America and nourished itself from the substance of the continent." The many lines that followed were an explanation, quite absurd, of the plight of Charcas during the War of Independence. It categorically affirmed that no other region in America had been exploited and tyrannized as thoroughly as Upper Peru, and that Spain even "profaned the altars and attacked the dogma and insulted the worship." This sounded exactly like one of General Olañeta's separatist and absolutist proclamations. But after all, those were written by Casimiro Olañeta and Urcullu and these two ^{were} members of the commission that wrote the Declaration of Independence. The document has such words as Sparta, Indostan, Manco-Capac, Ylotas, Mijeros, Ojandalam, Caribes; and such phrases as "dessicated hand of Iberia; a nervous and great manifestation of solid fundamentals; ferocious lands; torrents of tears." In-

deed horrible style and words, and René-Moreno was right when he said that Serrano only knew how to write "miserable ballads"⁹⁷ that echoed hideously from Churuquilla, a steep hill, at the foot of which is Chuquisaca. The echo then came back saying, "The Serranos, the great Olañetas, the Urcullus...history and the heavens are full of them and the acumen which is held by their skulls."⁹⁸ And René-Moreno added, Serrano was not the father of the nation but the father of the "rhymed adulation."⁹⁹

The document was divided into two parts, with a statement of supposed facts, and then began saying, "We have arrived by unanimous vote in determining the following DECLARATION" which contained the proclamation of independence and separation of the Upper Peruvian provinces. The crucial paragraph was a monstrous sentence of 290 words without a single period and might even defy the most expert translators. There are again such phrases as "the immense weight of our responsibility with heaven and earth; imploring full of submission and respectful ardor; the paternal assistance of the Holy Maker of the orb; the miserable power of King Ferdinand VII, corroborated a thousand times with the blood of his sons." The decisive sentences read:

The provinces of Upper Peru erect themselves into a sovereign state independent from all nations in the old world as well as in the new. The departments of Upper Peru, strong and united in this just and unanimous resolution, protest to the whole earth that their irrevocable will is to govern themselves, and be governed by a constitution, laws and authorities chosen by them and which they believe is more conducive to the future happiness of their [new] nation.¹⁰⁰

All the other sentences in the Declaration were useless, ugly and of cheap

words. This proclamation was signed by all forty-eight delegates, including the two from La Paz who originally had voted for union with Lower Peru. They decided, or were persuaded, to put their signatures on the great document in order to make the final record of independence and separation unanimous.

Indeed it was a queer document and one Bolivian author, devoid of historical perspective, says that the deputies of the Assembly were all "animated by the most intense civic fervor."¹⁰¹ Yet this same writer has to admit that the proclamation of independence "denotes poor concepts and [has] a profusion of rimbombante phrases, which can be attributed to the level of culture of those who wrote it."¹⁰² This is quite right because the document written by Serrano with the help of Olañeta, Urcullu and other doctores, is a most perfect expression of the double edge and revolving characters of the alumni of the University of San Francisco Xavier with their false adulations. Their mouthpiece was Casimiro Olañeta, who in 1825 was wasting no ink to embellish Sucre, and who in 1828 threw filthy and moody words against the Marshal. In 1829 he repeated the same game with Santa Cruz, and he wrote him that he "did not know that any man could deny his blood"¹⁰³ for such a just and virtuous man as he. Olañeta said to the new president of Bolivia that he would prove his friendship by being willing and sure to give his life for this just and great man.¹⁰⁴ Then he asked Santa Cruz to have many children because Bolivia needed virtuous descendants from such an upright man.¹⁰⁵ In 1840 when Olañeta had left the defeated General, in many pamphlets he thundered against this evil man, Santa Cruz, whom he called among other things, a "master of

intrigues" and possessed of a "hypocritical patriotism."¹⁰⁶ This same Casimiro Olañeta, who turned against every president and his own benefactors, and who died peacefully in bed at an advanced age, wrote in 1838 an essay unknown to historians, which he entitled Quam dulce es pro Patria mori.¹⁰⁷ Olañeta was the incarnation and blood of this Assembly which declared the independence of Bolivia. It was not a reunion of civic minded men, but of eternal turncoats with not a single atom of honesty and conviction.

The leftist Bolivian writer, Alipio Valencia Vega, says that the past actions and spoken words of the delegates of the first assembly created Bolivia because they wished to perpetuate their own reactionary, egoistic class, "and Casimiro Olañeta appears as the spokesman of this aspiration."¹⁰⁸ Carlos Montenegro, the intellectual father of modern radical Bolivian nationalism believed that the Assembly produced only a "fraud of the republican spirit"¹⁰⁹ and only Lanza and Ballivián, of the forty-eight delegates, represented the real epic as well as the people's will and desire for independence. But Lanza and Ballivián were submerged by the great wave of the Olañetas, Urcullus, Serranos and Moscosos and their subservient disciples, the many doctores of Chuquisaca who were "a fearful and lazy cast"¹¹⁰ who did not offer or do one single act for the good of the masses of Charcas. General Lanza in the midst of these dos caras was only the sad picture of a "truncated epic."¹¹¹ Yet Serrano wrote in his newspaper that one "should bless the authors of the Declaration of Independence of Upper Peru" because of their abnegation, patriotism and unimpeachable character.¹¹² To Rene-Moreno, Serrano and the other great

dos caras wished to compare themselves "to the skyline of the southern constellation,"¹¹³ so pure and so bright, untouchable and beautiful as those stars.

The emergence of Bolivia was a product of sixteen long years of revolution, war and intrigues. It was a logical and sensible conclusion which should have been achieved by the generation of 1809, the veterans of the war, the mestizos, the masses of Indians, the honest criollos such as Sucre and the patriotic Spaniards such as Arenales. But these were betrayed by the dishonest class which usurped its pure concepts and turned them to its own advantage. Herein lies one important factor of the many misfortunes of the future history of Bolivia. The creation of the Republic of Bolivar is a meritorious ^{no} case, but its immediate creators deserve to be despised rather than praised. The glory and credit belong to those who were absent from the Assembly and innocent of the great intrigue. Unquestionably Casimiro Olañeta in his own way was a great leader and genius in politics and scheming, but he was dishonest. Yet, because he had no historical perspective, he did not perpetuate his name in the pages of history. He is the greatest and most important of all Bolivian leaders and politicians. Hardly anyone could deny this. The creation of Bolivia is partially the story of Casimiro Olañeta.

On August 6, 1825, Upper Peru became an independent nation and this had taken sixteen painful years to achieve. But the Declaration of Independence and the separation were no final guarantee for lasting sovereignty, and now started the hardship of the implementation of the independence which again lasted seventeen years. This story is even more

colorful and full of plots than the previous sixteen years, and Casimiro Olañeta in the second epoch exhibited more maturity and less scruples. This period too, is the partial history of José Casimiro Olañeta. On Saturday, August 6, 1825, Bolivia began her life as an independent nation, and she was at the threshold of a terrible and frightening history.

NOTES

¹In Lecuna, D., I, 95.

²See Republica de Bolivia, Colección oficial de leyes, decretos . . . (La Paz, 1824), I, 1 ff.; Pinilla, Creacion, op. cit., 111; Paz, Historia, II, 634; Sucre to the Presidente de Potosí y Municipalidad de Chuquisaca, Potosí, April 2, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

³See supra, chap. 8.

⁴Memoria que el jeneral en jefe del ejercito libertador . . . presenta a la asamblea jeneral . . . (? Impr. del Ejercito [1825]), 4-5.

⁵Sucre to the President of Potosí and Municipality of Chuquisaca, Potosí, April 2, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁶Humberto Vázquez-Machicado, La creación de la nacionalidad boliviana (unpublished monograph); Sucre to the Presidente de la Junta Electoral de Oruro, Chuquisaca, June 11, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁷Sucre to the President of Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, June 3, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

⁸See letters of Sucre to Bolívar during the month of June, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 348-366.

⁹José Vázquez-Machicado, La nacionalidad boliviana (unpublished).

¹⁰Cited by Humberto Vázquez-Machicado, La creación, op. cit.

¹¹Letters of Sucre during February through May, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

¹²Sucre to Antonio Saturnino Sánchez, La Paz, March 1, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

¹³Sucre to Carlos Antonio Ortega, La Paz, February 22, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

¹⁴" . . . me ausento de esta Ciudad y salen de ella los militares, para que la Asamblea tenga en sus deliveraciones las [sic] más amplia y absoluta libertad" (Sucre to Arenales, Chuquisaca, June 29, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 65).

¹⁵Sucre to the Governor of Oruro, Chuquisaca, June 25, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 63.

63. ¹⁶Sucre to Andres Santa Cruz, May 30, 1825 in ANB, MI, 8,

¹⁷For the names of the delegates see Republica de Bolivia, Libro mayor de sesiones de la asamblea de representantes del Alto Perú instalada en 10 de julio de 1825 (La Paz, 1926), sesión 1, p. 1; see also José Macedonio Urquidí, Compendio de la historia de Bolivia (4th ed.; Buenos Aires, 1944), 168. Those absent were Francisco Palazuela (Cochabamba), Miguel Fermín Aparicio (La Paz), Juan Manuel Velarde (La Paz), Francisco María Pinedo (La Paz), Manuel María García (Potosí), Antonio Seoane (Santa Cruz), Vicente Caballero (Santa Cruz), and Miguel Vargas (Cochabamba) or Martiniano Vargas (Potosí); the Libro mayor does not indicate first names.

¹⁸See José María Santibañes, Vida del Jeneral José Ballivian (New York, 1891), 367 pp.

¹⁹Universidad San Francisco Xavier (Sucre), Libro de secretaria en que se asientan las asistencias, y fallas de los yndividuos de la Real Carolina Academia de practicantes juristas de esta corte, . . .; ANB, ACh (Expedientes de Abogados, 1775-1825); ANB, ACh (Caja Reales de La Plata, Libros mayores de contaduria); Samuel Velasco Flor, Foro boliviano (Sucre, 1877), 3-13; Valentín Abecia, Historia de Chuquisaca (Sucre, 1939), 339-374; Luis Paz, La Universidad Mayor Real y Pontificia de San Francisco Xavier (Sucre, 1914), 390-398. The graduates of the University were: Chuquisaca, José Mariano Serrano, Casimiro Olaneta, Manuel María Urcullu, José María Dalence, Angel Mariano Moscoso; Potosí, Mamuel José Calderon, Manuel Anselmo de Tapia, Manuel Martín Cruz, Manuel Argcte, José Antonio Pallares, Mamuel María García, José Mariano Enriquez, José Ignacio de Sanjines, Rafael Monje; Cochabamba, Miguel José de Cabrera, José Mamuel Pérez, Pedro Terrazas, Melchor Paz, Nicolas de Cabrera, Manuel Mariano Centeno, Dionicio de la Borda, Manuel Cabello, Francisco Vidal; La Paz, José María Mendizábal, José María de Asín, José Indalecio Calderón y Sanginez, Eusebio Gutiérrez, Fermín Eysaguirre; Santa Cruz, Antonio Vicente Seoane, Vicente Caballero.

²⁰Libro mayor, s. 1 (July 10), 1-2.

²¹Vázquez-Machicado, La creación, op. cit.

²²G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Perú/ nuevas notas, op. cit., 658.

²³See Pinilla, Creacion, op. cit., 177.

²⁴Cf. G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Perú/ nuevas notas, op. cit., 663.

²⁵See the interesting letter of Sucre to Bolivar, Cochabamba, July 11, 1825, in O'Leary, Cartas de Sucre, op. cit., I, 371.

²⁶Libro mayor, s. l (July 10), p. 1.

²⁷See Ignacio Prudencio Bustillo, "Letras bolivianas," Kollasuyo (La Paz), v, 5 (1943), 157.

²⁸Libro mayor, s. l (July 10), 2-3; also reproduced in BSGS, XXIII-XXV, 255-267 (1925) 2d part, 95-97.

²⁹Loc. cit.

³⁰Cf. G. René-Moreno, Ultimos dias coloniales, op. cit., 9-10.

³¹Bolivia en el primer centenario ([New York], 1925), 683; cf. Academia Nacional de Bellas Artes de la Republica Argentina, Documentos de arte colonial sudamericano/ Chuquisaca (Buenos Aires, 1948) cuaderno IV, pp. xxxix-xl.

³²Mathias Terrazas to Sucre, La Plata, May 8, 1825, in ANB, MI, 1, 5 (enclosure: Lista de el coro de esta Santa Yglesia Metropolitana de Charcas).

³³Libro mayor, s. l (July 10), 4.

³⁴Loc. cit.

³⁵This speech is available in Lecuna, D, I, 283-292, but it is a faulty transcription. This author has consulted the rare Memoria que el jeneral en jefe, op. cit., available in BNB, C.R-M.

³⁶Ibid., 3.

³⁷Ibid., 10.

³⁸"Acto continuo se leyó por uno de los representantes la esposicion de la conducta política y militar del Excmo. Senor Jeneral en Jefe del Ejercito Libertador del Alto Peru, Antonio Jose de Sucre, desde que pasó el Desaguadero hasta el 30 de junio. Este hombre prodijioso, este segundo Bolivar, que hablo de los pueblos con acciones dignas de alto reconocimiento brillo mas en ese dia, que en sus expediciones belicas y se presentó, mas grande que fijando la suerte del nuevo mundo en el campo de Ayacucho! Solo ese jenio pudo decir lo que había hecho, y hacer lo que el ha dicho!" (Gaceta de Chuquisaca, no. 1) (Saturday, July 30, 1825), in BNB, C. R-M.

³⁹See Gustavo Adolfo Otero, Figuras de la cultura boliviana (Quito, 1952), 136-139.

⁴⁰I. P. Bustillo, op. cit., 157.

⁴¹Cf. Joaquín Gantier, "La mujer en el motín del 18 de abril," BSGS, XLIV, 438-440 (1952), 269-275.

⁴²Libro mayor, s. 1 (July 10), 4.

⁴³Ibid., s. 1 (July 10), 1-5.

⁴⁴Supra, n. 38.

⁴⁵Sucre to Arenales, Chuquisaca, June 29, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 65; Sucre to Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, May 30, 1825, in ANB, MI, 8, 68.

⁴⁶See Alfonso Crespo, op. cit., 64-65.

⁴⁷Francisco Pinedo (La Paz, July 11), José María Dalence (Chuquisaca, July 13), Miguel Fermín Aparicio (La Paz, July 13), in Libro mayor, s. 2 and 3 (July 11, 13), 7-8.

⁴⁸Ibid., s. 2 (July 11), 6.

⁴⁹See Pinilla, Creación, op. cit., 184.

⁵⁰Libro mayor, s. 2 (July 11), 6-7.

⁵¹See G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Perú/ nuevas notas, op. cit., 667; Alcides Arguedas, La fundación de la república (La Paz, 1920), 279.

⁵²Libro mayor, s. 4 (July 18), 11.

⁵³Loc. cit.

⁵⁴"Estos dos colosos de la Asamblea, Serrano y Olañeta" (Pinilla, Creación, op. cit., 189).

⁵⁵Libro mayor, s. 4 (July 18), 11.

⁵⁶Cf. Pinilla, Creación, op. cit., 189.

⁵⁷Cf. loc. cit.

⁵⁸See Carlos Montenegro, Nacionalismo y coloniaje (2d ed.; La Paz, 1943), 48.

⁵⁹Gaceta de Chuquisaca, no. 2 (Saturday, August 6, 1825).

⁶⁰Vázquez-Machicado, La Creación, op. cit.

- ⁶¹Gaceta de Chuquisaca, no. 2, op. cit.
- ⁶²See Libro mayor, s. 4 (July 18), 11-12, partially reproduced in Pinilla, Creacion, op. cit., 188.
- ⁶³Libro mayor, s. 5 (July 21), p. 13-14.
- ⁶⁴Arguedas, op. cit., 283.
- ⁶⁵Cf. Pinilla, Creación, op. cit., 190.
- ⁶⁶See Arnade, "Una figura mediocre," op. cit., 85; see Agustín Iturricha, Historia de Bolivia bajo la administración del Mariscal Andrés Santa Cruz (Sucre, 1920), 203.
- ⁶⁷Libro mayor, s. 6 (July 22), 15-17.
- ⁶⁸G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Perú/ nuevas notas, op. cit., 658.
- ⁶⁹(Madrid, 1919), 147-148, 206-208, 313-315.
- ⁷⁰Cf. Pinilla, Creación, op. cit., 191.
- ⁷¹Sucre to J. M. Serrano, Chuquisaca, June 30, [1825] (enclosure missing), in ANB, MI, 8, 61.
- ⁷²Gunnar Mendoza, Pedro Vicente Cañete . . . (Sucre, 1954), 22.
- ⁷³Juan del Pino Manrique, Informe reservado . . . edited by G. René-Moreno in Revista Chilena, VIII (1877), 207-234.
- ⁷⁴G. René-Moreno, "El Alto-Peru en 1783," in Revista Chilena, VIII (1877), 206.
- ⁷⁵Libro mayor, s. 7 (July 23), 18-21.
- ⁷⁶See Pinilla, Creación, op. cit., 192-194.
- ⁷⁷"El discurso de Montoya, representante de Potosí, revela una vision bastante clara de lo que podriamos llamar la realidad internacional de entonces" (Vázquez-Machicado, La creacion, op. cit.).
- ⁷⁸Charles W. Arnade, "La creación de Bolivia," in Nuevo Mundo (La Paz) (August-September, 1953), 22.
- ⁷⁹Libro mayor, s. 8 (July 28), 21-24.

⁸⁰Bolivia en el centenario de su independencia, op. cit., 410;
Pinilla, Creación, op. cit., 178.

⁸¹Libro mayor, s. 8 (July 28), 23-24.

⁸²Republica de Bolivia, Libro menor de sesiones secretas . . .
(La Paz, n. d.), s. 1 (August 1), 1-3.

⁸³See Libro mayor, s. 9, 10, 11 (August 1, 3, 4), 26-31.

⁸⁴Libro mayor, s. 10 (August 3), 29-30.

⁸⁵Libro mayor, s. 11 (August 4), 31-33.

⁸⁶See G. René-Moreno, Bolivia y Perú/ nuevas notas, op. cit.,
65-68.

⁸⁷Loc. cit.

⁸⁸See Pinilla, Creación, op. cit., 197-201.

⁸⁹"Relacion de meritos y servicios del Coronel don Antonio Seoane de los Santos," AGI (Seville), Audiencia de Charcas, 582 (E. 121, C. 2, L. 15), as cited by Vázquez-Machicado, La creación, op. cit., n. 118.

⁹⁰See Arnade, "A Sojourn," op. cit., 66.

⁹¹See Pinilla, Creación, op. cit., 198.

⁹²"Sensiblemente para la historia, el Libro Mayor de sesiones de la famosa asamblea, no registra los discursos integros de los oradores, sino extractos demasiado cortos, que no dan lugar a juzgar las piezas oratorias en su verdadero mérito" (Agustin Iturricha, "El doctor José Mariano Serrano," BSGS, XXXI, 327-332 (1937), 35.

⁹³Vazquez-Machicado, La creación, op. cit.

⁹⁴Pinilla, Creación, op. cit., 199; Paz, Historia, II, 671;
Arguedas, Fundación, op. cit., 287.

⁹⁵Vazquez-Machicado, La Creación, op. cit.

⁹⁶In Lecuna, D, II, 292-297.

⁹⁷BB, 458, 119.

⁹⁸Loc. cit.

⁹⁹Loc. cit.; Cf. Carlos Romero, "Gabriel René-Moreno," Gesta Barbara (Potosí), segunda época, vol. V, no. 10 (November, 1926), 1.

¹⁰⁰Lecuna, D, I, 295-296

¹⁰¹Luis Terán Gómez, "La emancipación política del Alto Perú," Revista Militar (La Paz), no. 154 (1950), 129.

¹⁰²Loc. cit.

¹⁰³C. Olaneta to Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, November 11, 1829, in personal archive of Andres Santa Cruz (La Paz).

¹⁰⁴Loc. cit.

¹⁰⁵C. Olaneta to Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, December 11, 1829, in personal archive of Andres Santa Cruz (La Paz).

¹⁰⁶Folletos escogidos de Casimiro Olaneta, op. cit., 77-78.

¹⁰⁷Signed: Casimiro Olaneta, La Paz, June 3, 1838, 3 pp., in BNB, C. R-M.

¹⁰⁸Desarrollo del pensamiento político en Bolivia (La Paz, 1953), 53.

¹⁰⁹Nacionalism, op. cit., 52.

¹¹⁰Vázquez-Machicado, La creación, op. cit.

¹¹¹Montenegro, op. cit., 52.

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¹¹³BB, 458, 119.

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 - 4. Colección de periódicos bolivianos.
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 - b. Expedientes de abogados y practicantes juristas.
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 - 3. Archivo del Ministerio de Guerra.
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(copies supplied by Humberto Vázquez-Machicado)

II Archival Essay

Most all of the work for this study was done in Bolivian archives which possess an abundance of material that defies description, but unfortunately is badly preserved and practically unorganized.

The most important document depository is the Biblioteca y Archivo Nacional de Bolivia. This archive is a splendid one, and is directed by an extremely competent man. Unfortunately he lacks the help of a trained staff which is well versed in archival and library sciences. Yet they make up for this lack of technical training by their enthusiasm and the friendly attention they give to visitors. Although there is one director for both the Library and the Archive, both sections, under Bolivian law, are independent of each other, but they are located in the same building.

In the Biblioteca Nacional this author used mostly the splendid Colección Gabriel René-Moreno which takes up practically the whole library, and is its greatest component. A complete description of this collection, listing each item with excellent comments, is available in Gabriel René-Moreno, Biblioteca boliviana: catálogo de la sección

de libros i folletos (Santiago de Chile, 1879), 880 pp.; Gabriel René-Moreno, Primer suplemento a la biblioteca boliviana; epítome de un catálogo de libros y folletos, 1879-1899 (Santiago de Chile, 1900), 349 pp.; Gabriel René-Moreno, Segundo suplemento a la biblioteca boliviana: libros y folletos, 1900-1908 (Santiago de Chile, 1908), 348pp.

Everything cited in these bibliographic guides is part of the René-Moreno Collection, with the exception of several items that are missing. An additional guide to supplement some works not listed by René-Moreno is available in Valentín Abecia, Adiciones a la biblioteca boliviana de Gabriel René-Moreno (Santiago de Chile, 1899), 440 pp. A great part of the René-Moreno library is his splendid newspaper collection which is listed in Gabriel René-Moreno, Ensayo de una bibliografía general de periódicos de Bolivia, 1825-1905 (Santiago de Chile, 1905), 336 pp. All the newspapers cited are available in this collection with the exception of the rarest newspaper, El Condor de Bolivia. For more information about the René-Moreno Collection the monograph by Gunnar Mendoza, Gabriel René-Moreno, bibliógrafo boliviano (Sucre, 1954), 76 pp., should be consulted. Two items not listed in the guides were used by the author in this study. Of these the six volumes entitled Prensa argentina/ extractos sobre Bolivia y Bolívar (handwritten) which René-Moreno collected with the intention of writing a study entitled "Bolívar y Bolivia," were of invaluable help. Strangely, no one knew of the existence of these manuscripts and they were located by this author. The other manuscript collection not noted is entitled Manuscritos de Chuquisaca, 1624-1908, and contains miscellaneous documents that René-Moreno possessed and had used in his research. They do

not deal with any particular topic.

The next most valuable collection for this study in the National Library was the Colección Ernesto Ruck, which is mostly miscellaneous manuscript material which Mr. Ruck, a German who became the first director of the Bolivian Archive, had gathered as his own personal collection. This depository is much smaller and is contained in a showcase without any definite organization. The manuscripts do not pertain to any specific subject. Seemingly Mr. Ruck acquired whatever he felt was rare, without any intention of using it for a research project. The documents are listed in Biblioteca de Ernesto O. Ruck/ catálogo (Lima, 1898), 72 pp. (rare). Most of the material listed in the guide is available in the Ruck Collection, with some minor exceptions. Some manuscripts are not listed in the catálogo. For example, the fascinating diary of Tambor Vargas was located in the Ruck library.

Another collection used incidentally was that of the Bolivian biographer, Velasco Flor, entitled Manuscritos: archivo epistolar de Samuel Velasco Flor. This reservoir is not well organized and has little to do with the topic of this study, but contains interesting information for many monographs, since Mr. Velasco Flor had a wide circle of friends with whom he maintained a vivid and forceful correspondence. No guide is available for this collection and it awaits classification.

Of much value is the collection of Bolivian newspapers from 1825 to the present, which is not part of the René-Moreno collection and which is in the process of being classified and cataloged. When finished it will complement the rich newspaper files of René-Moreno.

One of the necessary problems that the National Library faces in the future is the desired integration of its collections into one organized whole, with a single guide. For example, it would be advisable that the Renó-Moreno newspaper collection and the newly cataloged newspapers should be integrated into one collection. The documents of the Renó-Moreno, Ruck and Velasco Flor Collections, and other unused reservoirs in the Library should be shifted into the National Archive, and be integrated with the manuscripts there.

In the National Archive the author used the great collection of the Audiencia of Charcas, which includes practically all the colonial records of Upper Peru. This large collection is divided into several sections, of which the largest is the Expedientes coloniales, 1552-1825, which the author used extensively. This is a "loosely designated" division and contains "not only true criminal, civil, and administrative expedientes, but also correspondence, cédulas, reports and all other kinds of documents which accumulated in the government offices." No definite or extensive index is available.

Of great use in determining the background of the turncoat Royalist leaders was the division entitled Expedientes de abogados y practicantes juristas, 1688-1825, which is the application file of students to the University of San Francisco Xavier and the graduate Carolina Academy. This collection was brought together by the director, Gunnar Mendoza, and a hastily written index is available. Other collections within the Audiencia of Charcas that were used were the Caja reales de la Plata, libro mayores de contaduría and Registro de

escrituras públicas de la ciudad de la Plata, which are mostly notary and tax records of the city of La Plata (Chuquisaca), but sometimes contain interesting information that cannot be obtained anywhere else. For a further description of these collections and others, see Juan de Zengotita, "The National Archive and the National Library of Bolivia at Sucre," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXIX (November, 1949), 649-676. This is an extremely well written and accurate article which served as a guide to this author during the first days of his stay in Sucre.

In the national period the divisions are very easy to use, due to a streamlined organization by the director. The documents are simply divided according to the administrative divisions of the government of Bolivia. As in the first years of its existence, 1825-1826, only the Ministry of Interior was organized, all documents are available in the files of the Ministerio del Interior. Later the Ministerio de Hacienda and the Ministerio de Guerra were added. Within each ministry's files the documents are divided according to the departments, La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba, Potosí, Chuquisaca, and Santa Cruz, following a chronological order. A typewritten guide of the Ministerio del Interior was available from the director. All three divisions have been consulted. In 1953 the organization of the manuscripts of the national period had only reached the 1840's.

The author has also relied extensively on the valuable library of the Sociedad Geografica Sucre. Here he spent many days making his way through unorganized piles. The collection was severely damaged in

the 1948 earthquake and since that time had never been reorganized or used. No description or catalog was available. The most valuable piece in this library is the complete file of El Condor de Bolivia, which is not available in the National Library or any other place in Bolivia. In his search and research in the Society, the author had some unusual experiences. No one knew where El Condor had been put after the earthquake, and after an intensive search the author located it in a glass box underneath a skull. When he lifted the skull he nearly dropped from surprise, since an attached card read that it was the skull of Casimiro Olañeta, which sometime in the past had been donated to the Society. The present members of the Society had lost track of this interesting historical relic of the great dos caras. Another day a beautiful little metal box caught the author's attention. He had a hard time opening it, expecting to find an interesting treasure. When he finally opened it he was disappointed, since it was filled with ashes. Underneath the ashes was a card saying that these were the remains of Jose Mariano Serrano. Seemingly no one in the Society knew that they possessed the ashes of Serrano and they congratulated the author for having found the remains of the great Serrano, intellectual father of Bolivia.

The rich collection of the University of San Francisco Xavier was opened to this researcher only in the last months of his stay in Sucre. Before that it was closed to the public, and the librarian had been exiled by the government and had taken the keys with him. When it was opened again it was found in a state of complete confusion and

disorganization, but the University appointed two able men to catalog it. Most of the library is composed of the private collections of two late citizens of Sucre, Messrs. Abecia and Arana, who were collectors of rare items. No catalog is available, but Abecia's Adiciones, op. cit., is nearly all in the library. Most of the material is duplicated in the National Library. The author used some volumes of the Libros de secretaría en que se asientan las asistencias, y fallas de los individuos de la Real Carolina Academia de practicantes juristas de esta corte. He could locate only the records from June 22, 1813 to September 25, 1819. Unquestionably the missing records are available in some obscure corner and by now probably have been located. These attendance records proved valuable in determining which of the founders of Bolivia attended the University and graduate Academy. In the last days of his stay in Sucre the author located in the rector's office some valuable unorganized and miscellaneous documents, which were mostly unknown letters to and from Sucre. Nobody knew from where they came or that they had been there.

The church records of Santo Domingo were used only in order to copy the birth certificate of Casimiro Olañeta, which Dr. Mendoza had earlier located.

The personal archive of Mr. Santa Cruz in La Paz constitutes one of the most splendid collections this author has seen. Mr. Santa Cruz estimates that he has six to seven thousand documents that pertain to his distinguished forefather. Most of the material is family property, but Mr. Santa Cruz, in order to complement this, has been preoccupied

with acquiring originals or good copies of all material that concerns the Marshal. Unquestionably this is a great archive and no history of Santa Cruz and his time can ever be written without consulting it. Mr. Santa Cruz has compiled two excellent guides in which each one of the documents is listed according to chronology: Lista alfabética, índice alfabético cronológico de cartas y oficios del Mariscal Andrés de Santa Cruz (originales, borradores, copiadores . . .); Lista alfabética . . . de cartas y oficios al Mariscal Andres de Santa Cruz . . . (typewritten).

In the library of the University of San Andres in La Paz some interesting miscellaneous manuscripts are available. Most of these cover the year 1828. They are well preserved, thanks to the director, Humberto Vázquez-Machicado, and an excellent guide, Catalogo cronologico de documentos manuscritos (typewritten), provides a good description of each document.

In Cochabamba, Bolivia's second largest city and most thriving center of the country, as well as the heart of Upper Peru, two archives are located, which apparently possess excellent material, but unfortunately are beyond the reach of the scholar. The departmental archive is in a complete state of chaos, with documents piled to the ceiling, others thrown on the floor. No one knows what is in them and no inventory has ever been taken, nor has any scholar used them. Having thumbed through some documents, the author believes that it contains highly interesting material, including some from the colonial period. But at the present research is impossible. The personal

library of the family Blanco Galindo, organized in its present form by the late General Carlos Blanco Galindo, ex-president of Bolivia, is a useful and interesting archive with some valuable material, especially of their forefathers, General León Galindo, close aide of Marshal Sucre, and General Pedro Blanco, hero of the War of Independence. Later General Blanco, in association with Casimiro Olañeta, invited the Peruvian army to enter Bolivia in 1828 and overthrow Marshal Sucre. Blanco was made president of Bolivia by his Peruvian proteges, but was killed by Bolivian patriots. The family Blanco Galindo is reluctant to let scholars do research in their library, and it is said that one of the reasons is to protect the name of General Blanco. Because of a friendship with the family the author was able to do a quick survey of the collection, but the family avoided showing him the diaries of General Blanco, which undoubtedly contain interesting information about the creation of Bolivia.

Dr. Humberto Vazquez-Machicado in La Paz was so kind as to let this author work in his splendid library, which has many books available in no other library. His many unpublished essays were of great help. He provided the author with copies of documents of the Archivo Nacional de Argentina and the Archivo General de Indias. The unpublished guide of Dr. Vázquez-Machicado's brother, the late José Vázquez-Machicado, to Upper Peruvian material in Seville is a great piece of research and should unquestionably be published.

The many archives in Bolivia will provide any scholar with a tremendous amount of material never used before by anyone.

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The author was born in Goerlitz, Germany on May 11, 1927. He spent his childhood in Germany and China, and pursued his secondary education in Switzerland and Bolivia. He came to the United States in 1946. During his freshman year he was enrolled at the University of Texas and the following year transferred to the University of Michigan. He earned his A. B. and M. A. degrees at the latter institution. In Ann Arbor he held the positions of Assistant Foreign Student Advisor and later Researcher at the William Clements Library of American History. Previous to this he worked in all kinds of odd jobs to support his studies.

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This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee and has been approved by all members of the committee. It was submitted to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council and was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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